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Stratification and Meritocracy in the US
Larry J. Griffin and Arne L. Kalleberg

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EDITORIAL NOTE

This is the last issue which will appear under the present Editorship. My successor as Editor will be Percy Cohen, who will assume the post in October 1981. During his leave of absence the Editorship will be in the joint hands of the in-coming Associate Editor, Chris Badcock, and the out-going Associate Editor, Leslie Sklair. I should like to express my thanks to all those who contributed to the running of the Journal during my Editorship, particularly the successive Journal Secretaries.

Angus Stewart

Larry J. Griffin and Arne L. Kalleberg

Stratification and meritocracy in the United States: class and occupational recruitment patterns*

ABSTRACT

It has been argued that achievement in the United States is governed by 'meritocratic' processes. In this paper we examine a number of aspects of this thesis. We argue that previous researchers have failed to sufficiently demonstrate the validity of the 'meritocratic' thesis because they have restricted their focus to occupation and have not considered the processes allocating people to unequally rewarded class positions. We first identify six class positions: employers, managers, technocrats, supervisors, semi-autonomous employees and proletarian workers. We then examine the mechanisms by which men are allocated into these class positions. We find that men are not generally sorted into class positions on the basis of 'meritocratic' criteria, at least as we measured these variables in this paper. This conclusion holds for a variety of equation specifications and for a number of data sets. We finally indicate the implications of our findings for discussions concerning the degree of meritocracy in the United States.

INTRODUCTION

Analysis and criticism of inequality in advanced capitalist societies have centred on two distinct, but quite related, phenomena: *positional* differences in levels of rewards and *recruitment* or *allocation* into these unequally rewarded positions.[1] Social democratic efforts to modify the stratification structures of Western European capitalist nations confronted the first aspect of inequality in an attempt to reduce the absolute level of positional inequality. Parkin labels such reform attempts 'egalitarian critiques' of stratification.[2] Successful reform movements in the United States, on the other hand, have not attacked the legitimacy of positional inequalities but, instead, have

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attempted to make allocative mechanisms more 'fair' by purging such processes of their ascriptive elements. This, states Parkin, is the 'meritocratic critique' of stratification.[3] Indeed, the perceived or actual 'equality of opportunity' and the high probability of social advancement in the United States were noted by Sombart over seventy years ago as important reasons for the failure of left-wing parties or programmes to gain mass support in that country.[4]

Certainly socio-economic achievement in the U.S. has long been characterized (at least for white males) as a meritocratic phenomenon; that is, as a process largely determined by an individual's ability, effort, motivation, and, above all, educational credentials and technical skills.[5] At least four structural tendencies of the American economy suggest the plausibility – even utility – of a meritocratic basis of stratification in the United States. First, advanced industrial societies, such as the U.S., are often identified as 'knowledge-intensive', with economies characterized by a shift from extractive and manufacturing to service industries and the generation, processing, and dissemination of theoretical knowledge and technical expertise.[6] Second, the control of private business firms is no longer identical with their ownership.[7] Third, production and service organizations are increasingly bureaucratized, and functions within them more specialized and professionalized.[8] Finally, the public sector has grown dramatically relative to the private sector, and state management of the economy (including the private sector) approaches a reality.[9]

These processes have led some observers to conclude that capital and property are of reduced importance as components of the class structure and that stratification is rooted predominantly in occupational differences in skill, knowledge, and expertise.[10] Given these societal characteristics, then, it is hardly surprising that differential advantages are presumed to be conferred not upon the heirs of the propertied but upon those highly educated and technically trained individuals who can best perform complex and skilled technical and managerial functions in capitalist and state bureaucracies. Hence, a meritocratic system of stratification is assumed to be functional in that it represents an efficient method to identify, develop, and exploit scarce human resources. While many of the assumptions embedded in this argument are dubious or untested,[11] the view that schooling or, more generally, labour market skill is decisive in situating white males in the occupational hierarchy and in affecting their earnings is extensively documented.[12] Featherman and Hauser, moreover, present evidence suggesting that the selection and sorting functions of formal education have become even more salient in the very recent past, thus reinforcing the meritocratic interpretation of stratification in the United States.[13]

While we find these theoretical and empirical observations insightful,

we argue that research has yet to demonstrate sufficiently the validity of the meritocratic image of achievement even in the supposedly most 'open' of all societies, the United States.[14] We have no quarrel with Blau and Duncan's[15] exposition of the meritocratic principle, which tends to equate occupational differentiation with stratification and occupational achievement with the 'process of stratification':

> . . . a fundamental trend toward expanding universalism characterizes industrial society . . .[16]
> Heightened universalism has profound implications for the stratification system. The achieved status of a man . . . becomes more important than his ascribed status, who he is in the sense of what family he comes from. Education assumes increasing significance.[17]
> . . . According to these speculations . . . the structural conditions in our industrialized society governed by universalistic principles . . . are the causes of its high rate of occupational mobility.[18]

What we do question is the implicit assumption that the demonstration of a strong education-occupation linkage is, in and of itself, sufficient to label socio-economic achievement processes in the United States as meritocratic or, in Blau and Duncan's terminology, 'universalistic.' We suggest that research is inconclusive because occupation is the only structural position generally considered in achievement studies. An adequate assessment of the meritocracy hypothesis requires the examination of the processes governing the recruitment of individuals into other structural positions, notably locations within the class structure (which we define in terms of the social relations of production – see discussion below). In order to incorporate class differences into the study of socio-economic achievement processes, then, we focus in this paper on those mechanisms which allocate people into various positions in the social relations of production. Before describing the details of the present study, we will briefly discuss its underlying rationale.

Class and Achievement In advanced capitalist nations, occupational differentiation is, indeed, quite important as a basis of stratification. One's location in the occupational structure is known to affect a variety of desired outcomes, from economic life chances to prestige and social psychological well-being. Neither the undeniable consequences of occupational differentiation, nor the structural changes or tendencies discussed above, however, obviate the reality that the United States remains a capitalist nation, with private ownership of the means of production, extensive buying and selling of labour power as a commodity, hierarchical organizational structures, and capital accumulation as a basic force driving the economy.[19] All are core attributes of capitalism as a *class* system.[20] The importance

of this for our purposes here is that occupation represents but one structural position in the capitalist social organization of work. Conceptually distinct from occupation is class, which represents *control* relations within the social organization of production.[21] Recent research by Wright, Kalleberg and Griffin and Robinson and Kelley, moreover, shows that class – operationalized in a manner consistent with an emphasis on property and control – exerts an influence independent of occupation on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary job rewards.[22]

These considerations suggest that the identification of achievement patterns in contemporary America as meritocratic is premature or, possibly, misleading. Focusing almost exclusively on occupational placement, a strategy consistent with the 'post-industrial' or 'post-capitalist' emphasis on technical activity, expertise, and knowledge, allocation/achievement studies have yet to examine those processes governing the sorting and selection of individuals into particular classes. We simply do not know the degree to which education and/or other acquired skills affect this particular allocation process. Likewise, we do not have systematic evidence on the degree to which status origins, class background, social networks, 'inheritance', and the like are implicated in the recruitment of individuals into entrepreneurial or managerial positions. Research by Mills and Domhoff, among others, suggests that these non-meritocratic criteria are indeed salient, but their inferences apply only to a small group of uniquely powerful and wealthy individuals who are hardly representative of the American labour force.[23]

Given the paucity of systematic research on this issue, then, our objective in this paper is to evaluate the importance of schooling, and other types of marketable skills, for placing white males into classes and to compare these effects with those registered for occupations. If we find that recruitment patterns into class positions are roughly similar to those observed for occupational positions, the case for a meritocratic interpretation of achievement is strengthened. On the other hand, if these processes are observed to be strongly divergent, especially with respect to the importance of schooling and technical training, a meritocratic explanation becomes less tenable or, minimally, one to be limited to the (admittedly important) occupational sphere.

DATA AND VARIABLES

The sample Most of the analyses to be reported here are based on survey data for a national sample of young adult men who, as high school sophomores in 1955, participated in an Educational Testing Service (ETS) survey of students and who also responded to a 1970

follow-up (designated 'Explorations in Equality of Opportunity', or EEO). More detailed descriptions of the ETS schools and ETS/EEO sampling procedures are available elsewhere.[24] Our analyses with these data use the 714 white male civilian labour force participants who have complete information on all current occupational and class variables. The EEO survey excludes blacks entirely and included too few working women. This sample is uniquely rich in information on status origins, academic ability, schooling and labour market experiences, class variables, and labour market outcomes. It is national in scope and most variables 'operate' similarly to those contained in more representative samples and/or to those more precisely measured in other surveys.[25] The EEO data are nonetheless subject to at least three limitations which could lead to artifactual results: (1) the sample is *not* representative of the employed civilian labour force, (2) it is restricted to a single cohort of relatively young men, all of whom were approximately 30 years old in 1970, and (3) some of the dimensions of class can be measured with only marginal success. In view of these limitations, we also utilize data from two other social surveys, the Quality of Employment Survey (QES) and the Survey of Working Conditions (SWC), both of which are nationally representative samples of the employed civilian labour force. We also reanalyze correlation matrices presented by Robinson and Kelley[26] and Kluegel.[27] Robinson and Kelley's sample, from the 1973, 1974 and 1976 General Social Surveys (GSS), consisted of men employed full-time. Kluegel analyzed a representative sample of all males from Wisconsin between the ages of 20 and 65 years old.

It should be emphasized that all of these surveys are subject to various limitations. The QES and SWC, for example, contain no data on the respondents' socio-economic backgrounds. The GSS, like the EEO survey, is not representative of the employed civilian labour force; and the Wisconsin survey is limited to a single state. Moreover, only the EEO data contain information on academic ability and on training opportunities other than formal schooling and work experience. Despite these limitations, however, analyses of data from all these surveys, taken together, should provide a reasonably accurate representation of the class and occupational recruitment patterns of U.S. men circa 1970.

CONCEPTS AND MEASURES

Occupation Theoretically, occupations are positions in a technical division of labour which perform similar tasks and which have similar training and skill requirements.[28] The most widely used indicator of occupational position is, of course, Duncan's 'socio-economic index' (hereafter labelled *STATUS*).[29] As is widely known, STATUS is a

linear function of the average educational attainment and average income of occupational incumbents. Because of the possible methodological dependency between an individual's own educational attainment and occupational status, a factor of obvious importance for the issues raised above, some researchers prefer a measure of occupational standing which is, at least in principle and in index construction, independent of a respondent's education. Occupational *PRESTIGE* is one such widely used indicator.[30] We use both measures in this paper, but neither may be the most appropriate measure of those attributes of occupations that generate different routines and training requirements, a point also noted by Duncan.[31] Horan, moreover, has argued that the use of occupational status or prestige scales suggests an implicit functionalist bias.[32] Because of these problems, we also employ four other measures of occupational position. First, we use a set of five indicators developed by the US Department of Labor to measure the complexity and skill levels of occupations, operationalizations much more consistent with our theoretical definition of occupation. Occupational *COMPLEXITY* is measured by a weighted summation of the ratings of the complexity of involvement with data, people and things. Occupational *SKILL* is indexed by ratings assessing the relative cognitive development (General Educational Development scores) and relative training time (Specific Vocational Preparation scores) necessary to adequately perform the occupational activity.[33] Finally, in the tradition of the classic mobility studies, which emphasize the 'discreteness' of the occupational structure,[34] we use manual-nonmanual and 'professional-other' dichotomies.[35] All of these indicators are transformations of the detailed 1970 Census occupational titles.

Class Classes represent positions within the social relations of production and, in capitalist nations at least, are characterized by power and control differentials emanating from ownership and authority roles in the social organization of work. While no agreement exists as to precise class boundaries, or even as to which dimensions constitute the major sources of class differentiation, there is an emerging consensus among some Marxists[36] and non-Marxists[37] that classes can be fruitfully conceptualized and operationalized in terms of a variety of control relations – over property (and hence, investments, physical resources, etc.), over the labour power of others, over production decisions (i.e., what is produced and how it is produced), and over one's own labour power. We may label the concepts underlying these dimensions of control as, respectively, PROPERTY, SUPERVISION, AUTHORITY (actually, non-hierarchical authority or technical specialization or expertise – see Thompson's[38] discussion of the distinction between this dimension of authority and authority over others or supervision), and AUTONOMY.

A position may be associated with a combination of these types of control (e.g., employers own property, supervise others, exercise authority, and are relatively autonomous), but some combinations may be logically inconsistent or empirically rare (e.g., non-autonomous owners). The specific questions used to measure these concepts are contained in the appendix.

Previous empirical research employing this general perspective used only a few of these concepts, generally property and supervision.[39] In this paper, we extend this research by incorporating all four dimensions of control into our conceptualization of class boundaries. Our task is facilitated by Wright's theoretical discussion of class boundaries in advanced capitalist societies. In *Class, Crisis, and the State*, Wright identifies ten classes (or 'contradictory locations' between classes), groups which are defined by their possession of, or exclusion from, certain types of control.[40] By slightly modifying Wright's schema, and merging it with available data, we are able to delineate six classes: small employers, managers, technocrats, supervisors, semi-autonomous employees, and the proletariat. (We were also able to identify a seventh group, the petty bourgeoisie, but there were too few of them to permit meaningful analysis.) Employers both own the means of production and control the labour of others; they comprise 6.6 percent of the EEO sample. Managers, like the remaining groups, do not own productive property, but they do exercise authority *and* supervise others (37.3 percent of the sample). Technocrats, on the other hand, are denied supervisory responsibilities but do participate in some organizational decision-making and, hence, exercise authority (10.6 percent of the sample). Supervisors simply monitor the performance of workers and transmit decisions made by others (18.1 percent of the sample) – they do not directly exercise authority over the production process. Semi-autonomous employees exercise no control except over their own labour power (9.4 percent of the sample). That is, they do not participate in decision-making or supervise others, but they do enjoy considerable discretion within the confines of their work roles. The proletariat, our final group, are denied even this vestige of control; indeed, they are defined by their lack of any type of control (18.2 percent of the sample). These are the classes which we will use throughout most of this paper. (Unfortunately, only the EEO sample contains the information necessary to operationalize all of these groups and, therefore, most of our analyses are limited to this survey.)

Admittedly, our schema may be somewhat limited, but its development was guided by a number of considerations. Theoretically, we wanted to identify enough classes so as to approximate the complexity of the class structure in contemporary America, while simultaneously ensuring that we did not trivialize the meaning of class by conjuring up a plethora of groups. Empirically, we desired a model

of class differentiation which exhibited maximum explanatory power but which remained statistically parsimonious. Finally, we wanted to operationalize, within the constraints imposed by data, Wright's[41] conceptualization. We did experiment with a variety of categorizations, but none represented improvements and several were distinct failures. Considering all of the above criteria, our class categories appear to represent the most judicious use of extant theory and these data.

Achieved Skills We use the term 'achieved skills' as a general concept to refer to labour market resources or skills *achieved* by the individual in order to enhance his marketability. This is similar to Giddens' notion of 'market capacity', where educational or technical qualifications are emphasized.[42] Schools, of course, are one arena in which individuals may acquire the skills and training necessary for career advancement and success, but it is only one institutional setting providing such training. Labour market experience, on-the-job training, vocational education, and military service are just a few of the many possible non- or post-schooling activities known to influence adult attainment in the labour market.[43] In order to evaluate the importance of a variety of (or proxies for) labour market skills, we use four indicators of 'achieved skills' in this paper (these are available in the EEO survey only).[44] *Educational attainment* is indexed both by the number of years of schooling completed and by a series of dummy variables representing education certification levels. Labour force experience is measured by two variables: number of years of *work experience* after the termination of formal schooling, but before entry into present job; and the number of years in the present job after termination of academic schooling (hereafter, labelled *job tenure*).[45] Finally, three types of *technical training* were obtained from self-reported training experiences: (a) on-the-job training; (b) apprenticeship; and (c) company training programme. Other types of training, which ranged from correspondence school to military service, did not affect any of the outcomes studied here and, thus, were excluded from the final analysis. We use a composite index of technical training, constructed by summing the three training items, though we did perform all analyses to be reported here with the separate items and our substantive conclusions remain unchanged. These variables measure one aspect of what we mean by meritocratic criteria, but we noted above that the concept of meritocracy also implies ability. Fortunately, the EEO survey contains an indicator of academic *ability*, a 20-item test administered by ETS during the 1955 survey and we also use this measure. Later, we discuss the consequences of expanding our measurement of meritocratic variables beyond those discussed here.

Status Origins We use five background status indicators in this paper: (a) mother's education; (b) father's education; (c) father's occupation while the respondent was in high school, coded in the Duncan SEI metric;[46] (d) parental income while the respondent was in high school; and (e) a 13-item factor-weighted 'acquisition' index of possessions in the respondent's high school household. All of the above descriptions of variables pertain only to the EEO data. The variables contained in the other data sets are described later in the text.

ANALYSIS

Class, Occupation, and Achievement Before proceeding to the central issues discussed above, we first present some evidence on two very strong assumptions implicit in this paper: (1) class and occupation represent distinct positions in the organization of production and neither is derivable from the other; and (2) class, as we have conceptualized and operationalized it here, generates inequalities in job rewards which are independent of the influence of status origins, job skills *and* occupational status. The data presented in panel A of Table I bear upon the first of these issues. We see that no indicator of occupational position is reducible to any class component; this is true even for those dimensions of class which most resemble the theoretical definition of occupation as a technical activity, i.e., authority and autonomy. In addition, we note that the *maximum* possible correlations between *any* representation of Census titles and our indicators of class are, at best, modest. The coefficients presented in the last row of panel A represent the total amount of variation in class components which lies between *any and all* detailed Census occupational titles. These statistics, obtained from a one-way analysis of variance, suggest that between one-half and two-thirds of the variation in authority, property, supervisory status, and autonomy lies *within* — rather than between — Census occupational titles and no transformation of Census categories will improve upon the 'fit' between class and occupation.[47]

It could be argued, of course, that the lack of a strong relationship between class and occupation is simply a measurement artifact, owing to the fact that the class components are directly assessed (that is, based on data concerning the respondent's own job), while occupational attributes are assigned to respondents based on their 1970 Census titles. Differences in levels of aggregation, then, may mask a much higher 'true' correlation. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, we present correlations between class indicators and respondents' assessments of the complexity of their *unique work roles* in the next to last row of panel A (labelled 'Job Complexity').[48]

TABLE I

PANEL A. *Relationships Between Indicators of Class Position and Indicators of Occupational Position, EEO Data (N = 714)*

	Class Components[a]					
	Property	Supervise	Authority (scale)	Authority (dummy)	Autonomy (scale)	Autonomy (dummy)
Status	.031	.199	.296	.252	.311	.280
Prestige	.048	.151	.274	.242	.305	.275
Complexity	.124	.250	.400	.322	.301	.268
Skill	.068	.271	.319	.293	.312	.275
Non-Manual[b]	.060	.218	.295	.246	.250	.219
Professional[b]	−.049	.029	.101	.080	.190	.179
Managerial (occupation)	.191	.301	.273	.228	.101	.076
Job Complexity	.125	.280	.425	.345	.362	.303
1970 Census Occ. Titles	.364	.469	.457	.392	.416	.379

PANEL B. *Occupational Composition of Classes*

	Classes					
Occupations	Employers	Managers	Supervisors	Technocrats	Semi-autonomous Employees	Proletariat
Professional	21.7%	39.0%	36.5%	43.2%	43.1%	20.1%
Managerial	45.7%	28.8%	15.9%	6.8%	1.5%	2.3%
Clerical/Sales	10.9%	9.1%	8.7%	14.9%	13.8%	14.0%
Craft	8.7%	17.4%	23.0%	16.2%	24.6%	26.4%
Semi-skilled/ Unskilled[c]	6.5%	4.5%	14.3%	16.2%	16.9%	34.1%
Farm	6.5%	1.1%	1.6%	2.7%	—	2.3%

[a]The entries in Panel A are correlation coefficients except the last row, which contains squared etas.

[b]0–1 dummy variables.

[c]Includes operatives, labourers, service workers, and farm labourers.

These correlations, which are based on occupational information obtained at the same level of aggregation as the class indicators, are quite modest and suggest, once again, the small degree of empirical overlap between the two concepts. The occupational distributions of the various classes (see panel B) reinforce this point. A craftsman, for example, has a reasonable probability of being a member of any of the six classes. Regardless of how occupational differentiation is measured, then, it is a poor proxy for class.

We will now present evidence that class independently affects the distribution of both economic and intrinsic rewards. Table II presents the reward advantages of being an incumbent of any non-proletariat class. That is, the coefficients assess the degree to which any of the

TABLE II *Class effects on job rewards, EEO data (N = 714)*[a]

	Annual earnings		*Fulfillment*	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Employers	$4995*	3792*	2.48*	2.19*
Managers	1799*	935**	2.18*	1.93*
Supervisors	1010**	43	.634*	.40**
Technocrats	1660*	981	2.11*	1.92*
Semi-autonomous	−11	−371	1.56*	1.42*
	$\bar{X} = 11520$		$\bar{X} = 9.53$	
	S.D. = 5044		S.D. = 1.79	

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .15$

[a] The entries are deviations from the unadjusted mean job reward of the suppressed class category, proletariat.

(1) Equation includes only the five classes.

(2) Equation includes paternal occupational status and education, maternal education, the acquisitions index, parental income, academic ability, education, work experience, job tenure, technical training, and occupational status.

five classes are more highly rewarded than the proletariat class. We note, in particular, the large earnings gaps between employers and the other classes and the significant differences between all classes exercising any control and the proletariat in fulfillment, our indicator of intrinsic job rewards.[49] Importantly, many of these class-based inequalities are observed whether or not we control for differences in achieved skills, status origins and ability, and occupational status (see column 2). Elsewhere we present detailed interpretations of similar results based on a cruder operationalization of class and discuss possible explanations of these findings.[50] Briefly, we believe these inequalities stem from differences in control over the economic surplus produced by the enterprise (which is most beneficial for employers and, less dramatically so, for managers) and over the definition and structuring of work tasks (which is most detrimental to the proletariat).

It may be of some interest to compare the explanatory power of class and occupational status, the latter, of course, being the most commonly used measure of structural position by allocation researchers. After first entering all variables contained in column 2 of Table II, *including* occupational status, in regression equations, class 'uniquely' explains 3.6 percent and 20.0 percent of the variation in earnings and fulfillment, respectively (both increments to R^2 are significant at $p < .01$). Occupational status, on the other hand, explains no additional variation in earnings and less than 1 percent of the inequality in fulfillment when added to equations containing all the control variables and the class categories. Class, therefore, appears to be a stronger predictor of inequality in *both* job rewards (though particularly fulfillment); these statistics indicate that traditional allocation studies ignore a positional variable (e.g., class) of considerable theoretical *and* empirical importance.

Class Recruitment Processes That class membership only loosely relates to occupational membership and produces inequalities in pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards naturally leads to the question we raised earlier: are recruitment processes into class positions based on such meritocratic criteria as educational qualifications, technical training, ability and/or skills obtained through work experience? The results obtained from investigations of occupational placement provide a baseline from which meaningful comparisons in allocative processes may be made. For the men analyzed here, we estimated regression equations in which several indicators of occupational placement were specified to depend on status origins, ability, and years of schooling completed. While some differences in the relative efficacy of status origins and schooling are observed depending on the indicator used, all analyses suggest the same general conclusion (see Table III): only academic schooling registers a pronounced positive influence on current occupational placement (and this represents a conservative estimate of the education effect; see footnote 44). These coefficients are hardly surprising, though our analyses with occupational categories indexing the upper levels of the occupational hierarchy (non-manual and, especially, professional) and with occupational complexity and skill indicate that the pronounced effect of formal schooling is not simply an artifact of the occupational status or prestige measure. Moreover, this effect is not due to the use of scales based on Census titles: the coefficients presented in the last column of Table III represent the effect of the independent variables on *individual*-level job complexity. The same general pattern of influences also are evident, though somewhat less dramatically so, for this measure of occupational activity.[51] We should add, finally, that these results are not unique to these data; virtually every investigation of the relationship between schooling and occupation leads to the same conclusion.[52]

TABLE III *Regression Analyses of the Determinants of Occupational Replacement, Standardized Coefficients. EEO Sample (N = 714).*

Independent Variables	*Occupational Indicators*						
	Status	Prestige	Complexity	Skill	Non-Manual	Professional	Job Complexity
Father's Education	−.008	−.022	.039	.013	−.012	−.070	.003
Mother's Education	.044	.027	.054	.042	.056	.027	−.006
Parental Income	−.058	−.023	−.007	−.088*	.014	−.089*	.013
Father's Occupation	.079*	.072	.069	.048	.169**	.041	.116**
Acquisition Index	−.003	−.019	.010	.039	.032	−.033	.003
Ability	.032	.029	−.033	.003	.021	.054	.050
Education	.600**	.630**	.484**	.551**	.502**	.577**	.397**
R^2	.400	.441	.296	.306	.312	.343	.234

* $p \leq .1$
** $p \leq .05$

The robustness of this net schooling effect is impressive: even though we control for six modestly powerful determinants of educational attainment (over 30 percent of the variance in educational attainment is explained by status origins and ability), schooling 'uniquely' accounts for about a half of the total variance explained in each of these indicators of occupational membership. Schooling does much more than simply signal that a man has the 'right' social origins or measured ability; indeed, it allows educationally certified men partially to overcome deficients in status origins or ability and to obtain desired occupational positions independently of their social backgrounds. Considered together with the relatively minor direct importance of parental occupational status, these results strongly suggest a meritocratic basis of achievement into occupational positions, regardless of how these positions are measured.

Let us now turn to an empirical examination of the processes underlying the placement of individuals into *class* positions. Table IV presents the results of a series of regression equations in which each class category is the dependent variable.[53] Consider first the results presented in Panel A. It is quite clear that educational credentials only minimally affect recruitment of the EEO men into class positions. Neither placement into the most economically and psychologically rewarded group (the employer class), nor allocation into the second most advantaged class (managers), is heavily influenced by formal schooling. These findings contrast quite strongly with those of the occupational analyses (see Table III). The two indicators of labour force experience, job tenure and work experience, do exert a modest positive influence on placement into the employer class. One plausible explanation of these effects is that experience on other jobs may have allowed these employers – who are *small* employers rather than large capitalists – the opportunity to learn about the job and market conditions, to establish business contacts, and, of course, to accumulate the amount of capital necessary to organize a business enterprise. Experience running these businesses (i.e., job tenure) probably functions to reinforce and/or expand the business acumen of these individuals, thus ensuring the survival of the firm and the continued incumbency of these men in employer positions.[54] We also note that technical training registers a small impact on recruitment into the managerial class.

Entry into the two 'intermediate' classes, supervisors and technocrats, appears completely insensitive to any dimension of achieved skills. We do observe, however, that these indicators of labour market resources (but particularly formal schooling) lower the probability that these men will be recruited into the more disadvantaged classes – semi-autonomous employees and (especially) the proletariat. Again, however, the coefficients are rather small. In sum, we find little evidence that class recruitment processes are

TABLE IV *Regression analyses of the determinants of placement into classes, standardized coefficients. EEO survey.*

Independent Variables	Class Categories					
	Employer	Manager	Supervisor	Technocrat	Semi-Autonomous Employee	Proletariat
	Panel A. Total Sample (N = 714)					
Father's education	−.028	−.007	−.005	−.041	.001	−.003
Mother's education	.043	.035	.070	−.061	−.033	−.067
Father's occupation	.072	.078	−.096**	−.027	.014	−.029
Parental income	−.002	−.062	.152*	−.016	−.045	−.031
Acquisition index	.080	−.017	−.038	.003	.008	−.029
Ability	−.020	−.004	−.028	.031	.065	−.029
Education	.106**	.108**	.042	−.007	−.084	−.190*
Technical training	−.143*	.092**	.036	.018	.026	−.093*
Work experience	.177*	−.012	−.008	−.034	−.045	−.031
Job tenure	.176*	.014	.029	−.023	−.116*	−.055
R^2	.058	.023	.027	.006	.014	.053
R^{2a}	.058	.026	.029	.007	.018	.053
	Panel B. Capitalist Sector (N = 541)					
Father's education	−.019	.012	−.023	.046	.005	−.018
Mother's education	.044	.006	.083	−.026	.005	−.106**
Father's occupation	.083	.057	−.074	.009	−.007	−.048
Parental income	−.021	−.071	.097**	−.014	.007	.007
Acquisition index	.061	.046	−.027	−.038	−.043	−.013
Ability	−.002	−.001	−.019	.044	.049	−.044
Education	.194*	.082	−.011	.017	−.127*	−.153*
Technical training	−.204*	.104**	.049	.031	.054	.091**
Work experience	.171*	.043	−.064	−.008	−.066	−.061
Job tenure	.176*	.043	−.007	.024	−.163*	−.074

R^2	.099	.022	.022	.006	.024	.064
R^{2a}	.101	.028	.026	.010	.034	.064
	Panel C. Public Sector (N = 173)					
Father's education	—	−.056	.036	−.001	−.050	.085
Mother's education	—	.133	.037	−.123	−.152	.030
Father's occupation	—	.131	−.195**	−.101	.128	.015
Parental income	—	−.049	.327*	.007	−.168	−.145
Acquisition index	—	−.151	−.069	.149	.179	−.020
Ability	—	.041	−.108	−.015	.091	−.007
Education	—	.053	.299*	−.110	−.050	−.228*
Technical training	—	.091	.043	−.035	−.060	−.082
Work experience	—	−.155	.222*	−.018	.023	.044
Job tenure	—	−.027	.125	−.085	−.054	−.029
R^2	—	.066	.116	.038	.061	.060
R^{2a}	—	.073	.133	.043	.064	.072

[a] Non-linear specification of the effects of education.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .10$

exclusively or even pronouncedly meritocratic. The relative insensitivity of these processes to *all* variables considered here is reflected by the very small explained variation in class membership; the overwhelming bulk (94 percent to 99 percent) of the inequality in relations to power and control among these men is independent of status origins, ability, *and* labour market skills and training.

Before concluding the meritocratic criteria are not of overriding importance, however, we need to consider whether these essentially null results are simply artifacts of the peculiarities of our measurement procedures (of class and/or meritocratic influences), of the aggregated nature of our sample, of equation specification, or of the EEO data. The remainder of the analytic portion of this paper will be devoted to exploring these alternative hypotheses.

A. Operationalization and Specification Concerning potential measurement and specification problems, we explored a variety of possibilities. Even though we expanded our view of 'learning' or 'skills' to include a number of non- or post-schooling labour market experiences and training opportunities and ability[55], it could be argued that our conceptualization and measurement of labour market resources were nonetheless too limited and/or deficient to reflect salient meritocratic influences. Griffin and Alexander, for example, found that some 'within-school' resources and stratification patterns exerted a considerable impact on occupational and earnings attainments and, moreover, that such simple quantitative indices as years of schooling attained were not acceptable proxies for these influences.[56] Accordingly, we examined the importance of a number of other variables, all of which index individual motivation and performance and access to interpersonal and institutional support. These were: academic standing in high school; educational plans; educational encouragements from peers, parents and teachers; the number of mathematics and science courses taken in high school; and senior year track in high school (e.g., college-preparatory, general, and vocational). These variables had no effect on class membership (data not presented here), though we acknowledge that since our sample does not contain any respondents from elite private preparatory schools we are necessarily silent about some possible school-to-school differences.

We also assessed the possibility that the variables which are the *components* of the class categories may be sensitive to schooling, etc., but that our procedures for combining these variables into categories obscured this pattern. We evaluated this speculation by estimating a series of regression equations in which each class component was specified to depend on all antecedent variables and found no support for this hypothesis (see panel A, Table V). The components of class appear to be no more affected by meritocratic

variables (or, we should add, by background variables) than do the class categories themselves. We performed one final check on our equation specification. While the influence of the linear, continuous schooling variable was shown to be minimal, entry into particular classes may be much more dependent on categorial (i.e., non-linear) educational *certification* levels. Using a specification identical to the one contained in Tables IV and V, except that education was entered as a series of dummy variables representing certification level completed (i.e., high school, some college, college graduate, some post-graduate schooling, graduate degree), we found little evidence of strong non-linear schooling effects. The coefficients of the remaining variables were virtually identical to those presented above, as were the R^2's (see the second row of R^2's in Tables IV and V).

B. Subgroup Analysis We have thus far assumed that the determinants of entry into classes have similar effects for all respondents in the sample. Should this not, in fact, be the case, then estimates of the importance of schooling and other indicators of skill may be quite misleading, essentially confounding the importance of certain influences for some men with their triviality for other men. We address this problem in three ways.

First, we ascertained whether the EEO men worked in capitalist or public sectors and then estimated parallel class membership equations.[57] We had no expectation as to which sector (if either) would be characterized by more meritocratic processes. Issues of productivity, efficiency, and resource utilization may be more salient for the capitalist sector, owing to the dictates of market competition. Hence, this sector might rely more heavily on meritocratic criteria for allocating men into positions of control. Alternatively, the criteria for entry and/or promotion into control positions in the public sector may be more formalized and explicit, even a matter of public law, and thereby less subject to particularistic standards. Our data, however, suggest that allocation processes are quite comparable across sectors (compare panels B and C in Tables IV and V). While a few differences are observed between sectors (e.g., the influence of education for placing men into the supervisor class is much higher in the public sector) meritocratic influences – with respect both to class *and* the components of class – are once again observed to be, at best, quite modest. And, as these tables indicate, these conclusions hold whether or not the more elaborate specification of educational attainment is employed (see second row of R^2's).

Second, we assessed the possible averaging consequences of aggregation by analyzing separately college-goers. Analysis of this sub-sample affords us an opportunity to examine a number of issues associated with the meritocratic image of stratification that is not

TABLE V *Regression analyses of determinants of placement into class components, standardized coefficients. EEO survey*

Independent Variables	*Property*	*Supervise*	*Authority (scale)*	*Authority (dummy)*	*Autonomy (scale)*	*Autonomy (dummy)*
	Panel A. Total Sample (N = 714)					
Father's education	−.078	.016	−.029	.052	.006	−.010
Mother's education	.051	.093**	.050	−.012	−.032	−.043
Parental income	.025	.037	.040	−.085**	.004	−.035
Father's occupation	.054	.069	.091**	.030	.054	.084**
Acquisition index	.070	.034	.070	−.010	.053	−.001
Ability	−.017	.010	−.084	−.034	.099**	.137*
Education	.117**	.156*	.220*	.188*	.121*	.100**
Technical training	−.154*	.050	.019	.062	.075**	.106**
Work experience	.171*	.032	.048	.071	−.039	−.039
Job tenure	.163*	.075	.085	.126*	−.068	−.095**
R^2	.057	.044	.053	.034	.070	.082
R^{2a}	.057	.045	.056	.036	.074	.087
	Panel B. Capitalist Sector (N = 541)					
Father's education	−.064	.026	.022	.079	.019	.007
Mother's education	.049	.080	.036	−.023	−.013	−.001
Parental income	−.004	−.011	−.070	−.112**	.023	.049
Father's occupation	.056	.044	.071	.070	.047	.100**
Acquisition index	.044	.048	.128**	.075	.010	−.011
Ability	−.003	−.014	−.081	.032	.129*	.168*
Education	.220*	.148*	.200*	.183*	.085	.054
Technical training	−.214*	.047	.025	.031	.056	.090**
Work experience	.154*	.091**	.117**	.107**	−.010	−.006
Job Tenure	.154*	.139*	.149*	.136**	−.060	−.069
R^2	.102	.045	.062	.057	.069	.083
R^{2a}	.108	.046	.063	.057	.081	.098

Panel C. Public Sector (N = 173)

Father's education	—	.018	—.244**	—.028	—.055	—.065
Mother's education	—	.146	.127	.043	—.124	—.120
Parental income	—	.165	.105	—.011	—.043	.005
Father's occupation	—	—.063	.172	.043	.114	.061
Acquisition index	—	—.182	—.058	—.059	.117	.072
Ability	—	—.039	—.033	.176	.027	.062
Education	—	.324*	.103	.003	.164	.197
Technical training	—	.144	.040	.085	.118	.164
Work experience	—	—.007	—.097	—.178**	—.117	—.094
Job tenure	—	.076	—.047	—.069	—.052	—.134
R^2	—	.098	.087	.038	.086	.107
R^{2a}	—	.115	.098	.041	.110	.156

[a]Non-linear specification of the effects of education.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .10$

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possible with a general sample of respondents. By evaluating the impact of such variables as college quality,[58] type of degree or training (business or engineering versus others), and college performance and certification for a select group of men (college-goers presumably resemble a 'knowledge' or technical elite more than do a general sample of the population), we were simultaneously able to further extend and refine our operationalization of meritocratic variables and address the aggregation issues. For this analysis, we used both the continuous schooling variable and the education certification categories; additionally, we assessed the impact of certain types of certification-degree interactions (e.g., engineering and post-graduate training, business and post-graduate training, etc.). The results of the estimation of all models (see Table VI) amply confirm our earlier findings: *even for college-goers*, tenure, work experience, and training exerted (at best) modest influences, while schooling, regardless of how it was indexed, registered only minimal effects on class membership or on the components of class (the latter are not presented but available on request).

Occasionally, the presentation of the meritocratic argument stresses the particular importance of schooling (and, more generally, labour market resources) for the sons of manual workers.[59] It is, after all, precisely this group who are presumed to better themselves economically through the acquisition of educational credentials and technical skills. We evaluated this speculation – our last attempt to assess the consequences of aggregation – by analyzing separately the class recruitment processes of sons of manual workers (defined here as craft, operatives, labourers, and service workers). The data presented in Table VII strongly suggest that, while the occupational status of this group is heavily dependent on schooling, sons of manual workers are no more likely than others to be positioned in class categories on the basis of their labour market skills. Again, nearly identical results were obtained for the class components (data not presented). Empirically, then, we do not find strong evidence supporting the view that bright, highly educated sons of manual workers are particularly benefited by the presumed openness of the class structure.

We must so far conclude that the recruitment of individuals into classes, as we have defined them, is only modestly affected by meritocratic criteria and that this influence applies to several theoretically defined groups, be they defined in terms of sector, educational certification, or social origins. Below we briefly discuss the results obtained from other data sets.

C. Analysis of Other Data We noted above that the EEO data were marred by several limitations, any of which may constrain our ability to generalize the above results to other samples or populations. To

assess whether the EEO results are anomalous, and to address some issues not possible with the EEO data, we present in Tables VIII and IX the results of our analyses of data from four other surveys. Owing to the fact that we reanalyzed published correlations from the General Social Surveys (GSS) and the Wisconsin survey, we can ascertain the importance of antecedent variables only for the components of class (rather than class categories) with these two surveys. For the purpose of comparability, we include the results of similar analyses for the Quality of Employment Survey and the Survey of Working Conditions (see Table VIII). The Wisconsin results are particularly useful for our purposes for two reasons: (a) the Wisconsin measure of supervision (see Appendix) is probably the most reliable and elaborate available and it appears no more sensitive to schooling than do the cruder indices of supervisory status available from other data; and (b) the Wisconsin survey is the only data source with a measure of parental property and we see that this indicator of *parental class* exerts a direct, unmediated influence on whether the son owns productive property. One implication of this finding is that the results of the EEO analysis might underestimate the influence of social background because that survey contains no measure of parental class or wealth. Unfortunately, we cannot pursue that speculation any further with those data.

Table VIII contains no surprises. Education has a small effect on the acquisition of property in all data sets, though it exerts a somewhat larger effect on the placement of these men into positions of supervisory responsibility. Work experience and/or job tenure also register modest beneficial effects. Explained variation is quite low and, in general, the patterns strongly resemble those observed with the EEO data.

In Table IX, we present coefficients evaluating the efficacy of three indicators of labour market skills for affecting entry into four classes: employers, managers, semi-autonomous employees, and the proletariat. (Neither the QES nor SWC contain the information on authority required to identify technicians and supervisors.) The results from both surveys are broadly similar to those already discussed, with one possible exception. Education appears somewhat more influential for positioning men in the managerial class (defined here as supervisory status only – see Appendix) and *less* effective for placing men into the employer class in the Survey of Working Conditions than in other surveys. It should be emphasized, however, that this education coefficient is biased upwards, due to the omission of status origins from these equations,[60] and it is relatively large only in the public sector. And even here the overwhelming bulk of the inequalities in class membership is not attributable to achieved skills.

In sum, our analysis of data from four other social surveys, two of

TABLE VI *Regression analyses of determinants of placement into classes, standardized coefficients. EEO survey, college-goers (N = 372)*

Independent Variables	*Class Categories*					
	Employer	*Manager*	*Supervisor*	*Technocrat*	*Semi-Autonomous Employee*	*Proletariat*
Father's education	−.035	.011	.067	.029	.047	−.067
Mother's education	−.059	.039	.053	−.048	−.045	−.011
Father's occupation	.122**	.094	−.200*	−.112	.056	.104
Parental income	−.037	−.113	.255*	.014	−.131**	−.049
Acquisition index	.151*	−.039	−.067	.055	.009	−.092
Ability	−.004	−.077	.005	.049	.065	−.023
Technical training	−.136	.142*	.054	−.057	.017	−.048
Work experience	.116**	−.003	.007	.012	−.025	−.139*
Job tenure	.090	.017	.092	−.006	−.148*	−.094
Education						
E1. College degree	−.065	.062	.084	−.089	−.031	−.047
E2. Some graduate	−.150	.055	.165**	.069	−.067	−.148
E3. Graduate degree	−.064	.102	.142	−.068	−.035	−.121
Major						
M1. Business	−.105	.081	−.048	−.042	.083	.070
M2. Engineering	−.120	.103	.084	−.097	.071	.048
College selectivity	−.044	.084	−.093	−.006	.044	−.037
College GPA	−.015	.068	−.015	−.008	−.037	−.026
Interactions						
(E1)(M1)	.090	−.044	−.022	.150	−.028	−.095
(E1)(M2)	.114	−.008	−.073	.002	.045	−.016
(E2)(M1)	.181*	.051	−.096	−.052	−.024	−.042
(E2)(M2)	.080	−.014	−.015	−.013	−.020	−.001

(E3)(M1)	−.004	−.057	.083	.022	−.089	−.079
(E3)(M2)	.127	.024	−.073	−.001	−.051	−.011
R^2	.086	.057	.092	.040	.049	.077
R^{2a}	.054	.031	.056	.009	.026	.074

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .10$

[a] Equation contains variables identical to those listed in Table IV.

TABLE VII *Regression analyses of the determinants of placement into classes, standardized coefficients. EEO survey, sons of manual workers (N = 329).*

Independent Variables	*Class Categories*						
	Employer	*Manager*	*Supervisor*	*Technocrat*	*Semi-Autonomous Employee*	*Proletariat*	*Occupational Status*
Father's education	.011	.004	−.007	.013	−.028	.007	−.027
Mother's education	.061	−.000	.126*	−.000	.008	−.152**	.027
Father's occupation	.135**	.049	−.035	−.032	.026	−.083	.104*
Parental income	.053	−.071	.023	−.045	.008	.061	−.037
Acquisition index	.031	.099	−.106	.050	−.116	.015	−.042
Ability	.068	−.023	−.058	.032	.010	.019	.044
Education	−.050	.181**	.098	.056	−.105	−.240**	.514**
Technical training	−.170**	.062	.017	−.025	.107*	−.064	—
Work experience	.174**	.043	.079	−.075	−.099	−.086	—
Job tenure	.112	.061	.088	−.068	−.161**	−.043	—
R^2	.084	.037	.027	.026	.039	.071	.392
R^{2a}	.097	.038	.036	.027	.050	.072	—

* $p < .10$

** $p < .05$

[a] Non-linear specification of the effects of education.

TABLE VIII *Regression analyses of the determinants of placement of men into components of classes (standardized coefficients)*

Dependent Variables	*Independent Variables*								
	Father's Education	*Mother's Education*	*Father's Occupation*	*Parental Income*	*Father's Property*	*Education*	*Work Experience*	*Job Tenure*	R^2
	Wisconsin Survey (N = 1180)								
Property	.064	−.040	.038	.067**	.246*	.033	.168*	—	.100
Supervise	.017	−.093**	.065	.055	.194*	.194*	.222*	—	.110
	General Social Survey (N = 1120)								
Property	−.019	—[a]	.081**	—	—	.138*	—	—	.017
Supervise	−.023	—	.021	—	—	.176*	—	—	.031
	Quality of Employment Survey (N = 780)								
Property	—	—	—	—	—	.086**	.049	.256*	.082
Supervise	—	—	—	—	—	.234*	.157*	.099*	.083
Autonomy	—	—	—	—	—	.301*	.119*	.123*	.110
	Survey of Working Conditions (N = 785)								
Property	—	—	—	—	—	.023	.098*	.106*	.030
Supervise	—	—	—	—	—	.317*	.146*	.181*	.125
Autonomy	—	—	—	—	—	.323*	.085**	.051	.089

* $p < .05$

** $p < .10$

[a] Variables unavailable.

TABLE IX *Regression analyses of the determinants of placement into classes, quality of employment survey and survey of working conditions*

Independent Variables	*Class Categories*			
	Employer	*Manager*	*Semi-Autonomous Employee*	*Proletariat*
	A. QES, Total Sample (N = 784)			
Education	.084*	−.174*	.010	−.264*
Work experience	.047	.118*	−.034	−.148**
Job tenure	.258*	−.070**	−.009	−.098*
R^2	.082	.032	.002	.092
	B. QES, Capitalist Sector (N = 643)			
Education	.106*	.128*	.027	−.243*
Work experience	.032	.111*	−.018	−.140*
Job tenure	.283*	−.070	−.010	−.121*
R^2	.090	.020	.002	.081
	C. QES, Public Sector (N = 130)			
Education	—	.222*	−.014	−.263*
Work experience	—	.205*	−.070	−.189*
Job tenure	—	−.053	.019	.047
R^2		.062	.004	.075
	D. SWC, Total Sample (N = 786)			
Education	.023	.303*	−.028	−.331*
Work experience	.099*	.079**	−.047	−.123*
Job tenure	.105*	.104*	−.123*	−.101*
R^2	.030	.087	.022	.102
	E. SWC, Capitalist Sector (N = 666)			
Education	.052	.261*	−.011	−.316*
Work experience	.104*	.060	−.026	−.123*
Job tenure	.117*	.111*	−.118*	.125*
R^2	.034	.069	.017	.103
	F. SWC, Public Sector (N = 114)			
Education	—	.414*	−.207**	−.308*
Work experience	—	.257	.199	−.115
Job tenure	—	.051	−.123	−.067
R^2	—	.139	.078	.073

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .10$

which are nationally representative and one of which contains a markedly better index of supervisory authority, suggests that basic inferences to be drawn from our EEO analyses appear to be generalizable beyond that sample. The results obtained with the EEO data,

then, are not an artifact of the EEO sample (e.g., age homogeneity, relative youth, advantaged backgrounds, etc.) and do not hinge on the specific measurement strategies necessarily adopted because of the limitations of the EEO survey. We simply do not find much evidence of meritocratic recruitment processes into the United States class structure in any of the five data sets we examined.

Some Caveats and Conclusions We emphasize that the conclusions and implications which we will draw from this research are tentative. Our conceptualizations and analyses are, of course, hardly definitive. The small sizes of our samples, the unrepresentativeness and limitations of the EEO survey (a factor somewhat mitigated by our replication of basic findings in the nationally representative QES and SWC data), the relative crudity of some of our measures (e.g., authority) and the complete absence of other indices such as parental class (again, problems which are moderated by our use of better measures contained in other data sources), and the particular difficulties in conceptualizing and measuring 'class', all dictate that our findings be interpreted rather cautiously.

Even with better data on and operationalizations of class membership, real problems remain with the concept of class. Thompson argues that '. . . class is defined by men as they live their own history and, in the end, this is the only definition.'[61] If we were to adopt Thompson's definition literally, static class analyses – such as those presented here and elsewhere – would, of course, be impossible. We believe it more fruitful to make some *empirical* progress with simplified operational measures than to make no such contribution, but Thompson's view needs to be considered seriously. Can class be meaningfully conceptualized in the absence of a sense that classes act for themselves throughout history? or struggle among themselves? or modify economic, political, or ideological relations of domination through such struggle? What are the relations between people entirely displaced from the production process and positions in production systems? How are classes organized, disorganized, and reorganized?[62] These are just some of the difficult and exciting questions which we do not answer or even address, and our ignorance about these matters is reflected by the poor performance of our empirical models. Our inability to explain class recruitment processes, despite the multitude of variables employed in our analysis and the use of sub-samples for whom these issues may be most pertinent, indicates the need for more theorizing about the determinants of class position.

All of these caveats notwithstanding, the findings and perspectives presented here are relevant for understanding the complexities and interrelationships among class, meritocracy, and achievement. The issue of achievement versus ascription is of fundamental importance

to stratification theory and research. Meritocratic societies ideally embrace the principle of achievement and shun the principle of ascription, but no society, of course, exists in this pure form. Nonetheless, as we noted at the outset of this paper, the United States has often been singled out, at least for white males, as the society most closely approximating the meritocratic ideal. Over a decade ago, Blau and Duncan concluded their study of occupational achievement by noting that:

> It is the underprivileged class of manual sons that has exceptional chances for mobility into the elite in this country. There is a grain of truth in the Horatio Alger myth. The high level of popular education in the United States, perhaps reinforced by the lesser emphasis on formal distinctions of social status, has provided the disadvantaged lower strata with outstanding opportunities for long-distance upward mobility.[63]

Blau and Duncan, among many others, infer that the importance of education in positioning men in the American occupational structure implies a relatively 'open' meritocratic stratification system. This theme has been echoed more recently, and most forcefully, by Bell, who states 'the university, which once reflected the status system of the society, has now become the arbiter of class position. As the gatekeeper, it has gained a quasi-monopoly in determining the future stratification of society.'[64]

As we noted earlier, however, such inferences have been based on research on occupational attainment, despite Bell's use of the term 'class'. Class, *as conceptualized* by the Marxist criteria of property ownership and control, has been generally ignored in mobility and achievement studies.[65] Our tentative results suggest that class membership *does* exert net influences on economic and psychological job rewards, *cannot* be empirically equated with occupational position, and *does not* appear to be nearly as sensitive to educational qualifications as does occupational placement. Educational institutions do not seem to represent the organizations within which access to class positions is determined, regardless of whether these positions are in the public or capitalist sector or of whether the men we studied were highly educated or Blau and Duncan's 'underprivileged class of manual sons.' The possession of knowledge and technical skills does not underlie class recruitment processes, though we did find that allocation into the employer class was modestly affected by skills acquired through work experience. At best, schooling serves to keep individuals out of the least advantaged classes, but its ability to place men in the most advantaged classes is weak indeed. We should also add that class allocation mechanisms seem no more dominated by processes of inheritance, though our reanalysis of the Wisconsin data did point to a modest intergenerational linkage of property ownership.

Where does all of this take us in answering the central question posed by this paper: are achievement processes in the US meritocratic? There is no *one* answer to this question because the structure of positional inequality in the US is multidimensional. We have identified two of these stratification systems. One is based on occupational position (and *not* solely on status), an indicator of the technical division of labour, and the evidence – especially on the very powerful role of schooling – suggests that achievement in this system is largely meritocratic. The other stratification system is based on ownership and control relations, and achievement in this system is but modestly susceptible to meritocratic influences. Our results suggest that both supporters and critics of stratification in the US have overestimated the success of the 'meritocratic critique' of inequality. Hence, in our view, we should be quite cautious about accepting an *overall* meritocratic interpretation of achievement and inequality in contemporary American society. Despite the popular appeal of such a view, and the uses to which it may be put, it does not appear to be the basis upon which men are sorted and selected into the American *class* structure.

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APPENDIX

1. Property In all data sets except the General Social Surveys owning property is ascertained by asking the respondent if he is self-employed. For the GSS, property is operationalized as being an employer *or* having no supervisor. The actual concept measured in this survey – control over the means of production – is somewhat broader than property *per se*, though the empirical differences between the two are not important.[66]

2. Supervisory Status In the EEO, SWC, and QES surveys supervisory status is measured by a question asking the respondent if he supervised anyone as part of his job. Some occupational groups may supervise clients (e.g., teachers, social workers, etc.) rather than the labour power of other workers. For such ambiguous respondents, we both (1) allocated individuals to supervisory – non-supervisory statuses solely on the basis of responses to the above question and, alternatively, (2) assigned them to the non-supervisory status. These distinctions make no difference, and in this paper we follow the first classification rule.

The supervision measure in the GSS is a continuous scale with three

possible values: no supervisory responsibilities, supervises one level of subordinates, and supervises two or more levels of subordinates.

Supervisory responsibilities are indexed in the Wisconsin data by five items tapping self-reports of (a) authority to hire or fire others, (b) influence the rate of pay received by others, (c) susceptibility of respondent's rate of pay to influence of others, (d) supervise the work of others, and (e) susceptibility of respondent's work to supervision by others. Kluegel's scale actually measures several concepts (supervision, autonomy), but the basic dimension underlying the items appears to be hierarchical authority (which is the basic concept underlying supervisory status).[67]

3. Authority Only the EEO survey contains the items necessary to measure nonhierarchical authority; i.e., authority based on technical specialization and expertise. Authority was assessed by two questions measuring 'opportunities for making policy decisions' and 'exercising leadership' in one's job. We used these items in two ways: (1) we simply added them together to form a continuous scale; and (2) we then dichotomized the scale so that individuals whom we defined as exercising authority must agree or strongly agree to *both* of the above statements.

We experimented with a variety of other scalings and specifications of these items. For example, we dichotomized the scale at the median; we used each item separately; and we used an 'either-or' specification. None of the alternative specifications produced results very different from those reported in this paper.

4. Autonomy The EEO, SWC, and QES surveys provide opportunities to measure autonomy. In the EEO survey, autonomy is indexed by responses to two items assessing the degree to which work is routinized ('job is repetitive', 'job is predictable'). The items were reflected and subjected to procedures similar to the authority scale discussed above. The QES and SWC contain, in addition to questions measuring routinization ('job requires repetition', 'job allows variety'), a three-item closeness of supervision scale ('supervisor allows worker to set own pace', 'supervisor encourages workers to develop new ways', 'supervisor lets workers alone'). The five items were summed to obtain an overall autonomy scale and then dichotomized.

Evidence suggesting the high congruence between workers' and organizational supervisors' reports of many of these items may be found in Bell and Stone and Porter.[68]

NOTES

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2. Parkin, op. cit., p. 18.

3. Parkin, op. cit., p. 13.

4. Werner Sombart, *Why is There No Socialism in the United States?* New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1978 (original German edition published in 1905).

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11. See, for example, the skeptical assessments of many of these propositions by Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1973; Maurice Zeitlin, 'Corporate Ownership and Control: the large corporation and the capitalist class', *American Journal of Sociology* vol. 79, 1974; and Ralph Miliband, 'Professor Galbraith and American Capitalism', in Miliband, (ed.), *The Socialist Register, 1968*, London, Merlin Press, 1968; Mandel, op. cit.

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29. O. D. Duncan, 'A socioeconomic index for all occupations', in A. Reiss, *Occupations and Social Status*, New York, Free Press, 1961.
30. P. Siegel, 'The American occupational prestige structure', unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago, Illinois, 1971; Treiman, op. cit.
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33. The indicators are more completely described in US Department of Labor, *Handbook for Analyzing Jobs*, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1972. The complexity and skill measures are based on the estimates, developed for some 21,000 titles in the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles*, of the occupation's typical level of functioning with data, people, and things, and the skill needed by workers to achieve average successful occupational performance. In our analyses, we use scores aggregated to the 1970

Census occupational titles developed by Lloyd Temme, *Occupation: Meanings and Measures*, Washington, Bureau of Social Science Research, 1975. Temme estimated for each of the 584 Census occupational-industrial groups the average scores on these variables associated with the DOT occupations within Census categories. The 584 categories explain approximately 75 percent of the variation in each of these scores across the 21,000 titles. The external validity of the complexity measures is suggested by the strong association between the DOT indicators and *self-reports* of work complexity in these and other data.

34. G. Carlsson, *Social Mobility and Class Structure*, Lund, CWK Cleerup, 1958. For a recent application of the use of discrete 'class' measures, albeit measures which combine occupational activity and property and control relations, see John Goldthorpe and C. Llewellyn, 'Class mobility in modern Britain: three theses examined', *Sociology*, vol. 11, 1977a; Goldthorpe and Llewellyn, 'Class mobility: intergenerational and worklife patterns', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 28, 1977b; J. Goldthorpe, C. Payne, and C. Llewellyn, 'Trends in class mobility', *Sociology*, vol. 12, 1978.

35. Non-manual occupations are defined to include professionals, technical, and kindred, managerial, clerical, and sales occupations. The remaining occupations comprise the manual category. We explored alternative specifications of this variable (e.g., allocating service occupations to the non-manual category), but the substantive conclusions remain unchanged.

36. Wright and Perrone, op. cit.; Wright, 1978a, op cit., Carchedi, op. cit., N. Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, London, New Left Books, 1975.

37. Weber, op. cit.; Dahrendorf, op. cit.

38. V. A. Thompson, *Modern Organizations*, New York: Knopf, 1961.

39. Wright, 1978a, op. cit.; Wright, 1978b, op. cit.; Wright and Perrone, op. cit.; Kalleberg and Griffin, 1978, op. cit.; Kalleberg and Griffin, 1980, op. cit.; Robinson and Kelley, op. cit.

40. Wright, 1978a, op. cit.

41. Wright, 1978a, op. cit.

42. Giddens, op. cit.

43. Mincer, op. cit.

44. Another reason for using labour market experiences and training opportunities is that estimates of the importance of schooling are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of work experience in achievement models. Griffin, 1978, op. cit. has shown that in the absence of extremely irregular work histories, there is an inherent negative correlation between years of schooling completed and most labour market experience. Including a variety of experience measures in this study *increases* our estimates of the importance of schooling for allocating men into both the class and occupational structures.

45. Number of years of work experience was obtained from self-reported retrospective career histories, gathered in 1970 and dating back to before 1955. Job tenure was ascertained from a single item on the 1970 schedule. These experience measures, while superior to those that must be estimated from schooling and age (a common practice in many studies due to data limitations), are of course not without inaccuracies, chiefly errors of recall. Although we have no direct validity or reliability information on these data, similar retrospective life-history data have been successfully validated by Z. Blum. 'Validation of retrospective occupational and educational experiences in life history data', Baltimore, The Center for the Social Organization of Schools, Johns Hopkins University. See Griffin, 1978, op. cit., for greater detail on the construction of these measures and for evidence of their theoretical and empirical advantages over conventional conceptualizations and measures of work experience.

46. Duncan, op. cit.

47. These general patterns also characterized the other data sets we inspected. In the GSS surveys, for

example, occupational status correlates with property and authority (continuous) at .164 and .277, respectively. In the Wisconsin data, these correlations are −.059 and .25. Finally, the QES survey indicates that the total amount of variation in property and supervisory status lying between 1970 Census occupational titles is .442 and .594, respectively.

48. This measure is a linear composite of four questions eliciting the respondents' reports of the hours per day spent working with things, paperwork, ideas, and people. This operationalization is based on the research of M. Kohn and C. Schooler, 'Occupational experience and Psychological functioning: An assessment of reciprocal effects', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 38, 1973.

49. Fulfillment represents the evaluation by job incumbents of particular facets of the organization of production. It is therefore a function of, but analytically distinct from, the objective content and structuring of work tasks and necessarily derives its meaning within a value system that assumes certain types of work to be more fulfilling than others (see, Braverman, op. cit.). We follow Braverman's, op. cit., argument that fulfillment is enhanced to the degree that a job is challenging and interesting and allows personal growth. Accordingly, the fulfillment scale is a linear composite of three items: (challenge: 'my work is challenging'), (interest: 'most of the time, my work is interesting'), and (growth: 'the opportunities for personal growth on my job are poor' — reverse code). These items are highly correlated ($\bar{X}_r = .561$) and internally consistend (coefficient alpha = .79). See Kalleberg and Griffin 1978a, op. cit., and 1980, op. cit., for more details on this measure and Kalleberg, 'Work values and job rewards: a theory of job satisfaction', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 42, 1977, for a more elaborate discussion of intrinsic rewards.

Of course, one could argue that some of the variation in this construct is due to occupational differences in the meaning of work (or, more specifically, in what constitutes an interesting, challenging, and personally meaningful job). Undoubtedly, this is partially true. Our argument, however, is that fulfillment reflects certain features of jobs, and not primarily subjective reactions to work. Individual reactions to job attributes such as intrinsic rewards are a function of, among other variables, individual valuation of them. For greater elaboration on this idea, see Kalleberg, op. cit. At least three pieces of evidence support this proposition. First, around 52 percent of the inequality in fulfillment among salaried employees lies *between* 1970 Census occupational titles in these data. Once we control for the background, schooling, and experience variables discussed above, many of which should be related to occupational values, the *net* between-occupation variance is reduced only slightly, to around 47 percent. The comparable statistics for earnings are 43 and 34 percents, respectively. Hence, the fulfillment data compare quite well with the more 'objective' earnings data. Second, in Kalleberg and Griffin, 1980, op. cit., we found rather strong relationships between occupational skill and complexity, indicators of occupationally-based differences in workers control, and fulfillment. Unless fulfillment has an objective referent, we should not expect to find relationships of this magnitude. Finally, in Kalleberg and Griffin, 1978, op. cit., we detected considerable occupational differences in intrinsic rewards (an operational construct which subsumes fulfillment), and these differences influenced job satisfaction *net* of individual work values. Were intrinsic rewards (or fulfillment) simply reflecting values, they should exert no independent effect on job satisfaction.

50. In Kalleberg and Griffin, 1980, op. cit., we employ more extensive controls for occupational position by using the nominal three-digit Census occupation codes and estimate these

job reward equations *within* major Census occupational groups and within capitalist and public sectors. These results are consistent with those presented here.

51. Kohn and Schooler, op. cit., employing a more precise measure of job complexity, present even stronger education-complexity linkages.

52. Blau and Duncan, op. cit.: Featherman and Hauser, op. cit.; Alexander, Eckland, and Griffin, op. cit.; Jencks et al., 1979, op. cit., Griffin, 1976, op. cit.

53. Ordinary least squares regression procedures may not be the most technically appropriate method to use with multiple nominal dependent variables. In effect, there is a part/whole problem here: since no category is ultimately suppressed in the analysis, the interpretation of the OLS coefficients may not be straightforward. Perhaps more technically appropriate is canonical correlation, which allows the estimation of effects of explanatory variables on the entire *set* of nominal dependent variables, considered simultaneously. We did perform extensive canonical analyses, though we chose to present the regression coefficients for two reasons: the canonical and regression results led to precisely the same conclusions, and the regression coefficients are more interpretable (data not presented, but available on request). With regression analysis, we can estimate the importance of any antecedent variable on a particular *class* category. Canonical procedures, however, estimate the effect of an antecedent variable on a *linear composite* of all the class categories. Hence, the influence of a regressor on any particular category is difficult to ascertain.

54. Also of importance to this study are our findings (not shown here) that men with higher-status origins are *not* advantaged with respect to the attainment of these particular market capacities. Indeed, the data suggest that men from lower-status backgrounds are, if anything, modestly more likely to acquire valuable skills and/or attitudes via these labour market experiences; this, of course, contrasts sharply with the educational advantages enjoyed by individuals with occupationally and educationally successful parents. These work experiences, then, may represent mechanisms through which men with relatively disadvantaged social origins, academic abilities, and educational qualifications can obtain access to economically and psychologically rewarding class positions. In this sense, recruitment to certain classes does exhibit some meritocratic elements.

We want to note that while we have assumed that job tenure represents one aspect of labour market skill, and hence affects entry into classes, an equally plausible explanation is that tenure may represent a 'reward' of class membership; more advantaged and powerful classes have greater tenure possibly because they are relatively insulated from the vagaries of the labour market. If this is incorrect, job tenure, contrary to our specification, may depend on class membership. Consistent with this view, we excluded job tenure from our equations and re-estimated all parameters. The consequence of this respecification was that meritocratic influences on class recruitment were markedly lower than those presented in this paper. Not only was the direct effect of tenure assumed zero under this specification, but the influence of education and work experience was reduced (see footnote 44). Hence, the estimates of meritocratic influences which are presented here should be regarded as quite generous: plausible alternative specifications would reduce the impact of skills even further.

55. Griffin, 1978, op. cit. demonstrates that these variables affect the earnings of the EEO men.

56. Griffin and Alexander, 1978, op. cit.

57. Sector distinctions, in the EEO data, are based on a question tapping the respondent's employment situs. Public employees consist of those men working in educational or non-profit research organizations, hospitals, social agencies, churches, and state and local

government bureaucracies. These categories include all possible non-capitalist employment locations ascertainable with these data. The capitalist sector includes self-employed individuals and those employed by family businesses, small private businesses, and large firms or corporations. In the QES and SWC data, sector distinctions are based on 1960 detailed Census industry codes. Public employees are assumed to consist of those working in the following industries: local, state, and public administration, public utilities, and health services, hospitals, welfare and religious services, legal services and educational services. Despite the differences in criteria used to distinguish public from the private sector in these data sets, these criteria are substantively similar and lend to similar results, both in this analysis and in those presented in Kalleberg and Griffin, 1980, op. cit.

58. We index college quality by Astin's college selectivity indicator. See A. W. Astin, *Who Goes Where to College?*, Chicago, Social Science Research Associates, 1965.

59. Blau and Duncan, op. cit., p. 436.

60. Griffin, 1976, op. cit.

61. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, New York, Pantheon, 1963.

62. See Adam Przeworski, 'Proletariat into class: the process of class formation from Karl Kautsky's *The Class Struggle* to recent controversies', *Politics and Society*, vol. 7, 1977 for a brilliant discussion of these issues.

63. Blau and Duncan op. cit., p. 435.

64. D. Bell, op. cit., p. 41.

65. See, however, the work by Goldthrope and associates cited in note 34.

66. Robinson and Kelley, op. cit.

67. Kluegel, 1975, op. cit.; Kluegel, 1978, op. cit.

68. G. Bell, 'The influence of technological components of work upon managerial control', *Journal of Academy of Management*, vol. 8, 1965; E. Stone and L. Porter, 'Job characteristics and job attitudes: a multivariate study', *Journal of Applied Psychology*, vol. 60, 1975.

Frank Musgrove and Roger Middleton

Rites of passage and the meaning of age in three contrasted social groups: professional footballers, teachers, and Methodist ministers

ABSTRACT

Interviews were carried out with professional footballers in their twenties, superannuated Methodist ministers in their seventies, and teachers in their thirties who were taking part-time higher degrees, to discover what they saw as the significant stages, turning points or landmarks in their lives and the way they saw age differences influencing their social relationships. Nobody thought that adolescence had been a stage or turning point, although women teachers in their thirties thought they had experienced a delayed adolescence in their twenties. For the two younger groups, marriage was a relatively unimportant rite of passage, but the first child was a watershed; the retired parsons, married in the 1920s, had all 'waited seven years for Rachel' and marriage, hard on the heels of ordination, was a very powerful rite. The footballers were members of a sharply defined ten-year 'age-set'; but neither of the younger groups had a strong sense of 'age-stratum solidarity'. The Methodist ministers had a strong sense of belonging to their own generation; but retirement after forty years of liminality was a rite not of separation but of incorporation: a return (with relief) to normality.

MEANING AND FUNCTION

This is a comparative study of significant stages or turning points in the lives of three different groups of English men and women. It attempts to show how they interpret age and see it influencing their social relationships. Stages and turning points are identified by the subjects of this study and not by the investigators; the meaning of age is the 'actors'' meaning.

It is now almost forty years since the American Sociological Society devoted its annual conference (1941) to the subject of age and sex. Talcott Parsons[1] and Ralph Linton[2] presented papers which

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

underscored the continuing importance of age as an aspect of social structure. Both emphasized discontinuities in the life-cycle of men and women in modern industrial societies. For Linton marriage marked the major discontinuity in the life-cycle and constituted the most important *rite de passage*. Rites of passage had generally degenerated, but '. . . it is significant that puberty ceremonies have deteriorated more than marriage ceremonies. Marriage still marks a very definite and abrupt status transition'.

Thirty-six years later, in 1977, the Swansea conference of the Association of Social Anthropologists addressed itself to the same issues of age as a principle of social differentiation and the progression through life by a series of jerks and reaffirmed the importance of both. The standpoint and the idiom have changed: they are now those of Claud Levi-Strauss. Youth and age, like men and women (and sisters and wives) are linked in systems of binary opposition and have acquired a cognitive status as '*bonnes à penser*'. They provide '. . . the conceptual apparatus with which societies order their world and create social order'.[3]

The major shift in the past forty years in the interpretation of rites of passage and age differentiation has been from analysis in terms of their latent function to their 'meaning'. It is not always clear in these allegedly *Verstehen* analyses who the meaning is for: subjects, congregations and spectators, or anthropologists. Bocock has distinguished between the deep, subjective meanings involved in religious ritual and the shallow, restricted meaning of 'civic ritual';[4] but the corpse being buried and the infant baptized clearly find no meaning in the ritual. Raum knew that many Chaga youths found virtually no meaning in their initiation rites ('haggard, drowsy, often insensible to what is going on around them');[5] Leach in his discussion of 'hair behaviour' in transition rites de-emphasized the meaning of ritual for 'actors' ('We have no grounds for assuming . . . . that the actors in public rituals are in a psychological condition which corresponds to the symbolism of their performance'). The meaning was for the spectators.[6]

Radcliffe-Brown distinguished between the meaning and the function of rites and asked: 'But how do we discover meanings? They do not lie on the surface'. In the event Radcliffe-Brown confounded meaning with latent function which the anthropologist discovered through comparative analysis.[7] In recent years interpretation in terms of the meaning that participants find in ritual has been more convincing: Beattie has reinterpreted Needham and Beidelman has reinterpreted Gluckman. There is apparently no warrant for supposing that the system of dual symbolic classification in Needham's mind is also in the minds of the Batoro;[8] and when attention is paid to what the Bantu of southern Africa actually say, the rites of ritual rebellion in which Gluckman imagined they were

engaged turn out in fact to be rites of (royal) separation.[9] Victor Turner has paid 'close attention to the way the Ndembu explain their own symbols';[10] only Pickering, in recent years, in attempting to explain the persistence of religious rites of passage in England, dismisses actors' meanings as meaningless ('these well nigh meaningless components of ritual') and retreats to latent functions almost indistinguishable from those originally proposed by van Gennep.[11]

Gellner has warned us that to understand the concepts of a society in the way its members do is not to understand the society: concepts mask as well as reveal reality ('and masking some of it may be part of their function').[12] And Robin Horton, although he advises us to start with what people say, knows that it is not enough simply to end there.[13] Beattie likewise concedes that the anthropologist must offer his own interpretation which may be at odds with his subject's, although it 'must be at least ideally explicable to and recognizable by him . . .'[14] In the last analysis we cannot escape, as Goody insists, from using our own categories and thinking our own thoughts.[15] In the study reported below the meaning and identification of a stage in life or a turning point are the subject's; its categorization as a rite of passage is the investigator's. The study was designed in a comparative framework which implies at least a rudimentary functional analysis by the researcher. Weber himself always maintained that sociological analysis must not only be adequate at the level of meaning, but 'causally adequate', too.[16]

In this study eight professional footballers in their twenties, eight teachers (taking advanced university courses) in their thirties, and eight retired Methodist ministers in their seventies were asked what the stages and turning points had been in their lives. None mentioned confirmation, most mentioned leaving home, all who were married mentioned marriage (some of the younger men as an afterthought). But only if a 'turning point' clearly had symbolic value, standing for something other than or beyond itself, and was clearly highly emotionally charged, was it judged to have the character of a 'rite'.[17] Neither leaving home nor, for the younger men, marriage qualified. Acquiring a mortgage (by the single as well as the married) was the most highly symbolic and emotionally charged *rite de passage* of all.

The three groups were chosen for study because of the marked differences in the phasing of their lives: their life-cycle schedules and time-tables of change are strikingly dissimilar. As Leach has argued, rites of passage do not simply announce the passage of time: they create it by inserting intervals in social life.[18]

The effect of age differentiation and the scheduling of life's transitions on social relationships have been curiously little studied in modern industrial societies and assumptions about 'age-group solidarity' and protracted and unchartered stretches of 'youth' remain curiously unverified. On the basis of comparative analysis

both van Gennep and Gluckman concluded that rites of passage were 'for' *society*: the former said that transitions were regulated and guarded 'so that society as a whole will suffer no discomfort or injury';[19] the latter that ritual promoted social harmony and efficiency by clearing up role ambiguities and uncertainties – making quite clear who was who – especially where role overlap was common, as in small-scale societies.[20]

In fact, as more recent comparative studies show, rites of passage in preliterate societies are a major source of social conflict and dislocation (whatever comfort they may bring to the individual participants). It is precisely those societies with elaborately regulated and ritualized age-set systems which are marked by age-related conflicts (it is the old who decide when the transitions take place); and the wide age-range of age-sets and the long intervals between initiations interfere with the orderly and regular supply of trained personnel and bring tribal manpower planning into disarray.[21]

Transitions from youth to adult life in late twentieth-century industrial societies offer less comfort to individuals and more efficiency to society. We have impressive historical studies from America which calculate the pacing and co-ordination of transitions today compared with a century ago. Leaving school, entering the workforce, leaving home, getting married, and establishing a new household are five steps to adult life which are now far more tightly scheduled and interlocked than in the past. They start later but finish earlier and formerly on average took twenty-two years to complete, today only fourteen. These tight schedules reduce conflict and incompetence, delimit the field of contestants for desired positions to manageable numbers of well prepared persons. But society's gain is the individual's loss: 'Growing up as a process has become briefer, more normful, bounded, and consequential – and thereby more demanding on individual participants'.[22]

This study is an exploration of the meaning of age and major transitions in life for twenty-four people who were invited to talk about these matters in very loosely structured two-hour tape-recorded interviews. The investigator made no prior identification of 'rites of passage'. Subjects were simply asked: 'Looking back on your life, would you pick out any particular stages or turning points?' (with prompts, if necessary, for adolescence and marriage). In relation to the influence of age on their lives they were asked five questions: 'Do you feel that there is a proper time for doing particular things, like getting married?'; 'Would you be bothered at the thought of people markedly different in age getting married?'; 'Would it bother you working for someone younger than yourself?'; 'Do you feel that age should be respected?' and 'Do you feel strongly that you 'belong with' people of about your own age?'

ADOLESCENCE AND LEAVING HOME

Neither the experience of adolescence nor first leaving home carried any special meaning which lent it ritual significance; but the three women in the twenty-four interviewees – all graduate teachers – referred to a 'delayed adolescence' in their early twenties. It had been postponed from their studious and docile teenage years.

For a forty-year old teacher, a late-entrant to the profession, leaving home for the first time, at the age of twenty-three, had high symbolic value. He was working in his home-town in a clerical post and decided to become a lumberjack in Canada:

> I was totally dissatisfied with myself. I was shy and retiring; I felt myself just utterly boring.

He found liminality:

> I wanted to get to a state where I had no security whatsoever. And I found this in Canada, where I'd nowhere to sleep, no money, no friends. And, you know, I felt I'd acheived something. I ended up with my basic self and I felt I could go on from there.

He went on to be a 'debarker' and learned to run across the logs as they came out of the mouth of the lake. His return to England was a rite of incorporation and transformation: 'After I'd done that lumberjacking I felt really big'.

But typically leaving home had no special meaning. Teachers had found the transition from home to college easy: 'I didn't notice any emotional break, really, I thoroughly enjoyed Keele', said a 31-year-old teacher of working-class origin. 'I left home to go to college when I was twenty', said a Methodist minister whose father had been an office manager; 'I thoroughly enjoyed it. I was the type who would have enjoyed Public School. I was a very keen football player and cricketer and tennis player'.

No-one saw his adolescence as a particular stage in life. 'I was always happy at home with my mum and dad', said one footballer; 'My mum never put a curfew on me', said another, 'She thinks I'm a big boy and can look after myself', said another. 'I had a very happy home life', said a teacher, 'We didn't really have any major conflicts. Well, there were differences, of course. Smoking and drinking, that sort of thing. But adolescence was not the traumatic experience for me that it may be for others'.

Two footballers attributed an unremarkable adolescence to the total indifference of their mothers. 'My mother has never been particularly interested in anything I've done', said one; 'It sounds terrible, but it isn't really. She just left it all up to me.' The other footballer, from a northern mining town, was more critical:

> All my mother does is cook the meals, you know. They're not bothered what happens. As long as they get their money on payday, they don't care two hoots. As long as they get their money, that's it, women around where I come from. It's a real working class area. Sounds daft, but it's true.

For the three women teachers, adolescence was merely deferred. One Geography teacher, now in her mid-thirties, is married to an Anglican parson and had a turbulent time in her twenties. But her teenage years were tranquil:

> I came from a very working-class background, but the sort of working-class area where children are encouraged to get on . . . I missed out on adolescent development because I didn't have any sort of conflict with my parents. No conflict of any sort. They encouraged me. I was a bookwormish little lady. It was terrible. I probably had an adolescence in my twenties, I suspect . . .

Her first conflict with the adult world was at the end of her university course when she wanted to marry a man of twenty-three who was preparing for the Church. The bishop objected. ('It's too young for the image, you know. We had a terrible to-do'.) They were finally allowed to marry on condition that her husband deferred his training for a year.

After her bookish schoolgirl years she now went wild. ('But not really wild. You can't be really wild as a curate's wife. But I probably pushed a lot more and reacted a lot more than I would now'.) She became very outspoken and intolerant: 'I suspect I had a late adolescence in that sense . . . maybe because I was a very bookish child and didn't have many relationships beyond a good, stable family. I was reading at three. That cuts you off, doesn't it?' If she had gone on to take a Ph D she would still be cut off now: 'I suspect I'd still be the adolescent that I was at twenty'.

The daughter of a senior university lecturer told a similar story. A physics teacher now in her thirties, married with two young children, she recalled her schoolgirl years at home as a very happy time: 'I can't remember any difficulties at all. I wasn't the sort of person to be going out a great deal. Guides and church youth club were my only activities . . . . We were a very close family. We didn't go out a tremendous amount. We just enjoyed ourselves in the family, really'.

Men and her time at the university changed all that: 'I probably had adolescent problems when I went to university rather than in adolescence. I'm sure I did. That's because I started having boyfriends. I never had boyfriends before'. The big conflict was over the one she eventually married. ('My parents strongly disapproved'.) He failed his degree and has had no regular work in the ensuing

decade; 'He's just pipping his exams all the time'. In the meantime he has fathered two children, his wife has become Senior Physics Mistress and is now taking a part-time higher degree. 'I sometimes think it's a shame my husband's not working: he's so much cleverer than me'. But she says she has little sense of stages in her life: 'It's all been such a gradual, happy sort of transition. I've never been an unhappy person. Most of my conflict has been since I've been married'.

The third woman teacher is thirty and unmarried. Her father was an engineer and she had no conflicts at home. She attended a girl's grammar school and had no contact with boys. But she also considers that she experienced an adolescent phase after eighteen: 'I really don't think that adolescence was a particular phase. The phase came when I was released from it and went away to University. That was a real phase, a real turning point. You know, freedom and a tremendous change in my life. There I was allowed to be me, and I couldn't believe it. I knew men for the first time, men who were just friends. I was deliriously happy about that'. She had actually rebelled at eighteen by applying to read for a degree in Theology instead of English. ('I crossed out English on my application form without telling anyone. That was the first time I'd ever taken a step out of line. But then I had to tell them. Everyone freaked, you know . . . all their faces dropped'.) She has never looked back since.

MARRIAGE AND MORTGAGES

Ralph Linton's emphasis on marriage as a rite of passage in modern societies gains no support in this study. For the Methodist ministers who had married fifty years previously in the 1920's, it was supremely important, partly because it was geared to ordination. But for the teachers and footballers, who had married in the 1960's and 1970's, it was not an important signal of status change. It was the mortgage rather than marriage that marked the transition to adulthood and independence. But though marriage itself signalled little change, a first child deeply modified social relationships, marked a major change of social state, and transformed the whole of life. This significance of a first child was far greater for the young footballers and teachers and made a far greater impact on their lives than had been the case with the Methodist ministers fifty years before. The relative importance of a first child and marriage appeared to have been reversed.

The teachers had scarcely noticed getting married apart from the fact that they were appreciably better off. A 33-year-old teacher had married two years previously, but 'I don't regard that as traumatic either. I'd been going around with this girl long enough, and you

can't string them along for ever, can you?' But he now enjoyed a richer and easier life:

> One thing I've noticed is how much better off I've been over the past couple of years. My wife's also a teacher and there's only the two of us. It's not bad, really: you can buy what you want and you can go on holiday, go abroad and that sort of thing. I quite like doing that . . . But that's the great difference between now and nine or ten years ago.

He remembers graduation as an important day in his life, and concedes: 'Well, I suppose my wedding day was, really. But I'm not sure that I think of it like that. I think my wife would: she would think it was great. But I've never really . . . it sounds awful to say it . . . but I've never really regarded it as . . . perhaps because, as I say, I'd known my fiancée for so long'.

A mortgage for a house marked the real transition from youth to adult status. It had no connotation of debt and disgrace: it was a mark of dignity and honour. For a teacher in his late thirties a stately and dignified progression through life was marked by a series of mortgages of increasing magnitude. The young footballers – who lived cautious, highly prudential, non-hedonistic and carefully calculated lives – saw a mortgage as a major landmark. The oldest footballer, now over thirty, who has had a very successful career, finds less significance in his medals than his mortgage which is now paid off:

> My house is paid for. Most people pay mortgages till they're what? Till they're 60, don't they? Till their dying day. But mine was paid off when I was 28. Paid for.

He is contemptuous of the miners in his home town for failing to recognize the social significance of a mortgage:

> All they've done with their life is go to the pit and have a few pints. And I say, 'How much are you paying for your house-rent? Seven or eight quid? Why don't you get a mortgage?' 'What?' they say. You know, they just don't understand. 'Why don't you get a mortgage? Instead of going out every night and spending all that on ale, save it and get a bit of a downposit'. But, you know, you can't tell them. But you couldn't tell me. It's just experience and living with different and better people.

A 22-year-old unmarried footballer has just bought a semi. 'At the beginning of last year I had some money and I wanted to buy a house as an investment'. Inflation as well as status has influenced his decision: 'I didn't want my money to rot in a bank'. His friends were taking the same step in their early twenties: 'The lads were in fact buying houses at the time. They were buying semis, you know. Some

were getting married . . . And I have just in fact bought a semi myself'.

The woman teacher of Religious Education has not got a husband but she's getting a mortgage. At present she is again living at home:

> I shall get a mortgage and buy something, a small terraced. I've seen a mid-terraced house, a small mid-terraced. I'll move when the completion date's through in February. I'll tell my mother it's the travelling to work that gets me down, but it's the living at home that gets me down. My parents still have this little image of me, you know. And I can sort of feel the chisel as they're trying to fit me back into it. And I don't really fit. They're starting to try to put me back where I was.

A mortgage is a sure line of defence for her adult status and identity.

TURNING POINTS FOR METHODIST MINISTERS

The Methodist Ministers had waited seven years to marry and had finally done so around the age of thirty. Marriage had to wait until they had finished three or four years at a theological college (which they tended to enter in their early twenties) and three years' probationary service before being ordained. ' "Seven years for Rachel", is what they used to say'. Marriage followed hard on the heels of ordination and one reinforced the significance of the other. As an eighty-year-old interviewee recalled (he had married at thirty-two after a twelve-and-a-half-year courtship): 'It was ordination on Tuesday, co-ordination on Thursday, and subordination ever since'.

This was part of the firm temporal and organizational scaffolding within which the Ministers were to live their orderly and linear (though geographically chaotic) lives. Ordination (followed by a manse without a mortgage) was a rite of segregation which cut them off from normal, secular life. Retirement forty years later was a rite not of separation but of incorporation which reunited them with society. They regretted only that at this stage they were unable to afford a mortgage which would have confirmed beyond reasonable doubt their re-entry into the world.

All the Ministers approved in retrospect of the old rule regarding marriage and none had resented it at the time. A seventy-year-old man whose father had worked in the Tyneside shipyards married at twenty-eight after many years of courtship:

> There was a very stern rule: it was clearly understood that a man accepted for the ministry did not marry until he was ordained . . . If a chap married on probation . . . oh, by Jove! If they didn't throw him out they generally placed a penalty of extra probation

> on him. The Wesleyan church, going back to the pre-union days, was very strict indeed. If a man married on probation and children were born before he was ordained, they were not allowed to come under the connexional children's fund. And they were actually referred to in Wesleyan circles as 'connexional illegitimates'.

He strongly disapproves of married theological students today; neither of his own children – a man of thirty-eight and a woman of forty-one – is married, and he does not feel that this is a matter for regret.

A former Durham miner recalled:

> I was ordained at Bradford in 1937. After which famous event we were wed. We'd waited for seven years. I was thirty and she was thirty-one. For seven years we wrote letters and we wrote letters and we wrote letters. We didn't live in the same place, you see. We lived seventeen miles apart.

But the old system is recalled with approval: 'It was an extremely good system, really. It was the discipline that . . . It was hard, but I think it was a good thing'.

The lives of Methodist ministers were lived within finely co-ordinated and superimposed inner, organizational and transcendental time-tables. Conversion, being 'called' to the Ministry, the seven-year rule for marriage, the twenty-year rule for a superintendency, the four-to-five year rule for moving to another living, all embraced within an overriding divine plan, provided a firm scaffolding for life. The ministers remained unswervingly on course, and none experienced anything resembling the 'mid-life crisis' that is nowadays suggested in the psychoanalytical literature.[23] 'I think I could sum it up by saying that my experiences throughout the years have invariably confirmed the convictions I had when I first recognized that I had a call to the ministry. Of course, the thing's unfolded . . . but it's confirmed what I believed at the start'.

Another retired minister claimed that nothing had ever changed his thinking. He was 'called' at eleven, converted at eighteen, worked in a shop till he was twenty-five when he left home for college. When he was asked to look back over his long life and recall the main milestones and turning points he answered wholly in terms of landmarks in organizational history:

> I think it's quite extraordinary. You see, I was trustees' secretary in my twenties, and I arranged the jubilee of the church, the fiftieth anniversary of the church. It was a special effort: we built a new organ chamber . . . And then fifty years afterwards I was invited to take the centenary service. I was trustees' secretary from 1922 to 1925 and, as I say, I arranged the jubilee; and then I went back three years ago and took the centenary.

His life finds its symmetry and meaning in the great, recurrent festivals and celebrations of his church. Its rites of passage are his rites of passage: 'The church', he concluded, 'is still the best organization. No man is an island'.

But the organization, its rituals and obligations, are simply an expression of the divine will. Even the frequent moves from living to living express a divine order. A sharp distinction was made between simply accepting the offer of a living, and being sent by God. As one retired minister and his wife recalled their lives in terms of moves, this divine architecture was laid bare:

> It's amazing how things work out for the good. When I come to think of it, most of my appointments have been given me. I don't think . . . have I ever accepted? I accepted Elland. But most of them I've been sent.
>
> You accepted a few, but Southend definitely was . . .
>
> I was sent to Southend.
>
> And definitely Hatfield.
>
> I wasn't invited there. They weren't invitations. Now that's most remarkable . . .
>
> We *have* had invitations . . . .
>
> Right at the beginning I was sent to Melton because a man broke down there . . . In a sense I was asked to go to Manchester . . .
>
> Because you were down for Warminster, really, weren't you?
>
> But I was invited to Northampton.
>
> Yes, and you were invited to Ipswich.
>
> But I wasn't really invited to Barking. It was arranged there.
>
> Things were done in high places. There was a switch. But Chelmsford . . . .

And so a lifetime is ordered and finds its meaning in a scheme of binary opposition in which transitions are defined as 'sent' or 'invited', sacred or profane. Forty years of life are reconstructed, stretched between these polarities, somewhat asymmetrical, with the balance tipped towards the divine.

The final transition, retirement, is movement from the sacred to the profane: a rite of reincorporation which restores normality. One minister's wife observed: 'I think ministers and their wives miss out on normality. It's a very lonely life. Now we've come back here in retirement, they don't look on us so much as the parson. We learn more of the little undercurrents now'. Her husband concurred:

> That's very true. They treat us now as if for the first time in our lives we're normal human beings . . . except that now and then one of them will remember . . . and it's all spoiled temporarily . . . .

'CLOSURE': FOOTBALLERS AND TEACHERS

The timetable of professional footballers' lives is finely calibrated. They advance from juveniles and apprentices to professional status through nicely graduated steps. Their lives, like the Methodist ministers', is highly structured; but their careers, unlike the ministers', are drastically foreshortened. Successive transfer fees accelerate the passage of time. Throughout their twenties they are engaged in urgent future-planning. The teachers in their thirties taking degrees are testing the openness of life: afraid that closure has already occurred. This is, perhaps, a symptom of the psychoanalyst's 'mid-life crisis'.

Closure for footballers arrives early, perhaps before thirty, and certainly not much after:

> When I was twenty-eight the manager said: 'Right, that's it: you're twenty-eight now, I can't give you a rise now.' And they start looking for someone to replace you. In the old days you used to get players playing till they were thirty-four or thirty-five. Not now. You see now, when they're thirty, they're virtually shattered. Especially in mid-field, running around for six or seven years. And they say, 'Oh, he's no good. He's twenty-nine now.' And they do look old at that age now, people in football.

After thirty it's a bonus. 'Not many people have a good ten years at the game'.

A sense of accelerated time leads to intolerance of waste. A marriage going wrong at twenty-four has to be jettisoned quickly: 'I thought, "I'm missing everything. It's all going flashing past me. If I don't get hold of myself soon, my life's going to be finished and there'll be nothing to show!"

There is no such time-panic among the teachers, but a sense that both their careers and mental lives have closed in. Without clear plans to change their lives and careers, they are tentatively testing the possibilities of openness. The rest of life is not, perhaps, finally decided and implicit in all that has gone before, age-related career stages are not immutable and pre-ordained. One finds re-assurance in the biographical summaries at the end of research papers:

> Whenever I read journal articles I read the author's biography: when they got a degree, when they got a doctorate, what they did before. I'm always fascinated by people who, you know, worked

> somewhere then all of a sudden, at the age of thirty or thirty-four or seventy-three, took a degree or a Ph D., that sort of thing. Because in that way I suppose I seem to think, 'Well, there's time for me yet to change my . . . options are still open.' That is how I look at things.

His own career to date has been perfectly linear: his father is an accountant; he took a degree at LSE; at twenty-four he acquired both a wife and a mortgage. In his early thirties he is fondly savouring models of indeterminacy.

AGE AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Forty years ago Talcott Parsons emphasized the separateness of 'youth', conceded that in modern societies 'age lines are not specific but approximate', but maintained that 'this does not, however, necessarily lessen their structural significance'.[24] The teachers in this study did not see age as either a powerful or proper regulator of social relationships: they played down, without wholly denying, its significance. But for the two heavily age-graded groups – the Methodist ministers in their seventies and the professional footballers in their twenties – age certainly 'mattered': age differences were seen as important and influenced behaviour. But the parsons did not venerate age and the footballers youth: footballers like parsons said age should be respected. The footballers had no particular sense of solidarity with their generation or commitment to a youth culture or ideology.

The teachers did not express disapproval of eighteen-year-olds marrying ('If they're quite sure they're doing the right thing'), or of large age-differences in marriage – up to twenty years ('It's their marriage, it's their life'). They had no strong sense that there was 'a right age to do things' ('If a girl wants to have a child at sixteen, then, you know, as long as they really want to . . . It's not my scene, but if that's what they want, O.K.'). The (single) woman RE teacher is impressed by the weak connection between age and maturity: 'When I think of the tape-recorded conversations of schoolchildren I think of their ages and I'm absolutely floored. I'm sure we hold kids back by putting all the eleven-year-olds together, and all the twelve'. She has no sense of belonging to 'her generation'; it is the girls she teaches who have a powerful sense of age: ' "Have you got a nice boyfriend, miss? Have you got a steady? Aren't you going to get engaged?" They are really concerned about it. "It's time you were looking miss. Don't you like Mr. Jones?" '

The footballers had strikingly conservative social attitudes – the older ones, nudging thirty, regretted that collars and ties and suits

were no longer required in the dining room and when travelling to an away match ('Even the boss wears a crew-neck pullover now'). They respected social position and occupational rank ('Football opens things up social-wise . . . The working-class person like me' – his father is a lorry driver – 'can meet directors like we've got here. They're talking about money all the time . . . After the game we can go upstairs and have a drink with them, and that'). And they respect age, not only because of the experience it implies.

They disapprove of large age-differences in marriage; so do the parsons: 'It is one of the things that has troubled me very greatly . . . I have tried to dissuade them . . .' (This parson's own daughter married at thirty-seven.) And they tended to think that respect should be automatically accorded to age:

> Yes, I think so. Oh, yes. I think that it's sensible for a young man, even if he's not in agreement with everything that the older man says, should show a certain willingness to believe that the older one has reached certain opinions, certain conclusions, as a result of genuine experience.

But the gulf between the generations, another parson thought, was virtually unbridgeable:

> You see, I think the generations are irreconcilably divided. My generation was totally different from my father's generation, and my children's generation is totally different from mine. I've felt that all my life. Of course they run into each other. But I'm quite sure that mentally and psychologically the generations are different. They are set apart.

CONCLUSION

Recent American research on 'subjective age' brings seriously into question Mannheimian notions of generational consciousness. So did the author's research on English university students in the late nineteen-sixties.[25] The American studies show a marked bimodal distribution of generational consciousness.[26] A majority of Americans between twenty-five and sixty-five seem to have very little age identification; but a significant proportion of those between eighteen and twenty-four tend to identify with their age-group, and similar proportions among people over sixty-five. But even among the young a very strong sense of 'stratum solidarity' is rare (between 16 and 32 per cent); and – contrary to the recent strident assertions of English Marxists[27] – there are no social-class differences. Working-class youth in America – whether especially oppressed or not – are not distinguished by a particularly strong sense of generational

consciousness and solidarity. The author similarly found English university students in the late nineteen-sixties with a very weak sense of belonging to the younger generation: future orientation towards a particular vocation or profession was much stronger.

The inquiry reported above is consistent with this picture. The younger subjects, the teachers and footballers, had no sense of loyalty or belonging to their own 'age-stratum'. It was the superannuated parsons who were defensively– and sometimes offensively – embedded in theirs.

This study has been directed towards the meanings that 'actors' find in age and particular transitions in the course of the life-cycle. It would be easy to impose pre-selected criteria, like van Gennep's tripartite diachronic structure, on the changes experienced at different stages in life. The footballers experienced separation (leaving home perhaps as early as fifteen); liminality (a period as a 'juvenile' or apprentice); and incorporation (professional status); the parsons experienced rites of separation from the secular sphere on ordination; their entire careers as ministers were a form of liminality; retirement was a rite of re-aggregation. This kind of formal dissection is a pointless and unhelpful imposition on the experience of those involved. The truly meaningful and symbolic rites of passage were entirely unexpected and would not be picked up in such an analysis: mortgages were a complete surprise; and so, indeed, was a parson's retirement not as a rite of separation but of incorporation.

The point of taking contrasted groups is to make comparisons which suggest the function of rites of passage, as distinct from their meanings for 'actors'. This study lends some support to the functionalism of both van Gennep and Gluckman. Rites of passage were both more objectively elaborate and subjectively meaningful for the Methodist ministers than for the other two groups. This is consistent with van Gennep's thesis regarding the special significance (and danger) of transitions between profane and sacred spheres; and with Gluckman's thesis regarding role ambiguity: a secularized world calls for an especially emphatic differentiation of the parson's role. (The 'dog-collar' has emerged only comparatively recently along with secularization.) But the comparisons in this study are also between different points in time. Marriage as a rite of passage does not simply differ in importance between different social groups: in the nineteen-twenties it was still perhaps the most important rite of passage in life; in the nineteen-seventies it is not.

But concepts of chronological ages are important '*bonnes à penser*': they are part of the conceptual apparatus which members employ to create social order. The meaning of temporal relationships and sequences may be open to renegotiation; but age remains an important

aspect of social structure. Chronological age is still an important principle of social differentiation, especially, perhaps in the bipolar opposition of youth and old age.

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NOTES

1. Talcott Parsons, 'Age and sex in the social structure of the United States', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 7, 1942.

2. Ralph Linton, 'Age and sex categories', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 7, 1942.

3. J. S. La Fontaine (ed.), *Sex and Age as Principles of Social Differentiation*, London, Academic Press, 1978, pp. 18 and 21.

4. R. J. Bocock, 'Ritual: civic and religious', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 21, 1970.

5. O. F. Raum, 'Some aspects of indigenous education among the Chaga', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. 68, 1938.

6. E. R. Leach, 'Magical hair', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. 88, 1958.

7. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.

Radcliffe-Brown asserts that 'The reasons given by members of a community for any custom they observe are important data for the anthropologist' (p. 142), but it is not clear what use he makes of these data since they are, apparently, only 'rationalizations' (p. 152). Radcliffe-Brown recommends his own practice: 'the method of investigating rites and ritual values that I have found most profitable during work extending over more than thirty years is to study rites as symbolic expressions and to seek to discover their functions' (p: 145).

8. Needham examined dual symbolic classification among the Banyoro of Uganda to explain why the diviner cast cowrie shells with his left hand: see Rodney Needham, 'Right and left in Nyoro symbolic classification', *Africa*, vol. 37, 1967.
Beattie wrote an article allegedly 'to set the Nyoro ethnographic record straight' (see John Beattie, 'Aspects of Nyoro symbolism', *Africa*, vol. 38, 1968) but in a footnote (p. 415) raised an important methodological point: 'whether the classifications expounded in studies of this kind exist in the minds of the people being studied, and, if so, at what level of explicitness, or only in the mind of the observer'. Needham defended himself in his Introduction to R. Needham (ed.), *Right and Left. Essays in Dual Symbolic Classification*, University of Chicago Press, 1973; Beattie carried his attack further in: 'Right, left and the Banyoro', *Africa*, vol. 6, 1976, raising again the problem of the connection between classificatory schemes of binary opposition in Needham's mind and classificatory schemes in the minds of the Banyoro.

9. Gluckman's well-known 'ritual rebellion' thesis is advanced in Max Gluckman, *Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa*, Manchester University Press, 1954. Beidelman claimed that 'Gluckman's analysis veers close to teleological functionalism' and insisted that 'one must first determine what the members of the society concerned say (and thus probably think) that they are doing'. See T. O.

Beidelman, 'Swazi royal ritual', *Africa*, vol. 36, 1966.

10. Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process*, Penguin Books, 1975, p. 11.

11. W. S. F. Pickering, 'The persistence of rites of passage: towards an explanation', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 25, 1974.

12. E. Gellner, *Cause and Meaning in the Social Sciences*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, p. 45 n. 1.

13. Robin Horton, 'Neo-Tylorianism: sound sense or sinister prejudice?', *Man* (ns), vol. 3, 1968.

14. John Beattie, *Other Cultures*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, p. 62.

15. Jack Goody, 'Religion and ritual: the definitional problem', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12, 1961.

16. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (ed. Talcott Parsons), New York: the Free Press, 1964, pp. 99–100 and Diana Leat, 'Misunderstanding *Verstehen*', *Sociological Review*, vol. 20, 1972.

17. Beattie sees symbolism as the defining feature of ritual: see John Beattie, 'Ritual and social change', *Man* (ns), vol. 1, 1966.

18. E. R. Leach, *Rethinking Anthropology*, Athlone Press, 1966, p. 135.

19. Arnold van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage* (translated by M. B. Vizedom and G. L. Caffee), Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 3.

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24. Talcott Parsons, 'Age and sex in the social structure of the United States', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 7, 1942.

25. F. Musgrove, 'University freshmen and their parents' attitudes', *Educational Research*, vol. 10, 1967 and D. Child and F. Musgrove, 'Career orientation of some university freshmen', *Educational Review*, vol. 21, 1969.

26. P. L. Kasscham, H. E. Ransford and V. L. Bengtson, 'Generational consciousness and youth movement participation: contrasts in blue collar and white collar youth', *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 30, 1974 and N. E. Cutler and V. L. Bengtson, 'The attitudinal meaning of subjective age identification among young adults': paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 1975.

27. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds), *Resistance Through Rituals*, Hutchinson, 1976 and Geoff Mungham and Geoff Pearson (eds), *Working Class Youth Culture*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976. For contrary evidence on weak 'age-grading' in England see F. Musgrove, 'Intergeneration attitudes', *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, vol. 2, 1963.

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Depillarisation in the Netherlands

INTRODUCTION

The pillarised structure of Dutch society assumed its most developed form between the late 1910s and the mid 1960s.[1] During this period most people lived most of their lives within one of the following three (or four) pillars: Roman Catholic, orthodox Calvinist or secular, with the last sometimes further divided into bourgeois liberal/conservative and socialist constituents. It is not possible to specify the numbers in each pillar but the 1960 Census recorded religious affiliations as follows: RC 40.4 percent, Dutch Reformed 28.3 percent, Rereformed 9.3 percent, Others 3.6 percent and None 18.4 percent.[2] Figure I sets out the pillarised structure of four institutional areas. Primary schools played a crucial part in the consolidation of the pillarised structure of Dutch society; parties and unions are central concerns of this article; and television serves as just one example of the extension of pillarisation beyond the concerns of this article.[3]

The aim of this paper is to consider some of the causes and consequences of the depillarisation which began in the 1960s. I shall advance the proposition that attempts to democratize and decentralize the internal organization of the pillars, or *zuilen*, can only end in the dissolution of the pillarised structure itself. In addition, I shall argue that one cannot adequately characterize depillarisation unless one also considers the character of the Dutch class structure. Failure to do this is responsible both for Lijphart's mischaracterization of political change from the mid 60s to the early 70s as a movement from consociational to *depoliticized* democracy, and for the perplexed air of recent analyses of changes in industrial relations.[4] In connection with the latter, it is mistaken to suppose that the erosion of major vertical divisions within the working class necessarily leads to intensified class action in politics and industry. The mistake derives from use of Marx as a source of expectations of class action when neo-Weberian ideas of a fragmentary

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FIGURE I *The Pillarisation of Dutch Society c 1960*

PILLAR	INSTITUTION			
	PRIMARY SCHOOL	PARTY	TU	TV[1]
1 RC	RC	CATHOLIC PEOPLE'S (KVP)	RC (NKV)[2]	RC (KRO)
2 ORTHODOX CALVINIST (Rereformed & strict DR)	PROTESTANT	CHRISTIAN HISTORICAL UNION (CHU)[3] ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY (ARP)[4]	PROTESTANT (CNV)	PROTESTANT (NCRV)
3a GENERAL: mainly BOURGEOIS LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE (liberal DR & no religion)	PUBLIC	PEOPLE'S PARTY FOR FREEDOM & DEMOCRACY (VVD)	[5]	GENERAL (AVRO) LIBERAL (VPRO)[6]
3b SOCIALIST (liberal DR & no religion)	PUBLIC	LABOUR (PvdA)	SOCIALIST (NVV)	SOCIALIST (VARA)

1. In addition the NTS, owned jointly by the pillarised broadcasting associations, provided programmes intended for all pillars.
2. From 1964.
3. Mostly DR and in origin more of a middle class party.
4. Mostly Rereformed and in origin more of a party of the 'little people'.
5. The very small liberal NVC organized higher civil servants and some other white-collar workers.
6. In origin liberal Protestant.

class structure offer a better clue to the course of contemporary change.

DEPILLARISATION, SOCIALISTS AND CATHOLICS

In 1959 Kruijt expected the Netherlands to experience gradual depillarisation, 'especially in those fields which are most remote from the essence of religion (sport, recreation, economic life)'.[5] Most observers, however, including Daalder, thought that the pillars were becoming stronger, not weaker, partly because more and more government subsidies were being apportioned to confessional organizations in ever more fields.[6] Thus, the extent and pace of depillarisation since the mid 60s have taken most of the Dutch by surprise, and there has been considerable doubt as to how the social changes involved should be characterized.

Some of the remaining linkages between institutions are represented, in simplified form, in Figure II. Reading across, it is important to note the formation of the joint Protestant and Catholic Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the joint Catholic and socialist Dutch Trade Union Federation (FNV). In addition, broadcasting has been complicated by the rise of TROS, a popular association which originated as an offshore pirate television station. Reading down, it is important to note the two most significant developments in the unusually fluid political scene from the mid 60s to the mid 70s; the emergence of a left Catholic affiliation with a political expression in the Party of Political Radicals (PPR), which has allied itself with the Labour Party (PvdA), and a secular liberal/progressive affiliation with a political expression in the Democrats '66 (D'66), among others, who have committed themselves to participatory politics and to opposition to both the 'liberal' VVD and Labour.

Before trying to account for the depillarisation of the 1960s and 1970s, it is worth distinguishing three processes to all of which Dutch writers have applied the associated term 'deconfessionalisation'. They are (1) the decline in the religious as a proportion of the total population (from 81.6 percent recorded by the Census in 1960 to 76.4 percent in 1971)[7]; (2) the increase in the religious who do not belong to, or support, confessional political, economic and social associations as a proportion of the total religious, and (3) the absorption of confessional associations in new organizations whose constituency is drawn from more than one of the traditional pillars. In practice, deconfessionalisation is tantamount to depillarisation in so far as it enables conservatives, liberal/progressives and socialists to divide according to horizontal differences of class and other sectional interests. It should always be remembered that the Protestant bourgeois liberals and the socialists never sought the establishment

FIGURE II *The Depillarisation of Dutch Society c 1978*

RELIGION/IDEOLOGY	INSTITUTION[1]			
	PRIMARY SCHOOL	PARTY	TU	TV[2]
RC	RC	CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC APPEAL (CDA)	GENERAL (FNV)	RC (KRO) General (AVRO, TROS)
LEFT RC	RC	RADICAL (PPR)	GENERAL (FNV)	RC (KRO) General (AVRO, TROS)
ORTHODOX CALVINIST	PROTESTANT	CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC APPEAL (CDA) Political Reformed (SGP)	PROTESTANT (CNV)	PROTESTANT (NCRV, EO)
CONSERVATIVE	PUBLIC R. Cath	PEOPLE'S PARTY FOR FREEDOM & DEMOCRACY (VVD)	[3]	GENERAL (AVRO, TROS)
LIBERAL/PROGRESSIVE	PUBLIC R. Cath	DEMOCRATS '66 (D'66) Others	GENERAL (FNV)	GENERAL (AVRO, TROS) Liberal/Progressive (VPRO)
SOCIALIST	PUBLIC R. Cath	LABOUR (Pvd A)	GENERAL (FNV)	SOCIALIST (VARA) GENERAL (AVRO, TROS) Liberal/Progressive (VPRO)

1. Lesser variants are given in lower case.
2. In addition the NTS, owned jointly by the pillarised broadcasting associations, provides programmes of common interest. TROS is a popular broadcasting association which originated as a pirate television station.
3. Unions of professional staffs and the higher paid are grouped in the RMHP.

of a separate secular pillar but rather found themselves living within one as a consequence of their inability to reverse the past, and prevent the future, separation of orthodox Calvinists and Catholics.

It is also worth remembering that challenges to *verzuiling* are nothing new. The first major assault was mounted before the War by the secularist, and sometimes anti-clerical, leaders of the Social Democratic Workers' Party who tried to detach workers from the pillarised structure of Dutch society and politics. That they elicited little response from Catholic workers is hardly surprising. For half a century the Catholics had sought separate institutions, and for centuries before that they had suffered the consequences of exclusion from government. The Pacification of 1917 in effect guaranteed their separate institutions and at the same time it ensured that the participation of the Catholic People's Party (KVP) was a crucial issue in the formation of any government. After centuries of discrimination, it is understandable that the new political insiders should have found the overtures of the socialist outsiders unappealing.[8] When in 1939, on the eve of the War, they finally entered government for the first time, the socialists reinforced a structure which hitherto they had been pledged to break through. It is for this reason that the politics of accommodation, which Lijphart dates from 1917, may perhaps be said to have only become fully operative some two decades later. After the war the Social Democrats, the left liberals who had broken away from the Liberal Party, the forerunners of the VVD, over the franchize question towards the end of the last century, and some individual Catholics formed today's Labour Party which, though it eschewed militant secularism, nonetheless renewed the attempt to break through the pillarised social structure. It had no more success with Catholic workers than its predecessor; even the strategem of forming a separate Catholic section within the party failed. Nevertheless the RC bishops feared the socialist movement sufficiently to threaten, in a pastoral letter in 1954, the denial of the sacraments to all Catholics who joined a union affiliated to the socialist trade union federation (the NVV), which was closely connected with the Labour Party. Catholics were also forbidden to attend socialist meetings, read socialist papers or listen to the socialist radio.

Why did the breakthrough which eluded the socialists for so long proceed so dramatically in the 60s and 70s? With hindsight one can recognize (1) that no challenge to *verzuiling* could succeed until the forces of modernism were stronger than the forces of anti-modernism, and (2) that a successful challenge had to originate with the Catholics who had formerly had most need of the protection of their own institutions. With respect to the first, it is worth recalling that the very name of the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) proclaimed the opposition of orthodox Calvinists to the secularism of the French

Revolution. Moreover the party originated in the late 19th Century campaign for the public funding of confessional schools, which, in turn, was part of a more general war on the unGodliness of the modern world. Similarly the *Syllabus of Errors* of 1864 obliged Catholics to abandon emancipation through participation in general multi-confessional institutions in favour of the development of separate Catholic institutions with the same rights, and the same claims on public funds, as any others. Hence Kruijt's comment that the pillar system was 'a kind of counter-offensive of some churches to protect their members against the secularizing effects of modern society; it increased the social control of church members by promoting group exclusiveness, exclusiveness of the religious ingroup'.[9] With respect to the second, it must be remembered that separation by the Catholics of their own volition reinforced the separation imposed upon them by three centuries of social and political discrimination.

How, then, did the forces of modernism come to triumph? The most important factor was the economic prosperity of the later 1950s and the 1960s. The Netherlands had industrialized late, had suffered badly in the Depression of the 1930s, had long considered themselves overpopulated and had sponsored emigration. The successful reconstruction of the economy after the War, adhesion to the EEC, the import of migrant labour instead of its export, and the rise in real incomes promoted an expansiveness in which the essentially protective structures of the pillars seemed increasingly anachronistic; and for the young, the beneficiaries of expanded educational opportunity, the conservatism and stuffiness of Dutch society, the control of its politics by the party élites and, last but by no means least, the staidness of the national and pillarised broadcasting services were all especially unacceptable. In a climate of economic and cultural expansiveness, the traditional social controls of the *zuilen* were no longer tolerable.

By the 1960s the Catholics, in particular, were shedding their defences.[10] Their participation in the Resistance had finally laid to rest doubts about their loyalty to the Dutch nation, and their participation in a prospering economy was rapidly closing the economic gap between themselves and the Protestants. As they advanced economically and socially, often in conjunction with migration from established Catholic communities, many ordinary Catholics, especially among those who had grown to maturity since the War, were inclined to assume more responsibility for their own lives and defer less to the leaders, clerical and lay, of the Catholic organizations to which they were attached. The process had started in the 50s and the 1954 bishops' letter, so often taken as a measure of the power of the episcopacy, is better regarded as a sign of its growing impotence. The process accelerated in the late 50s and the 60s and the church moved

quickly to contain it and, indeed, to give direction to it. The way in which it did so has recently been ably analyzed by Coleman. It involved the substitution of a commitment to collegiality in place of the traditional stress on hierarchy, and the adoption of 'a cultural-pastoral strategy based on a structural differentiation of church and secular society' in place of the old 'diffuse strategy for controlling society'.[11] In one sense these represented only the most rapid and extreme examples of changes occurring in many provinces of the universal church during the period of Vatican II. Nevertheless precisely because the Dutch case was so rapid and extreme, it is necessary to attend to the combination of structural and fortuitous factors which were responsible for it.

Pillarisation had ensured that the clergy were associated with an extraordinary range of organizations. As a consequence they were well aware of the economic and social advancement of the laity and began to perceive the incongruity of structures and postures which were derived first from the period of Catholic defensiveness and then from the period of triumphalism in which the church gloried in the notion that it would outbreed its rivals. Enough of the priests were uneasy at the furore generated by the 1954 bishops' letter to ensure that those among them who were involved, thanks to a privilege unique to the Dutch church, in the nomination of new bishops chose men of a different outlook in future. Vacancies and the creation of two new sees allowed this privilege to be exercised to such effect that by 1958 a majority of the bishops were non-signatories of the 1954 letter. Because the Netherlands are so compact, and because pillarisation had itself demanded it, the Dutch bishops had developed the practice of speaking and acting collectively more than probably any other national episcopacy. The change in composition of the bishops was associated with a call for reassessment of the place of the church in modern Dutch society. It was quickly answered and the Catholic media amplified the ensuing debate. At its height in the mid 60s Coleman estimates that 15 percent of the entire Catholic population was taking part in the discussions at all levels from the parish up.[12] In 1965 the bishops lifted the proscription on socialist organizations, and the 'progressive' views on collegiality, ecumenism, contraception and the celibacy of priests which they promoted in the Second Vatican Council caught the attention of the world press. There were special reasons why the debate in the Netherlands was so animated.[13] The Dutch Catholic community had, as a consequence of past discrimination and the erection of its own pillar, retained within it dissenting voices among intellectuals and workers who would have been lost to its counterparts in other national societies. It was also a community not only conscious of its Catholicism but also confident in the very material and organizational strength which pillarisation had given it. Thus the Dutch Catholic community

could afford internal division, being neither complacent, nor beleagured, nor disorganized.

Of all the new commitments, collegiality was the most important because it represented not only a departure from the traditional practice of the universal church but also a contradiction of one of the essential features of *verzuiling*. In the movement of renewal the laity were encouraged to speak out and to take greater responsibility for the running of Catholic community affairs. Laity replaced clergy in the management of many organizations and on the boards of many publications. In sum, the clergy relinquished its overall control of the Dutch Catholic community, the majority cheerfully, the minority fearfully. Inevitably the transformation of traditional relations of authority, and the introduction of divisions in what had been a solidary community, offended some. It also alarmed Pope Pius VI who installed two conservative bishops in 1970 and 1972 in order to arrest the reforms – but by then it was too late. The percentage of Catholics attending Mass each Sunday, estimated at 73 percent in 1964 and 64 percent in 1966, had fallen to 47 percent by 1970 and 40 percent in 1977.[14] In addition, resignations from the priesthood went up from 74 in 1966 to 243 in 1970, and ordinations fell from 301 in 1963 and 227 in 1966 to 48 in 1970 and 26 in 1972.[15] At the same time, the changed relations of authority deprived the leadership of the KVP of its traditional hold over the Catholic vote. Electoral support for the party fell from 31.9 percent of the national vote in 1963 to 17.7 percent in 1972.[16] The controversial papal appointments of 1970 and 1972 may have served to quieten the great debate among Dutch Catholics, but they did not, indeed they could not, reverse the erosion of the Catholic pillar which the debate both reflected and accelerated. Confirmation of this was provided by the merger of the Catholic and the larger socialist trade union federation to form the FNV in 1976, and the cooperation between the KVP and the ARP and CHU in local politics and the eventual formation with them of the CDA for the 1977 National Election.[17]

The depillarisation of Dutch society ushered in an unusually fluid period of politics. Between 1963 and 1972 the number of seats in Parliament won by parties other than the big five increased from 15 out of 150 to 37. (See table I). Perhaps the most spectacular advance was that made by D'66, a new party dedicated to more open and participatory government. Equally significant, however, was the emergence of the Radicals; even more than D'66, they opened the way for Catholic support for Labour in 1977. Irwin, citing Dittrich's unpublished doctoral thesis, argues that

> There is in fact a time lag between the point at which the confessional losses began and the Socialist and Liberal gains started.

TABLE I *Division of seats between all parties in the second chamber of parliament 1963–1977*

Party		*Election Year*				
		1963	*1967*	*1971*	*1972*	*1977*
Catholic Peoples'	KVP	50	42	35	27	–
Anti-Revolutionary	ARP	13	15	13	14	–
Christian Historical Union	CHU	13	12	10	7	–
Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	–	–	–	–	49
Labour	PvdA	43	37	39	43	53
Peoples' . . . for Freedom & Democracy	VVD	16	17	16	22	28
Communist	CPN	4	5	6	7	2
Pacifist Socialist	PSP	4	4	2	2	1
Political Reformed (right Calv't)	SGP	3	3	3	3	3
Farmers (right Calv't)	BP	3	7	1	3	3
Reformed Polit Alliance (right Free Reformed Church only)	GPV	1	1	2	2	1
Democrats 66 (open govt)	D'66	–	7	11	6	8
Democratic Socialist 70 (anti left domination of Lab)	DS'70	–	–	8	6	1
Middle Class	NMP	0	0	2	0	0
Radical (left Cath)	PPR	–	–	2	7	3
Roman Catholic (anti Cath liberalisation)	RKPN	–	–	–	1	0
Reformed Political Fed (ex ARP/CHU anti CDA)	RPF	–	–	–	–	0

nb Total Seats 150

Sources: Europa Yearbooks.
Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (1978), pt. E, table 2, p. 88.

> In 1977 when the confessional vote was stabilized, the Socialist and Liberal gains were greatest . . . given traditional differences and animosities it was difficult for a previously confessional voter to move immediately to one of the secular parties. Instead he made his move in two steps, either by sitting out one election and not voting or voting first for one of the new, minor parties.[18]

Turning from the confessional/secular to the right/left difference, Miller and Stouthard conclude, from an examination of data collected in connection with the 1970 provincial elections and the 1972 National Election, that those confessionally attached who voted

non-confessionally, a category most common among Catholics and least among Rereformed, preferred parties of the centre and right by a ratio of 2:1.[19] On the other hand, the first generation deconfessionalised preferred parties of the left, the rate of deconfessionalisation being highest among Dutch Reformed and lowest among Rereformed. These conclusions are consistent with table II which compares the sources of party support by religious group for 1964 and 1977. In the former year Labour drew 6 percent of its support from Catholics who attended church weekly (regulars) and 7 percent from other Catholics (irregulars); in 1977 it obtained 5 percent of its support from Catholic regulars and 19 percent from irregulars. As there were 3.7 times as many regulars as irregulars in 1964, compared with 1.3 times as many irregulars as regulars in 1977, support for Labour from regulars actually increased from 8 percent of their number to 12 percent over the thirteen years, whilst the support of irregulars declined from 41 percent to 34 percent.[20] Nevertheless 34 percent is a smaller percentage of a much larger total so that overall Labour nearly doubled its Catholic support. The same table shows that the VVD also benefitted from increased Catholic support, especially from irregulars. The 23 percent support for 'other parties' from the same source includes votes for the Radicals. The table also reveals that, remarkably, Labour now derives more than half of its vote from electors with no religion, and it confirms Miller and Stouthard's findings that Rereformed irregulars are the least likely to vote non-confessionally. In addition, the 'other religious parties' column for 1977 exposes the strength of orthodox Calvinist support for right wing Calvinist parties. In sum, the decline of the religious parties resulted in the loss of 28 of their 76 seats between 1963 and 1977 – an experience that moved them to combine as the CDA for the 1977 National Election. Although the new party won one additional seat and went on, eventually, to become the prime ministerial party in the current government, it was the two main secular parties, Labour and the VVD, which made by far the larger gain, 16 seats in all.

The demand for the democratization of politics vividly expressed by D'66 also led to important changes within the Labour Party.[21] There the New Left led the challenge to the traditional domination of the party elite. Fearing that the New Left might found their own party at a time when Labour's electoral fortunes were already in decline, the leadership chose to come to terms. Decentralization required leaders to respect Congress decisions and to account to party activists; it also gave greater influence to lower level and local party bodies. In addition, the party supported innumerable action groups. Most importantly of all, the insistence of the active membership that party accommodations be reached before elections and then presented to the electorate, and the corresponding refusal to allow party leaders to make the usual compromises in the

TABLE II *Religion and Party Preference*

RELIGION	*Principal Religious Parties*				*Principal Secular Parties*					*Other Parties*		
	CATH 1964	*ARP 1964*	*CHU 1964*	*CDA 1977*	*LAB 1964*	*LAB 1977*	*VVD 1964*	*VVD 1977*	*D66 1977*	*OTHERS 1964*	*OTHER RELIG 1977*	*OTHERS 1977*
CATHOLIC – REGULAR[1]	90	2	1	32	6	5	5	8	11	2	0	0
CATHOLIC – IRREGULAR[2]	9	0	1	23	7	19	9	21	19	2	0	23
REREFORMED – REG[1]	0	71	8	16	2	1	1	1	0	20	57	1
REREFORMED – IRREG[2]				3		1		4	0		4	3
DR – REGULAR[1]	0	15	61	9	3	1	4	3	0	4	38	1
DR – IRREGULAR[2]	1	8	22	9	41	19	39	26	19	16	0	13
OTHER RELIGIONS	0	3	5		4		4			8		
NO RELIGION	0	1	2	8	37	54	39	37	51	47	0	58
	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	99	99	99
CATHOLIC – REG 64	90	2	1		6		5			2		
CALVINIST – REG 64	0	86	69		5		5			24		
REST	10	12	30		89		91			73		
CATHOLIC – REG 77	.			32		5		8	11		0	0
CALVINIST – REG 77				25		2		4	0		95	2
CATH/CALV – IRREG 77				35 } 43		39 } 93		51 } 88	38 } 89		4 } 4	39 } 97
NO RELIGION				8 }		54 }		37 }	51 }		0 }	58 }

1. Regular: attends church at least once a week.

2. Irregular: attends church less than once a week.

Sources: 1964 – Netherlands Foundation for Statistics, The Hague. These %s have been adapted from Lijphart (1975) table 5, p. 31. NB In contrast to the 1977 source, Lijphart's table includes 'don't knows' (here excluded) and other religions but does not separate out Rereformed irregulars.
1977 – 1977 Dutch National Election Study. These %s have been calculated from figures given in a different form in table 3 of G. A. Irwin (forthcoming).

post-electoral formation of the next coalition, had as its consequence in 1978 the exclusion of the party from government even though it had made the largest gains in 1977. Objectors to the Dutch single list system of proportional representation have long complained that the formation of coalitions need not, and sometimes does not, reflect movement in the support for the parties at the ballot box; 1978 provided them with a particularly stark example.

Initially the prominence of the New Left prompted the appearance of a new Democratic Socialist '70 Party opposed to the left's domination of Labour. In the longer term, however, a more ideological and active Labour Party has gained strength at the expense of the Communists and the left splinter parties. Nevertheless, its gains owe even more to the erosion of the Catholic pillar and the freeing of Catholic workers from the KVP.

In concluding this section, I want to challenge Lijphart's characterization of changes in the political structure since the mid 60s. Lijphart's analysis is derived from the model of consociational democracy which he constructed to account for political stability in the absence of an homogeneous political culture. The pillarisation of politics sustained a fragmented political culture but paradoxically did not lead to instability or immobilism, a succession of governments unable to achieve anything decisive, because, Lijphart argued that overarching cooperation at the level of political élites compensated for the segmentation of the people. This model and the accompanying analysis of the politics of accommodation have rightly won general assent. What I question is Lijphart's judgment that 'In recent years Dutch politics . . . has been moving away from the consociational to the depoliticized type of democracy', where consociational democracy is characterized by fragmented political culture and coalescent (as opposed to competitive) élite behaviour and depoliticized democracy by homogeneous political culture and coalescent élite behaviour.[22] I would argue that, on the contrary, Dutch politics are more politicized now than at any time since the Pacification of 1917 and that Lijphart is prevented from acknowledging this by his equation of a fragmented political culture with a pillarised one. Instead depillarisation, as Lijphart himself concedes, renders class and other sectional cleavages more visible and these are increasingly the basis of political and industrial action. Thus, contrary to Lijphart, what the Netherlands display is not the disappearance of fragmentation, but the replacement of one form, based on pillarisation, by another, based on stratification.

Dutch politics have been livelier, and political clashes sharper, since D'66 set out to explode the traditional political structure. In so far as depillarisation involves the erosion of élite controls which used to leave ordinary citizens deferential to, and indifferent about, their political leaders, Dutch politics could only become more volatile

and more political; it was plainly the politics of accommodation which were depoliticized, not their successors. Given, too, widespread disillusionment with the common practice of including in coalitions parties which had lost seats at the preceding election and excluding those which had gained them, it is hardly surprising that Labour, the Radicals, D'66 and the religious parties have all at various times been moved to declare in advance of elections who they would, and would not, be willing to join in a coalition. This has sometimes produced blocs such as the progressive bloc, with Labour at its centre, in 1971–72, and the religious bloc of parties who were later to form the CDA. But this does not amount to polarization, despite recourse to the word by writers groping for a term for the more robust politics of recent times, there being, I shall argue, no basis for polarization in a society which is fragmented horizontally as well as vertically.[23] In any case talk of polarization ignores the third force of the VVD which was growing in strength at the time.

DEPILLARISATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Depillarisation has also had important consequences for industrial relations. For the first decade and a half after the War Dutch industrial relations were largely free of conflict, but this has decidedly not been true of the subsequent period. Union cooperation with management and government (albeit government-in-exile) began during the Occupation and continued afterwards. By facilitating the reconstruction of the economy, with new industrial sectors, the unions hoped to avoid any repetition of the unemployment of the 30s. To this end they participated in a system of 'guided wage policies' which required national collective agreements, reached in bipartite negotiations, to be assessed by the College of Mediators (CvR) in accordance with criteria laid down by the government after consultation with the Foundation of Labour (SvdA), a body on which both the employers' and the union federations were represented. The unions also took part with employers' and 'crown' representatives in the Socio-Economic Council (SER) which was established in 1950 to advise the government on its social and economic policies. But just as politics used to depend upon negotiations between party élites which kept their distance from those they claimed to represent, so industrial relations demanded national negotiations by union and employer élites and the government. Unions were highly centralized; there was very little plant level bargaining and no shop stewards' movement.[24] Instead, in enterprises employing more than twenty-five workers, there were supposed to be works councils, but, being only advisory, the latter evoked little interest and were set up in less than half the enterprises concerned. There was some loosening of

wage controls in 1954, as shortages of labour became more acute, but the system continued more or less intact until 1959.

In the 1960s and 70s a number of different processes combined to transform this structure. Principal among them was a growing disenchantment with élite control of pillarised institutions. In industrial relations this was reinforced by worker recognition, with or without the promptings of the New Left, that, in an increasingly prosperous economy, many employers could afford to pay more than national collective agreements required. For their part, many employers were willing to pay the extra money in order to attract workers in short supply. Thus, both unions and management wanted to bargain free of government supervision. By the mid 60s the bipartite boards of negotiation existed only where organized labour was weak, and in 1970 the CvR was abolished; only the SER continued to operate much as before. At the same time, leaders of the union federations faced demands for more autonomy for constituent unions (in which the metal and building unions were to the fore), and the latter, who were themselves highly centralized, in turn faced demands for democratic reform, the devolution of powers to regional and district levels and the development of 'plant work'. Failure to respond to these demands was associated with loss of individual members (in the absence of closed shops), unofficial action (including strikes), the secession of unions from the federations and a concomitant growth of 'categorical unions'. (Categorical unions represent the interest of a single category of workers – typically a white-collar or skilled group. They organize a fifth of the unionized labour force.) Willingness to accede to these demands gave rise to an industrial relations scene which was, by Dutch standards, turbulent. Moreover, according to Peper, each strike in the 60s and early 70s appeared 'to be directed toward breaking an established procedure or assumption in the industrial relations system'.[25] The development of 'plant work' is especially notable in that union officials have proved scarcely less anxious than managements to head off incipient shop stewards' movements. Despite reforms works councils remain of little moment to most workers.[26]

The incidence of industrial action fell again in the mid 70s. In the aftermath of the oil crisis, and in the context of world recession unions have been reluctant to do anything which might worsen unemployment. Nevertheless, their leaders now know that they have to strike harder bargains on behalf of the different groups they organize, and their willingness to do so has reined in many of the discontents which were responsible for the radicalization of the unions from below during the economically and culturally more expansive 60s. Governments, too, can no longer assume the union cooperation their forebears did in the 50s; instead they must win it in difficult negotiations.

The challenge to élite control of the unions came from forces which were increasingly sceptical of the need for pillarised unionism, and pressure for greater external cooperation with other unions ran parallel with demands for internal democratic reform. Pillarised unions which had once, in their anxiety to maintain central control of members, discouraged interrelations in the work place, now began to coordinate their increasingly assertive activities through, *inter alia*, the Union Consultation Board established in 1958. In the course of time the very justification for maintenance of their separate identities was called into question, and in 1976 the FNV was formed. The Protestant CNV has retained its independence. In this instance strict Calvinist conservatism manifests itself in suspicion of the new unionism, which emphasizes differences of interest, and a preference, which cannot be met, for the restoration of the old harmonious relations between unions, employers and government, which were founded upon belief in the mutuality of interests. Unlike the FNV, the CNV also supports the advisory works councils.

Windmuller, who published in 1968, stressed the significance of union decentralization and the disintegration of the guided wage policy system,[27] but today it is clearly necessary to distinguish between the de facto decentralization of the spontaneous workers' action of the decade before 1973 (autonomous local action) and the de iure controlled decentralization of the subsequent period (sponsored local action). Industry and company bargains are much more common than they were, and 'plant work' generally is more important, but they are the product of policies and procedures which the unions have been obliged to approve for fear of losing (control of) their members.

Akkermans and Grootings have recently referred to a development from corporatism to polarization but this seriously misleads in two ways.[28] Firstly, it suggests that the 'late capitalist' forces which have promoted increased incorporation of workers' organizations in other western European societies have been inoperative in the Netherlands. But this is to confuse means with ends. There has been a movement not from incorporation to polarization, but rather from incorporation based upon pillarisation, through a period of dislocation attendant upon depillarisation, towards reincorporation without pillarisation. The very failure of the unions to reach central agreements with the employers has provided governments with grounds for constant interference in wage determination. Moreover, the unions tended in the end to soften their opposition to the wage policies of the 1973–78 socialist led coalition in return for government adoption of proposals for investment grants, subsidies, taxes, unemployment benefits and other measures included in their action programmes. Secondly, there has been no polarization worthy of the name, no concentration into two great hostile camps. It is true that

depillarisation in industrial relations, as in politics, has eroded crucially important divisions within the working class, but other sources of internal differentiation are more visible than ever. Union decentralization has multiplied the bargains made, each bargain taking into account the particular circumstances of an industry, plant or occupational group. The revitalization of Dutch trade unionism owes more to recognition of the value of unions as instruments for the prosecution of particular interests than to consciousness of a community of interests of all workers by hand and by brain.

CONCLUSION: DEPILLARISATION AND THE CLASS STRUCTURE

Verzuiling depended upon strong sentiments of confessional solidarity and upon compliance with élite social and political control. In the 1960s and 70s the Dutch have shown themselves increasingly unwilling to accept unquestioningly the traditional authorities of each pillar – hence the demands for democratization. Yet it is hard to see the pillars surviving such demands. The 'progressive' and outward looking elements in the religious pillars have come to realize that, if they can afford to dispense with centralized authority, they no longer have need of the pillars at all – which is not to deny that depillarisation has proceeded, and will continue to proceed, faster in some spheres (politics and industrial relations for example) than in others (such as primary education).

It is not practical to launch now into a disquisition on class theory and the case of the Netherlands, but I do contend that, far from facilitating class polarization, depillarisation has exposed the fragmentary character of the Dutch class structure. In saying this I am mindful of Weber's comment that

> We may speak of a 'class' when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets.[29]

Applied to the workers, the effect is to emphasize the internal differences of qualification and skill which, mediated by the market, yield different life chances. Different groups of workers have, in the Weberian formulation, different class situations and class interests. Thus whilst in some respects one may speak of 'the working class', in others the singular is inappropriate. The same is true of the 'bourgeois' or middle class or classes.[30]

The maintenance of the pillarised structure of Dutch society

necessitated élite control of pillarised activites including politics and industrial relations. Dutch politics were dull and offered few opportunities for genuine citizen participation. With the demise of the big fix arranged by the party élites, they have become livelier and more ideologically contested, but the CDA must still appeal to a broad coalition of class and sectional interests, as, to a lesser but still significant degree, must the VVD and Labour. Similarly Dutch industrial relations were stable and afforded few opportunities for workers to engage in collective action to improve their pay and conditions for themselves. This is no longer the case, and union leaders today have to consolidate their position by responding to members whom once they would have directed. But in a fragmented class structure unions reinforce differences within classes as well as between them. Union rhetoric may call for socialist solidarity but union practice recognizes worker attachment to differentials, and for professional and many other white-collar groups unions justify themselves not as instruments of common struggle with the workers, but as devices for the protection of the superior incomes and perquisites which are necessary for the maintenance of economic, social and cultural distance from the workers.

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NOTES

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1. For general works on Dutch society see: J. Goudsblom, *Dutch Society*, New York, Random House, 1967; A. Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, 2nd edn, Berkeley, California UP, 1975; C. Bagley, *The Dutch Plural Society*, Oxford, OUP, 1973; M. C. Blanken, *Force of Order and Methods . . .*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1976; and J. Goudsblom, 'Dutch Society in Developmental Perspective', paper presented to the 9th World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, 1978.

2. Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook of the Netherlands*, The Hague, Staatsuitgeverij, 1978. See pt. E, table 1, p. 88.

3. In addition to general works, on schools see C. J. van Zeyl, *Ambition and Social Structure*, Farnborough, Saxon House, 1974, esp. ch. 2; and J. A. van Kemanade, 'Roman Catholics and their Schools', *Sociologia Neerlandica*, vol. 6, 1970, pp. 36–46: on parties see B. W. Schaper, 'Religious Groups and Political Parties in Contemporary Holland', in J. S. Bromley & E. H. Kossman (eds), *Britain and the Netherlands*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1960; H. Daalder, 'The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society', in R.A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Opposition in Western Democracy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966; and G. A. Irwin, 'From Order to Chaos (and a New Order?): Trends in the Dutch Party System', paper presented to the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington: on unions see J. P. Windmuller, *Labor Relations in the Netherlands*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1969; and M. van de Vall, *Labor Organizations*,

Cambridge, CUP, 1970; on television see K. van der Haak, *Broadcasting in the Netherlands*, London, RKP, 1977; and J. Wisten, 'Media Pluralism: the Policy of the Dutch Government', paper presented to the 11th Conference of the International Association for Mass Communication Research, Warsaw, 1978.

4. Lijphart (1975), op. cit., ch. 10. Also see A. Lijphart, 'Consociational Democracy', *World Politics*, vol. 21, 1969, pp. 207–55. On industrial relations see B. Peper, 'The Netherlands; from an Ordered Harmonic to a Bargaining Relationship', in S. Barkin (ed), *Worker Militancy and its Consequences 1965–75*, New York, Praeger, 1975; and T. Akkermans & P. Grootings, 'From Corporatism to Polarisation: Elements of the Development of Dutch Industrial Relations', in C. Crouch & A. Pizzorno (eds), *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968*, vol. 1, London, Macmillan, 1978.

5. J. P. Kruijt, 'The Influence of Denominationalism on Social Life and Organizational Patterns', *Archives de sociologie des religions*, vol. 4, 1959, pp. 105–11. See p. 111.

6. Daalder (1966), pp. 215–6.

7. Netherlands Bureau of Statistics (1978), pt. E, table 1, p. 88.

8. Compare S. B. Wolinetz, 'New Left and the Transformation of the Dutch Socialist Party', paper presented to the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, p. 6.

9. Kruijt (1959), p. 110.

10. On changes in the Catholic Church and community see W. Goddijn, *The Deferred Revolution*, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1975; and J. A. Coleman, *The Evolution of Dutch Catholicism 1958–1974*, Berkeley, California UP, 1978.

11. Coleman (1978), p. 22.

12. Ibid, p. 115.

13. Compare D. Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978, ch. 4. Also note G. Larkin, 'Isolation, Integration and Secularization: a Case Study of the Netherlands', *The Sociological Review*, vol. 22, 1974, pp. 401–18.

14. The estimate for 1964 is calculated from Lijphart (1975), table 3, p. 31. The figures for 1966 and 1970 are from p. 118 of J. M. G. Thurlings, 'The Case of Dutch Catholicism', *Sociologia Neerlandica*, vol. 7, 1971, pp. 118–36. The figure for 1977 is from G. A. Irwin, 'Patterns of Voting Behaviour in the Netherlands', in R. T. Griffith (ed). *The Economy and the Politics of the Netherlands since 1945*, The Hague, Nijhoff, forthcoming.

15. The figures for resignations are from Thurlings (1971), p. 118; those for ordinations are from Goddijn (1975), p. 120.

16. Lijphart (1975), table 34, p. 203.

17. It is intended that the CDA should move from its present federal to a unitary structure but the ARP is not satisfied with the proposed constitution or the basic political principles of the new party and is holding up full amalgamation. See *The Guardian*, London and Manchester, 5 March 1979.

18. Irwin (forthcoming).

19. W. E. Miller & P. C. Stouthard, 'Confessional Attachment and Electoral Behavior in the Netherlands', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 3, 1975, pp. 219–58. See p. 243.

20. Calculated from figures obtained from Lijphart (1975), table 3, p. 31; and Irwin (forthcoming,), table 3.

21. See Wolinetz (1975).

22. Lijphart (1975), p. 209. Also note fig. 3, p. 209. Lijphart uses a modified figure and terms in his comparative *Democracy in Plural Societies*, New Haven, Yale UP, 1977, pp. 104–9, but they make no difference to the argument I advance here. As he refers (p. 105) readers who want a fuller analysis of the postconsociational phase of Dutch politics back to Lijphart (1975), I prefer to base my criticisms on that celebrated book.

23. Irwin (1975), pp. 15–6, writes about polarization. So does S. B. Wolinetz on p. 10 of his 'Accommodation and Conflict in a

De-pillarized Society', paper presented to the ECPR/CPSA Workshop, Louvain, 1976.

24. In addition to references above, see A. L. Mok, 'Some Trends in Industrial Relations Research in the Netherlands', *Sociologica Neerlandica*, vol. 6, 1970, pp. 36–46.

25. Peper (1975), p. 139.

26. J. J. Ramondt, 'Industrial Democratisation without the Workers', *Netherlands Journal of Sociology*, vol. 13, 1977, pp. 34–43: and B. W. M. Hövels & P. Nas, 'Works Councils in the Netherlands', *Netherlands Journal of Sociology*, vol. 13, 1977, pp. 107–24.

27. Windmuller (1969).

28. Akkermans *et al.* (1978).

29. M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, pt. 2, ch. 9, section 6b, Berkeley, California UP, 1978, vol. 2, p. 927.

30. See C. S. Rallings & R. B. Andeweg, 'The Changing Class Structure and Political Behaviour', paper presented to the ECPR Workshop, Grenoble, 1978, on the heterogenous composition of the Dutch lower middle class.

Jennifer Platt

On interviewing one's peers

ABSTRACT

Most textbook treatments of interviewing implicitly assume that the respondent is not the interviewer's or the researcher's peer, but a member of different groups and a social inferior. Experience of interviewing peers shows that the interview relationship is very different in these circumstances, and that a variety of specific consequences for the nature of the interview follow. The extent to which this relationship is different from the more customary one draws attention to the tacit social, technical and ethical assumptions usually made, and these are discussed. It is concluded that there can be no one prescription for the successful conduct of the interview, although some of the consideration normally shown to one's peers might appropriately be extended to other types of respondent; in this as in other respect technical and ethical issues are inextricably interrelated, and to invoke the concept of professionalism does not solve the problems. In the theory of interviewing it should be recognised that some interviews are as much like participant observation as they are like other interviews.

The orthodox textbook treatment of interviewing makes a variety of assumptions about the relationships between interviewer and respondent.[1] It assumes that they are for practical purposes anonymous to each other[2] and that they do not belong to the same groups and will not meet again, so that the relationship has no past and no future, and the research roles are (or should be) segregated from all other roles. To the extent that this is true, the interviewer bears no practical social responsibility for the research, since the interview cannot have any consequences that she will need to live with. The assumption is also made that the interviewer is entitled to manipulate the situation, and has a good chance of getting away with it, because the respondent is a relatively low-status person who is not sophisticated

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enough to realize what is going on and/or not technically qualified to judge the research. (Many textbooks, especially those about interviewing rather than social research methods in general, distinguish different purposes for which interviewing may be done;[3] examples given include counselling, the taking of medical histories, personnel selection, journalism, therapy. Note that almost all of these imply some sort of power or special skill on the part of the interviewer, and a subordinate position for the respondent). Further, the normal assumption is that the interviewer is not the person responsible for the research; where that is so, the interviewer inevitably has some distance from the project, cannot accept responsibility for it as a whole, and regards it instrumentally.

These assumptions, however, do not fit all research, and even where they do in some sense fit they may have undesirable consequences. Over the last few years I have had the experience, in two different contexts, of interviewing my peers for research purposes. This was so different from earlier experience of more ordinary interviewing that it provoked reflection on the latent assumptions usually made, the extent to which they are moulded by involvement with particular topics, methods and relationships, and the extent to which their generalization is helpful or legitimate. This paper reports on some aspects of the experience of interviewing one's peers, systematizes the reflections that arose from it, and draws some conclusions. The primary concern is not directly with the effects on the validity of interview data, not least because of the doubts that may be raised about the very idea of context-free validity;[4] ethical questions are of as much concern as technical ones.

The contexts in which I interviewed my peers were, firstly an investigation into the consequences of changing modes of Finals assessment on the Arts side of my own university and, secondly, research into the social factors affecting the conduct of sociological research.[5] For the first, I interviewed colleagues across the Arts area, including some of those closest to me; for the second, I interviewed researchers all over Britain, with many of whom I already had at least a nodding acquaintance. In both cases the project was entirely under my own control, and known to be so; the interviews were structured only by an *aide-mémoire* as, for good reason, is more likely to be the case when the sample is of peers.

One's peers have a variety of relevant characteristics: they are in a diffuse sense one's social equals, they are one's equals in role-specific senses, they share the same background knowledge and subcultural understandings, and they are members of the same groups or communities. Some of these characteristics may, of course, occur without others, and the consequences vary accordingly; my own research was an extreme case in that they were all present simultaneously, and that the role-specific equality was an equal competence

in research activity. The discussion attempts to separate the different aspects. Such research situations are far from typical, but they may nonetheless, or even for that very reason, throw some light on those which are more typical. Let us try to enumerate some of their implications, and to show how these affected what happened.

SHARED GROUP MEMBERSHIPS

In so far as the people one interviews are friends and acquaintances, or their friends and acquaintances, or members of the same restricted community, the interviewer is not anonymous but has a history and perceived characteristics, some of which may be directly relevant to the research topic. Even among those not previously interested in the matter there may be some interest once interviewing has started, and rumours circulate within the group about what one is looking for and what the interviews are like. I found that joking remarks circulated about the therapeutic qualities of interviews, people tried to find out what others had told me, further respondents were recommended on the basis of my presumed interests, people not approached asked why I left them out. More important, but harder to demonstrate, is that personal and community knowledge are used as part of the information available to construct a conception of what the interview is meant to be about, and thus affect the content of what is said.

But these social relationships work both ways; one is anxious that the interviews should not be a socially unpleasant occasion, and that one should appear well in the eyes of people who constitute a significant reference group and with whom one will continue to live when the research is over.[6] Thus, there is a temptation to contribute discreditable stories about oneself in anticipation and legitimation of return, to appear to get the point quickly without requiring explicit statements, and to treat the interview situation as one no different from other conversations and so contribute one's own quota of gossip and comment to the discussion. Asking people about the relevance of career considerations and promotion prospects to their behaviour was awkward because of the shared norm that these things should not be too overtly pursued; much more so when one might have some idea of actual hopes, disappointments and chances, or even be potentially in competition. With more senior people, to raise these issues could seem odd because they might be thought to have achieved their career goals, and presumptuous when done by someone of lower status. I found myself approaching these questions with lengthy preambles and apologies ('I know it seems a bit ridiculous to ask this in your case, but . . . .') and sometimes, within my own university, leaving them out altogether. I also left

out of my sample altogether a few potential respondents of whom I was frightened on grounds of personality and/or status; this fear was not just of a sticky interview but also of longer-run consequences.[7]

Shared community membership is enormously helpful in some ways, but it implies personal relations which carry social obligations that can make the normal impersonal and instrumental use of the interview difficult. This can affect both respondent and interviewer. Several respondents expressed embarrassment at revealing things about themselves, or their views of others whom I knew, to me. Obviously it was socially difficult for me to probe in delicate areas. I do not know whether it is with pride or with shame that I should report that I usually, by a conscious act of role-playing, overcame this difficulty. (Previous experience of more routinized interviewing helped here. Perhaps an appropriate comparison is provided by Verplanck's concealed experiment on the effects of reinforcement on the contents of conversation, where the experimenters' experience in conditioning bar-pressing in rats provided valuable preparation?) Many of my respondents reciprocated. The problem then, is how to face each other subsequently. In the context confidentiality can only have different meanings from the usual ones; there is none of the practical anonymity of the transient research relationship.

I cannot deliberately forget my own data, which sometimes left me in possession of information normally only available under conditions of greater intimacy. Should greater intimacy be taken to have been established to carry over beyond the interview? My own feeling is that it would be offensive to assume this, and that one should in effect pretend that the interview never happened; it is evident, however, that not all my respondents want to do this – indeed to 'forget' their contributions is in a way to show ingratitude, and to define the occasion as having been merely an interview and a colleague as having acted merely as a respondent – or, alternatively, it is to define the occasion as embarrassing enough to need to be forgotten. Ordinary respondents who are not sophisticated in these matters often feel much less anonymous than in practice they are to the interviewer, and so act as though the situation here described as exceptional held in their case. To the interviewer, however, the two situations are very different.

To the extent that the roles are successfully segregated, the interviewer–respondent relationship is revealed in all its nakedness as one of instrumental use of another person; for this segregation to be achieved, conscious role-playing is required. A *reductio ad absurdum* of role-playing was reached when a close colleague fell into my assessment sample and I asked him a question, about the mode of assessment for a paper we examine jointly, which we both knew that he would normally ask me if in any doubt. Where both parties are sociologists, it certainly helps that each is familiar with the

formal prescriptions for the correct playing of both roles! However, decisions still remain to be made once a strategy of deliberate role-playing has been adopted. It can be difficult to decide when to switch roles. In some of my earlier interviews with sociologists, I found that my impulse was to start formal interviewing immediately after initial greetings, although this seemed acutely embarrassing. Varying degrees of intimacy affect the extent to which it is easy or necessary to segregate the formal and the informal interaction; in the research on research, the 'interview' performed many of the functions of introductory professional chat, and so could in a sense be used as informal interaction with people I did not already know; it was more unnatural with those I did know, where it could become very like one of Garfinkel's experiments[8] in revealing the normal presence of common understandings by questioning or violating them. Related problems can arise in more ordinary interviews when the person interviewed does not have in their familiar repertoire of available roles those of 'interviewer' and 'respondent': the interviewer can be treated as a member of the more familiar category of secretary or social worker[9] or, once admitted to the inner sanctum of the home and having discussed intimate topics, treated as a friend, on the assumption that the whole person has been involved and that only friends can have those shared experiences.

BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AND SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS

When the problem of social ease is solved, there still remains another: what counts as data in the relationship? Is it only legitimate to use what was said in the parts of the interaction defined as 'interview', and if so how can these be identified when there is no fixed schedule? I was anxious to have as much as possible defined as interview so that it could be recorded and unequivocally available to me as data; hence, in part, my socially embarrassing haste to get out my notebook. My general knowledge of some people meant, firstly, that respondents could assume that it was unnecessary to go into things that they knew I already knew about, so that an interview could start 'Up as far as (previous project) you can cope, can't you'. If the interview is to be treated afterwards as a literal document, this makes some material unavailable, since it is not down on the paper; not to treat it as such has obvious risks. In so far as one accepts the invitation to draw on one's background knowledge its inevitable biases are unnecessarily introduced, different interviews are made less comparable, and the interviewer's rather than the respondent's interpretations are imposed. For strictly factual matters – marital status, academic rank, subsequent jobs – one could draw on general knowledge without scruple about its accuracy, though it would still

be uneven. However, the dangers to which this permission to oneself can lead were exposed when, having decided late in the day that I wanted to classify all respondents in one project by their marital status, I found myself putting things down that I did not really know. A tacit process of inference from what I 'knew' had been at work: he's a pleasant, normal sort of chap – most normal sorts of chap are married – he must be married. The same sort of thing can happen during an interview. In either case, one is assuming that one already has knowledge which makes 'research' superfluous, or directs it towards some areas and away from others.

EQUALITY AND STATUS

Status differentials were sometimes relevant; more often salient was the norm and fact of basic equality. This implies reciprocity and symmetry in the relationship. (In two cases I interviewed people into whose samples I had previously fallen; is this reflexive sociology?) A norm is violated if one manipulates or dominates an equal, claiming the right to define the situation for him.[10] Thus, it seems offensive not to give some honest and reasonably full account of the rationale and purpose of one's study to such respondents, and the account cannot be one which is intellectually condescending. However, it is difficult to do this without inviting discussion of the study rather than getting on with the interview, and without providing so much information that it may bias the course of the interview. One solution to the latter is to point out the likely consequence as a reason for not telling too much; this again entails very conscious role-playing, and may leave an unease in the air about the intellectual legitimacy of the undertaking. An equal feels qualified to judge its intellectual legitimacy, and his acceptance of this is to some extent a condition of willingness to adopt the subordinate role of respondent.[11] To succeed, as textbooks usually suggest, in concealing one's specific hypotheses is to place oneself in the academically embarrassing situation of possibly appearing to have none; this would not matter, of course, for an interviewer who was not the research director. On the other hand, whether they are overtly stated or not, it can be exceedingly embarrassing evidently to have hypotheses that reflect unfavourably on one's respondents, for instance, seeing them as motivated by careerism rather than normative considerations.

Between equals, interviewing tricks seem inappropriate. In the assessment research I wanted to find out how accurately faculty members knew the modes of assessment just introduced for the courses that they taught. I found this out by asking what the mode was; most construed this as a request for factual information, and

no-one appeared to realise that I was going to compare their answers with the official document in order to evaluate the correctness of their knowledge. Some, rather than answering off the cuff, looked the right answer up; I could see no way of preventing this without showing my hand. It would have been socially uncomfortable to reveal that I proposed to judge my colleagues, and expected (correctly) to catch some of them out in wrong answers. Such interviewing tricks imply, not only that one is attempting to control the situation without the knowledge of the other person, but also that he cannot be trusted to speak the truth without being trapped into it.

Any sort of structured interviewing, particularly where precoded response categories are provided, arrogates to the interviewer (or research director) the right to determine the forms which answers may take, the dimensions along which events should be classified, and the topics to be regarded as relevant.[12] On the whole, my interviews were exceedingly unstructured, and thus were not very open to objections along those lines. But this is by no means an unequivocal advantage; if one loses control of the direction of conversation it may cease to be useful or relevant for the research, and there were indeed occasions when there were lengthy conversations of low value for the project which I could see no way to redirect without redefining my role. This could lead to tacit or overt requests for direction, to enable the respondent to say what was useful to me – and thus make the claim to equality implied by not enabling me to judge his relevance unfavourably, and by sharing my responsibility for the success of the research. Some of the 'bad' interviews were those where the people interviewed implicitly defined themselves as informants rather than respondents; rather than offering raw data for me to interpret, they told me their interpretations and the conclusions they had reached. This solves the status problem by redefining relative statuses or by bringing in statuses from outside the interview situation, and was usually done by people of higher academic rank than myself. A respondent could also make an assertion of identity and a claim to equality by a refusal to respond in the desired way to some obvious tactic, or by making technical comments on the manner in which the interviewing was done.

The question of standing is also one of the factors relevant to shared membership in an intellectual reference group, which creates an interest in appearing well to each other intellectually in order to maintain one's position. For the respondents, this could have meant that they were motivated to try to give me a picture of their examining practice or their research as tidier and conforming better to shared norms than it actually had been. To a surprising extent, however, it did not seem to work out like that, since people freely revealed many things that fell short of recognized good practice. But in that context to recognize one's own mistakes (or possibly the

limitations of conventional norms) was itself to make a claim to intellectually valid perceptions; it could also be seen as correctly understanding what I was interested in, and giving it to me. Confession can probably be made more freely to an insider, since shared group membership makes similar experience more likely. For the interviewer, the availability of such experience, and of a shared 'public language', tempts to carelessness. Not to accept the point quickly, without requiring detailed explanations, can seem pedestrian and unintelligent, but may nonetheless be necessary to get clear and explicit data.

Where it is assumed that norms are shared, their rationale and content do not need explanation, and thus the data become thinner; to ask for explanation is to define oneself as not a member of the same community, and could disturb a personal relationship. Certain norms (about the conduct of research) were, in the research on research, shared, public, and known by both parties to be so or at least to exist as obvious points of reference. In the research on assessment this was much less so, and the situation could become surprisingly similar to that in any ordinary project; issues such as the degree of importance that it is appropriate for an academic to attach to administrative duties, or whether it is proper to mark to a curve, are ones on which consensus may be perceived but does not really exist. In the assessment research I was shocked by some of the opinions expressed, and very much wanted to argue back and criticize; sometimes I succumbed at least to the urge to point out the implications of a position, or to reveal that others did not agree, even if I did not overtly state my own views.

DISCUSSION

Many of the points made above have a ring of familiarity about them which does not come from their customary appearance in discussions of interviewing; the context in which they are familiar is that of discussions of 'fieldwork' or participant observation. This is because some characteristics of interviewing one's peers – in particular, the shared community membership and the continuing relationship – make it resemble participant observation rather than the traditional survey interview. One of the conclusions to be drawn, therefore, is that the conventional distinctions between modes of data collection are not always useful. There is a danger that the division into chapters of textbooks on method may lead to the reification of methods and the divisions between them, so that possible variations and nuances within the 'same' method, as well as the lessons that may be drawn from experience with others, are ignored; the intellectual constructs then impede rather than facilitating the analysis of experience.[13]

This paper started by defining its problem in terms of the social relationships between interviewer and respondent, but in the account of my experiences it became evident that one could not avoid considering also the extent to which the method as a method, irrespective of the relations of those involved, contains social assumptions. The particular experiences described happen to arise from only one version of the method, and that the one which contains these assumptions in almost their weakest form, but nonetheless they were felt to be present. In laboratory experimentation it has long been recognized that the fact of conducting an experiment in itself has social implications (which may affect the outcome of the experiment).[14] The literature on interviewing is to some extent conflicting, although on closer inspection some of the conflicts are seen to arise from the fact that different issues are being addressed; in so far as the issues are considered, it is generally in terms of status and inequalities. There is much discussion of ways of achieving a feeling of equality between interviewer and respondent; it seems evident, even if not usually made explicit, that the main reason for this concern is the practical problem that most interviewers are middle-class while many of their respondents are of lower status.[15] Goode and Hatt assert that the interviewer role is inherently middle-class,[16] although they do not explain just what they mean by this, and then go on to explain the desirability for the establishment of rapport of conveying that it is a professional role rather than an indication of superiority. Benney and Hughes[17] and Babchuk[18] assert that the interview is governed by a convention of equality, although both do so in the context of the need to train interviewers to transcend the objective personal inequalities; it is not clear that they intend to imply that the convention is a shared one, or intrinsic to the method as such. Benney and Hughes go on to suggest that elite respondents maintain equality by subjectively addressing themselves to the survey's director or sponsor rather than to the interviewer.[19] (To do this one requires some idea of how surveys are usually organized, which may in itself be an elite characteristic.) Several other authors also mention the special problems of interviewing elites[20] and here, although the general texts do not usually draw this implication, it is clear that the problems arise from the nature of the method as much as from the personal status of the parties involved. Elite members expect to be treated as such, but to the extent that the method entails the imposition of someone else's categories and definitions of issues they cannot be; specific studies of elite interviewing make this very clear. Galtung[21] argues, in a sophisticated discussion which addresses itself directly to these matters, that survey method inherently suggests that the interviewer has high status, although the unstructured interview avoids this. I think that he is right. Social equality implies reciprocity and symmetry, with neither party

consistently manipulating or dominating the situation and with each equally competent to judge in the light of relevant norms;[22] as equality in the abstract shades over into community it also implies shared norms, grounded trust and a not purely instrumental use of relationships. No interview (or other research method) can meet all of these conditions; the more closely an interview approaches the structured and standardized extreme, the less the extent to which it meets them.

If the interview is treated as an isolated occasion subject to its own specialized rules, and these rules are known to both parties, such problems need not arise. As several writers have pointed out, however, in an interview to a greater extent than in many other relationships the two parties may perceive it differently[23] and at least one of them may be ignorant of these differences; in so far as 'role' is a normative concept, not just a behavioural description, the question arises of whose norms are relevant, and how likely it is that they will be shared. It is not adequate to define any divergence of norms as showing misunderstanding on the part of the interviewee, and the readiness of researchers to do so shows how easily and naturally the relationship is defined asymmetrically; social researchers are plainly not exempt from the general propensity of occupations to develop ideologies and definitions of the situation that rationalize practices which promote their own ends. At the same time, however, the recognized tension between the demands of impersonality and of rapport from the interviewer[24] implies a preparedness to exploit divergent understandings, since the interviewer is meant to be objectively impersonal in her approach, while using rapport to elicit information which might not be provided under purely impersonal conditions.

However, both research instruments and respondents vary. The respondent's role may be an unfamiliar one assumed for a unique occasion, may be subsumed into a more familiar role as teacher, giver of opinions or recipient of instructions, or may be a specific role which has some familiarity as such. (A friend reports interviewing an experienced shop steward, who gave his views reclining on the sofa and speaking at dictation speed.)[25] Several textbooks suggest that it is more compatible with some cultures and subcultures than others, and usually requires some socialization,[26] which can only practically be carried out during the interview itself. Galtung describes the ideal survey respondent as: 'well socialized and disciplined, used to examinations, to listening, to answering honestly and clearly. He has a certain minimum of formal education, good enough to fill in a standard questionnaire. He is below the average social scientist in social rank . . . . Without too much protest he fits into the precoded answers. Finally, he expresses some joy at having had the favour of being included in this important study: he is grateful, not overly critical'.[27]

Although telling, this is rather generalized. What makes a 'good' respondent depends to a considerable extent on the nature of the schedule used and the intentions of the research; at one extreme, docility and conventionality are tacitly prized characteristics, while at the other frankness, fluency and spontaneity are preferred. If there is a pre-established fit between the characteristics the respondent possesses and those the schedule presupposes, it may be presumed that the interview will be socially successful and the data recorded valid; if there is not such a fit, the dangers are evident. In so far as there are shared conventions about the roles, however, role performance may transcend personal characteristics; to the extent that this occurs, the status of the data becomes questionable.[28]

Another kind of distinction within the interview role, with some status relevance, is that between respondent and informant. (Up to here the usual term for the person interviewed, 'respondent', has been employed; from now on the less euphonious 'interviewee' is used as the general term, so that the distinction between 'respondent' and 'informant' may be maintained.) The respondent's task is to provide raw data to be interpreted by someone else, and he is an anonymous member of a large group. (Was the Affluent Worker[29] sample respondent – a graduate trainee temporarily in a clerical position – who, on being asked about his perceptions of the class structure, mentioned Marx, Weber and Dahrendorf, properly playing the role of respondent? One feels, uneasily, that he wasn't; real respondents should be naive subjects and not behave like sociologists.) The informant, by contrast, is seen as providing objective information to be taken more or less at face value, and is a distinct person with something unique to contribute, not just a randomly-sampled and replaceable member of the crowd. A planned respondent who behaves like an informant may not fit properly into the schedule provided, although it may be a deliberate part of schedule construction and interviewing strategy to try to make individual respondents *feel* like informants in order to motivate them to make their contribution. However, even respondents who feel like informants have got to be fitted into the research's categories, and so are likely to find either that only a small part of what they say is being recorded or that they are at the receiving end of socialization from the interviewer. But even the role of informant is not necessarily one already in someone's repertoire, and so may not be played when called for.

How distinct the role of interviewee, whether as respondent or as informant, is from other roles of more general relevance depends upon the style of the research – and the same of course is true of the role of interviewer. To the extent that the research approximates to concealed participant observation, the interviewee role as such does not exist. Whatever the style of the research, though, the greater the extent to which interviewer and interviewee already have

some direct or indirect social relationship independent of the research, the greater the likelihood that the roles of interviewer and interviewee will not be the only ones present. (Such generalized roles as those associated with age and sex cannot be avoided, though it is a moot question how far the more specific roles and relationships of the interview can neutralize them, whether through the professionalism of the interviewer or by other means.) It is particularly difficult to isolate the interview roles from others when interviewing one's peers, for two reasons. Firstly, peers are equals, and so the interviewer cannot so easily as with social inferiors control the situation and impose her professional definitions; to the extent that this is attempted none the less it is more artificial, and when the two are members of the same groups may lead to later personal difficulties. Secondly, peers belong to the same communities, and so are likely to have relatively specific shared norms of interaction and role-relationships already established which will be more salient.

Thus, the problems of interviewing one's peers bring to the fore problems latent in any interviewing about the extent to which instrumental use is to be made of the interviewee – and of oneself – as the customary prescriptions of professionalism imply; the questions raised are both ethical and practical. Are the short and long-run consequences of playing the role in alternative ways morally and personally acceptable? How far should criteria of professionalism be allowed to override one's personal feelings? (Weber's distinction between the ethics of responsibility and of ultimate ends[30] obviously has a bearing here – with the researcher playing the role of God for the hired interviewer. Who can play the role of God for the researcher who is his own interviewer?) One has to decide which of one's own feelings are to be managed, controlled, even manipulated – and which are to be acted upon and taken into account. (And in practice, of course, as Johnson points out, such 'decisions' may be made by one's feelings – as perhaps they should be.) There is a potential clash of personal and research rationality – and to make that distinction is implicitly to treat oneself as other than a whole person. Professionalism as an interviewer is role-specific, and often seen as entailing the instrumental management of ethical impressions rather than the doing of ethical acts; the ultimate sanction is then not guilt at wrong-doing, but shame at failure in gaining the required data.[31] (Galtung provides a notable exception to this tendency.) In my own research I felt more concerned, to put it at the lowest level, to manage long-term ethical impressions than I have done in other interviews; more importantly, the high level of empathy with the groups interviewed which followed from our shared memberships made guilt more salient than potential shame. Where one interviews one's peers, the boundaries between different aspects of the self (as discussed by Mead[32]) of both interviewer and respondent are broken down.

(Berger and Luckmann's very interesting discussion of the relationship between secondary socialization and subjective identities and the division of labour is also relevant.)[33] This again raises the general question of the extent to which research roles can be, or should be, dissociated from the whole self. Should the whole person take part in social research? (Does the whole person take part in any normal social activity?) Certainly research experience can affect other aspects of one's life: the cobbler's last sticks to him.

But to contrast 'feelings' with 'professionalism' implies that the two can be distinguished, and perhaps hints that whatever is classified as 'feelings' has greater authenticity.[34] However, 'feelings' too are social products, and for the thoroughly socialized professional there would be no contrast between the two; even where there is such a contrast, it is not evident that the 'feelings' necessarily should have some kind of superior status, as some self-castigatory sociological discussions tend to assume – any more than it is evident that 'professional' norms should. There is perhaps a danger of showing excessive ethical sensitivity, both in applying absolute standards rather than in attempting to calculate a risk-benefit ratio, and in defining as unacceptable in sociological research behaviour that is quite ordinary in everyday interaction.[35] If research is not to be judged by special 'professional' standards it is presumably to be judged by ordinary non-professional standards. These, of course, are not clear and consensually established, but it is evident that, for instance, a certain amount of small-scale pursuit of one's own ulterior ends without advance elicitation of informed consent from social partners is commonly regarded as normal. (Much of the self-criticism by sociologists rests on a picture of themselves as influential with those in power, and of their research as providing highly effective tools for manipulation; this seems to me an unduly optimistic self-conception,[36] and not usually one held in other contexts by those who tacitly assume it in this one).

Any calculation of risks and benefits must depend on the nature of the particular project involved, so no *general* technical principles specifying what methods are or are not acceptable could be enunciated on that basis. However, such calculation must include consideration of the technical advantages and disadvantages of various alternative methods, so even an ethical discussion brings one back to the technical questions. Among these is the question of the *technical*, instrumental strengths and weaknesses of approaches on which the subjects (as well as the interviewer) may make ethical judgements. If a subject perceives an interviewer's approach as unethical (which could be anything along a continuum from mild impoliteness to serious impropriety), that approach is very likely to be technically weakened, however it squares with the interviewer's own ethical judgements, because of the subject's reactions. If the interviewer is

made uncomfortable, either by his own scruples or by those really held by or imputed to the subject, he is less likely to be able to carry off the planned approach with coolness and persistence. Within a social group where rumours circulate, a *faux pas* with one subject can cause problems with others. The more one already knows about a group, the less likely one is to commit a *faux pas*; the nearer one is to membership of a group, the more significant the personal consequences may be of any *faux pas* that one does make. Ethical considerations thus shade off by imperceptible degrees into sociological ones and into technical ones.

The relationship between research director and interviewer also has consequences that need to be taken into account. Where the interviewer is not the researcher, but is obeying his instructions and so has limited room for manoeuvre, this complicates the ethical situation. The responsibility for taking up people's time, asking intrusive and disturbing questions etc. can be imputed to someone else. (Whether it should be is another matter.)[37] Moreover the interviewer, having accepted the job, is ethically responsible for following the researcher's instructions conscientiously. The division of labour which ensures that the researcher does not have direct experience of the interviewing makes it easier for him to avoid these questions, or to treat them merely as technical problems in the control of his labour force. Where the researcher is his own interviewer responsibility cannot be avoided – except by reifying the project, which can be a psychologically handy device. The very strong textbook emphasis on 'objectivity' and techniques for avoiding bias seems related to the conventional division of labour; if the interviewer can be regarded as neutral and transparent, the research director appears less cut off from direct contact with his data.[38] It is odd that the authors of textbooks appear to be addressing themselves to research directors, and so talk in terms of controlling a force of interviewers rather than being the interviewer. Presumably most readers, however, are students, who are not likely to have a subordinate labour force at their disposal for some years. It is striking, too, that these issues have been so much more discussed in connection with participant observation, where director and fieldworker are normally the same person.

The experience of interviewing peers has focussed attention on the prevalent assumption in much writing about interviewing that respondents are not the interviewer's or the researcher's peers, and the implications that this has for the manner in which interviews are conducted; it suggests, in particular, that the social and ethical sensitivity which one can hardly avoid feeling in interaction with one's peers might be extended to a wider circle,[39] and that the extent to which the combination of method and of relation between interviewer and interviewee creates peer or non-peer situations should be taken into account. No single recipe emerges for the technical

conduct of the interview; indeed the argument is that such recipes can only relate to a reified abstraction of '*the* interview' which it is unrealistic to attempt to impose on the variety of real situations. The conclusion is not drawn that interviewing as a method of data-collection is completely vitiated by the problems discussed. No technique is problem-free, and it is not useful to attack an existing good in the name of a hypothetical better. The weaknesses of interviewing are intrinsically bound up with its strengths as a specialized mode of social interaction.

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NOTES

My thanks are due to Michael Clarke and Martin Bulmer for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

1. Although each has its idiosyncracies, usually related to the particular experience of the authors, even a fairly cursory inspection of some of the standard works reveals obvious uniformities; in particular, most are primarily concerned with structured interviews in large-scale surveys of the general public. (See, for instance: Claire Selltiz *et al.*, *Research Methods in Social Relations*, Methuen, 1965; William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, *Methods in Social Research*, McGraw Hill, 1952; Herbert H. Hyman *et al.*, *Interviewing in Social Research*, University of Chicago Press, 1954; C. A. Moser & G. Kalton, *Survey Methods in Social Investigation* (2nd edition), Heinemann, 1971. The assumption is usually tacitly made that respondents are socially isolated from each other and will not communicate about the research. An exception to these generalizations is Lewis A. Dexter's very interesting *Elite and Specialized Interviewing*, Northwestern University Press, 1970; see also *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, 1972; B. Denitch, 'Elite interviewing and social structure: an example from Yugoslavia', and H. Zuckerman, 'Interviewing an ultra-elite'. Cf. the discussion by Cicourel (Aaron V. Cicourel, *Method and Measurement in Sociology*, Free Press, 1964) where he raises many relevant points.

2. See Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research*, Allen & Unwin, 1967, p. 155, on this.

3. E.g. Robert L. Kahn and Charles F. Cannell, *The Dynamics of Interviewing*, Wiley, 1957.

4. Cf. Irwin Deutscher, 'Public and private opinions: social situations and multiple realities', in Saad Z. Nagi & Ronald G. Corwin (eds.), *The Social Contexts of Research*, Wiley, New York, 1972, pp. 325–6.

5. Reports on the findings of these two projects are: Jennifer Platt, *Report of Research into the Operation of the New Pattern of B.A. Finals Assessment*, October, 1972, xeroxed; Jennifer Platt, *Realities of Social Research*, Sussex University Press, 1976. (Extracts from the former are printed in *A Question of Degree: Assorted Papers on Assessment*, Group for Research and Innovation in Higher Education, Nuffield Foundation, London, December 1975).

6. Goldner and Zuckerman both refer to the importance in gaining full cooperation of demonstrating competence to one's subjects. G. Sjoberg (ed.), *Ethics, Politics and Social Research*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969; F. Goldner, 'Role emergence and the ethics of ambiguity', p. 251; H. Zuckerman, op. cit.

7. Cf. Denitch, op. cit., p. 155.

8. Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Prentice-Hall, 1967: 'Studies of the routine grounds of everyday activities'.

9. Benney & Hughes suggest that more general and familiar models, such as those for male/female or parent/child encounters may be fallen back on by the respondent for lack of a more situationally appropriate one. M. Benney and E. C. Hughes, 'Of sociology and the interview', *AJS*, 62, 1956.

10. Daniels op. cit., shows the dramatic consequences that followed from this norm when she initially failed to perceive that her respondents defined her as a social inferior.

11. Cf. Zuckerman, op. cit.

12. Cf. Zuckerman, op. cit. p. 167; Dexter, op. cit. pp. 5–6.

13. Cf. Bryan R. Wilson (ed.), *Rationality*, Wilson, 'A sociologist's introduction', p. xii.

14. E.g. Robert Rosenthal & Ralph L. Rosnow (eds.), *Artifact in Behavioral Research*, Academic Press, 1969.

15. For discussion of relative status in the interview and its consequences, see: Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research*, Allen & Unwin, 1967, pp. 123, 154–9; Dexter, op. cit. p. 52; Goode & Hatt, op. cit. pp. 188, 192; Aaron V. Cicourel, op. cit., pp. 75–6; Stephen A. Richardson, Barbara Dohrenwend and David Klein, *Interviewing: its Forms and Functions*, Basic Books, 1965, p. 277; G. Lindzey, (ed.) *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Addison-Wesley, 1954; E. E. and N. Maccoby, 'The Interview: a tool of social science', p. 462; B. S. Dohrenwend *et al.*, 'Social distance and interviewer effects', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 1968–9, pp. 410–22.

16. Op. cit. p. 188.

17. Op. cit. p. 140.

18. N. Babchuk, 'The role of the researcher as participant observer and participant-as-observer in the field situation'. *Human Organisation* 21, 1962–3, p. 227.

19. Op. cit. p. 140.

20. Richardson *et al.*, op. cit., pp. 304–5; Maccoby & Maccoby, op. cit., p. 462; Zuckerman, op. cit.; Denitch, op. cit.; D. Riesman, 'Some observations on the interviewing in the teacher apprehension study' in P. F. Lazarsfeld & W. Thielens, *The Academic Mind*, Free Press, Glencoe, III, 1958.

21. Op. cit. p. 156.

22. Everett Hughes has pointed out that, quite apart from the specific method used, the question of who is studied by whom is relevant. E. C. Hughes, 'Who studies whom?', *Human Organisation*, vol. 33, no. 4, Winter 1974.

23. Benney & Hughes, op. cit., p. 139; M. Brenner, 'Interviewing: the social phenomenology of a research instrument', in M. Brenner (ed.), *et al.*, *The Social Contexts of Method*, Croom Helm, 1978.

24. R. K. Merton et al., *The Focused Interview*, Free Press, Glencoe, III., 1956, p. 178; R. A. Stebbins, 'The unstructured research interview as incipient interpersonal relationship', *Sociol. & Social Res.* Jan. 1972, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 164–79.

25. See R. F. Kahn and C. F. Cannell, 'Interviewing: Social Research', in *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, p. 153.

26. See e.g. Kahn and Cannell, op. cit. note 13, pp. 62–4; Jean Atkinson, *Government Social Survey Handbook for Interviewers*, H.M.S.O. 1968, p. 50; R. K. Merton *et al.* op. cit., p. 173. J. Galtung, op. cit. pp. 149–60.

27. Galtung, op. cit. p. 157.

28. Deutscher, op. cit. (note 4)

29. John H. Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Bechhofer & Jennifer Platt, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure*, Cambridge University Press, 1969.

30. There has been some philosophical discussion of the ethics of behaviour in a role, though Downie's discussion is inconclusive in the end on crucial points. (R. S. Downie, *Roles and Values: an Introduction to Social Ethics*, Methuen, 1971.)

31. There is a valuable discussion of related issues in John M. Johnson, *Doing Field Research*, The Free Press, 1975, especially in chapter 6..

32. Anselm Strauss (ed.), *The Social*

Psychology of George Herbert Mead, University of Chicago, 1956, p. 221.

33. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1966, pp. 158, 192.

34. Cf. Sartre's discussion of 'bad faith'. (J. P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, translated by Hazel E. Barnes, Methuen, 1957, ch. 2.)

35. Cf. B. Barber, 'Research on research on human subjects: problems of access to a powerful profession', *Social Problems* 21, 1973.

36. Cf. Murray L. Wax, 'On fieldworkers and those exposed to fieldwork: federal regulations and moral issues', *Human Organisation*, vol. 36, no. 3, Fall 1977.

37. Cf. Downie, op. cit.

38. For further discussion of related points about research division of labour see Platt, *Realities of Social Research*, ch. 5. On the conception of the research process as a transparent medium through which nature speaks, cf. P. McHugh *et al.*, *On the Beginning of Social Inquiry*, 'Bias', esp. pp. 68–73. Hyman *et al.*, (op. cit. p. 191) point out that, once this division of labour is taken as given, 'the only way in which the analyst can know the nature of the field-setting (and hence take it into account in interpreting the data) is by specifying it for the interviewers'.

39. Cf. Edward Shils, 'Social inquiry and the autonomy of the individual', in Daniel Lerner (ed.), *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences*, World Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio, 1959.

Stephen Cotgrove and Andrew Duff

Environmentalism, values, and social change

ABSTRACT

Theories which account for the support of 'post-material' values in terms of post-war affluence and security are found to be inadequate for explaining the high support for post-materialism amongst environmentalists and equally low support amongst industrialists. An alternative theory relating values to political socialization is put forward.

There are strong grounds for arguing that changes in values are the key to understanding social change.[1] Values play an important role in legitimating social, political and economic institutions and practices.[2] To appeal to some value (be it liberty, equality, or fraternity) is often enough to foreclose debate. Changes in values may therefore have important consequences for the legitimacy of a social system, and generate serious demands on the political system.[3]

A recent example of value change was the emergence of the so-called counter-culture in the 1960s.[4] It is possible that this could be identified as a turning point in the direction in which society is moving. Yet despite the central role of values as major variables for any understanding of social stability and change, research into the sources of values and value change has been largely neglected by sociologists. This analysis will attempt to bring sociological perspectives to bear on the problem in the hope that these will enlarge our understanding.

The environmentalist movement provides a promising contemporary case study. Environmentalists attach particular importance to the need for fundamental changes in values if mankind is to survive. And they have been at the forefront in political protest and direct action.[5] What then precisely are the values of environmentalists? How do they differ from other sections of society? What is the source of such differences? And what light does the emergence of an environmentalist movement throw on the mechanisms of value change and social change?

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THE SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF VALUES

Inglehart's original thesis that there has been a change in the value priorities of publics in western Europe since 1945 has been substantiated by a number of subsequent studies.[6] The shift, he argues, is from what he earlier described as acquisitive to post-bourgeois values, subsequently referred to as the change from material to post-material values. His evidence is that there are marked generational differences, and that support for post-material values is markedly stronger among those brought up in the period of post-war peace and prosperity. The roots of the shift he attributes, therefore, to the experience of affluence during adolescence.

The argument of this paper is not altogether to deny this connection, but to suggest that it is too simplistic. In short, we will argue that while experience of affluence in adolescence may be a necessary precondition of post-materialism, it is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon. Moreover, we are interested in accounting for the social distribution of values as well as their change over time. Our point of departure is our empirical finding that senior industrialists are significantly more materialist than members of the public of the same age group, and that environmentalists are much more *post*-material than the public even after controlling for age. Furthermore, the shift towards post-materialism in younger age groups is small by comparison with between-group differences (Table I).[7]

It is necessary first to emphasise the heterogeneous character of those who come under the broad umbrella of environmentalists. On the one hand, there are those who are mainly interested in protecting wildlife, preserving the countryside, and our national heritage of buildings. They wish simply to give higher priority to the protection of the environment. But, at the other extreme, there are those who argue that the problem requires more than simply a shift in priorities, and that fundamental changes are essential if we are to survive the growing threats to the environment and the exhaustion of materials which result from a high-growth, energy-consuming, and environmentally-damaging way of life. These 'utopian' environmentalists are the object of this analysis.[8] We distributed questionnaires to a random sample of members of two British environmentalist organizations, the Conservation Society and Friends of the Earth.[9]

To compare with the environmentalist sample we deliberately chose a second target group whose views on environmental questions and whose values we believed would be sharply opposed: we selected a sample of senior industrialists and engineers from the pages of *Who's Who of British Engineers* and the *Business Who's Who*.[10] As a contrast with industrialists, we selected a sample of trade union officials from the *Trade Union Handbook*. Our fourth target group

TABLE I: *Post-materialism scores* by age*

	Environmentalists			*Industrialists*			*Trade Unionists*			*Public*		
Age	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*
Under 21	29.00	3.45	21	—	—	0	—	—	0	23.23	3.24	47
21–30	27.58	3.78	123	—	—	0	27.50	4.75	8	23.33	3.78	108
31–40	27.69	3.79	106	21.33	5.16	6	25.94	3.90	47	22.98	3.39	95
Over 40	26.62	3.87	173	20.31	3.90	207	24.37	3.59	224	22.03	3.31	265

*Calculated as sum of eight item scores (range 8–40), a high score corresponding to more support for post-material values.

was a sample of the general public randomly drawn from the electoral registers for Bath, Swindon and Oldham.[11]

One possible explanation of the consistent differences in post-materialism scale scores between the four target groups, after controlling for age, is that present income is a second measure of affluence which has not been taken into account. Although the socialization experiences of the young have been in a relatively affluent society (compared to the pre-war generation), nevertheless it may be that a mediating influence is *personal* affluence, as measured by income. If it can be shown that environmentalists are on the whole better off than the general public, then this might account for their higher post-materialism scores (we did not obtain income estimates from the industrialist sample).

TABLE II: *Post-materialism scores* by age, controlling for income*

		Environmentalists			*Public*		
Income	*Age*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*
<£2000 pa	Under 21	29.00	3.33	10	23.90	3.60	20
	21–30	27.68	3.73	28	24.09	4.50	22
	31–40	28.60	4.48	10	23.79	2.91	14
	Over 40	27.20	2.88	20	22.29	3.20	51
£2001–£4000 pa	Under 21	28.50	4.36	4	22.60	2.56	15
	21–30	27.66	3.62	53	22.22	3.59	40
	31–40	27.19	3.65	31	22.38	2.48	29
	Over 40	27.55	4.33	42	22.40	2.96	78
£4001–£6000 pa	Under 21	—	—	0	23.00	0.00	1
	21–30	27.39	4.44	33	24.00	4.01	19
	31–40	28.43	4.28	28	23.71	4.21	21
	Over 40	26.33	3.72	33	21.70	3.91	43
£6001–£8000 pa	Under 21	—	—	0	—	—	0
	21–30	25.00	0.00	1	25.25	5.44	4
	31–40	28.04	3.06	25	22.86	5.76	7
	Over 40	26.45	3.46	33	23.00	4.58	11
>£8000	Under 21	—	—	0	—	—	0
	21–30	25.00	0.00	1	—	—	0
	31–40	24.33	2.94	6	23.00	2.66	3
	Over 40	25.81	4.23	37	20.67	3.05	3

*Calculated as sum of eight item scores (range 8–40), a high score corresponding to more support for post-material values.

Table II shows that the differences between environmentalists and the public persist after controlling for age or income, so affluence whether measured in terms of youth and the experience of post-war affluence, or in terms of personal income, is not able to account for the higher post-material scores of our environmentalist sample. Indeed, the more affluent environmentalists turn out to be less

post-material.[12] We also looked at the effect of education.[13] Again, we found that a higher proportion of industrialists than environmentalists were graduates, and that there was no significant difference on post-material scores within groups related to level of education.

What is particularly interesting is the high post-material score for the trade union officials, and the marked differences in the pattern of support for individual items by different groups (Table III). Both trade unionists and industrialists give equally strong

TABLE III: *Post-materialism scale items*

	Public	*Industrialists*	*Trade-Unionists*	*Environmentalists*
		% 'high priority'		
MATERIAL GOALS				
Maintaining a high rate of economic growth	46	38	44	2
Making sure that this country has strong defence forces	38	38	18	12
Maintaining a stable economy	71	71	70	50
Fighting rising prices	79	65	71	42
POST-MATERIAL GOALS				
Giving people more say in important government decisions	43	13	42	42
Progressing toward a less impersonal, more humane society	51	37	65	71
Seeing that people have more say in how things get decided at work	33	7	60	33
Progressing toward a society where ideas are more important than money	35	15	43	54
N =	(531)	(218)	(285)	(432)

support to three of the four material items. But they differ markedly in their support for post-material values. On one item, more say at work, trade unionists score higher than environmentalists. By contrast, industrialists score very low on three of the four post-material items. So, the relatively affluent industrialists support material values and reject post-material values. The trade unionists give equally strong support to both material and non-material goals.

VALUES, NEEDS, AND IDEOLOGIES

Existing theory then does not take us very far in accounting for the

distribution of values between groups. Inglehart's explanation of differential support for material values is quite simply that people 'tend to place a higher value on whatever needs are in short supply'. To go beyond such a simple explanatory scheme, he states, 'the work of Abraham Maslow is particulary suggestive'.[14] Briefly, Maslow argues that needs are pursued in a hierarchical order according to their relative urgency for survival. As the basic physiological needs for survival are met, so higher order needs for love, belonging, and esteem become increasingly important. Inglehart of course explains support for post-material values as mainly the function of adolescent socialization, although he agrees that some change in basic values may take place during adult life. It is perhaps not surprising then to find that income and socio-economic status have little connection with differential commitment to values. But our results remain puzzling.

Furthermore, two theoretical issues are raised by the Maslovian perspective. Firstly, the extent to which there is a linear relationship between material and post-material needs. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the relationship between needs and values. The first of these issues is not central to our problem. Inglehart's analysis does not rest on the correctness of the entire Maslovian theory, which as he says, is interesting mainly 'because it generates a set of expectations about the direction in which values may be changing'.[15] Indeed, Inglehart states quite explicitly that support for post-material goals does not imply opposition to material goals and that evidence from his 1970 survey indicates that most respondents consider both material and post-material goals desirable. This probably explains the partial support for material goals amongst our environmentalists, since it is not being claimed that support for one set of goals necessarily excludes support for the other. The strong support for both material and post-material values among trade unionists is certainly inconsistent with the Maslovian linear theory.

What is however central to the Maslovian tradition is the view that needs underlie choices, and choices are the expression of values. It is this theory which attempts to derive values from need deprivation and satisfaction which we would wish to question as a complete account of both the generation and distribution of values. A theory which puts so much weight on needs seems to underplay the intentional or goal-oriented character of human behaviour. Priorities attached to goals certainly tell us something about valued end-states, and about the extent to which pressing needs are met. But the precise relations between these elements, it is suggested, is problematic. If however we associate values with ideals, this serves to distance valued ends from needs. In short, we have doubts about the validity of attempts to reduce moral judgements to needs. And it is values as represented by ideals which also have political significance.

Individuals are more likely to man the barricades out of a burning sense of injustice than from hunger or poverty as such. So perhaps Inglehart and later researchers have been looking at the wrong kind of variables to explain support for post-materialism. By concentrating on the level of affluence of an individual as a determinant, they have neglected ideals as a possible cause.

Any attempt to extend the concept of values by looking at ideals is fraught with difficulties. Firstly, values themselves are conceptually elusive. In particular, there is the problem of distinguishing between ultimate or terminal values and intermediate or instrumental values.[16] Thus equality may be seen by some as an end in itself, intrinsically valuable. For others such as those on the moderate right it is a means towards the realization of some higher human condition (e.g. freedom).[17] The solution we adopted was a pragmatic one. We decided to pin down the values that were revealed in statements about preferences for various aspects of society: that is, to investigate social ideals, taking as a starting point items which seemed to surface most frequently on both sides of the current environmentalist debate.

On the basis of impressionistic evidence, we constructed twenty-one scale items using a modification of Osgood's semantic differential technique.[18] Respondents were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale what kind of society was preferred. The results were factor analyzed: four main clusters emerged (Table IV). Firstly, there were items similar to Inglehart's material values; a preference for economic growth, contrasted with no growth and limits to growth. The second factor was made up of items which are strongly analogous to Inglehart's post-material values; a preference for participation and satisfying work. A third factor stressed differentials as opposed to equality, rewards for achievement and a preference for the market. The fourth factor elicited a preference for individualism versus collectivism.

Now it is immediately apparent that these clusters of items have an explicitly ideological flavour.[19] Industrialists idealize a society which rewards risks and achievement, and in which market forces predominate. Quite simply, their ideal society is one which puts a premium on economic individualism. Trade unionists while supporting the material goals of the industrialists, prefer a society which emphasizes participation, the moderation of market mechanisms in the public interest, and is strongly in favour of collective as against individualistic approaches to problems. Environmentalists came close to trade unionists in their preference for participation and their suspicion of the market, but take a middle position on individualism versus collectivism. Where they differ, of course, is in their rejection of unlimited economic growth.

What we wish to stress then, is that Inglehart's scale taps only a part of a wider cluster of values which together comprise a measure

TABLE IV: *Social ideals*



* Public
O Industrialists
\+ Trades Unionists
△ Environmentalists

of economic individualism, and which has clear ideological and political significance. Environmentalists are opposed not simply to the way industrial societies go about achieving the goal of wealth creation: they are opposed to its central and dominant economic and material values.[20] Utopian environmentalists want a different kind of society from other members of their society, and it is in their different social ideals that we may find an explanation both of their high post-material scale scores and their membership of environmentalist organizations. The goal of environmentalists is to realize a society in which alternative values and institutions can take root. Post-material values are the values which they want to see made real in some future utopia. Thus it is not present need which generates values but their utopia; not their conditions of social existence *per se*, but what they would like to see as their conditions of social existence.

The ideological basis of support for post-material values is borne out by our observation that political identification is an equally good predictor of post-materialism: those who regard themselves as politically 'left' are also highly post-material while those on the 'right' tend to be materialists (Table V). Controlling for politics accounts for much of the difference between the four target groups.

TABLE V: *Post-materialism scores* by politics*

	Environmentalists			*Industrialists*			*Trade Unionists*			*Public*		
Politics	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*N*
Left	30.38	2.57	63	31.33	3.79	3	26.60	3.00	67	25.77	4.22	31
Mildly left	27.89	3.21	123	25.20	2.68	15	25.27	3.11	113	24.31	3.66	73
Centre	25.82	3.30	82	20.38	3.56	34	23.32	3.67	47	22.25	2.95	118
Mildly right	24.23	3.20	53	19.91	3.19	98	21.27	3.69	22	21.07	3.06	75
Right	22.33	3.66	15	18.63	3.54	43	19.43	3.60	7	20.27	3.96	48
No position	28.53	3.67	66	19.91	4.89	11	23.79	4.35	14	22.92	2.68	106

*Calculated as sum of eight item scores (range 8–40), a high score corresponding to more support for post-material values.

SITUATIONS AND VALUES

One criticism which has been levelled at Inglehart's approach is its failure to distinguish between public and private values. Marsh[21] found that post-materialists tended to be more dissatisfied with the material aspects of their jobs than were materialists. Inglehart's scale measures support for what are essentially political goals, and our scale of economic individualism measures support for alternative social ideals. So, it is possible to argue that the goals which individuals seek to maximize for society may not correspond precisely to the hierarchy of values which operates in their personal lives.[22] Perhaps environmentalists in market occupations are private materialists and public post-materialists.

Alternatively, it can be argued that different values are relevant to different situations. For example, the goals of family life, the values that its members seek to maximize, the criteria for conduct are predominantly non-economic. Individuals are valued as persons rather than for what they have achieved; needs are met regardless of ability to pay. The unconditional commitments and loyalties of the family are far removed from the contractual relations of the market place. Affection and companionship are highly valued goals, and mutual sexual satisfaction is expected to take place within this context. Indeed, the exchange of sex for monetary payments is generally condemned; even in a society dominated by a market mentality, the commercialization of sex is only grudgingly admitted and strictly regulated. In the same way, the intrusion of the values of kinship into economic or political affairs is equally condemned. To offer political posts or contracts to relations is nepotism and even corruption; only the criteria of competence relevant to the goal of the subsystem can be admitted.

The point is clear enough. Values are specific to situations. So when individuals are presented with a list of social goals, there is no necessary inconsistency if they emphasize goals for society which differ from those appropriate for areas of their personal lives. This has important implications for methodology and for the interpretation of the meaning of the results. Different values surface and are especially significant for different areas (or domains) of life. It is quite consistent to act according to material values in an occupation (to be dissatisfied with the salary, for example), and at the same time to give low priority to economic growth as a goal for society.

The point can be reinforced by returning to the differing patterns of support for particular material and post-material goals between our target groups (Table III). Although environmentalists were much more supportive of two post-material goals than the general public, on two other post-material goals there was no significant difference from the public. Similarly the percentage of environmentalists

giving high priority to two of the four material goals was quite large, as great as or even greater than the percentage supporting other material goals amongst the public and the industrialists. It is not that environmentalists reject material goals absolutely and neither do they embrace post-material goals without exception: the differences are relative and only emerge when we examine the overall response of environmentalists to a set of values. Thus, there is room for environmentalists to accept material goals in certain life domains, such as occupational choice, so long as this does not outweigh the overall commitment to post-materialism.

Nevertheless, intuitively, it is reasonable to expect there to be some kind of overall relationship between values in the various life domains.[23] Inglehart, for example, found that public post-materialists attached more importance to 'working with people you like' and 'a feeling of accomplishment', whereas public materialists tended to choose 'a good salary' and 'a safe job' as things which are most important in a job.[24] Rosenberg[25] found that those choosing occupations such as real-estate finance, sales promotion and business, attached a high weight to extrinsic rewards such as status, security and money, and a low weight to self-expression. By contrast, those preferring careers in architecture, drama, and advertising attached importance to self-expression, and those in social work, teaching, and natural science gave a low weight to extrinsic rewards. Those for whom self-actualization is of overriding importance will be more likely to become artists than marketing directors, despite the poor economic prospects for a career in art. And those who get to the top in business are more likely to be strongly committed to the goals and values of the market place. But this does not mean that post-materialists are indifferent to their own material rewards in their jobs. In so far as they may also occupy roles in the market sector, economic criteria are relevant for evaluating the economic rewards of the job.[26]

This then, we would argue, is the explanation: environmentalists try to choose occupations congruent with their public post-material values and social ideals. In particular, they tend to choose occupations which do not involve direct commitment to the goals and values of industrialism, and are congruent with their generally anti-industrial sentiments. This is consistent with Parkin's conclusions from his study of activists in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 'The occupational location of radicals, results from their desire to avoid direct implication in the capitalist economic system'.[27] This is supported by our empirical findings. When we look at the occupations of environmentalists, what is remarkable is the relatively high proportion employed in the personal service professions and creative arts; that is, in non-productive occupations in which economic material goals and values are less important and in which

TABLE VI: *Occupations of environmentalists and public*

	Environmentalists %	*Public* %
Commerce and industry		
professional and supervisory	15.3	14.0
clerical	7.1	11.6
Self employed	9.6	3.1
Service, welfare, creative	43.4	11.7
Manual	5.3	31.1
Retired	2.3	8.8
Housewife	7.6	15.5
Unemployed	1.4	2.2
Student	7.8	1.8
	100.0	99.8
	N = (437)	(543)

non-material values are more important (Table VI). But congruence between occupation and values is only possible for those for whom a choice of occupation is a reality. And this is by no means the case for the majority, for whom work is instrumental as a source of income rather than self-fulfilment. Environmentalists have achieved an above average level of education. And it is this we would argue that enables such a high proportion to choose an occupation congruent with their values and ideals. But although environmentalists who attach so much importance to post-material values choose congruent occupations, it does not follow that all those in non-market occupations premium non-market values.

Finally, we have to explain the strong support for both material and post-material values among trade unionists. It is here that the term 'post-material' can be questioned. The very high priority given by trade unionists to participation makes sense as an expression of the political rather than the economic dimension of their role. It is the subordinate position of workers in the hierarchical structures of industry which it can be argued generates an emphasis on participation. And although trade union officials are not now subordinate, it is their political socialization and earlier work experiences to which we must look for the source of their present values. Environmentalists stress participation too, but less strongly. It is the industrialists who occupy dominant roles, for whom participation has such low priority. So, 'post-material' is a misleading term. It reinforces the idea that such values emerge only after material values are met. Non-material values and goals relate to the non-economic dimensions of social roles and experience. Their emergence does not necessarily depend on the achievement of some level of material satisfaction.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND VALUE CHANGE

The argument of this analysis is for an extension and development of Inglehart's view that values can be explained largely in terms of a Maslovian theory of need deprivation and satisfaction.[28] The alternative model which we wish to present is admittedly still speculative in many of its aspects. But it more nearly explains the additional evidence of our survey which draws attention to the remarkably high degree of support for post-material values among a sample of environmentalists, and the fact that this cannot satisfactorily be explained by their socio-demographic background.

The evidence of generational differences in support for post-material values is well established. Part of the explanation is still that post-materialists have been socialized under conditions of peace and relative prosperity. And as Dalton[29] has emphasized, these socialization effects determine value priorities more effectively than do current experiences of affluence. A comparison by Hildebrandt and Dalton[30] between age cohorts experiencing varying degrees of prosperity confirms the generational difference. Indeed, there is little in the literature which would lead us to expect that indicators of current social and economic experience, including present income, would have much effect. Nevertheless, the dramatic differences in support for post-materialism between environmentalists and the public, and between industrialists and either of these groups, needs to be explained. Our findings that age, income, education and occupation account for little of the inter-group variance simply confirms the view that it is to early socialization that we must look for the roots of partisan commitment to values. It is commitment to post-material values, we would argue, that helps to explain both occupational choice and party alignment. Support for post-material values in turn can be attributed to the individual's social ideals. It is differences in utopia which account for the value polarization between environmentalists and industrialists.

Peace and prosperity provide the conditions which make possible a shift of social ideals. A certain level of material security may well constitute a threshold beyond which non-material values surface. But this does not explain why some from secure and well-to-do homes shift their priorities to post-material values and goals, while others as affluent and well educated pursue careers dedicated to material goals. Our data cannot provide the answer. We can only construct a tentative explanation as a basis for further research.

Our first point is to draw attention to the pull of aspirations and ideals as well as to the push of needs. Economic and material values and goals are obviously central in industrial societies. Indeed, what differentiates industrial societies from traditional is the hegemony of economic values and institutions, and the systematic and

rational organization of social life in their pursuit. But, however much the subsystems of the family, health, education and welfare function within the context of the overriding economism of industrial capitalism,[31] they remain the carriers[32] of non-economic goals and values. In this sense, the alternative society is with us now, and functions (somewhat uneasily) within the framework of an industrial market society.[33] Those who are most aware of and exposed to the conflicts of values are those who operate outside the market place – especially in the personal service professions and creative arts.[34] It is here that personalist values predominate. And it is in such occupations that those who give priority to non-economic values can find a congenial milieu. It is from this context that those who wish to assert non-economic values can take a stand in defence of an environment which they see to be threatened with destruction precisely by unbridled economism.

The rejection of the primacy of economic and material values is a part of a more general world view which is critical of the institutions and practices of industrial capitalism,[35] with its emphasis on economic individualism, and the centrality of market mechanisms. Hence, the alignment of post-materialists with the left is not because the left would necessarily share their rejection of economics but because they have nowhere else to go. Indeed, a significant proportion of environmentalists reject the left/right dimension in politics entirely as irrelevant to their political objectives precisely because parties of the left are also committed to economic growth and the dominance of material goals (Table V). On the other hand, for those who have a stake in the production of goods and services in the market place, material values serve to legitimate and justify their activities. Support for material values is closely tied to their personal interests. Again, materialism and post-materialism are tied to interests and are not simply reducible to psychological needs.

Our data then underlines and emphasizes the ideological significance[36] of values which relate to political and social goals. Their generation and distribution cannot be explained simply in terms of need satisfaction or deprivation. Material needs are met within the context of specific social arrangements. The institutions and priorities of industrial society exact a cost, in terms of personal relationships, the destruction of primary group loyalties and values, and humanly satisfying and alienating work. Entered into by most as an instrumental source of income and security, these institutions are centralized, hierarchically structured, imperatively co-ordinated, and requiring the application of specialized knowledge beyond the comprehension of the individual. It is the reaction against the costs of materialism which lies at the root of anti-industrial society attitudes. To the environmentalists, commitment to economic growth is seen as the imperative which generates the negative aspects of industrialization.

The rejection of the hegemony of economic values and economic individualism has an ideological significance which goes far beyond the satisfaction of material and security needs in an affluent society, and the search for personal fulfilment and self-actualization. It is this political dimension of value change which is important and which cannot be reduced to need satisfaction and deprivation. The commitment of the environmentalists to post-material values is part of a more general ideology which legitimates and justifies a quite different social ideal.

Any explanation of changing beliefs and values must then go beyond the view that political socialization can be explained somewhat mechanistically as mainly a response to material conditions. What this cannot account for is the differential responses of different sections of the community enjoying comparable material conditions. Our data reinforces the view that the process of change must be located well back in adolescence. The dramatic difference is between environmentalists and industrialists of all ages. Affluence may well reduce the primacy of economic values. But those who positively embrace post-material values are likely to have been exposed more strongly to such alternative values – with one or both parents working in the non-market sector, or left of centre in politics.[37] It is in such homes in particular that the young will be exposed to aspirations and ideals for a different kind of society, and in which the institutions and values of industrial capitalism are looked at in a more critical light.

This interpretation is reinforced by researches on the family backgrounds of campus radicals in the late sixties. Flacks[38] found a continuity between the basic values and aspirations of new left activists and their parents. Both were hostile to the competitive status-oriented individualism of bourgeois culture; both sought a way of life which emphasized self-expression, humanism and community; both were substantially disaffected with the political system. He traces the emergence of a new kind of middle class family, less authoritarian and hierarchical; more child-centred and democratic. It is in such families that the new character structures have been moulded, encouraged to pursue individuality and personal autonomy.[39]

The expansion of employment opportunities in the non-market sector could well operate in the same direction. Young people considering such careers, especially those who have the opportunities opened up by higher education, can embrace post-material values as part of the process of anticipatory socialization through identification with their future roles. Those who in recent years have aimed at careers in social work, teaching, or medicine have been able to attach more importance to non-material values including self-actualization, and the enjoyment of a measure of autonomy. By contrast, those aiming at careers in the generally hierarchical

structures of industry, must expect authority and subordination. And those whose career expectations are confined to the assembly line, factory operatives, or routine clerical work can hardly realistically expect self-actualization in their daily lives. But the increase in the numbers of technicians, and semi-professionals applying knowledge in work situations requiring an element of autonomous judgement could well challenge the traditional bases of authority based on hierarchical division of labour.[40] And the significance of the growth of higher education may well be that it has increased the possibility of choice – not only of careers, but also of values and ideals.

The general thrust of this discussion indicates that values are formed during adolescence and that any fundamental changes in values must await the slow process of generational change. But this does not rule out the possibility of some measure of subsequent change reflecting adult experience. Rokeach[41] measured a shift in values between 1968–1971 away from material concerns towards increases in the importance of non-material values such as a world of beauty, which he suggests reflects the increasing saliency of ecological issues. Such changes were admittedly mainly confined to white Americans in their twenties. He was also able to achieve changes in values experimentally by feeding objective information about inconsistencies in subjects' values and attitudes. This, he argues, can arouse states of self-dissatisfaction which result in long term changes in values and behaviour. Such evidence points to the possibility that programmes of information and education can have a more immediate, if limited, impact.

CONCLUSION

The sources of changing values and priorities are to be found at the intersection of multiple influences emanating from changes in the structure of modern industrial societies, and the differential experiences of those who occupy various positions in the social structure. Above all, we need to take account of the interests served by different values in the social system. A firmer grasp of such value changes can only come from a better understanding of the complex societal processes involved in the generation and maintenance of values.

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and

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6. Mark Abrams could detect no generational differences in a replication of Inglehart's study, but he did not rule out a general shift in values. 'Changing values: a report on Britain today', *Encounter*, October 1974, pp. 29–38.

7. The scale we used was a modified form of that used by Inglehart op. cit. The full text of the question was: 'Here is a list of possible aims for the country as a whole. What do you think this country's priorities should be for the next ten years or so?' 1 = High priority, 2 = Moderate priority, 3 = Intermediate/undecided, 4 = Low priority, 5 = Very low priority. The items are listed in Table 3. The 'post-material' items were recoded so that according them high priority gave a high score. The scale score across all eight items was summed.

8. S. Cotgrove, 'Environmentalism and utopia', *Sociological Review*, 1976, 24, p. 23–42. The term 'utopian environmentalists' is being used in a descriptive (not pejorative) sense to refer to those who have a vision of a better society.

9. N = 441, response rate = 79 percent. The survey was financed by a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

10. 1974/75 editions. N = 220, response rate = 63 percent

11. Public N = 577, response rate = 60 percent. Trade unions N = 286, response rate = 76 percent.

12. An analysis by Marsh of data from a survey in Britain in 1971 considered that 'post-materialists tend to be richer, better educated, and have a higher social status than materialists'. op. cit., 1977, p. 180.

13. Ibid.

14. Inglehart op. cit., p. 60.

15. Ibid., p. 61.

16. Jib Fowles, 'The problem of values in futures research', *Futures*, 1977, 9(4), p. 303–14; F. R. Kluckhohn and F. L. Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations*, Evanston, Illinois, Row-Peterson, 1961; Charles Morris, *Varieties of Human Value* University of Chicago Press, 1956.

17. Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values*, New York, Free Press, 1973.

18. C. E. Osgood *et al.*, *The Measurement of Meaning*, University of Illinois Press, 1959.

19. This is consistent with Marsh's observation of the partisan nature of public values, op. cit., 1977, p. 183–4.

20. S. Cotgrove and A. Duff, 'Environmentalism, middle class radicalism and politics', *Sociological Review*, 1980, 28(2), pp. 333–51.

21. Marsh, op. cit., 1977.

22. Ibid., ch. 6.

23. Marsh found the relationship to

be complex. Personal and public values were congruent for middle class radicals, but older middle class Tories tended towards post-materialist personal values and materialist public values, op. cit., 1977, p. 181.

24. Inglehart, op. cit., p. 86.

25. M. Rosenberg *et al.*, *Occupations and Values* Chicago, Illinois, Free Press, 1958.

26. Marsh argues that dissatisfaction with the material aspects of their job is evidence that post-materialists are also materialists. But this is consistent with Herzberg's two-factor theory of motivation: that pay and security (contextual factors) are sources of dissatisfaction, rather than positive satisfaction, while self-actualisation is a source of positive satisfaction. Hence it is quite possible to be concerned about the material aspects of a job in order to remove a source of dissatisfaction. This does not necessarily imply 'materialist' motivation, however. F. Herzberg, *Work and the Nature of Man*, London, Staples Press, 1968.

27. F. Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, Manchester University Press, 1968, p. 187.
Follow-up studies of student activists found that ten years later they were concentrated in the knowledge and human service industries and had rejected careers in business. Fendrich, J. M. 'Activists ten years later: a test of generational unit continuity' *Journal of Social Issues* 1974, 30(3), pp. 95–118.

28. Such an extension is in fact consistent with Marsh's conclusions. He found that the Maslovian perspective was more successful in explaining personal than public post-materialism. Marsh, op. cit., 1977, p. 183.

29. Russel J. Dalton, 'Was there a revolution?', *Comparative Political Studies*, 1977, 9(4), pp. 459–73.

30. Hildebrandt and Dalton, op. cit.

31. It can be argued that the overriding commitment to economic and material values and goals of industrial societies (both market and command economies) generates a series of imperatives. Parsons' pattern variables can be seen not so much as the alternatives facing all societies, but as a reflection of the values necessary in industrial societies, and in which hegemonic values reduce problems to technical/instrumental rationality.
See J. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, London, Heinemann, 1971, p. 91. The counter-culture's promotion of expressive values is thus a challenge to industrialism in which expressive values must be subordinated to material values.

32. For an exploration of the notion of groups as carriers of world-views see K. Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953, and S. Cotgrove, 'Styles of thought: science, romanticism and modernisation', *British Journal of Sociology*, 1978, 29(3), pp. 358–71.

33. Marxist theorists, such as Althusser, would argue that such sub-systems are all part of the repressive state apparatus and function to ensure the reproduction of labour. Though there are undoubtedly pressures to ensure that the educational system is harnessed to serving the needs of industry, this is an over-deterministic view, which fails to take account of the operation of educational values in opposition to purely market/economic values.
The sociology of the professions has grappled with this problem: professional values and codes of conduct can be reinterpreted from this perspective as attempts to protect non-market sub-systems from the intrusion of inappropriate market values and criteria. The commercialization of medicine would and does raise obvious problems.

34. The emergence of radical movements within the professions are evidence of such conflicts of values and the attempt to assert alternative values. See P. Halmos (ed) *Professionalisation and Social Change*, Sociological Review Monograph, 20, 1973.

35. This association between post-materialism and anti-industrial attitudes has also been noted by other

researchers, including Inglehart and Marsh.

36. This is consistent with Marsh's conclusion on the public post-materialists, op. cit. 1977.

37. F. Parkin, op. cit.

38. R. Flacks, 'The revolt of the young intelligentsia: revolutionary class-consciousness in post-scarcity America' in R. Aya and N. Miller (eds) *The New American Revolution*, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1971.

39. Op cit., pp. 226–230.

40. See Eliot Friedson in P. Halmos, op. cit., 'Professionalisation and the organisation of middle class labour in post-industrial society', pp. 47–60.

41. M. Rokeach, 'Change and stability in American value systems, 1968–1971', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 1974, 38, pp. 222–38.

James Curran

Class imagery, work environment and community: some further findings and a brief comment

ABSTRACT

Relationships between class imagery, size of workplace and type of community are briefly examined in analyzing data from a study of shopfloor workers in small and large firms in the printing and electronics industries in an affluent, urban conurbation. The results confirm recent studies reporting that the link between deferential imagery and small firm employment has little empirical support. The data suggests that the industry in which the worker is employed may be a more important influence on social imagery than size of workplace. The findings also indicate that life cycle position interacts with size of workplace in influencing worker attitudes but not in any neat one-to-one fashion. Finally, community structure is also confirmed as an influence on small firm worker social imagery, though not towards the adoption of a deferential class model.

INTRODUCTION

In the proliferating literature on working class social imagery, one widely discussed variety may be summed up in the notion of the 'deferential worker'.[1] This image involves adherence to a prestige or hierarchical model of society in which those who occupy the top strata do so through their possession of innate qualities. Any challenge to their position would be a challenge to the natural order of society. The deferential worker identifies closely with his social superiors and seeks contacts with them in and out of work. Such contacts are both sources of psychological and social rewards and confirmation of his membership of the wider social order.

Deferential imagery has been linked particularly to employment in the small enterprise and the persistence of marginal economic activities in advanced captialist societies.[2] But, even if those holding such an image are a minority in the working class, they are alleged to be

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important for the stability of the social order through their support of the dominant ideology and resistance to leftist ideologies.[3] However, a clear finding from several studies seeking the working class deferential has been 'their failure to locate this animal in his prescribed habitat'.[4]

In largely rejecting the existence of the working class deferential, recent studies have raised some additional complexities. For example, as Newby has argued,[5] the assumption of a stable deferential imagery belittles the importance of the inconsistencies and contradictions in everyday relations between workers and their class superiors. There has also been an over-concentration on work experiences as the main influence on class imagery. Exceptionally, as in Batstone's research,[6] out-of-work influences have been given greater importance than work experiences on social imagery but, on the whole, non-work experiences have been treated as residually important. Such a view not only discounts influences from local social relations but also those from the mass media.[7]

Thus, while the alleged link between small firm employment and deferential imagery now seems doubtful, two issues remain far from resolved. What differences in class imagery may be attributed to employment in work units of differing size and how are they related to out-of-work influences in different types of community?

THE SAMPLE

A sample of 118 male shopfloor workers in eight small manufacturing firms – four printing and four electronics firms – were interviewed on a range of issues concerning their work and non-work lives. Following the Bolton Committee, the definition of small firm adopted was one with '200 employees or less'.[8] A further 83 workers doing similar work in two large firms, one from each industry, were also interviewed. All interviews were carried out between 1974 and 1976 and the response rate was just over 73 percent of all those invited to participate.[9]

The two industries were chosen for their contrast to each other. Printing, a mainly craft industry with, until comparatively recently, a slow rate of technological change, is predominantly a highly unionized, small firm industry.[10] Electronics, on the other hand, is a relatively recently established science-based industry with a high rate of technological innovation. It has few craft traditions, a relatively low level of unionization and a lower proportion of small firms.[11] The intention, in choosing such contrasting industries, was to examine the connections between class imagery and industrial sub-culture.[12]

Respondents and firms were located in or around the densely populated, highly urbanized area of northern Surrey. The local

economy is dominated by white collar and service industries with manufacturing providing only a little over a quarter of all employment.[13] Unemployment is low and has been low since the end of the Second World War.[14] Socially, the middle classes are heavily represented[15] and it is their presence which give the local social order its distinct character.

SELF-RATED SOCIAL CLASS

Small and large firms do not recruit randomly from the labour force.[16] Employers' selection practices and other influences combine to produce two distinct, albeit overlapping, labour forces. Small firm workers in the present research were, on average, younger, less well trained, less experienced and less likely to be trade union members than those in the large firms. Such differences might well be expected to be associated with differences in class imagery.

Just over half (54 percent) of the small firm workers saw themselves as 'working class' compared to 51 percent of their large firm counterparts. Conversely, 32 percent of the large firm workers labelled themselves 'middle class' as compared to 26 percent of small firm workers. Relatively few (11 percent) either could not or would not lable themselves but most of these were either unsure about their class position or would not categorize themselves on moral grounds. Only two respondents denied the existence of class.

Generally, it is thought that about 65–70 percent of manual workers see themselves as 'working class' and about 25 percent as 'middle class'. But, in fact, previous research shows a good deal of variation.[17] It was expected that the present sample would be less likely to regard themselves as 'working class' than manual workers generally. As Runciman reported,[18] manual workers living in the South are more prone to see themselves as 'middle class' than those elsewhere in Britain. Secondly, the present sample contained a high proportion of home owners and this has also been found to be associated with 'middle class' self-rating.[19] Finally, respondents were mainly skilled or semi-skilled and again this appears to increase the likelihood of 'middle class' self-rating.[20]

Some of the above differences were linked to the greater tendency for large firm workers to regard themselves as 'middle class' as compared to the small firm workers. For example, large firm workers were more likely than small firm workers to be home owners.[21] Self-rated social class was also related to income and small firm workers earned less, on average, than large firm workers.[22]

Amongst small firm workers, class self-rating was also associated with age. Of the small firm workers aged under thirty-five, 46 percent labelled themselves as 'working class' compared to 73 percent

of those aged thirty-five and over. Among large firm workers this was reversed with older workers being more likely to see themselves as 'middle class'. If self-rated middle class status is related to material success in later life, the reason for this might be that older small firm workers have less reason to make such a self-rating. There was also an inter-industry difference with printing workers being more likely to see themselves as 'working class' regardless of size of firm.

COMPLEXITY OF CLASS MODELS

Lockwood suggested that working class deferentials would have 'at least a fourfold division of society'.[23] Batstone, however, found that small firm workers had no more complex class models than large firm workers.[24] In the present study large firm workers more frequently offered class models with four or more strata. But when the differing age distributions of the small and large firm samples were allowed for, the proportions holding class models of varying complexity were similar since it was older workers who offered more complex models.

There was again a clear difference between the two industries. Electronics workers were much more likely to have a three class model of society than printing workers and much less likely to have two or four class models. Just why such differences should occur is unclear but these inter-industrial differences were markedly greater than those between workers in firms of differing size.

THE DETERMINANTS OF CLASS MEMBERSHIP

Respondents were next asked their views on the main influences putting people into different classes. Again, overall, the differences between the small and large firm samples were small on every influence mentioned, never exceeding five percentage points (Table I.) The largest difference was on wealth and income and was in the direction suggested by previous research. Small firm workers were less likely to see wealth and income as determinants of class membership and more likely to mention status factors such as family of origin or lifestyle. As with the views on class order complexity, inter-industry differences were greater than those between workers in small and large firms. This was especially marked in relation to the importance attached to wealth and income; 42 percent of printing workers mentioned these influences but only 27 percent of electronics workers.

It should be stressed that Table I should not be seen as implying that respondents offered simple, one dimensional models of the class order. As the Table indicates, respondents often mentioned more

TABLE I *Influences which put people into different social classes*

	Small printing firm workers N=64 %	*Small electronics firm workers N=54* %	*Large printing firm workers N=41* %	*Large electronics firm workers N=42* %	*All small firm workers N=118* %	*All large firm workers N=83* %
Wealth/Income	39	26	46	29	33	37
Education	12	19	22	12	15	17
Family of Origin/Breeding	44	31	41	29	38	35
Occupation	3	15	2	7	8	5
Life-style/Behaviour	8	17	12	7	12	10
Other	8	7	7	14	8	11
Could not say	6	6	5	17	6	11

Percentages do not add up to more than 100 because some respondents mentioned more than one influence.

than one influence as being important. Equally, the frequency with which a reason was mentioned did not necessarily indicate its salience in respondents' class imagery. As Marxist theorists have argued, people may mention education or family background as important influences on class membership but recognize that wealth or income is more important since they fundamentally influence education and the kind of family into which a person is born.

Respondents also often indicated that influences on class membership had varying importance in relation to the classes in their model. For many workers, the core members of the upper strata were there through birth but other members of the strata were seen in classic class terms as occupying their position through their ownership and control of the means of production. The same respondent might then describe the 'middle class' in status terms, as striving for a certain distinctive lifestyle – 'people who try to be better than ordinary people' – while reverting to occupational/income criteria for the determinants of membership of the lower strata in his model.[25]

Differences emerged between younger and older workers on the main determinants of class membership. Older workers (those aged thirty-five and over) were more likely to see education as important than younger workers, regardless of size of firm. Among older small firm workers, 32 percent mentioned education as an important influence on class position compared to only 7 percent of those aged under thirty-five. Among the large firm control sample, the corresponding proportions were 25 percent and 9 percent. Younger workers clearly took a more cynical view of the changes in educational provision introduced since World War Two and their effects on job opportunities. Older workers may also have increasingly seen a lack of education as a reason for their lack of personal advancement.

Older workers in small and large firms tended to cite a wider range of influences on class membership than younger workers. This may well have been simply the result of experience; older workers have had more opportunity to observe the range of influences that can affect a person's life. The higher proportion of small firm workers shown in Table I as thinking that factors other than wealth or income were important in placing people in different classes, was partly due to younger workers in small firms being more inclined to select such influences than their younger counterparts in large firms and the fact that the small firms contained more younger workers.

BELIEFS ABOUT MOBILITY

The lack of difference between the class images of small and large firm workers but strong contrast between workers in the two industries,

was echoed in respondents' beliefs about social mobility. Electronics workers were more likely to believe that upward mobility was easier than printing workers but, overall, there was little difference between the small and large firm samples.

Younger workers were not, on the whole, very much more optimistic about the possibilities of upward mobility than older workers. Their relative lack of faith in education as a means of upward mobility clearly contributed to this pessimism. Nor were younger workers strong believers in the rewards of hard work. In fact, only nine of the 118 small firm shopfloor respondents and three large firm workers thought hard work was what most helped a person to get on.

Surprisingly, there is little published data on manual worker beliefs about social mobility. Goldthorpe *et al*, for example, did not report such data despite their concern with *embourgeoisement*. Ingham asked small firm workers about their perceptions of the class order but not about their views on social mobility. Batstone's small firm workers, however, had a stronger belief in mobility through occupational advancement than his large firm workers.[26]

In the present study not only were small firm workers in both industries less ambitious, as measured by a wish to be promoted to foreman, but less than 10 percent thought a shopfloor worker could beome a director even if he had the ability and worked hard. Moreover, small firm respondents were not particularly optimistic about their promotion chances; only 21 percent thought their chances were 'very good' or 'good'. This was only slightly higher than the equivalent proportion (17 percent) among the large firm workers.

One social mobility path which might be expected to appeal to the small firm worker is entrepreneurship. He has access to entrepreneurial role models and if, as suggested earlier, he is in an increasingly less favourable labour market position than large firm workers, then self-employment might be an attractive alternative. Nearly two out of three small firm workers wished to own their own business, compared to 47 percent of the large firm workers. But whether such ambitions were much more than pleasant daydreams is doubtful. Only eleven small firm respondents claimed to be making serious preparations to start their own business and most of these efforts appeared minimal.

CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

The notion of class consciousness no less than that of deference, presents considerable conceptual and methodological problems. Class consciousness was defined as an awareness of belonging to the working class in the sense of a grouping who are essentially employees in the economy and whose common interests are in opposition to

those of the employing class in society. It was not expected, in the light of so much previous research to the contrary,[27] that many respondents would display a full blown class consciousness in the above sense. On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of class consciousness as imperfectly or partially present in respondents' overall class imagery.

One simple test of an element of class consciousness in respondents' class imagery might be the exclusive use of economic criteria in describing the determinants of the class order and membership of any strata within it. On this test few respondents qualified; eight small firm workers and twelve large firm workers. A less severe test allowed respondents to use economic criteria in describing membership of the various strata in their class models but also to employ non-economic criteria in describing some or all the strata and to combine economic criteria with other criteria as the main influences putting people into different classes. Fourteen small firm and four large firm workers described their class models in this way. Thus, overall, less than 20 percent of respondents could be described as even suggesting an element of class consciousness by their criteria in constructing their class models.

It might be objected that, as tests of class consciousness, the above lacked an essential reference to strata in conflict. However, there were clear indications among small and large firm workers of oppositional beliefs of this kind. For example, over one third of respondents agreed that co-operation in industry was impossible because employers and employees were on opposite sides. Moreover, workers in small firms were only slightly less likely to hold such a belief than those in large firms.[28] But, since not all those who described their class models predominantly in terms of economic criteria also agreed that opposition between employers and workers was inevitable, combining these findings would not greatly increase the proportions showing indications of class consciousness.

Workers were shown three statements concerning class relations in Britain and asked which came closest to their own view.[29] As Table II shows, few respondents appeared to think class unimportant and rather less than one in four opted for the statement which recognized the existence of class but deemed it relatively unimportant.[30] True, rather more small firm workers agreed with the statement that class is now unimportant in Britain but the difference was small.

Most respondents clearly found the third statement closest to their views and, remarkably, there was virtually no difference between the two samples. As previously, differences were much more between industries than between small and large firm workers. The direction of the difference is consistent with the earlier findings showing that electronics workers were less likely to use economic criteria to put

TABLE II *Views on social class*

	Small printing firm workers %	*Small electronics firm workers* %	*Large printing firm workers* %	*Large electronics firm workers* %	*All small firm workers* %	*All large firm workers* %
'Class is a thing of the past – we are all equal now in Britain'.	3	7	2	–	5	1
'There are classes in Britain but they are not important and people can move easily from one to another'.	20	22	17	36	21	26
'There are two main classes in Britain – those who work and and those who get others to work for them'.	64	52	63	50	59	57
Other/Don't Know	13	19	17	14	15	16
	100 N = 64	100 N = 54	100 N = 41	100 N = 42	100 N = 118	100 N = 83

Percentages do not always add up to 100 because of rounding.

people in different classes and more optimistic about upward mobility opportunities.

Older workers were slightly more likely to choose the third statement while younger workers were slightly more likely to select the second statement. Thus, although the age distributions of the samples favoured small firm respondents being less likely to opt for the third statement, in fact, this did not occur; small firm workers seemed as class conscious on this indicator as those in the large firms.

OUT-OF-WORK SOCIAL RELATIONS

Class imagery has often been assumed to be reflected in social relations with others. For example, Lockwood's working class deferential seeks and enjoys involvement with his social superiors in and out of work while his privatized worker is socially involved with neither his superiors nor fellow workers.[31] Batstone, while reporting that his small firm workers lacked a deferential imagery, nevertheless reported close, personal relations with bosses in and out of work.[32] Relations between small firm workers and their bosses in the present study were very much more socially distant than those in Batstone's study. Almost 70 percent of small firm workers reported that they knew their managing director either 'not very well' or 'hardly/not at all'. Relations outside work were non-existent; few respondents reported having even seen a boss outside working hours, let alone having any extended social relations.

When differences in marital status were controlled for, levels of out-of-work interaction among small and large firm workers became very similar. Two factors which went against close relations among fellow small firm workers were that small firms had higher levels of labour turnover[33] and normally contained fewer people of similar age, outlook and tastes with whom friendships might be fostered.

An alternative avenue for contacts with social superiors – especially in such a strongly middle class locality – was through membership of voluntary clubs or associations. But as Table III indicates, 44 percent of small firm workers belonged to no bodies of this kind compared to 24 percent of large firm workers. Moreover, large firm workers joined more clubs or associations as the average number of memberships per respondent indicates. Further, participation in out-of-work activities was related to age. Among small firm workers aged 45 and over, 65 percent belonged to no club or association of any kind In other words, if the age distributions of the small and large firm samples had been more similar, the differences might well have been even greater.

A simple claim to membership of a club or association without a measure of attachment may be misleading. For instance, just over

TABLE III *Membership of clubs or associations*

	Small printing firm workers $N = 64$ %	*Small electronics firm workers* $N = 54$ %	*Large printing firm workers* $N = 41$ %	*Large electronics firm workers*(1) $N = 41$ %	*All small firm workers* $N = 118$ %	*All large firm workers* $N = 82$ %
Parent Teacher Association	11	—	10	5	6	7
Working Men's Club	6	11	15	19	8	17
British Legion	8	4	7	—	6	4
Residents'/Tenants' Association	12	9	15	5	11	10
Church/Church Group	2	4	2	7	2	5
Sports Club	37	11	32	24	25	28
Evening Classes	5	2	5	10	3	7
Social Club	11	18	34	29	14	32
Political Party	3	6	5	2	4	4
Other	—	2	10	17	1	13
Belonged to None	32	57	24	24	44	24
Average Number of Memberships per respondent	0.95	0.67	1.34	1.19	0.82	1.26

(1) This question was not put to one respondent



10 percent of small firm respondents belonged to tenants' or residents' associations, but questioning revealed that, for most, membership was nominal. Frequency of attendance is one measure here and on this small firm workers emerged as slightly more attached but this was countered by their lower likelihood of holding an official position of some kind than large firm workers.

The class character of the clubs or associations to which respondents belonged was not always easy to assess. But small firm workers were less likely to belong to clearly working class clubs or associations such as working men's clubs. Sports clubs, the most popular single association to which respondents belonged, were particularly difficult to categorize in class terms but there was no evidence that these were not composed mainly of people similar to respondents. Even if it were assumed that *all* the church groups, social clubs and sports clubs were highly middle class and a main source of middle class contacts for small firm workers, clearly only a small proportion were achieving inter-class relations in this way.

As a further test of non-work social relations, married respondents were asked about the occupation of the husband of any couple they and their wives regarded as especially close friends. Overall, about two out of three married respondents claimed friendships of this kind. Among small firm married workers, 63 percent of the husbands in couples regarded as close friends were manual or supervisory workers, compared to 44 percent among the large firm sample. In short, it was the large firm married respondents who were more likely to have opportunities for mixing with the middle class through such contacts.[34]

One further possible source of inter-class contacts for married workers was through social relations with their wives' families. But here again, small firm married workers had fewer opportunities. Nearly two out of three married small firm workers had fathers-in-law who were manual or supervisory workers but among large firm married workers this proportion was 44 percent. Thus, overall, there was little evidence of small firm workers' non-work lives showing more inter-class social contacts.

CONCLUSIONS

The above findings confirm those of other recent studies reporting that deferential class imagery does not predominate among small firm manual workers. The research has extended both the range of small enterprise employment and the types of community studied and there seems little doubt that the original proposition asserting this connection ought now to be regarded with considerable scepticism.

The research also explored further the notion that the community

in which the small enterprise is located may be of considerable importance in influencing workers' class imagery. The locality in which the present small firm workers lived was one which ensured maximum exposure to middle class lifestyles and one which, therefore, might have been expected to reinforce influences towards *embourgeoisement* emanating from employment in the small enterprise. Yet, the findings point in the opposite direction.

In other words, out-of-work experience may, as suggested by Batstone, be of great importance in influencing small firm workers' views of society as well as their relations with employers but the exact character of these influences may vary. In the present research the small firms were not embedded in an 'ethos of small town capitalism'[35] but rather within an affluent, urban conurbation. The latter clearly influenced both small firm workers' social imagery and their relations with others.

The present study also suggests that industrial sub-culture may be more closely linked to class imagery than size of enterprise. Differences between the two industries in the present study relevant to differences in class imagery, are not hard to find. Printing has had a long history of worker/employer conflict which has recently been exacerbated by the introduction of new technology.[36] The high level of unionization is also apparently associated with variations in workers' class imagery.[37] The electronics industry, on the other hand, has historically had much lower levels of conflict and more relaxed social relations than is typical of manufacturing industry in general.[38]

The notion of a straightforward relationship between small firm employment and class imagery now seems untenable. Clearly, at the very least, several factors play an important part in the formation of workers' social imagery and those directly associated with size of enterprise may not be dominant. In a discussion of the formation of social imagery we should now think in terms of the worker in the small firm rather than the small firm worker.

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NOTES

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1. For a recent, critical summary of the wider literature on working class imagery see, H. H. Davis, *Beyond Class Images, Explorations in the Structure of Social Consciousness*, London, Croom Helm, 1979, pp. 9–47 and for an excellent discussion of the more specific literature on the working class deferential see, H. Newby, *The*

Deferential Worker, A Study of Farm Workers in East Anglia, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1979 (orig. pub. 1977) espec. ch.2.

2. This point was explicitly made by D. Lockwood in his very influential article 'Sources of Variation in Working Class Images of Society', *Sociological Review*, vol. 14, no. 3, Nov. 1966, pp. 249–67 reprinted in Bulmer (ed.) *Working Class Images of Society*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul/SSRC, 1975, pp. 16–32.

3. See espec. F. Parkin 'Working Class Conservatives: A Theory of Political Deviance', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 18, no. 3, Sept. 1967, pp. 278–90 and *Class Inequality and Political Order: Social Stratification in Capitalist and Communist Societies*, London, Paladin, 1972 (orig. pub. 1971). See also Newby, op. cit., pp. 107–8.

4. K. Roberts, F. G. Cook, S. C. Clark and E. Semeonoff, *The Fragmentary Class Structure*, London, Heinemann, 1977, p. 44 who report few indications of a clear deferential image among their sample of urban manual workers. Similarly, Newby op. cit., found little evidence of deferential imagery among his sample of farm workers, confirming the findings reported in, I. Carter, 'Agricultural Workers in the Class Structure: A Critical Note', *Sociological Review*, vol. 22, no. 2, May 1974, pp. 271–9 and E. Batstone 'Deference and the Ethos of Small Town Capitalism' in Bulmer, op. cit., pp. 116–30.

5. Newby, ibid. ch. 8 and 'Paternalism and Capitalism' in Scase (ed.) *Industrial Society: Class, Cleavage and Control*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1977, pp. 59–78.

6. Batstone, op. cit., espec. pp. 124–5.

7. It has been mainly political theorists who have argued that access to the national, social, political and economic order through the mass media but especially through television, may be supplanting influences from local social networks. See, for example, D. Butler and D. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, London, Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974 and I. Crewe, 'Do Butler and Stokes Really Explain Political Change in Britain', *European J. of Political Research*, vol. 2, no. 1, March 1974 pp. 47–92. However, Davis, op. cit., represents a recent attempt by a sociologist to show how local and national sources of influences may vary in importance in the overall class imagery of different groups of workers.

8. *Small Firms, Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms*, Cmnd. 4811, London, H.M.S.O., 1971, Table 1.1, p. 3. This differs from the definition of '100 employees or less' adopted by some previous sociological researchers such as G. K. Ingham, *Size of Industrial Organisation and Worker Behaviour*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1970 and Batstone, op. cit., but, in fact, six of the small firms in the present study had less than 100 employees.

9. The samples consisted of all shopfloor workers in the six smallest firms; one-in-two samples of all such workers in the two largest small firms; and, all comparable workers, that is, workers doing similar jobs, in two departments in the large firms.

10. See, J. Child, *Industrial Relations in the British Printing Industry, The Quest for Security*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1967; Department of Employment, *Printing and Publishing, Manpower Studies, No. 9*, London, H.M.S.O., 1970 and R. Price and G. S. Bain, 'Union Growth Revisited: 1948–1974 in Perspective', *Brit. J. Of Industrial Relations*, vol. XIV, no. 3, Nov. 1976, pp. 339–55, esp. p. 342.

11. For a brief history of the electronics industry see, G. C. Allen, *British Industries and Their Organisation*, London, Longman, 5th ed., 1970, esp. ch. 9. The exact level of unionization in the industry is not known but all indications are that it is lower than the average for manufacturing industry. For data on the distribution of differently sized enterprises in the electronics industry covering the period of the research

see the appropriate *Reports on the Census of Production*, London, H.M.S.O., 1978.

12. Such a connection has been made in relation to workers in one of the industries in the present research in, I. C. Cannon, 'Ideology and Occupational Community: A Study of Compositors', *Sociology*, vol. 1, no. 2, May 1967, pp. 165–85 but no systematic comparison between different industries and differently sized firms has been attempted.

13. *Census 1971, England and Wales, Economic Activity Leaflet, Surrey*, London, H.M.S.O., 1975.

14. In December 1975, roughly the midpoint in the research, unemployment in Surrey was 2.7 percent compared to a national level of 4.8 percent. *Dept. of Employment Gazette*, vol. 84, Jan. 1976, pp. 58–9. This relationship between the local and national unemployment levels has held for many years.

15. Data from the 1971 Census, for example, indicated that 54 percent of the male employed population in Surrey were in either the top two of the Registrar General's five classes or the non-manual section of class three. This compared with 35 percent in the population as a whole.

16. For data on the differences in employer recruitment practices and worker characterstics in the small and large firms in the present study see, J. Curran and J. Stanworth, 'Self-selection and the Small Firm Worker — A Critique and an Alternative View', *Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 3, Sept. 1979, pp. 427–44.

17. For example, J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 174, found that 22 percent of their manual workers regarded themselves as 'middle class' but noted that in earlier studies middle class self-rating had varied between 12 and 40 percent. Much of this variation may be due to the fact that the various samples are rarely statistically representative of the working class.

18. W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth Century England*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, p. 166.

19. See, for example, Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 107 and Roberts, Cook, Clark and Simeonoff, op. cit., pp. 56–8.

20. Roberts, Cook, Clark and Simeonoff, ibid., Table 2.1, p. 22.

21. Among large firm workers aged 30 and over, 81 percent owned or were purchasing their own home as compared to 53 percent of the comparable small firm workers.

22. Differences in levels of earnings between the small and large firm workers in the present study were substantial and similar differences have been reported in previous research. See, for example, Ingham, op. cit., pp. 86–87 and *Small Firms, Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms*, op. cit., p. 20.

23. Lockwood in Bulmer, op. cit., p. 19.

24. Batstone, op. cit., p. 120.

25. For broadly similar finding — after allowing for differences in sample construction and question wording — see Roberts, Cook, Clark and Simeonoff, op. cit., Table 3:2, p. 47.

26. Batstone op. cit., p. 120. A quarter of Batstone's small firm workers believed that a manual worker could 'get to the top' compared to less than one in ten in the large plants.

27. For summaries of recent thinking and research on class consciousness in Britain see, Roberts, Cook, Clark and Simeonoff, op. cit., ch. 5, and J. Westergaard and H. Resler, *Class in a Capitalist Society, A Study of Contemporary Britain*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1976, (orig. pub. 1975), Part Five.

28. See, J. Curran and J. Stanworth, 'Worker Involvement and Social Relations in the Small Firm', *Sociological Review*, vol. 27, no. 2, May 1979; pp. 317–42, esp. pp. 335–7, for a fuller discussion of this finding.

29. The three statements were

presented in random order to the sample as a whole and respondents were not pressured into choosing one of the statements. The latter is indicated by the relatively large proportions of respondents who are recorded as 'Don't Know' or 'Other' in Table II.

30. Some respondents agreed with the first part of the statement – that classes exist in Britain – but disagreed with the latter part asserting they were unimportant and mobility was easy. These respondents were classified as 'Other' in Table II.

31. Lockwood in Bulmer, op. cit., pp. 22–3 and Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer and Platt, op. cit., ch. 4.

32. Batstone in Bulmer, op. cit., pp. 122–9.

33. For detailed findings on labour turnover in the firms in the present study see, Curran and Stanworth, *Sociology*, op. cit.

34. Data on these social contacts did not support the notion of an extensive occupational community among printing workers of the kind suggested in Cannon, op. cit. The proportion of married printing workers whose close married friend was also a printer was only slightly higher than the proportion of married electronics industry respondents whose close married friend also worked in the same industry.

35. Batstone in Bulmer, op. cit., pp. 127–30.

36. M. Williams, 'The New Print Technology', *New Society*, vol. 48, no. 871, 14 June 1979, pp. 638–40 and Child, op. cit.

37. Although the relationship between trade union membership and class imagery should not be exaggerated – union membership is peripheral to many workers' lives – it was found, for example, that trade union members showed more indications of class consciousness than non-union members.

38. See, T. Burns and G. M. Stalker, *The Management of Innovation*, London, Tavistock, 1961.

REVIEW ARTICLE

Martin Albrow

. . . law, ideology, law, ideology, law, ideology . . . sociology . . . ?

Two main and contradictory sources have combined to produce the recent upsurge of social scientific interest in law. Neither has been from the main stream of sociology. One has been officially inspired and financed interest in 'socio-legal' studies following hard on the heels of the development of legal training in institutions of higher education in the last fifteen years. The other has emerged from the internal dialectics of Marxist debate moving from a Gramscian interest in politics to an Althusserian interest in ideology and finding in law a bridge between the two. To a large extent the latter development has come to fill the theoretical vacuum in the former, which, springing as it does from establishment empiricism and instrumentalism, itself provides fertile ground for Marxist theorizing of the relations of law and ideology.

What still remains as an open question is whether a general critique of law as ideology can lead into the scientific study of social relations underpinning and generating law, i.e. the sociology of law. The part of Marx's work he regarded as scientific, namely the analysis of capitalist production, certainly provides an exemplar for sociological theory. But ideology critique and analysis is only tangential to that work, as motivation and by-product, and what he says about law is very much in the position of *obiter dicta.* For the development of the sociology of law what is of interest is whether self-designated Marxists are gong to be able to move from ideology critique to an analysis based on the study of social relations. Some recent publications reviewed here would suggest that the move is being made, albeit with some difficulty.

The volume of readings from Marx and Engels put together by Maureen Cain and Alan Hunt is of particular value not only because it will save scholars a considerable amount of tedious searching but also because its preface and linking commentaries offer an important statement of the motives and direction of those who would seek to find in Marx and Engels some guidelines for the study of law. 'Our hope', they write, 'is that in making this set of extracts available we

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have shown the possibility of a radical theorization which not only allows people to seize their time, but also shows that their time is everyday.' (p. xv) 'We hope the reader will find it as demanding and refreshing as we did to seek a starting point for current work in Marx' and Engels' struggle to create a new theory fit for a new world.' (p. xx)

The spirit then of their enterprise is to allow the reader to seek inspiration rather than doctrine and this is of course fully warranted by the selection they have been able to make. As they state candidly, 'no theory of law as such is constructed by Marx and Engels: indeed no concept (theoretical definition) of law is developed, although directions for such an elaboration are suggested.' (p. xiii) They have however, necessarily, to impose some ordering on their materials. In this respect they acknowledge the influence but not the dictates of Althusser. They have a flexibly assessed 'Young Marx, Young Engels' section, three sections which reflect the doctrine of the three 'instances', economics, politics and ideology, a section separated out and specifically dealing with the state, law and crime, and finally a section 'Law in "Historical Materialism"' which emerged because some passages could not be subdivided in this way.

Inevitably the Cain-Hunt selection reveals the inchoate state of Marx' and Engels' thought about law. Their commentary is replete with numerous statements of the following kind: '. . . questions concerning law did not form an object of inquiry for Marx . . .' (p. 62); 'Lawyers, as they note, make a living out of the reification of concepts, and so too do politicians. Neither writer, however, managed adequately to theorize the problem.' (p. 109); '. . . we cannot find in a developed form a 'Marxist theory of the state'.' (p. 145); '. . . there is no ready made 'Marxist theory of crime' to be found in the texts.' (p. 149); '. . . they did not elaborate fully a concept of political activity, nor of its place in the total social order.' (p. 202)

The problem, then, for Cain and Hunt, as for all Marxists, is that in respect of the study of law Marx and Engels deserve no more than the Weberian description of 'talented writers'. A model for the scientific study of law has to be sought in other parts of Marx's work which have undeniable scientific aspirations and achievements and that means above all in *Capital* and the economic writings generally. Unfortunately, there has been a persistent tendency to rely on methodological and meta-theoretical prescriptions rather than to take the material focus of Marx's theory, namely social relations, and the result has been a proliferation of Marxist theories of law. Empiricist, realist, historicist, positivist and conceptualist elements co-exist in Marx's theory and it is hazardous to reject one or another approach to law simply on the grounds that it adopts one or other of these methodological directions. In large part since Althusser this has become a dominant tendency and Cain and Hunt,

while free, like many others, from strict adherence to Althusser's position, are still left walking the polemical battlefields of meta-theory. We can see this in their reaction to the most prominent early contributions to a Marxist theory of law.

Karl Renner's *The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions* has long had classic status.[1] It was designed to demonstrate that legal systems may persist in spite of underlying economic changes but law itself could not be the engine of change. Acts of will were required to change law in accord with more fundamental economic changes, and law itself fulfilled vital functions in 'preserving human society' although the law had no control over collective productive capacity. Renner was denounced by Soviet writers as 'one of the tolerationist social democratic jurists . . . who have demagogically donned the toga of Marxism, while in reality perverting its very essence . . . This theory represents the traitorous watchword of the social-democrats: peace in industry. It expresses the aspiration of the social democratic flunkies of the bourgeoisie to beautify bourgeois exploiter law.'[2]

Cain and Hunt are more restrained but they object to Renner because 'the position he advances . . . is much closer to functionalist social theory than it is to Marxism . . . This tendency calls into question Renner's unquestioned status as a leading exponent of the Marxist theory of law' (pp. 66–7). But is functionalist argument such a mortal sin? There are not infrequent allusions to the fulfillment of functions in *Capital* while Cain and Hunt include the passage from the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* which runs: 'The question then arises: what transformation will the state undergo in communist society? In other words what social functions will remain in existence there that are analogous to present state functions?' (p. 163)

It is at the same level of *a priori* argument that Cain and Hunt reject Pashukanis, the other classic Marxist theorist of law. He saw law in general as a bourgeois phenomenon, coming to full expression in capitalist society and therefore something which would be dissolved in communist society. Cain and Hunt object to this view on lines essentially similar to Renner's, namely that the economy sets limits to the way in which the rest of social structure may vary, but does not give rise to it. Cain and Hunt see Pashukanis as an economic determinist and for that reason dismissive of law as an object of political struggle. It is difficult to follow Cain and Hunt's reasoning. Is it not precisely because it is in capitalist society that the state and law are constituted as forms that struggle for their dissolution is possible? They would seem to impute to Pashukanis a position on political struggle he is at pains to reject.[3]

Pashukanis is given considerably more credit by Bernard Edelman, barrister and lecturer in philosophy at the *École Normale Supérieure* whose *Le Droit saisi par la photographie* (1973) has now been

translated by Elizabeth Kingdom with a useful introduction by Paul Hirst who calls Edelman's work 'the most original contemporary Marxist writing on the theory of law' (p. 1). Edelman also draws his inspiration from Althusser in generating a theory of law where men are produced as subjects in the form of categories which are supposed to represent their essence and which do indeed represent their essence because that is what they become within the law. 'Law and legal subject reflect the circularity (the dual mirror relation) of all ideology. Law is a process of constitution of subjects with certain attributes necessary to capitalist production' (p. 7, Hirst's Introduction). Edelman demonstrates this position by taking the French law in relation to photography, showing how creative activity is transformed into the costs of labour power, how the subject is seen as free only in selling, and how, by fixing the sphere of circulation, production is itself made possible by law.

Edelman's account is not easy to follow: the argument is so interspersed with complex illustrative renderings of the relations of law and artistic production that its flow is broken while the illustrations are themselves fraught with problems only some of which are taken up by the author. There are two features in particular which need singling out because they occur so often in contemporary Marxist discourse. The first is the readiness with which 'law' is invoked as subject: 'the law fixes the sphere of circulation'; 'the law makes production possible'. To this we can return. The second is a method of reading texts whereby short extracts from key sources are taken by Edelman to be saying something he has to express in his own words and also to 'occult' something he has to reveal. This can be illustrated from the section he entitles 'The birth certificate of juridical ideology' where for what he calls his 'juridical introduction' he takes three texts as follows:

> the juridical personality of man exists by itself and independently of the possibility for the human being in question of forming a will.
>
> In juridical language, beings capable of having rights and obligations are deemed 'persons'. More briefly the person is said to be identical with the subject in law. The idea of personality, necessary for giving support to the rights and obligations . . . is indispensable in the traditional conception of law.
>
> After the abolition of slavery, every human being is a person. It is not necessary that he should be fully conscious of himself and be endowed with intelligence and will. Children and madmen are persons, even though they have no conscious will; they are, then, bearers of rights and obligations.

These texts are taken by Edelman from 'contemporary classics of French civil law'. His own 'deciphering' reads:

> *The texts say* that the subject in law is the general and abstract expression of the human person. They also say that what makes this expression effective is the *general capacity* of man to belong to himself and therefore to acquire. Finally they say that if this capacity is the mode of existence of the subject, it is because the subject can/will/consents/is free to belong to himself and to acquire. (p. 29)

I have puzzled over this 'reading' for some time and cannot find the freedom to acquire implied anywhere by the texts, nor can I find any justification for finding the subject in law the 'expression' of the human person. What the texts state is an 'identical' relation. Probably Edelman possesses a key not available to me, but that only goes to show that his method is oracular and revelatory. Rather than using context, deductive reasoning, author's intentions or other background factors, Edelman performs an intuitive act of translation and establishes equivalences of meaning in ways inaccessible to a third party. This is no trivial matter. It goes to the heart of any claim to read ideology and therefore to reveal the underlying reality.

It is much to Colin Sumner's credit that he faces head-on the problem which Edelman avoids. He begins by asserting firmly that ideology is to be understood only within a semiotic theory. 'An ideology is a sign of something other than itself, an outcome and element of social practice which reflects and designates the world of that practice within the consciousness of human beings.' (p. 20) 'Ideologies and their formations do not *just* exist in consciousness. . . . They also exist embodied within the material products of social practice. As determining elements within social practice they help to shape the product. High rise flats, motorways, and parks are obvious examples of material form which, structured by ideologies and their formations, in turn act as material elements structuring our social practice. Laws are perhaps classic examples of ideology's active character.' (p. 22) This is a good example of Sumner's style. He covers a remarkably wide span of issues, writes in a refreshingly unconvoluted manner, illustrates his point concretely, is uninhibitedly categorical in his judgements – and occasionally too runs the danger of over-simplification. High-rise flats and laws are not obviously in the same conceptual domain; the writing is moving rather more quickly than the argument.

Having defined his terms and established a concept of ideology, Sumner turns to general methods of 'reading' ideology and discusses in turn content analysis, structuralism, the semiology of Roland Barthes, and neo-structuralism: the Marxist *avant garde* (Althusser, Derrida, Kristeva). In each case Sumner is trenchant: content analysis is superficial; structuralism is idealist, non-explanatory and a-historical; Barthes takes consensus for granted; the

neo-structuralists are super-abstract and unable to do more than sight ideology-in-general without identifying the definite historical origins and appearances of particular ideologies.

Sumner then turns to presenting his own historical materialist method of reading ideologies, taking law as his exemplification. For him ideologies originate within social practices and 'social practices involve the conjunction of forms of co-operation and ideology in definite social and material settings' (p. 223). Thus, in the social practices of capitalism, exchange is a dominant social relation and certain ideologies are necessitated by it, including ownership, the legal personality, and the contract. 'These three ideologies are inseparable from the regular practice of exchange' (p. 222). (Why three? Are they not elements of one?) It is this grounding of ideology in social practice which generates for Sumner his method of 'reading' ideology. The social basis of ideology provides the precise nature of its signification.

The signification is grasped first of all as spontaneous impression from which the researcher moves to pilot study. No special techniques are required here. Then 'if there is good evidence to suggest an historical and logical link between structure, context and ideology' (p. 240) (it is difficult to see how, in view of Sumner's concept of ideology, such evidence will not be discovered) then we move to theory, which would appear to be concerned to establish the necessity of the ideology in question. After theory we turn to history to see how the ideology operates in its necessary historical milieu and in order to establish the essence of the ideology. Finally the research returns to the present and analyzes in depth a further example of the same ideology.

We are left regretting that Sumner is unable to offer us a concrete example of his method. One more chapter would possibly have been enough to remove the impression that the prescriptions he offers are not more than useful hints rather than determinable techniques. What Sumner does lead us towards is a recognition that much recent Marxist work on ideology has indeed discarded rigour in respect of empirical method and regarded the production of new vocabulary as itself a contribution to understanding. Sumner is properly sceptical about both claims to technical rigour and to insight through speculation but in some ways this only leaves him the course of ostensive demonstration of method through the practice of research. His homely hints are inadequate substitute. But at least his constant stress on ideologies as reflections of social relations does open the door to more generalized sociological methodology.

Cain and Hunt, Edelman, Sumner are all self-described Marxists who distance themselves variously from Renner, Pashukanis and Althusser and who each adopt distinctive positions of his or her own. The label 'Marxist' would therefore appear to carry little import

apart from defining who belongs and who has the right to be cited. The diversity of approach is at least as wide as among those to whom the label 'bourgeois' might be accorded. Hunt is unusual in that he has been prepared as a Marxist to write an account of sociological thought on law. He provides useful accounts of Roscoe Pound, American legal realism, Durkheim and Weber. Not surprisingly he finds a basic unity in their adherence to bourgeois legal ideology, in which it is presumed that observance of law is natural and rational and that it serves to integrate society. But he is outspoken in his tributes to Weber who for him represents the focal point of further advance, provided the questions he addressed are freed from the theoretical position he adopted.

This last proviso by Hunt is however symptomatic of a thematic unity which does characterize contemporary Marxist writing, namely the quest for theory (not adherence to an existing theory). Edelman's invocation of law as a subject was noted above as a point to which we would return. It is associated with a concern for the essential nature and most general characteristics of law. It is a concern which Cain and Hunt take for granted as a central task for Marxist writers. They seek a 'theoretical definition of law . . . which constructs a concept of law in relation to a field of articulated concepts constituted in dynamic relationship with each other and with the material world which they represent.' (xiv) We can see this concern for the 'theoretical definition' in so many Marxist formulations, in Renner's law as the imperative voice of society for example, or Edelman's role for law in fixing the determination of exchange value, or in Sumner's view of law as 'at the same time, an instrument of party politics, a protector of revered ideas and agency for the prevention of social chaos' (p. 267).

But by what method, we may ask, does one arrive at these 'theoretical definitions', these summary intimations of the nature of the great abstraction 'law'? Does 'law' inhere in each and every Statute of the Realm, is it accomplished daily in the courts, or observed in the transactions of the local high street, or practised by so called 'lawyers', or revealed by jurisprudents? Is it the assemblage of all items called 'law', *'droit'*, *'Recht'* . . .? Is it 'the law', or 'laws', or 'law and order'? Or is it unfair to ask such questions since they are scarcely answerable in general terms, but only in specific contexts? It is fair because such questions are begged every time 'law' is invoked and every time a 'theoretical definition' is offered. If lawyers live from the reification of concepts, then social scientists who theorize those concepts may well be living from 'over-reification'. 'In consciousness – in jurisprudence, politics, etc. – relations become concepts . . . The judge, for example, applies the code, he therefore regards legislation as the real, active driving force. . . . Idea of law. Idea of state. The matter is turned upside-down in *ordinary* consciousness.'[4]

Among Marxist writers Pashukanis best understood the dangers inherent in the definitional approach to the general theory of law. 'The attempt to find a definition of law which would answer to "human nature" or "human community living" in general – as well as to these complex relationships – must inevitably lead to scholastic – and purely verbal – formulae.'[5] Now while his strictures can, as I have argued, be applied to contemporary Marxists it is undeniably the case that they also apply to 'bourgeois' sociology of law. That is made clear enough through reference to the recent collection of readings edited by Campbell and Wiles who draw upon forty-seven authorities including Ferguson, Dicey, Renner, Parsons, Dahrendorf and Garfinkel in order to illuminate our experience of social order. For them 'law is the most obvious manifestation of the purposive attempt to create order'; 'always there is law attempting to pattern our actions' (pp. viii, ix). Given this orientation it is not surprising that the law as ideology theme does not gain space in the collection. But what is surprising is that those who have been giving such explicit attention to ideology should themselves be adopting an intellectual strategy so close to ideology construction. But this is not invariably the case and I shall conclude by considering two publications, one 'Marxist', one 'bourgeois', which both promise fruitful new directions, or at least the re-opening of old ones.

Paul Hirst's *On Law and Ideology* contains one essay 'The Law of Property and Marxism' which explicitly rejects essentialist accounts of law, rightly argues that Marx was unable to conceptualize corporate property and proceeds to update an account of the political significance of company law and organization. The analysis is not fully developed but the methodological and substantive emancipation of the author from recent Marxist orthodoxies is more significant than the usual disagreements among believers. This essay follows on four other essays on ideology which distance the author progressively from Althusser and Rancière. At every point Hirst challenges recent orthodoxies, including the doctrine of the three 'instances' in the social totality, the concept of the 'ideological state apparatus', and the formation of the subject by 'interpellation'. These are imaginative and acute essays even if one can feel that some of their ingenuity is Houdini like, escaping from bonds which were self-imposed in the first place. But Hirst's work does suggest reconstruction rather than reification and one based upon historical and empirical inquiry into social relations.

An analogous enterprise from a quite different starting point is undertaken by Clive Grace and Philip Wilkinson. They bracket the taken-for-granted aspects of law, treat it as inherently problematical and explicitly reject the normative analysis involved in regarding it as a given. Their interactionist/phenomenological approach involves enunciating propositions which could easily be taken on board by

the Marxist: for instance Blumer's dictum, 'it is the social process in group life that creates and upholds the rules, not the rules that create and uphold group life' (p. 254). 'Law' is seen merely as a type of categorization of experience and the relationship between this categorization and social action is deemed to be open to empirical investigation. We have to avoid giving constructed reality the status of objective reality. The result is that Grace and Wilkinson lead us in the direction of the empirical study of legislation (they take their own example from child care) and advocate an interpretative sociology where we suspend our assumptions about the norm-governed nature of social conduct, where we observe the terms in which actors describe and achieve regular patterns of action and we study the routine procedures for the production of the appearance of patterned social action.

Undoubtedly the phenomenological approach has its own problems; phenomenological reduction cannot proceed indefinitely; at some point some observations of social activities must be accepted as protocol elements in research. But these difficulties are no greater than those faced by Marxists who acknowledge the constitutive nature of ideology for all kinds of social relations but at the same time recognize the materiality of social relations as providing the bedrock for social investigation. Indeed the Marxist has more problems since he tends to bind in one package the problems of method identified by the phenomenologist, labels it 'ideology' and reifies it as a substantive field of social relations. In this respect the phenomenological/interactionist approach to the constitution of social relations represents both a more sophisticated approach to problems of method and a more successful engagement with empirical research than the Marxist discussion of ideology has yet been able to achieve.

'Ideology' is not a substantive sphere of social life but a mode of constituting any sphere whatsoever. 'Marxist' theories of ideology, or of the state, law or religion which reify those concepts are at worst self-contradictory or at best contributions to reconstitution in the bourgeois sense of reshaping ideas and values. A sociological approach to these phenomena involves identifying their base in social relations, resolving those relations into their most general and abstract elements and showing how their combination results in specific historical developments. In this respect there is no conflict between Marxist, phenomenological, or for that matter Weberian approaches.[6]

Marx did not expatiate upon 'the nature of the economy'. He produced an analysis of the development of capitalist society based upon a theoretical model, the abstract elements of which included the commodity, value, exchange, money and capital all clearly derived from types of social relationships. Is it too much to hope that the idealist phase of the seventies is over and that Hirst's and

Grace and Wilkinson's accounts might signal a return to empirical and historically based investigation of the development of law in contemporary society with the help of abstract theoretical models which might now contain such elements as force, norm, sanction, property, authority, litigation and legislation? And would it be absurdly optimistic to imagine that Marxists and non-Marxists alike might see this as a common task within the sociology of law.

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Maureen Cain and Alan Hunt, *Marx and Engels on Law*, London, Academic Press, 1979, 281 pp., £9.80 and £4.75 (paper).
Bernard Edelman, *Ownership of the Image: Elements for a Marxist Theory of Law*, translated by Elizabeth Kingdom with an introduction by Paul Q. Hirst, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, 217 pp., £7.95.
Colin Sumner, *Reading Ideologies: an investigation into the Marxist theory of ideology and law*, London, Academic Press, 1979, 313 pp., £11 and £4.95 (paper).
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Clive Grace and Philip Wilkinson, *Sociological Inquiry and Legal Phenomena*, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1978, 307 pp., £8.50.

NOTES

1. 1904. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949.

2. S. A. Golunski and M. S. Strogovich, 'The Theory of the State and Law' in Hugh W. Babb (trans.), *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U.P., 1951, p. 425.

3. E. B. Pashukanis, 'The General Theory of Law and Marxism' in Hugh W. Babb op. cit., pp. 146–7. See also the recent P. Beirne and R. Sharlet (eds), *Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law*. London, Academic Press,1980.

4. From *The German Ideology* by Marx and Engels cited by Cain and Hunt, p. 142. Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. V, pp. 92–3.

5. Pashukanis, op. cit., p. 119.

6. For an account of the Weberian depiction of the interplay between material interests in the social organization of the legal profession and the use of juristic ideology see my paper 'Legal Positivism and Bourgeois Materialism: Max Weber's View of the Sociology of Law', *British Journal of Law and Society*, 2, 1975, pp. 14–31. See also Hunt's account of Weber, which, however, mistakenly attributes me with equating positivism and materialism (p. 166).

Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain *John H. Goldthorpe* (in collaboration with Catriona Llewellyn and Clive Payne) Clarendon Press 1980 310 pp. £12.00 (£4.95 paper)

John Goldthorpe and his collaborators have produced an indispensable book; like Professor Glass's a quarter of a century before, not unflawed, but similarly likely to stand as a major source of reference and for a similar length of time. The very scale and consequent cost of the research project which it describes means we are unlikely to see another such undertaking for some time.

The data derives from a sample of over 10,000 men in England and Wales aged 20–64 years in 1972 and a follow-up study of intergenerationally mobile and stable groups carried out in 1974. Without doubt others' interpretations and criticisms will follow but Goldthorpe's framing of the evidence within a wider concern for the historical development of class formation and class relations makes this important not only at a descriptive level but as a contribution to social theory too. He begins by locating the study within the development of theoretical discussion of social mobility from Marx onwards. The results of the 1972 survey are then presented so as to test three accounts of the general pattern of occupational mobility common in recent theoretical writing. Arguments that the class structure of modern capitalist societies is characterized by closure whereby such mobility as occurs is mainly outside the range of the most advantaged positions, or that there is a buffer zone around the manual/non-manual boundary which may be penetrated but rarely crossed, are refuted by evidence that a very high proportion of men in the higher professional and managerial levels of the class structure were not born there, 40 per cent in fact originating from the working class (Classes V–VII in Goldthorpe's class schema). At the same time cohort comparisons show that most of these men still achieve their upward mobility in the course of careers which started in routine white-collar or manual work contradicting the argument that while educational expansion might have provided for some more upward mobility that way, it must have been counterbalanced by a corresponding decline in career mobility.

In Chapters 3 and 4 trends in mobility and fluidity are discussed. The change in the mobility rates evident in the cohort comparisons of the 1972 survey is contrasted with the stability apparent in the 1949 survey. Regrettably, for technical reasons, direct comparisons between the two data sets are not presented but the claim of novelty in the discovery of increasing upward and decreasing downward mobility (p. 72) overlooks the fact that a broadly similar account appeared in this journal in 1972.

This reviewer remains sceptical about the value of the concept of fluidity. Individuals of course experience mobility or the lack of it and Goldthorpe argues, quite rightly, that it is absolute mobility rates which are relevant to questions of class formation and action (p. 121). He describes fluidity as a property of the occupational division of labour taken as a whole relating to the relative

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accessibility of positions within it independently of any change in the proportions of origin or destination positions accounted for by the various classes. Fluidity is therefore a matter of relative mobility rather than absolute rates and is measured here in terms of 'odds ratios' whereby the chances of e.g., men from what Goldthorpe describes as 'service class' origins gaining such positions themselves rather than ending in manual work is measured against the chances of men from working class origins reaching service class positions rather than following their fathers as manual workers. Using odds ratios Goldthorpe and his colleagues unsurprisingly confirm for England and Wales, as Hauser *et al.* did for the USA, what is termed the 'constant fluidity model'. But for odds ratios to show an increase in fluidity it would be necessary that, to confine ourselves to this example, the chances of men from working class origins moving into professional and managerial jobs rather than into manual work should increase more than the corresponding chances of the sons of 'service class' fathers themselves following such occupations rather than manual work. Now the minimal assumption of mere difference between occupational groups, even without the reinforcement of social, economic and cultural resources, means that this could only arise under two polarized sets of circumstances. These are, firstly, where the chances of self-recruitment into the advantaged group cannot increase because they are already maximal, and there is some evidence in the data here that, given many senior positions still recruit on the basis of experience, this position may already be approaching as regards the first jobs of more recent cohorts; or secondly, where having a father in one group was a disqualification for an individual's own occupational membership of it, the kind of situation prevailing in an immediately post-revolutionary period. Odds ratios on the other hand would indicate a decrease in 'fluidity' where social difference between classes increased. A decrease in social differences alone, however, which simply increased mobility into more desirable positions would thereby give no positive advantage to the formerly less privileged group and would therefore not show up in the odds ratios as an increase in fluidity. The odds ratio, in other words, is a statistic that, other than in exceptional historical circumstances (when there would be simpler ways of discovering what it indicates), can only vary in one direction. While Hauser was seeking to test the expectation that class differences in the USA had widened, Goldthorpe is seeking to show that despite increasing mobility from working class to 'service class' this has not reduced inequality. As it stands these calculations here serve only to obscure the changes in absolute mobility rates which the 1972 survey demonstrates and the degree of inequality which persists could be more easily discerned in the growing homogeneity of recruitment to professional and managerial jobs which a simple inflow analysis (calculated from Table 3.1) would reveal.

The other concept derived from Hauser's work, the calculation of mobility densities (see Chapter 4) is more useful and does not depend upon the concept of fluidity. Goldthorpe and Payne show the location of the main mobility flows within Goldthorpe's sevenfold class schema and incidentally give strong empirical support for our *a priori* reservations about the coherence of the 'intermediate' grouping in the three level collapse introduced earlier in the book.

The most valuable and original part of the book begins with Chapter 5, in which from the 1974 survey, the authors trace out worklife patterns and show just how complex the pattern of mobility in fact is. Chapters 6 and 7 examine the impact of mobility on kinship and friendship relations which largely conform to Duncan's additive model in that the mobile appear to mediate the influences of

origin and destination classes rather than any distinctive consequences of mobility in itself. This material dispels numerous myths about the socially mobile as peculiarly isolated, rootless or obsessed with career striving, though it appears their social networks are likely to be more segmented than those of men remaining in their class of origin. Chapter 8 discusses the personal experience and meaning of mobility on the basis of life-history notes provided by some of the 1974 respondents. It is reassuring that these autobiographical accounts confirm the sociological classification of mobility. On the whole they seem an optimistic and cheerful lot of men, mobile or not, though it may be that the more dispirited, frustrated or fatalistic were less inclined than the others to reply to this third request for information.

All this of course refers only to the experience of men, and, particularly with questions of class formation and action in mind, women have come to play an increasingly important part in the occupational structure. In the Appendix on the survey design Goldthorpe sets out the reasons for limiting the investigation to men. However the inclusion of a rather smaller sample of women without provision for inter-cohort comparisons would perhaps have been a better investment than, say, the development of the Hope-Goldthorpe scale and might have served to verify some of the assumptions upon which this decision was based while providing a bench-mark for future comparison.

In the concluding chapter, Goldthorpe returns to the implications of mobility trends for class cohesion and class action. He argues that the findings of the study are not incompatible with the maintenance of the class conflict which he believes necessary for the reduction of inequality and the increase in fluidity. On the other hand, there is no direct evidence here that this is likely to occur and his belief might be thought inconsistent with his argument that the increase in upward mobility which has occurred was brought about largely by the changing structure of the occupational division of labour in a period of economic growth. Though I have my reservations then, it is an interesting point of view and one which focusses attention on issues that are important for all of us.

Trevor Noble
University of Sheffield

Marx and Mead. Contributions to a Sociology of Knowledge *Tom W. Goff* Routledge and Kegan Paul Monographs in Social Theory 1980 166pp. £7.95.

The intention behind this book is to lay the foundations for a critical sociology of knowledge that avoids the usual well-rehearsed criticisms. The central chapters discuss Marx and Mead as two complementary approaches to a sociology of knowledge. Goff rejects the conventional 'positivistic' critiques by turning the charge of relativism back upon them. They themselves, he argues, are unable or unwilling to say precisely why their own standpoint is to be preferred. It would appear that the genetic fallacy is itself a fallacy. In Goff's view, the demand that the claims that have been made concerning the social determination of thought be empirically verifiable reflects a 'positivistic' prejudice. In essence, the approach offered here accepts the social grounding of all thought as an unavoidable fact and denies the relevance of all the epistemological difficulties that are usually taken to be implied by such a state of affairs. Goff argues that at the root of the confusion concerning the aims and interests of the sociology of knowledge is the fact that sociology as a whole has, since its origins in the Enlightenment, been an essentially contradictory enterprise. As a discipline it stresses human sociality while, at the same time, it operates with an epistemology that is based upon individualistic premises.

Goff's version of Marx is one that

stresses the centrality of human praxis. However, his argument that Marx's concepts of 'alienation' and 'praxis' are inconsistent with each other is far from convincing. It is at this point that Mead is introduced. Strangely, Goff argues that Marx's theoretical weakness on the problem of 'alienation' can be supplemented by ideas on sociality drawn from Mead. In fact, Goff states that there is virtually nothing in Mead's work that explicitly justifies any kind of programme in the sociology of knowledge. Neither Marx nor Mead alone can provide the answer, but each can add something to the other. For example, Goff's argument is that Mead's concepts of 'internalisation' and 'socialisation' come to the rescue of Marx's inadequacy on 'alienation'.

Goff wants to argue for a 'critical sociology of knowledge' but his arguments and approach are not critical enough in the sense that he has much more in common with the critics of the sociology of knowledge than he would like to think. Neither have made the necessary conceptual distinctions and have accepted the insulation of sociological theory from philosophical analysis. The result, in Goff's case, is a purely verbal attempt to resolve the problem of relativism. On the penultimate page he tells us that he 'virtually embraces relativism as a fact of human life' but in the last paragraph of the book we are informed that 'the critical perspective' nonetheless 'rejects any total relativism of thought and does provide a fundamental criterion of judgement. This criterion is obviously man himself, or more precisely, man's life understood as praxis'.

The book is full of vague meandering prose and the repetition of pseudo-generalizations. The general air of vagueness is not helped by the failure to make some basic points clear. For example, what is the 'knowledge' that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with? Does the 'embraced relativism' encompass morality and logic?

Peter Lassman
University of Birmingham

The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno *Gillian Rose* The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1978 212 pp. £8.95 (£3.95 paper)

In recent years a number of books have been published with the aim of expounding the writings of critical theorists. The work of Theodor Adorno however has remained strangely mysterious. Regarded as fragmented, abstruse and pessimistic, Adorno's thought has received less systematic analysis than that of others of his Frankfurt School colleagues. Indeed, as Gillian Rose suggests, it has been 'eminently quotable but egregiously misconceived'.

In this scholarly book Rose argues that there is in fact a unity to Adorno's work even though it is composed of fragments. The reason why such unity has been largely unrecognized lies in the fact that most commentators have approached Adorno's work literally and without paying sufficient attention to his style. It is impossible, Rose claims, to fully comprehend Adorno's ideas without understanding the ways in which he presents them and why it is that he is so preoccupied with stylistic strategies. Rose's clear exposition of these issues provides the necessary backdrop for her subsequent analysis of his major ideas and the ways in which they are grounded. It is important to remember however that his theory can only be understood if one knows how to read the texts and that Adorno's style itself is determined by his theory of society. The relationship between the two is inherently dialectical.

The major theme of the book is an analysis of the category of reification upon which Adorno's thought fundamentally depends. Gillian Rose very interestingly demonstrates how the term has been abused and misused in the work of many writers so as to render it almost theoretically useless. She then extracts the core of Adorno's theory of reification in a way which is both intelligible and

faithful to its complexities. Reification is exploited through Adorno's critique of philosophy, his critique of sociology (both sociological theory and empirical research) and finally via his analysis of culture, particularly literature and music. Although such arguments are to be found in many forms, ranging from long books and short articles to reviews and radio broadcasts, the principles which inform and structure his writings are always the same. In short, she argues, 'Adorno tried to develop a critique of society by producing a critique of its intellectual and artistic products'.

One of the difficulties in coming to grips with Adorno's work is that many of his ideas were developed in opposition to the ideas of others. Thus it is not just Marx and Hegel who influenced him but thinkers as diverse as Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Lukacs and Benjamin. It is one of the many strengths of this book that Rose is able to incorporate Adorno's responses to such a formidable array of thinkers without either oversimplifying their ideas or detracting from the main theses of the book. She is also to be congratulated on the sensitive way in which she treats Adorno's ideas. Rose is not an unequivocal supporter of his work. Like others before her she questions the lack of grounding in a historical subject, the politically diffuse concept of control and the absence of a theory of the operation of power. However, unlike others she does not dismiss Adorno's work or complain about its irretrievable pessimism. She recognizes that, because for Adorno praxis is a theoretical notion, he cannot be regarded as a pessimist. Thus she contends that, 'in spite of the gloomy picture which he dialectically paints of society, he is always concerned in his own work and in the assessment of the work of others, to achieve a style which will best intervene in society'.

This book does not claim to be exhaustive in its treatment of Adorno's work. However it is a pity that some space is not given to his important collaboration with Horkheimer and that there is not more analysis of his interest in Freud. But these are minor shortcomings. In general this is a really excellent volume. It can be recommended not only as an introductory text, as the subtitle suggests, but also as a highly provocative book which should stimulate further interest in Adorno's 'melancholy science'.

Mary Maynard
University of York

An Alternative Sociology *Franco Ferrarotti* Irvington Publishers 1979 200pp. £8.85

The alternative sociology which Ferrarotti advocates is what he also calls a Critical Sociology (his capitals), namely, 'a socio-logical science that studies the structure of society from the point of view of an ascending class in order to rationally transform the society'. The editor of this American translation, J. W. Freiberg, claims that 'there will be nothing easy about creating the "critical sociology" Ferrarotti calls for, especially in the United States', mainly because there are no left political parties and labour unions in an 'advanced position' in that country. Hence what is referred to contemptuously as 'professional' sociology is not critical of the status quo, presumably because the ascending class has not ascended far enough to make an impact on sociologists, especially by providing the funds whereby they can make a living and conduct research as scientific experts, which is how the members of the ruling class use them at present, for their own purposes, of course.

Ferrarotti's notion of an ascending class is thus firmly rooted in Marxian teleology which holds that it is the historical mission of the ascending class 'rationally', if revolutionarily, to transform the society in which it ascends. Ferrarotti claims that 'to talk about social classes, about bourgeoisie, and proletariat is becoming increasingly ambiguous' and maintains

that the way to deal with this problem therefore is 'to examine some of the social mutations which are underway in Italy and in the other industrial countries from the point of view of a hypothesis which still recognises that class relations (as opposed to the class system) are fundamentally bipolar'. He calls this polarity 'tendential'; and by describing 'the fundamental cleavage between the classes' in terms of the relationship between the group of people who buy 'abstract-alienated labour' and those who sell their labour-power — and hence deliver abstract-alienated labour — as a process intensifying over time, he is able to refer to the proletarization of white collar workers, service workers and scientific workers. This he regards as a characteristic of the alternative sociology which makes tendential polarity a superior form of analysis from that used by 'professional' sociologists who regard these workers as a middle class, growing in numbers in the population.

These workers, incidentally, as well as changing the composition of the labour force, 'radically' change 'the terms of the problem of class consciousness.' Class consciousness need not come from the outside, but it can grow within the proletariat through the process of building its own hegemony. Hence the advancement of industrialization and the implementation of the various forms of rationalization of social life lead increasingly by this means to the increasing isolation of ruling groups and of influential groups indirectly ruling, that is, of high-level politicians and administrators or 'the political class'. This, Ferrarotti claims, is 'the functional prerequisite, the inevitable price that must be paid for modernization'. Power becomes more and more centralized, the control over important decisions is simplified, becoming concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. 'The ability to make decisions acquires the appearance of an anonymous, rational and depersonalized process'. The alternative sociology presupposes 'the transition from formal rationality to substantial rationality' and the reader is left to believe that the ascending class will achieve this.

How does Ferrarotti *know* what he writes about the changing nature of society is true? 'The critical work of analysis elaborated by the alternative sociology', he admits, 'may sometimes take on the appearance of a digging out of bits and pieces of world news reports'. Certainly a whole chapter on contemporary labour relations is shot through with bits and pieces of this sort and with government statistics selected apparently quite haphazardly. There is no discussion of negative instances. These are either ignored or dismissed on the assumption that they will disappear in due course, as the hypothesized 'tendency' deals with them in the light of the teleological prophecy. While one may applaud, on other than sociological grounds, the desire of Ferrarotti to want to know 'for what reasons and using what mechanisms, the public, i.e. the interests of the great majority of the people, is systematically put aside and misused by the institutions that supposedly represent it, and by the men who manage them', to call this an alternative sociology without specifying in any way *how* a sociologist can get to know these reasons and to understand these mechanisms is to misuse the term 'sociology'. To Ferrarotti such reasons and such mechanisms seem obvious. For the genuinely critical sociologist nothing is obvious and the alternative sociology is dogmatic not critical.

J. A. Banks
University of Leicester

Social Interaction and Consciousness *P. D. Ashworth* John Wiley 1979 227pp. £11.00

In this book Ashworth brings together a wealth of empirical material on particular social psychological issues, and tries to organize them in terms of the theoretical perspective of symbolic

interactionism. In the first two chapters the symbolic interactionist position is established, criticized and elaborated, whilst the rest of the book is concerned to bring theoretical coherence to the sometimes disparate findings of social psychological research. This is achieved by a chapter by chapter examination of particular substantive issues; language use and thinking, perception of physical objects and people, perception of oneself, experiencing emotions, motivation and attitudes.

In one central respect at least, this book succeeds admirably, in that it fulfils the need for a text which attempts a dialogue between 'interactionist' and 'experimental' (or psychological) brands of social psychology. Thus the book is a significant advance on texts like Brown's *Social Psychology* or Stone & Faberman's *Social Psychology through Symbolic Interaction* which tend to define issues exclusively from their own theoretical point of view. As a corollary to this, each chapter provides an excellent introduction to the material relevant to the subject of its concern; the ones on emotion and attitudes being good examples of this.

The more innovative aspect of Ashworth's thesis, i.e. the attempt to fit the findings of experimental social psychology into the symbolic interactionist framework, whilst acquiring a certain *a priori* plausibility in the context of the current vogue for theoretical integration, nonetheless raises some quite thorny problems of analysis which Ashworth does not always resolve, or for that matter, broach. The issues of the status of the discipline of social psychology and its relation to sociology and psychology are dealt with in a rather cursory and 'matter of fact' way by conceiving social psychology as a Janus-faced, interface discipline. Thus problems of epistemological commensurability implicit in the experimental versus the interactionist versions of social psychology are accorded no particular importance. Now whilst the skimpy treatment of such issues may be a disappointment to those concerned with the more philosophical and theoretical problems of the social sciences, this in no way vitiates the general usefulness of the book as an introductory text.

Derek Layder
Leicester University

Critical Sociology: European Perspectives *J. W. Freiberg* (ed.) Irvington Publishers 1979 408 pp. £12.00

This is an American collection of writings by European marxists and critical sociologists. Originally given as papers at Boston University, the contributions are seen as an injection of critical ideas into the 'conformist and conservative' world of American social thought. Discussions of Habermas (Giddens) and Althusser (O'Neill) help to lay the foundations for the 'critical paradigm'; articles on space (Lefebvre), work (Dreitzel) and the state (Offe and Ronge) 'apply' this paradigm to the social process. The writers also include Abdel-Malek, Therborn, Touraine and Castells.

Ten years ago, this injection of talents might have been very useful in British as well as American sociology. Today many of the papers seem far too general, although they bring together a lot of basic ideas in left-wing social thought. It is not so much that the ideas are wrong, but that they are no longer so fashionable in this form. This collection exudes the preoccupations of the late 'sixties and early 'seventies (indeed seven of the fifteen papers were published between 1973 and 1976). In the last article, Poulantzas writes, in the convoluted and over-italicized style which mars so much of 'critical' thought, that

> in the economic crisis, and more particularly in the political crisis, where the economic crisis is translated into political crisis, *the internal contradictions take primacy over the external factors, and this is also true for the crisis of the*

nation-state in the social formations where one finds such crisis.

He did not live to see the greatest international crisis since 1945; those of us who have can see with hindsight that here was one assumption of European marxism which was radically mistaken. In the 'dangerous' world of the 1980s we need a restatement of critical social thought which meets the new challenges of our time.

Martin Shaw
University of Hull

Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis *John Rex and Sally Tomlinson* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 355pp. £10.50

In the authors' own words: 'The focus of this study as a whole is that of the relationship of West Indian and Asian communities to British Society' and . . . 'that means the degree to which they are absorbed into its class structure' (p. 158). The research is therefore placed firmly within the 'race relations' mould. It is the white British experience and ideologies which form the introductory background to this book, not the immigrants'. This is of course quite proper in so far as it is white racism and 'the escalating anti-immigrant tone' of British legislation which forms the social realities of life for the black population. Unfortunately, however, the corresponding material on the attitudes and politics of West Indians and Asians is weak.

There are two major sources of empirical evidence; a sample survey of households in Harmondsworth, an inner-city area of Birmingham, which provides respondents of West Indian, Asian and British ethnic origins and a series of less structured interviews with spokesmen from a range of political and religious organizations active in the locality.

The first of these suffers from a problem common to community-based studies. It raises questions which ultimately can not be answered at the local level. This is all the more significant where there is a fairly pronounced segregation of home and work. Survey techniques are notorious for their tendency to atomize respondents and responses. All the more so when questions are addressed to a sample selected by place of residence about work experienced elsewhere (the same points can be made for the section on education – no one school is studied, only individuals' comments on schooling). Questions have to be relevant to such a wide range of circumstances, the answers can only be general and disjointed. As a result the material lacks the density to impart the flavour of direct personal experience. What are we to make of tables (p. 118) which compare rates of Trades Union membership among Asian and West Indian residents with those of the local white population, demographically quite different from both the local black population and the British population as a whole? What conclusions can we draw from this about the state of black political consciousness?

For the white liberal reader, to whom this book is explicitly addressed, the description of locally active political and religious organizations is more informative, though it is almost impossible to comprehend their relative importance either to the respondents or to the wider society.

To my mind the most interesting aspect of this book is the authors' own reflections on 'the state of the nation'. The book carries a clear warning to the white establishment to heed the change in aspirations of the black population in Britain since 1967 (when *Race, Community and Conflict* was published) which, in the opinion of the authors, have moved from a goal of assimilation to that of political recognition for independently defined ethnic interests. Their prognosis for the future is one of increasing racial conflict, if currently illiberal policies on immigration, education etc., are pursued and these political aspirations are denied. This section is interesting

for the authors' own assessment certainly, but perhaps even more so, as a reflection of current trends in mainstream British politics.

Ruth Madigan
University of Glasgow

Endless Pressure *Ken Pryce* Penguin Books 1979 297pp. (£1.95 paper)

The potential is enormous: a participant observation study based in a West Indian community in Bristol, conducted by a West Indian sociologist and taking over three years to complete. *Endless Pressure*, however, is not the black sociologist's Whyte. Pryce's work shows enterprise and endeavour, is loaded with empirical data but is short on incisiveness and, in the end, depth analysis.

Pryce clearly had a difficult time, as a doctoral student, deciding exactly how to capitalize on his social science training and his blackness vis à vis a study of some aspect of West Indian life in Bristol. He spent a year being sucked into the complex world of the city's Pentecostal Churches eventually emerging with very little to show for his efforts. Perhaps consequently his other explorations into the life styles of 'lower class' Jamaicans with in his terms an 'expressive – disreputable orientation' were neither sufficiently extensive nor intensive to create the depth of analysis one expects from ethnography. Pryce for instance seems to base his analysis of one sub-group in the 'disreputable orientation' – teeny-boppers – on half a dozen contacts. Teeny-boppers incidentally share this orientation with their older brothers – hustlers. The men in this orientation are juxtaposed with the Saints, Proletarian respectables, in-betweeners and main-liners which are classifications of basically stable, law-abiding West Indians. Indeed Pryce is so committed to this framework that the whole test is organized under these headings as we await the inevitable moment when the whole thesis is diagrammatically presented in one 'life style map'.

Yet alongside this crude categorization in which data are uncomfortably fitted Pryce offers us a sharp concise Marxist analysis of the colonization of the West Indies, the subsequent migration from the Islands to Britain and the nature of the migrant's continued oppression in this country. The ethnography and the macro-analysis run parallel, however, there is insufficient engagement between the two, little attempt to analyze contradiction and the hegemonic forces at work. For me it is the tidiness of the study, due to the absence of any theoretical struggle between the Marxist analysis and the everyday life of Bristol's West Indians that signals the study's failure. Pryce never really moved into his subject's world but merely peered in from the edges – by overhearing conversations and being an accepted outsider in semi-public places such as cafés and night clubs. He admits that he never really got over the class and educational barriers between himself and many of his informants. Indeed he was not able to be completely honest with his subjects about his research role. I do not really mean to doubt Ken Pryce's integrity, more likely his research plans and the advice of his mentors were either too ambitious or too vague. His entrée was simply naïve. Pryce can perhaps be forgiven for ignoring the instruction given by the handful of participant observation studies conducted in this country but his failure to mention and thus presumably consult the work of Gans, Rainwater and Suttles deserves censure. Participant observation is a distinctive methodology and one must wonder why Pryce was allowed to stumble into his fieldwork. *Endless Pressure* could have been a seminal work comparable with Elliot Liebow's *Tally's Corner*. Alas it is not.

Howard Parker
Liverpool University

Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945–1975 *Gary P. Freeman* Princeton University Press 1979 362pp. £12.50

This work contains much that is old and some that is new. Thus, its sections about the effects of the colonial legacy on patterns of labour migration, about developments in immigration policy in the two countries since 1945, about immigration as a political issue, and about the different approaches of the two countries to the welfare and anti-discrimination aspects of the subject, are derived heavily from existing published material. On these matters the specialist on France would learn little that (s)he did not already know about the French situation, and the informed British reader can learn little new about his or her country's orientations and policies. Doubtless the American reader will benefit more from these expository parts of the book. The author's consideration of the political economy of labour migration also adds little to existing debates and summaries of the relevant issues, such as that in Castles and Kosack's work, although Freeman seems particularly affected by Gorz's views and also uses the theory of the buffer-role of migrant labour during an economic recession that Castells, for example, has expounded. Moreover, some of the author's emphases and data can be regarded as deficient. His discussion of racist populism in Britain, for example, considers only Enoch Powell at length and there is only indirect mention of the (British) National Front, surely an omission in a book purporting to cover a period to 1975; even his discussion of Powell and Powellism is heavily derivative and there is no mention of the widely available data on who constituted Powell's public support (e.g., Schoen's book, published in 1977). Conclusions on the degree of racial tolerance in Britain are based almost exclusively on the *Colour and Citizenship* data that were collected in 1966.

On the other hand, the novel aspect of the work is found in the use of the two-country comparison to explore the various implications of what is really a quite elementary starting point – that there has been, among both political elite and mass public, a much greater cognition in France than in Britain of the economic function of labour migration. The consequences of this fact in the fields of government policy, of the political strategy of the Left, and of mass political behaviour and attitudes to immigrants are explored by Freeman in the most useful parts of his book.

As he notes, there was in Britain a 'failure of the government to point out persuasively the economic stakes of Britons in continued migration' (p. 316), while in France migration was 'a consciously developed policy to deal with the crises of advanced capitalism' (p. 122) and 'the French planning apparatus and administrative style heightened the emphasis on economic aspects of the phenomenon, reduced participation by the public in policy discussion, and bought the government time during which it extracted enormous profit from migrants' (pp. 316–7). Because much of the sociological research into race and immigration in Britain accepted, indeed contributed to, the conventional liberal-democratic paradigm within which the issue has been approached, few writers within sociology have till recently subordinated this perspective to an economic analysis.

Unlike the British Labour Party, whose inconsistencies of approach were quickly revealed with the tergiversation of the 1965 White Paper on Immigration after exerience of government, the mainstream French Left – albeit partially and with some not infrequent diffidence – has been able to develop and to offer to its supporters a more systematic, class-based analysis of labour migration, one to be sure whose policy imperatives have not been subjected to the harsh reality of implementation. There is therefore a contrast when one compares the two

countries: whereas the British Right has been in the vanguard of immigration restriction, with the Labour Party in reluctant tow as it suppressed the associated qualms of its liberal-democratic conscience, the French Right until at least 1969 fostered immigration for purely economic motives. Calls for restriction in France came then from within parts of the Left and were based on opposition to the exploitation that such migration entailed for individual migrants and for their sending countries.

Thus, racist populism within the working class has been relatively rare in France, though only too well known in Britain. Although Powellism is far from being an exclusively working-class phenomenon, both it and also support for the National Front have a noticeable resonance within parts of the working class. On the other hand, the French anti-immigrant parties and movements with which the National Front might in an ideological sense be compared (Front National, Parti des Forces Nouvelles, l'Eurodroite) have an electoral support (what there is of it) that in its social and spatial location is coterminous with that of the mainstream French Right.

Even so, there are probably reasons in addition to those founded on the more class-based analysis developed for its supporters by the French Left that assist in explaining the latter's success in preventing working-class mobilization to right-wing racism. One is the historically greater political consciousness of the French working class and its correspondingly greater attachment to class-specific parties. Much working-class culture in Britain seems heavily parochial and localized in its attachments, orientations and cognitions, thus being peculiarly susceptible to 'outsiders' and the supposed threats that they pose. Finally, more than in Britain (even if less than in the Federal Republic of Germany) there may till recently have been a public perception of the greater transience of individual migrant labour, if not of the phenomenon itself; the reality about such transience may have been different but that fact had not fully penetrated public consciousness. (Even in the Federal Republic the model of a contract-labour system on, say, the South African model is inappropriate, despite the persistence of the contrary belief in parts of the British Left, since there has in fact been a large amount of permanent settlement.)

Although in his last chapter Freeman considers the future scenario in the two countries – according to what he labels the Swiss and German models (respectively, an end to immigration and a contract-labour system) – his analysis has not really anticipated the full stringency of the French Government's current policy on migrant labour, with its increasingly numerous instances of forced repatriation and its proposed changes in French nationality laws. Moreover, perhaps associated with this new draconianism in French government policy, other events and the results of some recent French opinion polls raise doubts about Freeman's assertion that the French public is in general less agitated about immigration than its British counterpart. Even so, it is easier for a reviewer than an author to be wise in this way with the benefit of hindsight and present knowledge and Freeman's fundamental point about the different political approach to the issue in each country has provided a valid and useful analysis.

Christopher T. Husbands
LSE

Women under Communism *Barbara Wolfe Jancar* The Johns Hopkins University Press 1979 291pp. £11.25

The main aim of this cross cultural analysis of the position of women under Communism is to question the achievements of Communist States in respect of women's liberation and to advise Western women's movements that they 'should divest themselves

of their Marxist economic revolutionary leanings and concentrate on giving priority to women's interests, regardless of the economic base of society'. Jancar admits that economic liberation has led to improved social status, particularly in traditional agrarian cultures such as Soviet Asia and China, but argues that paternalistic, authoritarian states have a limited ability to command equality from above and hence 'liberation will only go as far as the revolutionaries in control desire'. The lack of an open, democratic, pluralist, political culture impedes the formation of independent women's groups, blocking the path to 'post-industrial self-actualization' such as is envisaged for the West.

This thesis, however, cannot be supported by the evidence presented as it is based not on a comparison between Communist and Western actual states, but an inappropriate comparison between communist reality and a hypothetical projection of a possible Western future. The evidence, carefully documented, uncomfortably demonstrates that in many respects, such as access to higher education and the professions, availability of child care institutions, even payment for women to stay at home and look after children (in Romania and Hungary), Communism, in comparison to most Western states, has a substantially better record. Indeed, it is noted that even emigré women complain, that to appreciate real discrimination, one must come to the West! According to Jancar, the West is seen to have the advantage that women have freedom to choose, either to work or to stay at home. They do not have to do both. They have the freedom to form groups and press for women's liberation. Useful as this may be, it cannot be regarded as a substitute for actual achievements.

She is, however, on strong ground when meticulously analyzing the substantial degree of inequality and sexual stereo-typing which still remains in cultural, economic and political life in communist states. Having been granted access to higher education and the professions, women are blocked at 'middle' levels, failing to get promoted to the highest directing and prestigious posts. Even this degree of emancipation has been paid for in terms of the 'double-shift' i.e. women still do the bulk of domestic chores in addition to their work outside the home, reducing their leisure time to zero. As a political scientist she locates the 'woman' problem squarely in the political realm, noting, along with Aristotle, that leisure is necessary for political life. In Communist States the key to political power lies in the Party and the Party demands of its members a substantial amount of their leisure time. Women have precious little leisure to offer and are therefore ill represented in the Party and State hierarchies where decisions are taken as to the allocation of values and resources. The more powerful the political or economic institution, the fewer women are found, and hence men continue to mould the environment. It is not suggested that they deliberately discriminate against women. Indeed, she points out that in many Communist countries (particularly those with a rural predominance) women tend to uphold the traditional role stereo-typing themselves and are most resistant to change and that it is difficult to liberate women faster than they wish to be liberated. Men have, in many areas, therefore, been the interpreters and enforcers of women's liberation. In the absence of an independent women's movement, making its own demands, it appears that state needs have predominantly influenced social policies affecting women, particularly concerning the demographic problem (which led to pro-natalist policies in Western Communist countries and anti-natalist policies in China). Although these policies have sometimes led to improved conditions for women, such was not their aim.

Jancar would seem correct in assuming that if women are to safeguard the movement to full liberation, they cannot rely on male benevolence from above. The negative birth-rate

might demonstrate personal adjustments to the pressures of the 'double-shift' and force regimes into providing the necessary facilities if the reproduction of the labour force is to be mantained, yet this falls short of a genuine cultural change in male-female relations necessary to make 'equal status' meaningful.

Despite the questionable methodological framework and the liberal ideological distortion in perspective, this is a carefully researched book, full of useful data, which raises many valid points for consideration by all concerned with the 'woman' question.

Susan Saunders Vosper
Birkbeck College

Theories of Underdevelopment *Ian Roxborough* Macmillan 1979 175pp. £10

Do we need yet another text on underdevelopment? One may well ask. Roxborough's argument is that we do because current writings on the Third World are both overgeneralized and ahistorical. This defect applies equally to Marxist theories of dependency and imperialism, and liberal theories of modernization. By contrast, Roxborough pleads for historical specificity in development approaches, that is, approaches which take account of the changing international context in which each respective developing country is inserted,the manner of this insertion, and the particular historical class formation and alliances that arise from this insertion. To understand and explain social change in Third World countries, the author maintains, we must start with a historical analysis of the formation of social classes. Since the class structures of the Third World differ from those of the advanced nations by their greater degree of complexity it follows that a greater variety of forms of class alliance is possible. Which particular form will be chosen depends on a variety of factors, both structural and conjectural. Which these factors are, sadly, is not made very clear, Presumably the manner of insertion into the world capitalist system and the role that the particular UDC is supposed to play in the international context has everything to do with it. But other than suggesting some historical periodization (e.g. the change from export orientation to Import substitution Industrialization and next to the dominance of multinational corporations) at a very general level, the changing international context is not studied at all. It is for this reason that when the historical development of the class structures of several Latin American countries is examined in chapters 7, 8 and 9, he fails, despite some descriptive detail, to achieve his own aim, namely that of historical specificity. In fact historical description is made to take the place of historical specificity, and the complex interaction of internal and external forces is completely lost sight of. A serious omission here is the failure even to account for the force of 'nationalism' on all three Third World continents, which force can be viewed both as an internal and an external force. It is an internal force from the standpoint of the class alliance and the leadership of the alliance and it is an external force in that it transcends national frontiers (African Nationalism, Arab Nationalism) and rises and falls with the pulsations of changing imperialist pressures.

The historical development of the class structures of several Latin American countries (Chile, Brazil, Cuba, Bolivia) is examined in some detail to bring home the point that a *variety* of different class-alliances there have brought about an equal variety of 'bourgeois' revolutions, and had established state forms which were 'exceptional', by which is meant that they remained highly permeable, open to foreign penetration, and therefore incapable of serving national purposes, weak in terms of their power to organize civil society and lacking in hegemony. In short they were

bourgeois revolutions that remained incomplete, thus permitting the petty bourgeoisie or a bureaucratic apparatus to take over. This concept of the (incomplete) bourgeois revolution, the author claims, should be an essential complement to theories of imperialism and development. He makes an important theoretical claim here which is not satisfactorily elaborated.

If his excursion into Development theory formation (chapters 6–10) is not very convincing, his review of existing development theories (chapters 1–5) is concise, and sometimes lucid. It presents a very useful critical and 'swift' review text for those teaching in the subject, but – I should think – not one which is at all comprehensible to undergraduate students and generally those who are not already thoroughly familiar with the literature referred to.

Ankie Hoogvelt
University of Sheffield

Relations of Production: Marxist Approaches to Economic Anthropology *David Seddon* (ed.) Frank Cass & Co. 1978 414pp. £12.50

This book consists of a collection of articles by a number of French anthropologists who have been influenced in a variety of ways by Marxism. Some of their names, Godelier, Meillassoux, are now familiar to many British social scientists but this was not so in the early 1970s when the book was first planned. The long delay in publication might have made this volume anachronistic but in fact the school represented here is not really known by the wider anthropological and sociological public.

The editor describes his excitement on discovering the work of A. Gunder Frank and later that of the contributors to this book. The sense of purpose and relevance of these French marxists contrasted with the British social anthropology of the late 1960s in which he had been trained. Following others he is led to describe present British anthropology as being in a state of crisis. This is probably a misnomer for stagnation which indeed is manifested by the absence of a sense of crisis where it should be present.

By contrast, the approaches to be found in this book, although very varied, all share a clear purpose which is in Godelier's words, 'the attempt to think history scientifically', 'to lay bare the essential structures of society and to explain their *raison d'etre* and the principles of their evolution', and in this way also to integrate the history of pre-capitalist social formations with capitalist ones by understanding the articulation of different modes of production. Apart from the marxist terminology, one would have thought that there was nothing very surprising in this, but its significance comes from the fact that it is a reaffirmation at a time when British social anthropology, having dismissed evolutionism for a number of types of social functionalism, and then having abandoned that, finds itself without a unifiying field of discourse.

The alternative proposed here is more specific but still much vaguer than the connecting passages between the chapters, put in by the editors, suggest. The authors return again and again to the vexed question of what to retain of the two contradictory classical marxist evolutionary schemas set out in *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* and *The Origin of the Family.* This topic is particularly interestingly dealt with in the chapter by Godelier on the Asiatic mode of production. Meillassoux and Coqueny-Vidrovitch especially have problems in adapting marxist concepts to traditional African Agriculturalists about which the classical marxists were particularly ignorant. Indeed the understanding of African societies in marxist terms represents a large part of the book and we have several articles dealing with kinship and marriage in West Africa.

Much of this might seem very traditional and, intriguingly, this seems a continuing concern on the part of

the editor and the authors who see themselves as involved in a losing battle against the influence of what they call empiricism or the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss or Radcliffe-Brown. I find much of this concern misplaced. There is no reason why marxists cannot use the advances made by others by criticizing and contextualizing them. The problem which is well recognized by all the authors here is that there is no adequate marxist theory of pre-capitalist societies, it has to be created, and this with whatever elements are available. It is an ongoing task as this book stresses. It inadvertently however also does something else. Most of the articles published here were originally written in the 1960s and reading them now it makes us painfully aware that we have not got much further since then.

Maurice Bloch
L.S.E.

Strangers in African Societies *William A. Shack and Elliot P. Skinner* (eds) University of California Press 1979 325pp. £10.50

One cannot but applaud the imaginative idea underlying the conference which spawned this volume. Sponsored by the US Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, the conferees were asked to consider the relevance of George Simmel's classical essay on 'The Stranger' for their fieldwork in Africa. The result is a mixed bag in terms of quality, but none of the sixteen essays, including an introduction by Shack and a conclusion by Skinner, is without some interest.

By far the most ambitious paper is that by Donald Levine who has forsaken his more familiar role as an Ethiopianist to give us an elegant exposition and extension of the stranger concept – as Simmel meant it, as Park and others misinterpreted it and as he believes it should now be typologized. He provides a convincing demonstration that much conventional literature has wrongly conflated 'the stranger' with 'the marginal man', whose *angst* at being 'a man of two worlds' would lead, in Park's characterization, to spiritual instability, intense self-consciousness, restlessness and malaise. Simmel's original delineation is more positive. The stranger is 'the freer man, practically and theoretically; he examines conditions with less prejudice; he assesses them against standards that are more general and more objective; and his actions are not confined by custom, piety or precedent'. (cited, p. 280) But as Levine maintains, the conceptual clarification of Simmel alone is not sufficient to account for the full variety of stranger relationships and host responses. Compulsive friendliness will predominate when the stranger is perceived (and acts himself) as Guest, Sojourner or Newcomer, but compulsive antagonism could also be reflected in characterizations of the stranger as Intruder, Inner Enemy and Marginal Man.

None of the other papers matches Levine's in theoretical sophistication. Of the four papers loosely classified under the section title 'Historical Processes and Strangers' Roles', Challenor ('The Dahomeyans in Francophone Africa') and Leighton ('The Lenanese of Sierra Leone') provide solid case studies, while Ruth Schachter Morgenthau contributes a more tangential paper on 'Strangers, Nationals and Multinationals in Contemporary Africa'. Of course, it's true that the new intrusion of strangers firmly wedded to the international economy produces new challenges in the clash over resources, power, institutions and ideas, but Morgenthau's views remain at so general and diffuse a level that it becomes clear that her essay was brought within the framework of the book by stretching Simmel's rubber band so thin that it frays and curls at the edges and looks in serious danger of snapping.

The other sub-sections of the book comprise four specialized essays on Ghana and the same number on Uganda. Here a scholarly consistency

is produced by the force of real events — the expulsion of some 100,000 Africans from Ghana in late 1969 and early 1970 and the eviction of 79,000 Asians from Uganda in the three months following Idi Amin's decree of August, 1972. Of the four Ghanaian essays, one can single out Jeremy Eades for taking the unusual case of an *unsuccessful* group of Yoruba traders in Northern Ghana and Margaret Peil's attempt to look at 'Host Reactions', which has the undoubted virtue of actually attempting to test some of Levine's hypotheses. Sadly, with this exception, the remaining authors have not attempted to grasp the conceptual nettle and have been content with theoretically minimally-informed ethnographic or historical work. This applies to the remaining Ghanaian articles and to the Uganda pieces, though both Jessica Kuper and Christine Obbo have produced solid enough essays on the Goans and 'Village Strangers in Buganda' respectively. Ali Mazrui toys with an attempt at a class analysis of the expulsion of Luo workers and the Asian bourgeoisie from Uganda, but his task is made more difficult because of his obvious ignorance of and hostility to, Marxist concepts.

Aside from Levine's excellent reinterpretation of Simmel, the essays that are best are those that deal explicitly with, or provide a useful background to, the recent events in Uganda and Ghana. Taking a longer historical period, these events appear as aberrant departures from the more normal African relationships of hospitality, assimilation or indifference. But, as several contributors point out, if overt conflict between strangers and hosts was rare in the colonial period, it depended on the force, or threat of force, of arms as well as the lack of concern by the colonial powers over questions of citizenship or sovereignty. One might add that the ethnic division of labour produced by colonial recruiting methods served colonial interests and also helped to maintain law and order — as one might exemplify by citing the use of Amin and his spiritual kin in suppressing the Mau Mau. The crises of Ghana and Uganda are extreme indications that the post-colonial state cannot use the methods of the colonists or share their insouciance over questions of citizenship. In that respect, while one would hardly seek to justify the ethnocentrism of the Ghanaians or the racism of Amin's thugs, Africa is simply moving into line with many other states. For that reason, Monica Wilson's bland optimism that strangers will one day become brothers (p. 66) or Morgenthau's finger-wagging liberalism about the 'contemporary intolerance of strangers in some parts of Africa' (p. 120) are simply inappropriate. Contemporary Western societies may not have an Amin, but as examples of intolerance one might like to consider Carter's Immigration Proposals of 1977, the French Interior Minister's plans to computerize police files for immigrants (*Le Monde*, 7.2.80) or the Thatcher Government's definition of British nationality and citizenship.

Robin Cohen
University of Warwick

Social Origins of Educational Systems *Margaret S. Archer* Sage Publications 1979 815pp. £20

The dust jacket of this massive tome carries promises by Bottomore and Halsey that this is a successful attempt to show how educational systems develop in response to cultural and structural pressures. Four countries are used for comparative evidence: England, Denmark, France and Russia. The analysis is based on reports in English and French and covers the period from roughly 1700 to the present day. The major problem is that a useful theoretical message is lost in a vast, indulgent medium. Only a highly select and dedicated few will work their way through this book, and they may feel cheated in that the profit

is not in proportion to the time spent. For those who want the message more cheaply, I shall provide a Skimmers' Guide.

The road is by no means smooth, because many common signposts are missing. The Contents provides only minimum information, there is no Bibliography and the Index is grossly inadequate. Since there is no list of Figures, one arrives at Figure 7, the clearest statement of the goal of the journey and the main highways to it, by chance – if one has persevered to page 616. I suggest starting here. Chapter 1 is a scenic detour through macrosociology which most people who attempt this book will not need and which seems to have little to do with the rest of the journey. Armed with Figure 7 as a map, read enough of the beginning of each chapter to clarify the terminology (usually clearly defined) and a paragraph or two of each section which seems relevant for the goal. Stop for substantial meals of comparative material according to your interest, but if you dally too long you will lose the overall picture in the mass of detail. Do not depend on chapter endings, because many do not summarize what has gone before. For example, Chapter 7 runs 220 pages (and 381 footnotes), but has data right to the end. Summaries are more common in the recapitulations at the start of a chapter, reminding the wanderer of the road travelled before starting out yet again. These are sometimes repetitious, but going step by step through the massive evidence which has been assembled is a mediaeval method of transportation which most travellers of the 1970s cannot afford. Try to ignore abstruse phrasing, 'there' and 'it' without apparent referents, the lack of commas and other bumps in the road; rereading a sentence or a paragraph rarely produces more light than the first try. Better to keep moving, since most points are made often enough so that the main road can be followed fairly easily.

Archer's power model of educational change is based on an analysis of two major cycles, the build-up to state control of education and system developments since that time. Each cycle is treated in terms of structure, interaction (competition for control) and structural elaboration (pressures for change). Private enterprise in the early period (ownership characterized as mono-integrated and subordinated) gave rise to competition. Some systems changed through substitution of the control of one group for that of another; other systems were characterized by restriction in both control and access. The systems arising from these changes are differentiated mainly in being decentralized (UK and Denmark) or centralized (France and Russia). Within these systems, change comes about through processes of negotiation: internal initiation (rarer than most observers have thought), transactions with external groups which demand services, and political manipulation. Centralized systems suffer the most political manipulation, with a resulting stop-go pattern of modification over time. The varying pressures on decentralized systems tend to lead to incremental change because they can more easily adapt or resist what seems inimical to their goals. Key points to watch for in comparing systems are levels of differentiation, specialization, systemization and unification.

The author could do a valuable service to the fields of Sociology of Education and Political Sociology by providing a 200 page revision to make her message more available to students and scholars.

Margaret Peil
University of Birmingham

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The publishers regret that on the cover of the March Issue Christopher Badcock was described as Managing Editor of the journal when he in fact only assumed this duty with the June issue and Angus Stewart was Editor of the journal at that time. Also reviews by the following reviewers appear in the June issue and not, as listed, in the March issue – Margaret Archer, James G. Carrier, David Dunkerley, David Jary, Ronald Dore, Christopher Baldry, Jonathan Harwood, Maureen Cain, Simon Holdaway, Adrian Cunningham, Janet Finch, Brian A. Forsyth, Bob Mullan, Paul Littlewood, Ray Fitzpatrick.

Professor S. N. Eisenstadt

Cultural traditions and political dynamics: the origins and modes of ideological politics*

HOBHOUSE MEMORIAL LECTURE

I

It is a great honour and pleasure for me to be able to address you today here at the London School of Economics. The remarks which I shall present to you today deal with some problems in comparative analysis and a large part of what I know about comparative analysis I have learned here in 1947–8 and through continuous contacts thereafter. When I came here in 1947 for what today would have been called a post-doctoral British Council Scholarship, I was greatly interested – under the influence of my teachers in Jerusalem, Martin Buber and Richard Koebner – a social philosopher and an historian – to combine historical and sociological study and especially to engage in some type of comparative analysis. And I was very lucky to be here at that period when old and new were interacting in a great intellectual ferment. Morris Ginsberg and T. H. Marshall were continuing their vigorous teachings of the comparative approach so strongly influenced by Hobhouse and Edward Shils and others were also teaching here at that period bringing in the Weberian and Durkheimian tradition. Ginsberg's seminar was a place in which many lively discussions, in which sociologists, anthropologists and historians – many of whom became leaders of their disciplines, among whom I would like to mention specially the late Maurice Freedman – participated, and to me, who still cherishes my copy of Ginsberg's Home University Sociology (which I acquired as a high school student in 1940) it was a great, unusual, intellectual treat. In anthropology a similar experience could be found in Raymond Firth's seminars, where it was possible to exchange views with Audrey Richards, Lucy Mair, Edmund Leach, the late S. F. Nadel, and with many others, and through them further with other anthropologists, especially with Meyer Fortes and the late Max Gluckman.

It was a very great intellectual stimulus, and my own interests focussed mostly on the continued interweaving of sociological

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theory and comparative analysis – an area to which the subject on which I shall talk today belongs.

II

In this lecture I would like to trace the relations between cultural traditions and some central aspects of the dynamics of political systems, especially but not only, in so-called historical or pre-modern societies. This is a subject which has been, paradoxically enough, both very central as well as very neglected in sociological discussions and analysis. It has been at least implicitly very central in many of the evolutionary schools and approaches and can indeed be fully illustrated by Hobhouse's own concern about the relations between moral and political evolution.

But it has also been a relatively neglected subject. Beyond the general correlations between moral and political development – correlations which, as is well known, have often been seriously criticized as have been other central assumptions of the evolutionary approaches – there have been but few systematic comparative analyses of the relations between different cultural traditions and political dynamics. There has been no systematic analysis of the kind that Weber attempted with respect to the relations between cultural traditions and economic life – although his own corpus contains many powerful insights about these problems. In what follows I shall attempt to give some preliminary indications about some of them.

I shall concentrate here on one central problem – on what may be called the origins and modes of ideological politics – I would be almost tempted to call it the birth of ideology. We have been sometimes told – somewhat, as has been often pointed out, prematurely – about the death of ideology. In order to understand the persistence of ideological politics – albeit in different guises and modes, some of which have indeed disappeared – it might be worthwhile to analyse the historical origins of ideological politics. I shall attempt to do this here today – focussing on two areas of political life – namely the structuring of collectivities and the accountability of rulers.

III

The origins of ideological politics can be found, in different places on our globe, in that rather long-stretching period which the Swiss-German philosopher Karl Jaspers has termed as the Axial Age, i.e., the period of the first millennium B.C., when there emerged and

became institutionalized in some of the major civilizations – namely in Ancient Israel, later on in Christianity; in Ancient Greece; China in the early Imperial period; Hinduism and Buddhism, and last of all and later on in Islam – a conception of a basic tension between the transcendental and the mundane orders – a conception which differed greatly from that of a close parallelism between these two orders or their mutual embedment which was prevalent in so-called pagan religions, in those very societies and religions from which these post-Axial Age civilizations emerged.[1]

Before proceeding to the analysis of the impact of the post-Axial Age breakthrough on political dynamics, I shall address myself – and because of shortness of time, very briefly – to two of the most interesting civilizations of pre-Axial Age which may serve us as good comparative cases – namely Ancient Egypt and Japan. Although far away from one another and different in many crucial ways, these two civilizations – as well as many others which have not gone through the transformation of cultural traditions or connected with the Axial Age – share some basic premises which had several repercussions on the structuring of collectivities and the accountability of rulers.

In both these civilizations – as in many others – the major types of human collectivities – the political, local, ethnic or linguistic – were perceived as given and as rather natural; they were defined in primordial and ascriptive terms – in terms almost entirely lacking any independent ideological elaboration. And although some distinctions between the different types of collectivities – such as linguistic, political and the like – were not absent, yet these distinctions were but rarely defined in principled, ideological terms.

Obviously in fact these collectivities were created through some historical processes of which conquest was probably the most visible one. In so far as contacts with other societies became intensified through such processes they gave rise to a growing awareness of the existence of such different collectivities.

But all these distinctions were on the whole seen as natural divisions and the construction of such collectivities and the relations between them, however much influenced by conquest and migration, became but rarely a focus of ideological political struggle.[2] It is very difficult to speak here about the wars of religion as they developed later on, above all in the Christian and Muslim realms.

A rather parallel situation can be identified with respect to the accountability of rulers. In Egypt the Pharaoh was God-King, in Japan the Emperor of divine origin and often seen as a divine being. Each of them was seen as the embodiment of the cosmic and social order, epitomizing it and as such not accountable to anybody. He could not even be held responsible to uphold, as was the case in

some tribal societies, the customs of the community and be *de facto* deposed by the elders or other representatives of the community. The Egyptian King or the Japanese Emperor could, of course, be killed or become, through the vicissitudes of political struggle, deprived of any actual power, to become even a beggar in the streets of Kyoto – but neither of them could be called accountable to anybody or deposed through any customary process.[3]

Both such structuring of collectivities as well as patterns of accountability of rulers can be seen as manifestations of the almost total lack or at least weakness, in these civilizations, of any highly principled or ideological level of politics. This weakness was manifest in the fact that first, the main participants in the political struggle in these societies were the direct representatives of the basic groups in the centre and in the periphery (kinship, territorial, religious, personal or family groups); they tended to be organized in cliques, competing for access to the royal household, creating continuously shifting and cross-cutting allegiances and coalitions with each other. Second, this lack or weakness of an ideological dimension of politics could be seen in the fact that the major issues and mechanisms of political struggle on part of 'higher' (central and aristocratic) as well as 'lower' (peripheral) groups alike were petitions and pressures on the centre to co-opt new elements into the central cliques and/or change their composition: to change the details of the distribution by the centre of various resources to the major groups; as well as to extend the lines of clientele and patronage, and that these issues were usually formulated in *ad hoc* and dispersed manner – with but relatively low level of principled or ideological formulation, of subsumption of some more general principles.[4]

IV

The picture changes in many crucial respects in a most extreme way in the Axial Age, with the emergence and institutionalization of the conception of a chasm, tension between the transcendental and the mundane orders – an institutionalization which has in a sense created the 'Great Civilizations' mentioned above. While the concrete expressions of this conception varied greatly between these civilizations – and we shall yet address ourselves to some of these differences – the very emergence and institutionalization of such conception had far-reaching implications on the institutional structure of these civilizations in general and the political process in particular.[5]

It was the institutionalization of this conception that ushered in the age or ages of ideological politics – which had far-reaching repercussions on all areas of political life and among them on the structuring of collectivities and accountability of rulers.

The institutionalization of such perception of tension, of the chasm between the transcendental and the mundane orders, has created a strong tendency to define some collectivities and institutional spheres as the most appropriate carriers of the attributes of overcoming this tension, of 'salvation' – a term derived from the Christian tradition but which can be also, as Weber has shown, applied to other civilizations – thus endowing seemingly natural and 'primordial' groups with special meaning couched in terms of the very perception of such tension and of its resolution.

The most important innovation or transformation in this context has been the construction of 'cultural' or 'religious' collectivities – as distinct from ethnic or political ones. While some embryonic elements of such construction might have existed in those societies in which no conception of tension between the transcendental and the mundane order was institutionalized, it was only with the development and institutionalization of such conception that these elements became transformed into new, potentially full-fledged civilizational collectivities or frameworks – with autonomous criteria of membership and loci of authority.

The membership of these collectivities and frameworks became imbued with a strong ideological dimension as well as a focus of ideological contention and struggle.

The same applies to other collectivities which were perceived as relevant from the point of view of this cultural conception. Thus, for instance, in so far as the political sphere was defined as a focus of resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order, of salvation, there tends to develop a very high level of ideological politics, of the definition of the issues of political struggle and of their organization in highly principled and ideological terms and the same applies to the military and educational spheres. Naturally there arises also in such situations the tendency to organize these different collectivities – the civilizational (religious), political or ethnic ones in some hierarchical order – and the very construction of such an order usually becomes a focus of political and ideological conflict.

V

No less far-reaching repercussions have developed in all these civilizations with respect to the conception of the relations between the political and the higher, transcendental order in general and the accountability of rulers in particular. The political order was conceived as lower than the transcendental one and as one which had to be structured according to the precepts of the latter and above all according to the perception of the proper mode of overcoming

of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order of 'salvation'.

There emerged the conception of a higher authority – God, Divine Law and the like. The King-God – the embodiment of the cosmic and earthly order alike – disappeared, and a secular ruler, in principle accountable to a higher order, appeared, and accordingly there appeared also the possibility of calling a ruler to judgment. The first most dramatic appearance of this conception appeared in Ancient Israel, in the priestly and above all prophetic pronunciations. A different conception of such accountability – of an accountability to the community and its laws – appeared in the northern shores of the Eastern Mediterranean – in Ancient Greece. But in different veins this conception appeared in all these civilizations.

Even the most despotic rulers could not do away with this conception – they could at most attempt to represent themselves as the proper carriers of this higher Law or order. But such attempts of theirs could never be fully successful, mainly because this conception of the accountability of rulers – as that of the ideological structuring of collectivities – was not a purely academic, intellectual exercise. It was connected with the emergence of a new social element, of a new type of elites in general and of carriers of models of cultural and social order – be they Jewish prophets and priests, the Greek philosophers, the Chinese Literati, the Hindu Brahmins, the Buddhist Sangha or the Islamic Ulema – in particular.

It was these groups that formulated and articulated, and carried the perception of tension between the transcendental and the mundane order and the relatively successful institutionalization of the derivatives of such perception tended to reinforce the autonomy of these elites. The institutionalization of these perceptions transformed the various technical, ritual, magical and sacral activities of the former priests into aspects or dimensions of relatively autonomous construction of the cultural and social order, and their carriers into potentially autonomous 'intellectuals' who tend to acquire a high degree of autonomy and – potentially country-wide – status consciousness of their own. They become potentially independent of other elites and social groups and categories – but, necessarily, in strong competition with them.

Such competition becomes here very intensive because a parallel transformation also takes place in the structure of other elites – especially those whose activities are also closely related to the focus of the resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order – be they political, military, educational or, in some cases, the economic ones.

All these elites – with variations which we shall yet analyse in greater detail later on – tend to develop claims for an autonomous place in the construction of the cultural and social order. They see

themselves as performing not only specific technical, functional activities, but also as potentially autonomous carriers of the models of cultural and social order – very often of different, alternative conceptions of such order. Accordingly, the non-political elites tended often to view themselves as being on a par with, if not superior to, the political authorities. They tended to be very active participants in the social (and political) spheres, and see themselves as carriers and representatives of the major ideological attributes of these spheres, and they very often view the political authorities as potentially accountable to themselves. On a parallel, however, the political (and other) elites very often viewed themselves also as autonomous articulators of the models of cultural order – potentially superior to the cultural elites.

The political activities of these different elites could often manifest themselves in the establishment of close relations and linkages with movements of protests, rebellion and heterodoxy – linkages which often activated such different alternative conceptions of social and cultural order.

VI

All these developments affect the scope and intensity of societal struggle and conflict in general – and, in so far as the political sphere is perceived as relevant from the point of view of 'salvation', of political struggle. The issues of such struggle tend to become highly generalized and ideologized, and the struggle tends to become organized in relatively distinct settings. Concomitantly there develop growing linkages between different levels of issues of such struggle – from the discrete to the general, from the local to the central, reaching potentially up to the very principles of legitimation of the political order.

If the legitimation of most of the great pre-Axial Age civilization was based on some fused, traditional, sacred and primordial criteria, the picture would have become much more complicated with the institutionalization of the perception of tension between the transcendental and mundane order.[6]

In these post-Axial Age civilizations, there developed first a strong tendency to an oscillation or tension between primordial criteria on the one hand and sacred or ideological ones – defined in terms of the attributes of salvation – on the other; and the concomitant tendency to ideologize or 'sacrilize' the primordial attributes. Second, there tends to develop here a tension between 'traditional' criteria of legitimation and more 'open' (rational or charismatic) – both given in the very stress on the necessity to find some resolution of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane orders.

All these tensions were not purely 'academic' – they constituted a continuous focus of actual political struggle in general, and of the construction of collectivities and of the relations between the rulers and other elites who wanted to make the rulers accountable to themselves in particular.

VII

Thus, we see that the very emergence and institutionalization of the conception of a basic tension and chasm between the transcendental and the mundane order has transformed the nature of the political process in general and of the structuring of collectivities and of accountability of rulers in particular. On the symbolic level it has added the ideological dimension to these processes, it has 'problematized' them – they were no longer perceived as given. On the institutional level it has added a new element – that of the new, autonomous elites, especially the autonomous carriers of models of cultural and social order – be they cultural and religious and even secondary political elites who perceived themselves and were perceived by others as the carriers of a higher, non-mundane authority.

It was the combination of these two elements – of principled conceptions of the nature of social and political order, and of new types of elites – which has given rise, in the major civilizations analysed here, to the emergence of ideological politics, and to the consequent intensification of political struggle. These developments can perhaps be seen in the clearest way in the first great breakthrough to such transcendental conception in Ancient Judaism – but obviously they developed in all the civilizations analysed here.

But while the ingredients of such politics could be found in all these civilizations, their concrete expressions, their concrete modes, varied greatly between them and within them, in different historical periods and in different territorial divisions.

The fully orderly, routine institutionalization of such accountability has been very rare – it developed only in the West, building on the triple base of tribal, Greek, Roman and Judaic traditions; yet it would be wrong to think that in other such post-Axial Age civilizations there was no such development at all. Rather, there developed different modes of ideological political in general and of accountability of rulers and these different degrees of ideological definition of the structure of collectivities, that developed in all of them.

There were of course many factors – geopolitical or internal-political that influenced the development of such different modes of ideological politics. Here, however, we shall concentrate on the impact on such developments, first of all of different cultural conceptions, especially of the different conceptions of the tension

between the transcendental and the mundane orders and of salvation, and of the concomitant structure of the major elites that were predominant in these civilizations. We shall not however assume that the impact of different cultural traditions or orientations is effected through some process of emanation. Rather we shall emphasize that it is effected but mainly through the activities of different elites who are both the carriers of such traditions and orientations as well as major partners in ruling coalitions who control the access to power and the flow of resources in society.

These elites exercised control over two crucial aspects of the flow of resources in the society; first they controlled the access to the major institutional markets, i.e., the economic, political and cultural ones; second they controlled the scope of such markets and the conversion of resources between them – especially the conversion of economic resources into political and status (prestige) ones; and third they controlled the construction of the definition of social and cultural worlds, of the reference orientation of the major social groups.

But the modes in which these elites exercised their control varied greatly according to the major cultural orientations they carried and the combination of these two has influenced in each of them the patterns of ideological politics in general and of the structuring of collectivities and of accountability of rulers that developed in these civilizations. In the following pages we shall attempt a systematic analysis of these variations, starting with some of the distinctions between the cultural orientations that developed in the different post Axial-Age Civilizations.

VIII

The first distinction relates to the concrete cultural definitions of this tension between the transcendental and the mundane orders which has greatly varied in the various orientations mentioned here. The two most important differences here are first between on the one hand those cases – as in Confucianism and in the classical Chinese belief systems and in a somewhat different way in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds – in which this tension was couched in relatively secular terms, *i.e.*, in terms of a secular – metaphysical and/or ethical – distinction between the transcendental and the mundane orders (usually connected with the maintenance of more 'primitive' religious traditions on the more popular level) and on the other hand, the great monotheistic religions and Hinduism and Buddhism in which there did develop a conception of a *religious* hiatus and tension between these orders.

Second, within the latter cases, there developed an important

divide between the monotheistic religions in which there developed a conception of God standing outside the Universe and potentially guiding it, and those systems, like the Hinduist and Buddhist ones, in which the transcendental, cosmic system was conceived in impersonal, metaphysical non-deistic terms.

Last is the distinction between the major focus of the resolution of the tensions between the transcendental and the mundane order or of salvation. Here the major distinction is between purely this-worldly, purely other-worldly and closely interconnected or interwoven this- and other-worldly conceptions of salvation.

It is probably no pure accident that the 'secular' conception of such tension has been connected with a tendency to an almost wholly this-worldly conception of salvation; that the conception of such tension in metaphysical, non-deistic terms, tends more towards an other-worldly conception of salvation, while the great monotheistic religions tended to stress a loose combination and interweaving of this- and other-worldly conceptions of salvation.

Each of these modes of definition of the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order and of salvation, as it becomes predominant in a society or civilization, was, as indicated above, connected with a distinct structure of the major elites and with distinct modes of their control over the flow of resources in society.

The combination of these three factors – cultural orientations, structure of elites and the modes of their control – has influenced the modes of ideological politics in general and of the structuring of collectivities and of mode of accountability of rulers in particular developed in these civilizations. In the following pages we shall attempt a systematic analysis of these variations.

IX

The most articulated 'this-worldly' conception of the tension between the mundane and the transcendental order has become most fully institutionalized – and for the longest period in the history of mankind – in China with some interesting parallels into which we shall not be able to go in detail here, but some aspects of which, of great importance for our analysis, have been studied by Professor Humphreys – in Ancient Greece.[7]

China's Confucian-Taoist-Buddhist-Legalist tradition,[8] as compared to monotheistic religions, was characterized by a visibly weak stress – as compared to other post-Axial Age Civilizations – on the tension between the transcendental and the mundane order; a strong this-worldly focus of overcoming this tension; a very weak conception of an historical-transcendental time dimension; a cyclical time

dimension; and a relative openness in its formulation as well as accessibility of the broader strata to the social and cultural orders as indicated by the Confucian literati.

The thrust of the official Confucian-Legalist framework was the cultivation of the socio-political and cultural orders as the major focus of cosmic harmony. It emphasized this-worldly duties and activities within the existing social frameworks – the family, broader kin groups and Imperial service – and stressed the proper performance of these duties as the ultimate criteria of individual responsibility.

This ideology was very closely tied to the political framework of the Chinese Empire. The Empire was legitimized by the Confucian and legalist premises, and the Confucian ethical orientation found their natural place and framework, their major referrent, within the Empire.

The Chinese tradition stressed also a basic affinity between the symbols of the centre and the status identification of the broader social strata. Orientation to the centre and to participation in it constituted an essential component of the collective identity of many local and occupational groups.

Such this-worldly orientation generated a very strong emphasis on civility as the central criterion of the legitimation of the socio-political order, while the sacred or primordial criteria of legitimation have been here secondary or tended to disappear. The tension between them tended to become relatively weak, being funnelled as it were into secondary areas which have been either dominated by central ones or segregated from it.

This mode of legitimation was very closely connected with a specific way of structuring of different collectivities. It was above all manifest in the ideological centrality and institutional predominance of the political collectivity, as against the civilizational ones – in so far as they were not institutionally interwoven with the political ones; as well as with the secondary standing and relative autonomy of 'ethnic', regional or kinship collectivities.

Accordingly, in contrast to the situation in the 'other-worldly' civilizations, to which we shall soon turn, here the civilizational collectivities were, in terms of definition of autonomous membership, and above all in terms of institutional carriers, bases and frameworks – relatively weak.

A close corollary of this situation has been the weakness, up to total non-existence, of any distinct cultural or religious centre or centre which could compete with the political one in terms of power and authority and of the definition of the central attributes and boundaries of the society.

At the same time other collectivities – ethnic, religious, social-religious – were, in these societies, ordered in a loose hierarchical order in relation to the political ones with the latter at the apex

of the hierarchy, controlling the access to the political centre – while at the same time permitting quite far-reaching autonomy of the lower or peripheral groups or sectors.

X

Such structuring of the major collectivities was closely related to the mode of articulation of the accountability of rulers. This accountability was less institutionalized in China than in any other of the Great Civilizations referred to here. Truly enough the Emperor ruled under the Mandate of Heaven, and in principle he could lose this Mandate – but on the whole it was only after a dynasty fell through some combination of internal disintegration, rebellions and external conquest, that the Mandate of Heaven was invoked against the preceding dynasty by the new rulers and their officials.

And yet it would be wrong to assume that the concept and premise of Mandate of Heaven, with its basic implications about the existence of a higher authority to which the ruler is accountable, had no impact on Chinese politics.

Thus, first of all, there existed some institutional roles – like some parts of censorship, or the astrologer – or even some special individuals in the bureaucracy, such as the Great Reformers, which could sometimes try – often at the risk of their life – to indicate to the Emperor that he may be losing the Mandate of Heaven.[9]

But even beyond this, it is enough to compare the patterns of Chinese politics – with its high level of ideological tension in the political discussion, the continuous emergence of reformers, the potentialities – truly enough but rarely realized – of heterodoxy and rebellion becoming combined and effecting some institutional transformations – with the Japanese or ancient Egyptian ones – to see the important impact of this basic premise on these politics[10] – a premise which became fully activated in the modern revolutionary movements.

Yet all this notwithstanding, from all the post-Axial civilizations, the conception of accountability of rulers as it developed in the realm of the Chinese civilization, was most muted, least ideologically and especially institutionally developed. This institutional weakness, both of distinct civilizational frameworks and of accountability of rulers, cannot be understood except in terms of analysis of the structure of the major carriers of these this-worldly conceptions – namely, of the famous Confucian literati.

XI

These literati and bureaucrats[11] were on the one hand the major

carriers of the Confucian (or Confucian-legal) world order and orientations briefly depicted above, *i.e.*, the articulators of the models of cultural and social order. As such they were, especially symbolically, autonomous – *vis-à-vis* both the broader strata as well as from the political centre – even if rather closely related to them. They were recruited and organized according to criteria which were directly related to – or derived from – the basic precepts of Confucian-legalistic canon, and were not mediated or set-up by either the broader strata of the society or even by the Emperor himself.

These literati were not, however, just intellectuals performing some academic functions. This stratum of literati constituted a source of recruitment to the bureaucracy. They exercised an almost virtual monopoly over venues of access to the centre. Thus, they constituted a central power elite which exercised control over the two crucial aspects of the flow of resources in the society mentioned above; *i.e.*, they controlled the access to the major institutional markets, and conversion of resources over the construction of the definition of social and cultural worlds. But the mode in which they exercised this control was greatly influenced by their predominant this-worldly orientation and their concomitant structure.

Unlike the parallel European or Byzantine elites – and in close relation to the very strong this-worldly orientations they represented – they combined at the same time both cultural ('religious') and administrative-political functions. Among them there developed only a relatively small degree of organizational and even symbolic distinction between these two types of activities. Their organizational framework was almost totally identical with that of the state bureaucracy (which recruited ten to twenty per cent of all the literati), and except for some schools and academies they had no organization of their own. Consequently the different elite activities were usually carried out in one institutional framework which usually meant the submergence of the cultural under the political activities. Accordingly, there did not develop among them separate political, administrative or religious organizations and hierarchies, within independent resources and bases of power.

All this gave rise to a concomitant weakness of the autonomous bases of power and resources of the more central (especially administrative) as well as cultural elites alike, as against the Emperors and their entourage. It was only in one institutional sphere – the educational one – and in Rome in the legal and legal-educational sphere – that there did develop some autonomous intellectual organizations and structures – but even here the more specific roles into which such activities crystallized were usually very closely interwoven with the political-administrative setting and oriented towards it, and rather segregated from activities of secondary elites of the periphery.

Accordingly, these intellectuals could not, because of their basic acceptance of the interlinked political and cultural realm as the major focus of salvation and the concomitant lack of any independent resources or power bases, develop radical orientations beyond the private realm. They could not become a point of linkage with movements of protest and rebellion in the periphery, or even with central political power, and accordingly, they did not evince a high level of symbolical or organizational transformative capacities.

There was no way in which they could call the rulers effectively and regularly to account. But the latent premises of such accountability have always existed in China – to become very visible and powerful in the various revolutionary movements which developed from the downfall of the Empire on.

XII

The pattern of ideological politics in general and of accountability of rulers in particular that developed in the other-worldly civilizations – most fully represented by Theravada Buddhist societies[12] – was of course different. In these societies there did develop a relatively autonomous religious group – the Sangha, who represented the higher pristine order and who had a relatively clear conception of the proper cultural and social order which was concomitant with this higher, transcendental one. They have created new civilizational frameworks, different from primordial ethnic or national collectivities, and were seemingly able and willing to call the rulers to account, especially for their upholding of the proper moral order of the community.

But the mode of the ideological politics in general and of construction of collectivities in particular that developed in these societies was greatly influenced by the other-worldly orientations prevalent in them and by the concomitant structure of the religious elite.[13]

These elites evinced – in so far as their cultural or religious activities were concerned, a relatively large degree of symbolic and to varying degrees also organizational autonomy from both the major ascriptive groups as well as from the political rulers. (Even the Indian Brahmins, although they seemingly constituted such an ascriptive group – in fact their ascriptive identity was an ideological construction going much beyond local ascriptive kinship units.)

But this autonomy as well as the critical activities of these elites were on the whole confined to the cultural or religious sphere. In the more mundane sphere they attained at most some – usually limited – organizational autonomy – but in these spheres they were both symbolically and organizationally much more dependent on the political authorities. Their organizational autonomy was contingent

on the acceptance of the basic rules of the political game established by the political elites. Thus, although they were called upon to legitimize the political order and took part in the formation of new political regimes or in the restructuring of the scope of ascriptive communities – they evinced but very little autonomous, potentially critical participation in the political realm. Indeed they tended to legitimize any victorious ruler.

Their intellectual activities were not oriented to such participation. In so far as they developed alternative conceptions of a social or cultural order, these have been either oriented almost entirely to the 'other-worldly' spheres, or to the moral improvement of the community without, however, generating very high potential restructuring of the political, social or economic spheres of activities.

But with all these limitations, the very activities and orientations of these elites, had yet far-reaching – even if very specific – impacts on the structuring of collectivities and on the pattern of legitimation of rulers and their accountability. The very upholding of the criteria of salvation as bearing also on the political realm added here several additional dimensions to the structuring of the political realm, its legitimation in general and accountability of rulers in particular.

First of all there developed here a basically secular conception of kingship. The King was desacralized and his role defined largely – even if perhaps not entirely – in secular terms with a strong emphasis on the necessity to accept it in terms of the maintenance of social order. At the same time however demands were made on him to support the higher cosmic order and the concomitant moral order of the community to which in principle he is subordinate. Thus in principle Royalty was legitimized in terms of the predominant 'other-worldly' religious symbols.

At the same time the relatively autonomous religious elites tended to become the carriers of the 'moral conscience' of the society. Truly enough this moral conscience did not imply a distinct new socio-political vision. Rather, it implied the more stringent, elaborate and articulate upholding of the given order and of its religious (and moral) precepts. Accordingly the complaints and demands articulated by these elites were not usually conceived in terms of new principles of political action, but rather in terms of further articulation of the premises of legitimation inherent in the existing principles. However, at the same time, such religious groups could become the standard bearers of outcries against the failure of the authorities to uphold their duties, as well as important factors in the fermenting of popular rebellions or upheaval. They could help in the spread of different 'populistic' demands, of demands to change the concrete application of existing rules as well as of policies of rulers, thus generating a new dimension of political activity.[14]

It is also through these orientations and activities of theirs that

these elites provided a new dimension in the construction and definition of the basic collectivities. First of all, given the strong religious orientations it was the 'civilizational' collectivities and frameworks that developed here as distinct and symbolically autonomous highly articulated frameworks. Secondly, these orientations certainly effected important changes in the construction and the definition of the 'local', 'national' or political communities. They added to the 'usual' primordial or territorial components of such definition a certain broader orientation which provided the basis and frameworks for the crystallization of new symbols and boundaries of political collective identity, of national political communities, first of all in the fact that the political realm was conceived as a reflection or representation of basic conceptions of the cosmic order – giving rise to what S. J. Tambiah has called the galactic polity.[15]

Second, it was evident in a very strong tendency, which developed especially in the (Theravada) Buddhist societies, to define the local-national communities – and the nature of such definition could become foci of continuing socio-political struggle.[16]

XIII

Thus both within this- and other-worldly civilizations there developed special modes of ideological politics in general and of construction of collectivities and accountability of rulers in particular. The fact that they differed greatly from what we have been accustomed to in the West should not belittle their importance and interest – in many ways they have shaped the political dynamics of their respective societies till this very day.

But there is no doubt that the fullest ideological and institutional articulation of the political process in general and of the structuring of collectivities and institutionalization of accountability of rulers in particular developed within the three great monotheistic civilizations – Judaism, Christianity and Islam.[17] Truly enough even here there developed many crucial variations and, as is well known, it was only in the Western-European (and North American) parts of Christian civilization that the more embryonic elements of such institutionalization that existed in Ancient Judaism and in a different mode in the Greek tradition, became fully – and routinely – organized. But the ideological and institutional possibilities of such developments existed in all these civilizations.

This was due both to the basic ideological-symbolic premises of these civilizations as well as to closely connected institutional factors. The relevant basic ideological premises that developed in these civilizations were a strong emphasis on a very high level of

tension between the transcendental and the mundane orders; on a multiplicity and complexity of the ways of resolving such tension and of holding the rulers at least partially responsible for such resolution. Such resolution was always seen as being attainable through activities in this-worldly, political, military or economic spheres which had to be reconstructed according to other-worldly orientations. Closely related was also an emphasis on a high level of activism and commitment of groups and strata and individuals to the cultural and social orders, and on relatively autonomous access to these orders of such groups and strata – to some degree countered by, and in constant tension with, the strong emphasis on the mediation of such access by such bodies as the Church or the political powers. All these generated also in these civilizations the development of many alternative conceptions of the social and cultural order.

These basic ideological premises gave rise in all these civilizations first of all to strong tendencies to the concomitant development of a multiplicity of mutually relevant – above all religious, cultural and civilizational and political – frameworks or collectivities; each relatively autonomous, yet all of them impinging on one another and conditioning the access to each other, and to a high level of symbolic articulation and ideologization of the criteria of membership of these collectivities and of their boundaries. Second, and in close relation with the former, these basic ideological and institutional tendencies gave rise in these civilizations – as the stories of wars of religions, of the combination of these wars with that of construction of boundaries of political collectivities fully attest to – to a continuous ideological articulation of the structuring of the basic political, religious, national or ethnic – collectivities.

The same in principle holds about the accountability of rulers. In all these civilizations there developed very articulate conceptions of a higher order to which the rulers and the community are responsible. The basic tenets of these civilizations in this respect are too well known to need in the short time available to us any further elaboration or illustration.

While the ideological tenets of accountability of rulers have been closely related to the basic religious conceptions, especially to the conception of salvation that developed in these civilizations, the possibility of their institutionalization – as well as that of the structuring of the boundaries of the major collectivities – has been related here, as in the other civilizations, to the structure of the elites that developed within them. The crucial fact here has been that in conjunction with these cultural orientations there developed in these civilizations a very great multiplicity of elites at different levels of social life – both central as well as what may be called secondary elites. These elites had, unlike the Buddhist Sangha, a very strong orientation to social, political and sometimes economic spheres,

and were usually imbued with very strong ambitions to restructure these mundane spheres. At the same time, unlike the Chinese literati, these elites, because of the variety of their conceptions and their organizational diversity, have always potentially had bases of power and resources independent of the political centre – as well as independent, symbolic and organizational linkages with the major social groups and strata in the periphery, and with movements of rebellion, protest and heterodoxy.

These tendencies to the development of multiple autonomous elites, often carrying alternative conceptions of the social order – most of them oriented to the socio-political realm and with relatively independent 'bases and resources' – generated the conditions for the fullest development of the 'independent' autonomous religious and secular intellectuals, who strive to participate in the construction of cultural and political order – as well as of autonomous political elites.

Needless to say in all these civilizations and societies many of the religious and intellectual groups become co-opted, as were the Chinese literati, in the central bureaucracies, and their own organizations were often supervised by the political powers or even co-opted into the political frameworks. Yet, because of all the conditions specified above, there developed in these civilizations potentially independent stratum of religious or secular intellectuals as well as of political elites, and a continuous tension between them, and between their attempts to attain autonomy from the authorities and from each other on the one hand and the quest to participate in the construction of the socio-political order on the other hand. It was these different elites and sub-elites which were active in the structuring of the major collectivities and which portrayed themselves as the carriers of that higher order or Law to which the rulers and the community were deemed to be accountable. Needless to say the political rulers always tried on their part to portray themselves as such carriers, but because of the actual or potential activity of all these other elites, it was only under very special circumstances that the rulers could be successful in these attempts of theirs.

In close relation to these tendencies there developed also in these societies or civilizations much stronger tendencies to the development of multiplicity of movements of heterodoxy and of movements of protest, both of which articulated conceptions of alternative social order and of different principles of accountability of rulers; to linkages among these movements and between them and different levels of political struggle in general and attempts to reconstruct the centre of these societies according to different bases of legitimation of the social order in particular.

In all of these civilizations there developed continuous tension between different principles of legitimation – be they primordial, sacred or civil. All these principles – as well as the struggle between

them – were formulated in highly ideological terms; they became central foci of political struggle – and in the name of each of which different principles of structuring of collectivities and of accountability of rulers were annunciated.[18]

XIV

One of the most interesting developments in these civilizations which bears directly on the institutionalization of the process of accountability of rulers is a tendency for the development of the legal sphere as an autonomous socio-political realm which tends to become distinct – although never entirely separated – both from the sphere of custom as well as from being just an instrument of political regulation. The fullest development of such systems can be, of course, found in Western Europe and later on in the US – although very significant developments in this direction took place in Judaism and in Islam and in the Byzantine and in the Russian Empires.[19]

The most crucial development here is not just the elaboration and codification of different customs and laws, the growing organizational and intellectual complexity of legal systems or the relatively specialized educational 'formation' of legal cadres. All these could, in varying degrees, be found also in other, especially in this-worldly, civilizations. In addition to all these characteristics, in the monotheistic civilizations we find that the legal frameworks and activities became here one of the most central and distinct arenas of the articulation of the basic premises of the political and social order and of its grounding in the basic cultural orientations. Concepts of rights and of duties became very closely related to the basic conceptions of political identity and of legitimation of the socio-political order. To some degree they become also – as in the Jewish and Islamic cases – the most important frameworks of definition of membership of the civilizational and cultural communities, and of the basic components of collective identity.

Above all the autonomous spheres of law and its carriers became also one of the major – if not the major – arena which attempted to become invested with the responsibility of defining the accountability of rulers, and thus became caught up in the ideological articulation of the most central levels of political struggle.

XV

And yet with all these characteristics common to all the monotheistic civilizations the mode of ideological politics in general and the concrete institutionalization of the structuring of collectivities

and above all of the accountability of rulers in particular differed greatly between them and within each of them. These concrete differences were influenced by a whole gamut of concrete historical conditions, by the vicissitudes of internal and external power struggles into the details of which we cannot enter here.

But however varied these historical processes their impact on the structuring of collectivities and above all on the institutionalization of accountability of rulers was mediated by their effect on the relations between the basic cultural premises and orientations on the one hand and the structure of the major elites on the other.

Of special importance in this context was the degree to which such historical processes influenced first the interweaving of this – and other-worldly conceptions of salvation, and second the organizational differentiation of the major elites, their internal autonomy, mutual access to one another and the relative strength of secondary elites.

The fuller development of the institutionalization of accountability of the rulers, as it was first worked out in the Western Europe – however precarious it was even here – was due to a set of historical processes which have assured, within these countries, first a continuous interweaving of this- and other-worldly conception of salvation and of their application to multiple institutional spheres – be they political, economic or educational; second the continuous development of multiple autonomous elites and groups. These developments gave rise to several crucial characteristics of (Western) European society, the most important of which have been (1) multiplicity of centres; (2) a high degree of permeation of the periphery by the centres and of impingement of the periphery on the centres; (3) a multiplicity of cultural and functional (economic or professional) elites enjoying a relatively high degree of autonomy with close relationships with the broader strata, continuously impinging on each other, carrying different variations of combined this- and other-worldly orientations – with a high degree of mutual cross-cutting, autonomous access to the centre, without any group to monopolize the centre.[20]

XVI

In other parts of the Christian civilization these processes did not work in the same way. Thus, to mention briefly, in Russia[21] the monolithic Imperial system was characterized by a high degree of principled interweaving of this- and other-worldly conceptions of salvation (which in the more modern setting were couched in secular metaphysical terms) but unlike in Western Europe also by a high degree of segregation between them. The other-worldly orientation was relegated to the private or 'religious' sphere while the combination

of this- and other-worldly as applied to the socio-political field was vested in the rulers, giving rise to the subordination of the cultural (religious) to the political order.

The Russian state was also characterized by a relatively low degree of autonomous access of the major strata to the principal attributes of the social and political orders. The political sphere became the monopoly of the rulers; the economic sphere became less central, and economic activities were left, in so far as they did not impinge directly on the centre, to their own autonomous development. To this end, the centre vigorously segregated access to the attributes of the cosmic order (salvation) which was given to all groups of the society with comparatively weak mediation by the Church from access to the attributes of the political and social orders, which were after the post-Mongol period almost totally monopolized by the political centre.

Hence, as is well known, accountability of rulers was never successfully institutionalized in Russia – but at the same time it constituted a basic ideological ingredient in its political culture. It is impossible to understand the revolutionary – and paradoxically enough – even the totalitarian tendencies in Russia without reference to the high level of ideological articulation of politics in general and the idea of the accountability of the rulers to a higher authority or ideal in particular.

XVII

These various historical processes have worked out in a different way in Judaism[22] and in Islam and let's finish by pointing out some of the aspects of Islamic history which bear most closely on our analysis.[23]

The most important cultural orientations that crystallized in Islamic realm were the distinction, chasm, between the 'cosmic' transcendental realm and the mundane one and the stress on the overcoming the tension inherent in this chasm by total submission to God and by this-worldly – above all, political and military – activity; the strong universalistic element in the definition of the Islamic community; the principled autonomous access of all members of the community to the attributes of the transcendental order, to salvation, through submission to God; the ideals of the *Ummah* – the political-religious community of all believers distinct from any ascriptive, primordial collectivity, and that of the ruler as the upholder of the purity of the *Ummah* and of the religious and moral life of the community.

Of special importance from the point of view of our analysis is the fact that in the Islamic realm the original vision of the *Ummah* assumed complete convergence between the sociopolitical and

the religious community. Political problems were central in the theology of Islam.

At the same time, however, because of the historical patterns of spread of Islam, this ideal of the *Ummah* was never realized and there developed, at least during 'quiet' routine periods of different Islamic regimes, a relatively strong segregation between this-worldly and other-worldly activities with a generally stronger emphasis on the latter; and a concomitant segregation between the political and the religious elites.

Thus the historical spread of Islam gave rise to the very high degree of symbolic and organizational autonomy of the political elites; to the relatively high symbolic autonomy – but only a minimal organizational one – of the religious elite; and to a growing separation of the two. The religious leadership was greatly dependent on the rulers and did not develop into a broad, independent and cohesive organization. Religious groups and functionaries were not organized as a separate entity; nor did they constitute a tightly organized body – except when, as in the Ottoman Empire, organized by the State.[24] Thus in fact there developed a strong dissociation between the political and the religious elites as well as – because of the strong ideological dissociation of the universal Islam community and the various primordial ones – between these elites and the local communities. But a strong latent religious-ideological orientation toward unification of these spheres was always prevalent in Islam.

The combination of religious orientations, structure of elites, and the relations between elites and local ascriptive communities gave rise – in Imperial and patrimonial Islamic systems alike – to some unique types of ruling groups.

The most distinctive of such ruling elites were the military-religious rulers who emerged from tribal and sectarian elements, and the system of military-slavery which created special channels of mobility such as the *qulam* system in general and the Mameluke system and Ottoman devshime in particular, through which the ruling group could be recruited from alien elements.[25]

All these have greatly affected the pattern of accountability of rulers that developed in the realm of Islam. On the purely symbolic level, the rulers were supposed to uphold the ideal of the *Ummah* and to be accountable to it; but this ideal was given up quite early in the history of Islam and instead there developed theological acceptance of any rulers as better than anarchy. Accordingly there did not develop in Islam, as Bernard Lewis has shown, a concept of revolution.[26] But the older ideal continuously persisted in the realm of Islam.

It is the combination of the persistence and non-realizability of the ideal that explains several crucial aspects of political dynamics in Islamic countries. On the one hand there developed in stable

Islamic societies but little effective routine checks – religious or otherwise – on the authority of rulers. At the same time it was the religious leaders, the *ulema* and the sufi-Sheiks who were usually the keepers of the religious law and through it of the boundaries of the community – thus not only being an indispensable partner of any ruling coalition, but also a potentially very potent one in possible confrontation with the rulers.[27] Truly enough such confrontations were very rare, but their possibility was always there.

Many of the later (such as the Abbasides and Fatimides) caliphs who came to power on the crest of religious movements which upheld this ideal, legitimized themselves in such religious-political terms, and sought to retain popular support by stressing the religious aspect of their authority and by courting the religious leaders and religious sentiments of the community.

Because of this there developed in Islam, as Professor Gellner in his interpretation of the Ibn Khaldun has indicated, a less direct yet very forceful pattern of accountability of rulers – a pattern viable to this very day – manifest in the possibility of rulers being deposed by the combination of sectarian groups with the resurgence of tribal revival or popular upheavals against 'corrupt' or weak regimes.[28]

XVIII

We have come, at least for the time being, to an end of our exploration. We have explored the origins and different modes of ideological politics and have found them not in the present or in the modern era but in the distant past, in some very formative periods of human history.

We have analysed the origins of ideological patterns in general and of construction of collectivities and accountability of rulers in particular, and we have above all stressed the impact of several crucial aspects of cultural orientations on these aspects of political dynamics. But we have stressed that such impact of cultural traditions is effected not through some process of emanation, but mainly through the activities of different elites who are both the carriers of such traditions and orientations, as well as the central partners in the ruling coalitions and who control the flow of resources in society and the construction of social reality. The concrete features of these modes of control and the consequent structuring of collectivities and of patterns of accountability of rulers are shaped by the continuous interaction between the cultural orientations they represent, their own structure, and the concrete historical setting within which they act.

We have shown how such different patterns of interaction have shaped different modes of ideological politics as they developed

in some of the civilizations analysed here. We have concentrated – though even here necessarily very briefly and inadequately – on the way these developments took place in historical times – but this is not irrelevant for the understanding of the contemporary science. Indeed it seems to be crucial for such an understanding.

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NOTES

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1. See K. Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, Zurich 1949, pp. 15–106 and also *Wisdom, Revelation and Doubt: Perspectives on the First Millenium B.C.*, Daedalus, Spring 1975 and E. Voegelin, *Order and History* vols. 1–4 Baton Rouge 1954–6.

2. On Egypt see H. Kees, *Ägypten – Die Kulturgeschichte des Orients*, Munich 1933 and J. Wilson, *The Burden of Egypt*, Chicago 1951. Japan see J. W. Hall, *Japan from History to Modern Times*, London 1970.

3. Op. cit.

4. This aspect of the political struggle in these types of societies is analyzed in greater detail in S. N. Eisenstadt, *Political Sociology*, New York 1970, parts 1–4, and *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies*, New York, 1978, esp. chs. 3 and 4.

5. See K. Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, op. cit.; *Daedalus*, Spring 1975, op. cit. and S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies*, op. cit., esp. ch. 5.

6. These terms are derived from E. Shils, *Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties*, in *idem, Center and Periphery, Essays in Macro-Sociology*, Chicago, 1975, pp. 111–26.

7. S. C. Humphreys, *Anthropology and the Greeks*, London, Boston, 1978.

8. On the Chinese tradition see E. O. Reischauer and J. K. Fairbank, *A History of East Asian Civilization, vol. I, East Asia: The Great Tradition*, Boston 1960; M. Weber, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, transl. by H. Gerth, New York 1964; C. K. Yang, 'The Functional Relationship between Confucian Thought and Chinese Religion', in J. K. Fairbank (ed.), *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, Chicago 1957, pp. 269–91; A. F. Wright (ed.), *The Confucian Persuasion*, Stanford 1960; D. S. Nivison and A. F. Wright (eds.), *Confucianism in Action*, Stanford, 1959; and A. F. Wright (ed.), *Studies in Chinese Thought*, Chicago, 1953.

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James Murphy

Class inequality in education: two justifications, one evaluation but no hard evidence*

ABSTRACT

It is argued that despite decades of intensive research, the case for claiming class inequality in education has yet to be established. From an examination of classical and contemporary research which advances such a claim, it is shown that the translation of 'class disparity in education' into 'class inequality in education', is typically effected without evidence and that the critical holding conditions for such a claim, in a differentiated society, remain unmet. Shown to be an attribute of both liberal and radical research in America, Britain and France, it is argued that this failure has resulted in claims about educational inequality which are certainly premature, probably overdrawn and possibly mistaken.

Though no necessary relationship exists between class disparity in education and class inequality in education, educational commentators have conventionally taken the existence of one to indicate the existence of the other, and have sought by exposition to justify this convention by two rather different strategies. The first strategy which might be called 'the structural exclusion account' is an argument much favoured by the more radical academic of a Marxist persuasion, whilst the second, which might be termed 'the cultural dispossession account' is an argument adopted for the most part by less radical commentators of a Fabianist persuasion. Though both accounts offer somewhat contrasting, sometimes antithetical justifications for this convention, in that the first explains class difference in educational representation in terms of 'structural bias', the second in terms of 'cultural handicap', neither account however actually sustains this equation in a manner which is, in a social scientific sense, respectable. The reason in each case is the same, for neither account takes seriously class difference in educational aspiration.

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TWO ACCOUNTS: TWO JUSTIFICATIONS

At source the structural account takes class disparity in education to be the consequence of the unequal distribution of power and privilege in capitalist society. Variously interpreted such inequality in power and privilege is taken at the highest level of abstraction to be responsible for class differentials in access to knowledge,[1] and at a more comfortable level of reflection to be responsible for class differentials in access to selective education.[2] One step removed, such inequalities in power and privilege have been seen as responsible for the class differential provision of educational resources[3] and for the class differential consumption of such resources.[4] Less directly, the unequal distribution of power and privilege has been taken as instrumental in structuring ability[5] and in shaping attitudes to education.[6] Rarely taken to be conspiratorial, never taken to be accidental, the exclusion of the working class from selective and higher education has at a lower level of abstraction been attributed to the culturally loaded 'ethos' professed by the school,[7] to the culturally loaded curriculum presented by the school[8] and to the culturally loaded tests adopted by the school.[9] Covert rather than overt class bias has been further identified in the expectation of teachers[10] which results in the working-class being differentially tracked into educationally terminal schools[11] streams[12] and colleges.[13] More recently the working-class have been seen as excluded by the zoning strategies of the school, which through residential segregation[14] or white flight[15] cut the working-class child off from that emerging condition for educational equality – access to affluent classmates.[16]

By this account the working-class stand structurally excluded. The cultural account on the other hand, whilst rarely denying the determinate influence of inequality in power and privilege, preferred for its part to focus in general on the cultural consequences of such structural influences and in particular on those emotional, psychological attributes which through extended habituation with poverty effectively deprived the working class of an equal chance. Acknowledged by the main architects of this account to be structurally generated[17] the immediate source of prevailing educational inequality was, however, identified as residing primarily in these cultural, emotional and psychological conditions. Though now in something of a decline, it was an account which was at the time uncompromisingly deployed as by Plowden, who echoing Moynihan declared that 'the educational disadvantage of being born the child of an unskilled worker is both financial and psychological'.[18] Uncompromisingly advanced, it was a view which was uncompromisingly sustained by research, which identified in the cultural milieu of the working-class, a matrix of factors and forces which through extended

socialization left the economically disadvantaged, educationally disadvantaged. Like the range of 'bias' identified by the structural account as in need of eradication, the range of handicaps identified by the cultural account as in need of amelioration was likewise comprehensive. Perhaps not surprisingly, given its centrality in Lewis' classic description of 'the culture of poverty', the one handicap most recurrently cited as hindering the realization of educational equality was the existence within the working-class of 'a strong present-time orientation, with little ability to defer gratification and plan for the future'.[19] Sometimes regarded as a cultural imperative, sometimes as a personality attribute such impulsiveness on the part of the working-class has long been canvassed by 'cultural' theorists and indeed by structural theorists of catholic taste, as effectively depriving, dispossessing and disinheriting the working-class of an equal chance.[20] Taken as responsible for the low achievement and early leaving of the working-class, this reluctance to make sacrifices, as Bourdieu puts it,[21] has long been complemented by the often noted low cultural saliency of education in the culture of poverty.

To these more obvious handicaps, subsequent research added more, which if rather more subtle in their operation, were no less debilitating in their effects. Deriving again from a focus on the distinctive socialization experienced by the working-class, an experience typically characterized by inadequate maternal instruction, and paternal interest,[22] the working-class emerged handicapped further, limited on the one hand conceptually,[23] and restricted on the other linguistically.[24] By this account then, the working-class stand 'culturally dispossessed' of a fair start.

Structurally excluded or culturally dispossessed, the persistence of working-class under-representation stands in both accounts as an enduring testament to the persistence of unequal educational opportunity. The inevitable consequence of structural bias in the first account and the predictable outcome of cultural handicap in the second, class disparity not surprisingly emerges in both as class inequality.

TWO JUSTIFICATIONS: ONE LIMITATION

Paradoxically however, this equation of educational disparity with educational inequality has yet to be sustained in either account for whilst it is of course, true that both accounts rooted as they are in the empirical tradition advance much in the way of observation, it is however equally true, if less apparently so, that both accounts offer little, which when viewed even with charity, could be construed as constituting evidence of educational inequality. The reason in each case is the same. In each account all that has been documented

is the obvious: namely that there are class differences in education. As evidence of class differences in education, such observations are, to be fair, difficult to fault, for it is indeed the case that it takes longer to count middle-class heads in selective education than it does to count those of the working-class. More specifically it is probably also the case that there exist differences in facilities and funding, – though in America, less striking than was previously thought[25] – that there are differences in teacher quality and in teacher turn-over, and that for sake of clarity, that what counts for knowledge in the school is more in accord with middle-class expectations than working-class expectations. In addition one would not want to deny the observations that teachers tend to regard the working-class as less able, that the working-class are alienated by the school, that they participate less in extra curricular activities and that they leave earlier.

Likewise with the cultural dispossession account one does not wish to deny that there are cognitive, linguistic, emotional and motivational differences between the classes or indeed that the working-class have a lower measured IQ, though in this instance, one might question whether some of the imputed qualities such as lack of impulse control, linguistic deprivation and cognitive impairment are as class specific as they are made out. Reservations aside, such observation provides on the whole convincing and varied evidence of class differences in education. As evidence of class inequality in education, however, such observations are without exception difficult to accept for at no point do such observations warrant, at least in sociological terms, the critical interpretation placed upon them – the interpretation that such difference, be it real or imagined, constitutes, as in the structural account, evidence of exclusion or, as in the cultural account, evidence of dispossession. It is unwarranted for by a curious oversight neither the structural nor cultural account have controlled for the eminent possibility, suggested by such observations, – that such difference is simply difference. This point can be put more fully if rather more formally, and it is this, that since it makes little sense in a pluralistic society to speak of exclusion or dispossession, unless there is evidence in the first instance that those 'excluded' or 'dispossessed' actually wanted what they are supposedly excluded from or dispossessed of, it appears by the same token a critical if minimal condition for converting class disparity in education into class inequality in education that, other things being equal, universal demand for such education be first documented, or if demand for education is less than total, that such differential demand be itself shown to be the product of structural or cultural inequality. When and only when one or other of these holding conditions have been met, have the sociological as opposed to ideological grounds for claiming class

inequality in education been established, for then and only then has that ever present possibility, that such difference is simply difference, been sociologically and scientifically contained.

Contrary to appearances however such holding conditions are nowhere fulfilled, for it is significant on further inspection that the empirical requirement for such a conversion has been met in both accounts by an experiential rather than evidential response, by an experiential response, moreover, which taking education to be a natural aspiration of man, quietly circumvents the need to document either the universality of educational demand or the inequity of differential demand. Though this experiential response is typically implicit the consequent suspension of enquiry that attends such a belief is recurrently betrayed by arguments which, in presuming education to be a natural desire, transforms these holding conditions from being matters of empirical dispute into matters of indisputable fact. Based on collective conviction rather than on reflexive inspection, on a conviction more exactly that suspends inspection, these holding conditions remain in the arguments of the Egalitarian, strikingly unmet.

THE DIFFERENT MANIFESTATIONS OF THIS LIMITATION

An attribute of both structural and cultural accounts in general, this failure to meet the documentary demand for converting class difference in educational representation into class inequality in education provides a common, if less than ideal bond between otherwise diverse perspectives and conflicting sentiments. By a perverse irony, moreover, it is a failure which is at its most apparent when it is at its most critical, notably in the commentaries of those who most influence the direction and most determine the structure of this debate.

Notable in this regard is the pioneering work of Glass, who from an observation that '. . . of undergraduates . . . only a quarter were the sons and daughters of manual workers', proceeds to claim the need for further reconstruction '. . . if we are to combine diversity of educational provision with equality of educational opportunity'.[26] Whilst the rationale for such a conversion is not without merit for Glass cites evidence for explaining such differential representation as the consequence of differential demand, it is a rationale however that is empirically less than adequate. It is less than adequate for at no point does Glass actually show such class differences in attitudes to be contingent on structural bias. Simply put, there is no evidence, cited or otherwise, for taking class differences in demand to be the product of structural or cultural inequalities. There is by the same token no reason, at least empirically speaking, for converting class

disparity in educational representation into class inequality of educational opportunity.

Likewise in that other authoritative statement on post-war reform, Douglas makes a similar if uncharacteristic jump from observed difference to proclaimed inequality. As with Glass, Douglas starts with the observation, that

> . . . in the upper middle class there are 14 pupils in grammar schools for everyone in a technical school whereas in the lower manual working class, there are only two pupils in grammar schools for everyone in a technical school[27]

and proceeds despite recurrent emphasis on class differences in parental aspiration[28] and in pupil attitudes[29] to declare that

> this is a distribution of selective secondary school places that can hardly be justified in terms of social equity or, for that matter, of national interest.[30]

As with Glass the incompatibility of such a distribution with social equity is passed over as self-evident, and above sociological debate.

In an equally striking fashion this same failure to empirically resolve this question is evident in that most recent example of demographic analysis, the Oxford Mobility Study. A longitudinal comparative study of social mobility in Britain, it considers amongst other issues, '. . . the chances of proceeding from given class origins to a university degree for those educated before and after the 1944 Act'.[31] The finding in line with previous demographic research is not unpredictable for whilst '. . . all origin categories have increased their output of graduates, the proportion of graduates remain correlated with origin and the differences between them have increased'.[32] The interpretation, again in line with previous demographic research, is, if unwarranted, not unpredictable, for such a statistic at least in the view of its leading author is taken to 'show no clear trend towards the elimination of class inequalities in educational attainment'.[33] In one sense, a superficial sense, Halsey is indeed correct, for as the statistic is about social class differences in education, and not about social class inequalities in education it does not, indeed cannot, indicate anything about class inequalities in educational attainment. In another sense, a rather more substantial sense, however, Halsey is, if not incorrect, at least premature in his judgement about the prevailing class inequalities in education, for it is a judgement that follows neither from a documentation of universal educational demand nor from a documentation as inequitous, of differential demand for education. Unhampered by such evidential considerations, it is a judgement that remains in the last analysis tentative rather than definitive. Such empirical indifference at this point of critical significance undermines also Halsey's

more recent deliberations on the inequity of British education, for once again, though this time with Heath and Ridge, Halsey reaches the same verdict from the same unsubstantiated equation of class disparity in education with class inequality in education. This time, however, such an experiential leap from educational disparity to educational inequality has resulted not only in the empirical but also in the conceptual bankruptcy of the claim, for it is a claim which is made despite recurrent acknowledgements of class disparity in educational aspirations, despite what is described in the penultimate line of the text as '. . . the stubborn resistence of class and class related culture'.[34] Their analysis of 'post-secondary education' is a case in point, where acknowledging from the start that by this rung of the educational ladder '. . . half have chosen to have done with formal learning'[35] they proceed nonetheless to promptly ignore this remark by presenting as evidence of '. . . class inequalities at different stages of the educational system'[36] statistics which simply describe class disparities at different stages of the educational system. Taken as confirming that '. . . class inequalities are crucial at each successive stage of the educational career',[37] such evidenced disparity is presented by Halsey, Heath and Ridge as a testament to '. . . class bias in selection'.[38] Like the first claim, this claim of class bias is, however, not sustained empirically, for though the authors freely take the rapidly reducing numbers in post-compulsory education to be in a large measure the consequence of 'new found freedoms'[39] in general and of 'the enormous drop-out of working-class boys' in particular [40] they singularly fail to contain the spectre of self-selection suggested by the former, and the spectre of class disparity in self-selection suggested by the latter. Studiously ignoring rather than strenuously exorcizing this spectre of class different tastes for education, Halsey, Heath and Ridge end up with an indictment of British education which is, not only empirically premature, in that it fails to control for class different taste before claiming class inequality, but is, in addition conceptually confused, in that it derives from a computation of 'unequal chance' which simply entails 'different choices'. It is a confusion neatly embedded in their summarizing remarks, where evaluated as the consequence of unequal chances, class disparity in education is then explained as the consequence of different choices. As they put it

> . . . The boy from a privileged school or from a privileged social background had a much higher chance than his unprivileged contemporary of gaining a place at university. These inequalities however were very largely a consequence of earlier decisions in the educational process.[41]

Wanting it both ways, Halsey, Heath and Ridge end up with an explanation and evaluation of class disparity in education, which is

sociologically less than enlightening, for whilst it is not inconceivable that different choices might on occasion be the consequence of unequal chances, the point here however is that in so taking different choice and unequal chance to be one and the same, Halsey, Heath and Ridge not only confuse the matter altogether, but fail in the process to document what is here crucial, namely that class disparity in educational aspiration is, in some sense or other, the product of inegalitarian forces.

A characteristic of empirical research, this failure to document the inequity of differential aspiration also flaws more theoretical treatments of class inequality in education. Notable in this regard is the influential thesis of Bourdieu and Passeron, a thesis which not unlike that of Halsey, Heath and Ridge evaluates class difference in educational representation as inegalitarian[42] yet explains such inequality as the consequence of class differences in educational aspiration – 'pupils of working-class origin' as they put it 'are more likely to eliminate themselves from secondary education by declining to enter'.[43] Unlike Halsey, Heath and Ridge, however, Bourdieu and Passeron are somewhat perturbed by this mis-match between an evaluation which proclaims inequality and an explanation which invokes differential aspiration, and accordingly they try to re-align the evaluation with the explanation by taking differential aspiration to be itself a consequence of inequality. It is an adjustment, which if not particularly novel, is nonetheless strikingly radical, for it turns on the intervening claim that 'subjective expectations' are the deterministic consequence of 'objective conditions'.[44] It is an adjustment, however, which has little to commend it empirically, for far from carefully documenting the existence of this posited relationship between 'subjective expectations' and 'objective conditions', Bourdieu and Passeron merely protest its existence. In one sense, however, this is all that is required for this dramatic reversal of the traditional view of reality and individuality turns on a more fundamental claim, on what Bourdieu and Passeron take to be the indispensable principle of sociology, namely that '. . . every power to exert symbolic violence . . . adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations'.[45] Lacking the clarity of Descartes' 'cogito ergo sum', this first principle of Bourdieu and Passeron lacks also its compulsion, for even if one were persuaded that '. . . every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate . . . adds to its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations',[46] it is a moot point in a society with half its population 'declining to enter secondary education'[47] whether education is in fact covered by a principle which is concerned only with those powers which 'manage to impose meanings'. Without some additional and in this instance rather ethnocentric assumption to the effect that individuals of all classes are naturally predisposed to education

Bourdieu and Passeron's first principle does not clearly, still less logically embrace education.

Other theorists, however, are rather more direct and get around the complication raised by class difference in educational aspiration by spontaneously declaring such a difference to be itself an example of educational inequality. Thus Evetts for example, when faced with what she describes as 'apathetic and directly hostile parents'[48] sidesteps the need for further evidence by declaring that such a difference is also inegalitarian. As she disarmingly puts it, such factors as 'motivation, parental interest, norms of aspiration, teacher quality etc. are known to be unequally distributed between social groups'.[49] Others, if no less direct, are however rather more abrupt, as for example Husen, who manages to get around the need for further evidence, by blindly affirming on the one hand Orwell's famous dictum that 'some are more equal than others' and by blandly citing, on the other, as an example of such inequality, class differences in educational orientations. As he puts it,

> Since, from the outset 'some are more equal than others', for instance have better educated parents, we find in both socialist and capitalist countries striking class differences in participation in advanced education.[50]

Evidently for Husen as for Evetts, such disparity is self-evidently inequality, which is fortuitous for in neither case is any evidence advanced for so taking differential aspiration to be inequality.

Other theorists for their part get around the problem posed by class difference in educational aspiration by simply ignoring it altogether.[51]

Such failure to take seriously the holding conditions for converting class disparity in education into class inequality in education is as much an oversight in American research analysis as it is in European research. One typical example of such empirical indifference is to be found in that uncompromising indictment of Bowles and Gintis of 'the total functioning of U.S. education', 'a system' which they claim 'provides eloquent testimony to the ability of the well to do to perpetuate in the name of equality of opportunity, an arrangement which consistently yields to themselves disproportional advantages'.[52] It is a claim that rests in part on the observation that 'children from less well off families are . . . less likely to have graduated from high school,' and in part on the further observation that such a difference is not 'simply a reflection of unequal intellectual ability or . . . of different levels of scholastic achievement in high school'.[53] It is a claim, however, that is as it stands, unwarranted, for even if these alternatives had been adequately controlled, the further alternative that such differential attainment is the consequence of differential aspiration

is left running wild. True the authors try to 'head off' this possibility by asserting that such difference in years of schooling '. . . thwarts the aspirations and need of working people'[54] but it is an attempt that is less than convincing for not only is this asserted universality of demand empirically unsupported by hard evidence, it is logically undermined by a later claim '. . . that the educational aspirations of unorganized common people . . . are almost impossible to discover'.[55] Rarely however is such a failure to document the inequity of differential aspirations quite so explicit, for typically such a failure is masked in both the cultural and structural account by an evaluation of differential aspiration which presumes in each case that such difference is in some sense pathological. Though such an assumption, once sustained, would of course relieve both the cultural and structural theorist of the obligation to document the inequity of differential aspiration, the point here, however, is that rarely if ever has such an assumption actually been justified.

Until its current demise, the classic example of such a practice was to be found in the cultural account, where without a shred of empirical support one commentator after another observed class difference in aspiration, called it deficit and demanded its remediation, in the name of equality.

Bronfenbrenner's review of the literature on cultural difference is in this regard typical, for like the theorists surveyed Bronfenbrenner simply takes cultural disparity, whatever its form, to be the main source of educational inequality. Indeed on this Bronfenbrenner is uncompromising as is well illustrated by his opening remarks 'whatever their origin, the immediate overwhelming and stubborn obstacles to achieving quality and equality in education now lie in the character and way of life of the American negro, as in the indifference and hostility of the white community'.[56] However, empirically speaking he is not convincing, for when he comes to sustain this assertion the main evidence advanced is not evidence of the inegalitarian determination of such cultural difference in motivation, but is, more simply evidence of cultural difference in motivation between the negro and white child. Described as a 'lack of motivation' on the part of the negro child, this difference in motivation between negro and white children is then taken not as a good reason for questioning the prevailing view on the inequity of negro attainment but paradoxically, as a good reason for rejecting the prevailing view of educational equality. 'Objective equality of opportunity is' he declares, 'not enough. The negro child must also be able to profit from the educational situation in which he finds himself. This he cannot do, if he lacks the background and motivation necessary for learning'.[57] Unfortunately for Bronfenbrenner however, this last observation weakens rather than strengthens his case, for whilst it would of course be a mockery by any view of equality, if the school

disabled the negro child, what is here rather more pertinent however is whether in fact, given cultural differences in motivation, such a situation actually prevails. On this Bronfenbrenner is unhelpful, for apart from calling it a deficit, Bronfenbrenner does not at any point specify in what sense such motivational disparity is inegalitarian. True, Bronfenbrenner does try to render this indictment of the American negro and the American educational system more plausible, by suggesting such motivational difference is rooted in deeper cultural factors such as paternal absence, latent femininity, exaggerated masculinity, impoverished environments and inadequate socialization, however such a strategy serves only to confound rather than clarify his claim for not only is the egalitarian status of such cultural difference left empirically unexamined, but the relationship of such cultural factors with educational motivation is likewise left unspecified. Pushing further back into his analysis the empirical requirement for converting educational disparity into educational inequality, Bronfenbrenner ends up burying rather than meeting this requirement, for what now needs to be documented as inegalitarian is not the determinants of representational disparity but the determinants of aspirational disparity. Failing to document either, Bronfenbrenner ends up with an indictment of American education which is empirically empty.

However, if the cultural account provides the classic example of how to side-step the empirical requirement for converting educational disparity into educational inequality, the structural account provides the most systematic in the work of Boudon, whose thesis on educational inequality never once meets, or indeed tries to meet, the documentary requirement for converting educational disparity into educational inequality. A somewhat surprising failure in a theory of educational inequality, such a failure is, in this context, however, not in the least unexpected. It is not unexpected for by the opening paragraph of his Preface, Boudon has already admitted that when he is talking about class inequality in education, he is, in fact talking about class disparity in education. As he puts it clearly and unequivocally,

> By inequality of educational opportunity (IEO), I mean the differences in level of educational attainment according to social background.[58]

A frank admission, it is however not quite a full confession, for in addition to taking educational inequality to mean educational disparity, Boudon in the next breath takes them to mean one and the same, by taking as given that a measure of educational disparity is a measure of educational inequality. As he puts it, again unequivocally,

> Thus a society is characterised by a certain amount of IEO if, for instance, the probability of going to college is smaller for a worker's son than for a lawyer's son.[59]

For Boudon, then, educational inequality means educational disparity only in the sense that they both mean the same. Whilst semantically, there may be little to choose between these two assumptions, as both play fast and loose with the traditional distinction between disparity and inequality, the latter is sociologically speaking rather more critical than the former. It is more critical for whilst the former gives good reason to suspect that what Boudon is about to present as a theory of educational inequality is yet another theory of educational disparity, the latter gives little reason to expect either, for with educational disparity and educational inequality so tightly linked such that educational disparity is, regardless of its determination, a measure of educational inequality, Boudon is left with a model of the world which simply cannot handle difference, indifference or dissent as a legitimate educational response. Hardly the assumption that theories of educational disparity, not to say educational inequality are made of, such however, is Boudon's central assumption. Underwriting both the descriptive and explanatory elements of his theory, it is an assumption which leaves Boudon with a theory of educational inequality which is at once, empirically unwarranted, and conceptually unconvincing.

At an empirical level, the assumption that a measure of educational disparity is a measure also of educational inequality, is nothing, if not convenient, for by this assumption, all that is evidentially required to demonstrate the existence of class inequality in education is to indicate the existence of class disparity in education. An undemanding requirement in a society characterized on all fronts by class difference in educational representation, it is for Boudon, however, a particularly felicitous requirement, for in setting aside the normal requirement of demonstrating class discrimination before claiming class inequality, it allows Boudon to side-step what is, by the normal requirement, the most striking deficiency of his data – notably its singular lack of evidence, cited or otherwise of class discrimination in education. Too seductive to resist, when the only data in the bank is data on class disparity, it is an assumption that leaves Boudon with a theory of educational inequality, whose statistical precision is somewhat out of phase with its sociological compulsion. Nowhere is such a mis-match clearer than when Boudon sets out to build up an international profile on educational inequality, where after a complicated statistical preamble on how to convert raw data on class differences in educational representation into a form which admits of cross-cultural comparison, Boudon proceeds, without further ado, to take such statistics as

parsimonious measures of class inequality in education. Thus, having derived what he calls a 'disparity index' – a disparity index is 'a crude estimation of the number of times a youngster with a high social class background has more chance of attending college than youngsters with low social background' – he concludes that 'IEO is high in all countries when college level is considered'.[60] However, as the disparity index for these countries is not uniform, his general conclusion on the high rate of inequality, is accordingly modified to fit the fluctuations in his 'disparity index'. Thus, since the disparity index for Portugal is unusually high and since the disparity index for Belgium is relatively low, Boudon infers the same is true of educational inequality – as he puts it,

> IEO rates are similar in most continental countries of Western Europe except for Portugal, where they appear as higher, and Belgium where they appear as lower.[61]

Similarly because of their low rating on the disparity index, Norway, Sweden and the United States are seen 'to have relatively low IEO rates',[62] and since East European countries return a similarly low rating when '. . . the same kind of disparity index'[63] is applied to their rate of college attendance Boudon concludes with similar ease that '. . . the IEO rates of Eastern Europe are probably closer to those of the U.S.'[64]

Capable of generating rather more fine grained observations on educational inequality, this disparity index when applied, as for example to changes over time in the class composition of education, enables Boudon to arrive at the conclusion that IEO likewise changes. Thus finding that over time '. . . the probability of, say a worker's son attending high school increases much more considerably than the probability of, say, a professional's son',[65] Boudon is moved to claim that '. . . Western societies are characterised by a steady and slow decline of IEO'.[66]

A convenient, if less than convincing equation at an empirical level, this equation of educational disparity with educational inequality proves at a conceptual level, to be neither, for it leaves Boudon with a 'contradiction' of some consequence and a 'paradox' of some intractability.

The contradiction is perhaps best illustrated by taking as seriously, as does Boudon, his measure of class inequality in education, for if it is indeed the case that class disparity in education is a measure of class inequality in education, then whatever the origin of such 'disparity', it cannot at least in logic be 'difference'. For Boudon however it is, for Boudon not only parsimoniously measures class inequality in education by class disparity in education, but equally parsimoniously explains such disparity in educational representation by difference in educational aspirations. Indeed as Boudon is at pains

to stress on a number of occasions, this is the distinctive feature of his theory of IEO. As he puts it

> . . . it introduces the assumption that people will make different choices according to their position in the stratification system.[67]

Or as he subsequently elucidates

> . . . in other words, it is assumed . . . that . . . they behave within decisional fields whose parameters are a function of their position in the stratification system.[68]

More simply described as 'differences in aspiration as a function of social background'[69] these secondary effects of stratification as he calls them, are taken by Boudon as explaining class differences in education. As he puts it,

> . . . the secondary effects of stratification on IEO are, other things being equal, probably much more important than their primary effects. In other words, the attendance at college of a disproportionate number of students from the higher class is probably much more attributable to the different systems of expectations generated by different social backgrounds than to the different cultural backgrounds.[70]

Class differences in educational aspirations, then, explain class differences in educational representation. Whilst this is not a particularly surprising claim in educational research, it is in this context, somewhat confusing. It is confusing for what Boudon is now left with is an index of class inequality, in the form of class differences in educational representation, whose origin is not in inequality, but in difference. Of course, such a contradiction is not, in any sense irredeemable or insuperable, for were such differences in aspiration shown to be inegalitarian, such a contradiction would indeed be quickly resolved: in this context, however, this contradiction is not quite so clearly dispatched for Boudon never once actually shows such difference to be inegalitarian. Whilst strictly speaking such a failure casts a dark shadow over the internal coherence of Boudon's thesis, and thus over his conclusion that '. . . stratification is the principal factor responsible for inequality of educational opportunity',[71] a more charitable interpretation might possibly grant that Boudon technically resolves the contradiction for he does at least on two occasions suggest that such aspirational diversity is the consequence of economic inequality.[72] On innumerable occasions Boudon does, it is true, assert that such aspirational diversity is the consequence of stratification,[73] but as stratification even in his terms describes only difference — 'we assume stratification generates and actually describes a number of differences between people'[74] — such assertions naturally do not count in this matter. However even if

Boudon is given the benefit of the doubt and even if his assertion about the causative influence of economic inequality is accepted, as successfully averting the contradiction, such a resolution leaves in its wake a rather more ticklish problem, for in assuming differential aspiration to be inegalitarian, Boudon merely 'trades in' one logical contradiction for a sociological paradox of rather greater intransigence.

The paradox like the contradiction can be simply described, for as a direct consequence of such a resolution Boudon is now left with a theory of IEO, which if logically consistent, is no longer sociologically competent. It is no longer competent for with aspirational as well as representational disparity now assumed to be inegalitarian, Boudon is left with a theory of educational inequality which ends, as it starts, by begging the very question in contention by assuming educational disparity to be educational inequality. Making the one assumption that he cannot make, if he is to demonstrate the inequity of class disparity in education, Boudon not only reduces sociology to the status of a metaphysical underlabourer, whose task is to justify rather than verify conventional beliefs, but so neuters reality of its complexity and diversity that what now stands as sociologically problematic about the inequity of class disparity in education, is that it was ever seen to be sociologically problematic.

At its most influential, however, this failure to document the inequity of class disparity in education flaws the otherwise critical and empirical work of Jencks and his associates. It is a commentary, in addition, which illustrates in a particularly graphic form the confusion which attends such a failure.

Having at this disposal a mass of statistical evidence on the quantitative and qualitative differences that exist between the classes, Jencks and his associates break with tradition by treating seriously, at least at the outset, class differences in educational aspirations. A recurrent concern, such sensitivity furnishes 'Inequality', with its most iconoclastic prescription. It is a sensitivity more particularly that underwrites at a prescriptive level, that uncompromising demand for the provision of alternative benefits for those who get relatively few benefits from education, a prescription that turns in the first instance, and last analysis on taking as 'basic', class differences in aspiration. As they put it more trenchantly, 'If people do not want to attend school or college, an egalitarian society ought to accept this as a legitimate decision and give these people subsidized job training, subsidized housing, or perhaps simply a lower tax rate'.[75] It is a sensitivity in addition that undermines at a descriptive level the explanatory certitude of the traditional debate, for it leads the authors to freely admit the ambivalence that such aspirational diversity creates for the explanation of class differences in educational representation. It is an ambivalence that is constantly indicated as when the authors deliberate on the clear-cut differences in

representation that obtain at every level of American education. Thus, in explaining class differences at the pre-school level, the authors mindful of differences in expectations concede 'we cannot say how much of the inequality we observe is due to variations in taste and how much is due to vagaries in public provision of such services'.[76] Likewise at the secondary level sympathetic to the differential educational attitudes the authors conclude that the differential attrition rates of the classes '. . . does not necessarily prove that poor or black students have less opportunity to use high schools than other students'.[77] Similarly when accounting for the even more striking class differences in higher education, Jencks and his associates go no further than is warranted by the evidence, cautioning that '. . . it is hard to say to what extent the selectivity of higher education represents a denial of equal opportunity and to what extent it results from variations in people's appetite for education'.[78] Cautious almost to a fault and sensitive to the limitations of their statistical data, Jencks and his associates break with tradition by advancing at a descriptive level explanations of differential representation that are strikingly if not surprisingly indeterminate.

Such a break with tradition, so striking in the prescriptive and descriptive elements of 'Inequality' is however at an evaluative level less than complete, for whilst such an admission of aspirational diversity undermines, as the authors rightly observe, many widely held educational beliefs, it paradoxically has no such implication for that most widely held of educational beliefs that class disparities in educational representation reflect class inequalities in educational opportunity. For Jencks and his associates class difference in educational representation is evaluated as it always has been, as class inequality in educational opportunity: an evaluation that, notwithstanding the acknowledged indeterminacy of the presented evidence in this regard, is paradoxically taken as warranted by such evidence. As the authors put it '. . . the evidence reviewed . . . suggests that educational opportunities are far from equal'.[79] True additional argument and supplementary statistics are advanced to warrant this critical step from explanatory ambivalence to evaluative confidence, but it remains for all that a shift warranted by no evidence at all, or by evidence of something else. Thus when discussing the difference, or as Jencks significantly puts it, '. . . the inequality that obtains at the pre-school level',[80] the unresolved question as to whether such difference is contingent on 'variations in taste' or on 'vagaries of provision' is quickly if not empirically resolved by the 'throw-away' line, 'both are apparently involved to some degree'.[81] It is an observation to be pedantic, that if true, is less than illuminating because apart from prejudging the nature of differential representation, by precluding without evidence the possibility that it could be the sole consequence of one or the other, such an observation

leaves empirically unspecified not only the precise contribution of each factor, but more importantly the egalitarian significance of each factor. Given that class differences in educational aspirations are, for Jencks and his associates, 'basic', the critical empirical requirements for converting class disparities in educational representation into class inequalities in educational opportunity turns critically on first resolving this dilemma of taste or provision.

Likewise at the secondary level, the explanatory dilemma as to whether such differential attrition rates are the upshot of class different expectations or class different opportunities for education, is taken as resolved by the further observation that '. . . public funds are being used to subsidize a service used by the middle-classes more than by other groups'.[82] Although attractive, such a resolution is seductive, for the precise egalitarian significance of such additional evidence depends once again upon first resolving whether class differences in education reflect class differences in educational opportunity or class difference in educational expectations. Of itself such evidence of differential subsidy whilst no doubt correct is not particularly helpful, for as the economic correlate of differential representation, it says little about the determinants of such representational rates and as such, about the equity of such rates. It is quite simply irrelevant, for what is here in contention is not the economic consequences of differential representation, interesting though they be in another context,[83] but whether such evidenced class differences in educational consumption is the product of something else other than what Jencks heretically professes but here religiously ignores, namely class differences in taste.

CONCLUSION

Though this concern with the failure of educational research to document the inequity of class disparity in education, is no doubt pedantic, it is not, at least in a pluralistic society, unnecessarily pedantic. It is not unnecessarily so, for once class difference in educational aspiration is taken seriously, the equity or otherwise of class difference in educational representation becomes a sociological problem rather than an ideological given. Of course should class disparity in education transpire, after investigation, to be class inequality in education, then the beliefs of the reform establishment would stand vindicated: however should such disparity transpire after inspection to be only that, or even partly that, conventional certitudes on the inequity of class disparity in education would be well dented.

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NOTES

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Robin Theobald

The politicization of a religious movement: British Adventism under the impact of West Indian immigration*

ABSTRACT

Black religiosity in Great Britain is almost automatically associated by sociologists with pentecostalism. However, another form of religious expression which differs in a number of important respects from pentecostalism, Seventh-day Adventism, has become, during the last twenty years, an important focus for immigrant religion.

This paper attempts to assess the impact of a large influx of coloured migrants into what was essentially an 'Anglo-Saxon' movement. The paper concentrates in particular upon the emergence of certain tensions which recently came close to provoking an organizational split in British Adventism.

On a more general level the paper attempts to locate the events discussed against a broader socio-economic context and to examine the cumulative impact of changes in this context for the character of the movement under consideration.

1. INTRODUCTION

The study of black religiosity in Britain has focused almost exclusively upon pentecostal movements. This is no doubt partly because pentecostalism is perhaps the most 'visible' form of black religion. Pentecostalism also embodies a world view which tends most readily to be associated with the assumed needs of black migrants. On this point at least one well-known contributor to this area, Clifford Hill, has seen in pentecostalism's thoroughgoing rejection of the world a major attraction for low-status individuals who are in turn rejected by the world.[1] That is to say, the experience of coloured migrants at the hands of white society is such as to convince them that the world is indeed irredeemably sinful and corrupt, that the world cannot be changed and that only the self can be changed by allowing

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the Holy Spirit to enter in and purify. This type of pentecostalism accordingly represents the characteristic reaction of religious withdrawal.

Without in any way wishing to devalue the contribution of Hill and others,[2] it is nonetheless the case that this concentration on pentecostalism has obscured the role of Seventh-day Adventism as a focus for black religiosity in Britain. Some idea of the importance of Adventism for Caribbean migrants may be gathered from a recent estimate which suggested that of the West Indians who were regularly attending British churches in the mid-sixties, one quarter were attending Seventh-day Adventist churches.[3] By 1978 nearly half of Britain's thirteen thousand adult Adventists were black and if one takes account of children blacks now easily outnumber whites.[4]

There are certain basic similarities between Seventh-day Adventism and the beliefs which tend to be associated with pentecostalism; similarities which are, of course, to be expected in all fundamentalist protestant movements basing themselves upon a literal interpretation of the Bible.[5] Accordingly one discovers in Adventism an unequivocal expectation of an imminent cataclysm which only a minority of the faithful will survive to reap their reward in a totally regenerated earth. The concomitant of this position – a rejection of the present dispensation which is seen to be in the final stages of its decline – is, for Adventists, based upon an elaborate and highly sophisticated prophetical exegesis. The Bible provides abundant evidence, Adventists claim, that the 'last days' will see a very substantial degeneration of human relationships with growing apostasy, a rapid increase in crime, disorder and civil strife, and ultimately with humankind enduring every kind of privation as the terrible prophecies, foretold in the Book of Revelation, reach their fulfilment. Accordingly the Seventh-day Adventist movement's basic aim is to gather together a small group of God's faithful followers before the final conflagration. Clearly such ideas have a fairly obvious appeal to a coloured minority newly cast adrift in a white-dominated urban industrial society.

But, in addition to ideas, one should also take account of the community involvement which is afforded by church membership. On this level it seems that Adventism scores quite highly with the local church offering a wide range of activities, from Bible study to welfare work, and from youth clubs to cookery classes. But not only does the church provide these activities, it eagerly solicits the help of the laity in running them. The fact that the new member is soon given work to do has been singled out by Malcolm Calley as being of especial importance in explaining the appeal of the Seventh-day Adventism to the West Indian migrant:

> (The migrant) is given work to do in his spare time and is made to feel that his contribution is worthwhile: he can feel that he is a member of a group with common aims and values.[6]

In addition to this, Calley, along with Sheila Patterson, seemed to think that black migrants were given a genuine welcome in Adventist churches, a welcome which compared very favourably with the much more ambivalent reception many of them had encountered in the churches of the main denominations.[7]

In view of the friendly reception upon which both of the above writers have commented quite independently of each other, it is interesting that by 1978 relations between black and white within British Adventism appeared to have deteriorated to a point at which a group of black activists, the 'London Layman's Forum', were pressing for the establishment within the British Isles of a separate black-majority conference. In order to exert pressure on the administration the Forum group had been able to persuade three large black-majority churches in London to withhold their tithes from the local 'South England' Conference. The dispute had become highly politicized: so far as some members of the administration were concerned, the Forum group were a politically motivated and unrepresentative minority, some of whom had links with radical elements outside the SdA movement. As for the Forum group itself some of its members quite clearly interpreted the position of blacks in the SdA movement in terms of more general models of exploitation.

The emergence of a militant separatist faction within British Adventism is somewhat puzzling, particularly when one appreciates that there is within the movement at large a strong antipathy to 'politics' and to political action. Adventism's anti-political ethos stems not simply from the standard pre-millenialist's rejection of the 'world' and its ways, but from a highly specific eschatology which imputes to the state a crucial role in the series of events which precede the second coming. Adventists believe that during the 'last days', the state, or rather the church-state of Rome aided and abetted by apostate protestantism, will inaugurate the final and decisive persecution of the faithful by legally enforcing the Roman sabbath and thereby striking at one of the 'eternal truths' of Seventh-day Adventism.[8] 'Politics' then signifies for Adventists the world of wrangling politicians, sabbath legislators, squabbling union and business leaders, and totalitarian states, all of whom eventually will move, and in some cases are currently moving, against the members of God's 'last remnant'.

Not only is this hostility to politics directed at the world outside: 'politics' or overtly political behaviour within the SdA movement itself is strongly discouraged. This means that, although various positions within the movement's conference structure are elected

by delegates at conference sessions, lobbying of any kind would be condemned out of hand. Officers are supposedly elected solely according to the principle of 'the best man for the job'. In conference committees representatives of various branches of the movement's work are not expected to pursue sectional interests: boardroom politics, I have been told on several occasions, are not a feature of decision-making in the SdA movement. A kind of Christian consensus prevails or is believed to prevail.

Given these characteristics, how then do we explain the separatist tendency of the mid-seventies? What is the precise nature of the connection between the apparent politicization of British Adventism and the influx into it of migrants from the Caribbean? In seeking to answer this question I shall identify certain major factors in the unfolding of a dispute which culminated in the demand for a separate conference. Through an examination of these factors I am attempting not only to comprehend what amounted to a process of polarization between a group of activists, on the one hand, and the movement's administration, on the other, but to explore more generally the relationship between a conservative evangelical movement and the wider socio-economic context in which it is constrained to operate.

2. THE SETTING

Firstly, and possibly most importantly, it must be appreciated that Seventh-day Adventist churches are linked to a highly bureaucratized administration through a conference structure, and that this administration is run by full-time workers, the overwhelming majority of whom are white. In this vital respect black-majority Adventist churches differ quite strikingly from black pentecostal churches which, although perhaps loosely linked within a broader organizational framework, are usually started by blacks for blacks. In other words, we are dealing in the case of British Adventism, with a large influx of blacks into what was an overwhelmingly white movement.

Following the general distribution of coloured immigrants this influx was concentrated and tended to be most visible in the inner city churches. In the early fifties Adventist churches in London, such as Brixton, Chiswick, Holloway, and Camp Hill in Birmingham, were almost completely white. Twenty years later only a handful of white members were left in these churches. What happened to these white members? Some of them will certainly have died. Others will have moved to the suburbs as part of the general drift of the indigenous population out of the inner city areas. Still others will have apostasized many of them a local manifestation of a more general exit from

organized religion. However, it is certain that some of these white members, it is impossible to say how many, left their churches because they did not like the blacks being there.[9] Whilst the first coloured migrants were no doubt welcomed, as Calley and Patterson have suggested, the rapid increase in the inflow of West Indians in the late fifties and sixties, led eventually to unease and bewilderment, and, among some indigenous Adventists, a fear that their churches were being 'taken over' by an alien group. Paralleling black-white relations in the world outside, certain myths began to emerge: the blacks were too fundamentalist and too enthusiastic in their beliefs (unlike pentecostalism, Adventism has a distinct aversion to ecstatic utterance of any kind); they were too noisy and too demanding, unreliable, bad timekeepers, had too many children and, worst of all for pious Adventists, were not too rigorous in their observances of proper relations between the sexes.

The converse was that many of the blacks, confronted with the declining proportion of whites in the churches they were attending, took this to indicate that their white brethren did not want the blacks in 'their' churches. By no means all the blacks felt that they were unwanted in British churches, just as not all of the whites subscribed to the myths that were in circulation. Nonetheless there existed a situation of unease and into this situation were projected certain decisions, decisions which were seen to emanate from the white administration, and which confirmed what were probably the more perceptive blacks in the belief that they were being firmly rejected by their white brethren.

3. THE NEW GALLERY

The first controversial decision concerned the New Gallery, the SdA movement's evangelistic centre in Central London. At the New Gallery the movement developed a type of programme which has become the norm for its evangelistic outreach in the cities of the developed world.[10] Briefly, the basic aim is to build up a regular following through a series of 'lectures' which may be spread over six months or more. These lectures are by no means always related overtly to a religious topic. In the 1960s a prominent Australian evangelist introduced to the New Gallery a type of programme based upon what has become known as the 'archaeological' approach. This involves a series of talks illustrated by slides on the ancient civilizations of the Middle East. The idea is to relate the rise and fall of these civilizations to events recorded in the Bible and so, in some sense, to establish the veracity of scripture. Other types of programme have been put on at the New Gallery. One of the institution's more recent directors ran a series of seminars based around the theme 'The

Origins and Development of Western Thought', and designed in his own words to demonstrate 'how Christianity enriches man's social, ethical, aesthetic, emotional, physical, intellectual and spiritual experiences'.[11] The general approach of the Gallery is one that gives religion a low profile, at least initially; the Gallery does not in fact identify itself as a religious institution. The idea is to arouse the interest of clients through lectures and through activities of a social club nature; then gradually introduce them to the Bible, to the basic ideas of Christianity, and finally to Seventh-day Adventism. Those who stay the course will ultimately become members of a local Adventist church, usually in their area of residence.

But, in addition to its role as an evangelistic centre, the New Gallery also served as the Central London church with its own permanent congregation until 1970 when this congregation was transferred to a newly acquired church in North London. The reason given by the administration for this transfer was that the number of church members at the New Gallery had become too large and was interfering with the institution's evangelistic role. It is crucial to understand that this expanded membership was almost entirely attributable to the effects of immigration as many West Indian Adventists who had settled in Inner London had chosen the New Gallery as their local church.

Whilst objectively the administration's decision in this case seems fairly unexceptionable, the fact that most of the transferred members were black gave it an additional and crucial dimension, particularly in the context of the more general exit of whites from inner city churches. Accordingly some of the black members formed the opinion that the real reason for the move was not simply that the Gallery's congregation was large, but that it was a large black congregation. The sight of a crowd of blacks congregating with their children outside the New Gallery after meetings was almost certain to deter the kind of people its director was trying to attract — middle-class whites. At any rate, this was the real reason, conjectured some of the blacks, behind the decision.[12]

4. THE CARIBBEAN'S 'HISTORICAL' CONTRIBUTION TO BRITISH ADVENTISM

The second major issue which provoked considerable bitterness among black Adventists was the publication, in October 1974, in a special issue of the British Union's church newspaper of a brief history of the British Union Conference, including a chapter on the effects on British Adventism of immigration from the Caribbean.[13] This chapter, like the rest of the short history, was extremely well-researched and contained many acute historical and sociological

insights. Nonetheless its appearance aroused a storm of protest among black members with its author, a prominent Adventist layman, receiving a large number of letters objecting to various aspects of the piece. The author, with whom I discussed this reaction, seemed unsure as to what precisely his correspondents were objecting to, except that in some general way they resented their being treated as a separate group. However, after conversations with a number of West Indians (as well as whites), it transpired that it was rather the tone of the article, the perspective which seemed to inform it, that many found offensive. The piece, it was pointed out to me, seemed to view the influx of West Indians in an almost entirely negative light, emphasizing the difficulties that it had created for British Adventism and British Adventists. Insufficient attention was thought to have been given to the positive effects of immigration: the massive gains in membership, the West Indian contribution to the evangelistic effort and to other lay activities. Most of all the chapter seemed to have ignored the substantial benefit to British Adventism as a whole by the financial contribution in the form of tithes that were flowing into Union coffers from large black-majority churches. On the contrary, the author chose rather to highlight the earlier practice of some West Indian Adventists of continuing to remit tithes to their churches of origin in the Caribbean after settling in Great Britain. On the whole the perspective that was thought to lie behind the piece was one that seemed to see the arrival of a large number of black members somewhat in the manner of an invasion which was to transform irrevocably British Adventism. Whether this was indeed the author's perspective or his interpretation of what the average indigenous Adventist was thinking, or a case of oversensitive blacks reading into a piece something that was never intended to be there, is impossible to determine. Whatever the explanation, the crucial point is that a number of increasingly restive blacks interpreted the article as yet one more example of the insensitivity of the white administration to the needs and sensibilities of black Adventists.

5. THE 'REGIONAL CONFERENCE' ISSUE

It is probably not coincidental that certain among the black membership began seriously to give voice to their grievances not many months after the appearance of the offending *Messenger* article. At the triennial session of the South England Conference in the spring of 1975, a number of black laymen pressed for the greater representation of blacks both in the ministry and at various levels of the administration. Their demands were prompted by a basic feeling that the current white-dominated administration was giving insufficient attention to the special needs and problems of black members.

High on the list of priorities was the call for more black (full-time) workers, especially ministers, who would be more attuned to the needs of black congregations, and with whom the black members would find it easier to identify. A second area in which many of the black delegates at the session felt their needs were being neglected concerned the provision of Adventist education within the London area. It should be pointed out that many West Indian parents confronted, as they frequently are, with problems of authority in their dealings with the British-born and British-reared children, tend to see an education in Adventist schools as the major means of combating the corrosive influences of an increasingly secular society.

As a result of these and other grievances being expressed both on the floor and in the committees of the session a resolution was passed to the South England Conference executive committee requesting it to study the problem of race relations in the movement and also to recommend to the next administrative tier, the British Union Conference, a policy which would allow for greater black representation at ministerial and administrative levels. Black ministers, the resolution recommended, should either be trained in the UK, or recruited from overseas to care for black-majority churches.

There followed a series of events which is extremely difficult to disentangle. In outline it seems that the South East England executive, on receiving the resolution, set up a sub-committee to examine the problem. This sub-committee rejected the notion of proportional representation, a way of tackling black problems which seemed to be favoured by the majority of black spokesmen, mainly on the grounds that proportional representation 'would not be acceptable to all parties in the South England Conference'.[14] This sub-committee instead asked the next administrative tier, the British Union Conference, to appoint yet another sub-committee to consider the feasibility of setting up a 'regional conference'. Regional conferences have existed in certain areas of the USA since the 1940s, and in fact the term 'regional' is a synonym (or euphemism) for a black majority conference. In recognition of their special difficulties as a racial minority black Adventists have been permitted in the US to affiliate, where they are sufficiently concentrated, by church to a separate conference.[15] Such regional conferences, then, have the same status as a local conference within the existing union conference. In the context of the UK, a regional conference would be made up of those churches currently attached to local conferences or missions within the British Union Conference who expressed the desire to affiliate to it. The point is that this regional conference would be staffed primarily by black workers, would accredit its own ministers and run its own departments, but within the overall jurisdiction of the British Union Conference. It is important to appreciate that the setting up of a regional conference would place a sizeable

proportion of white members in the position where they would have to decide whether to remain in their black-majority churches affiliated to a black-majority regional conference, or transfer their membership to a nearby 'white' church, if such existed.

The Union sub-committee concluded tentatively that a regional conference in the UK did seem to be a viable proposition, but that it was impossible to form any definite judgment without some indication of the likely support for such a conference from among the members. Since a regional conference must ultimately be financed by its members' tithes, then, some estimate of the number likely to favour the idea was deemed essential. Accordingly the B.U.C. executive decided that a referendum, or, as it preferred to term it, an 'opinion poll',[16] be conducted to allow members to express their views on the issue. This decision and the broad outline of the background to it were communicated to church members by the B.U.C. president in a leading article in the *Messenger* in October 1976. During the course of the article the president made it clear that the British Union, by which he presumably meant its executive committee, was not in favour of a regional conference being set up in its territory.[17] The same issue of the *Messenger* carried on its back page a voting slip which all members were asked to complete and return to Union headquarters. The union received just over five thousand completed returns (about 40 per cent of its total membership), of which approximately 800 were in favour of a regional conference with 4,200 against. On the basis of this result the B.U.C. executive felt justified in concluding that a regional conference was not, after all, a viable proposition because the project did not have sufficient support from the members, including, it is important to note, a majority of the black members.

6. POLARIZATION

Black members, or rather the activists among them, however, looked upon the whole regional conference affair in a completely different light. Such was the level of mistrust that now existed between, on the one hand, the black members who were associated with the recently-emerged 'London Layman's Forum' and, on the other hand, the administrators, that the former believed the whole regional conference issue to have been a deliberate ploy by the administration to secure a 'no' vote in the referendum. The Forum claimed in a newsletter that was circulated around the London churches that black members had never asked for a regional conference but initially for an integrated South England Conference, and subsequently for an integrated London conference. The group was therefore particularly angry that the *Messenger* article in which the B.U.C. president had

outlined the reasons for the referendum had clearly implied that it was the blacks or certain blacks who were seeking the establishment of a regional conference. It was further charged that the article itself was quite clearly biased against the idea of a regional conference.

A crucial question here seems to be one which asks where the idea of a regional conference originated? Unfortunately, even after a prolonged period of intensive interviewing, I find it impossible to provide a completely satisfactory answer to this question. It does seem, however, that the idea did not originate from the black members. Formally the South England Conference sub-committee which had been set up to consider the recommendations of the 1975 S.E.C. conference session, asked the Union to investigate the feasibility of a regional conference mainly on the grounds that proportional representation would not be acceptable to 'all parties in the South England Conference'. But to which 'parties' is this statement referring? The administration's interpretation of this statement as I understood it amounted to this: the British Union was more than willing to appoint black ministers and other workers but was severely hamstrung by an insufficiency of trained personnel. Since, under the normal process of events, it would be a long time before a respectable number of blacks could be trained, too long to be acceptable to the black members themselves, then a regional conference was thought to be a suitable device for speeding up the process for this would place the running of affairs in black hands within a very short space of time. Thus, according to this view, the 'all parties' refers to the blacks, or at least those blacks who were pressing for change. The Forum group, as may be expected, placed a totally different interpretation on this statement: they believed that proportional representation had been rejected mainly because the leadership was afraid of a backlash from those whites in the London churches who would not take kindly to being abandoned in a 'sea of black faces'.[18] The 'all parties', according to this view, then referred to the whites in the London churches.

One could continue at great length speculating as to the motives and intentions behind the actions and pronouncements of the various parties to the dispute without reaching any definite conclusion. On the basis of a good deal of experience of British Adventism I am disinclined to accept that the whole regional conference affair was a conspiracy dreamed up by the church leaders. But, having said this, I hasten to add that, in the light of previous developments, it was by no means illogical for the Forum group and its supporters to have reached such a conclusion. The crucial point is that they did reach such a conclusion and that this, ironically, seems to have convinced them that their only course was now to press for the regional conference arrangements which they had not originally considered. As they saw it their white brethren had made it clear on a number of

occasions that blacks were not really wanted in the British church. Their special needs were being ignored and when they had asked for integration they had had foisted upon them a referendum over a type of administration for which they had not even asked. The only way, therefore, in which the special difficulties and needs of black Adventists could be adequately catered for would be under a separate black-majority administration.

Accordingly the Forum group, by means of a regular newsletter and in other ways, set about persuading black members at large of the need for a regional conference. At the same time the activists brought pressure to bear upon the administration by writing letters to local union presidents, to the General Conference in Washington, and through direct lobbying in committees on which they were represented. However, a decisive stage was reached in the second half of 1977 when the Boards of three large black-majority churches in London were persuaded to withhold their members' tithes from the South England Conference.

The action placed church leaders in a serious dilemma. Formally there were sanctions that could be deployed: in withholding their tithes these churches had strictly speaking placed themselves outside Adventism's 'sisterhood of churches' and for this the South England Conference would have been entitled to withdraw conference support from them in the form of both ministers and the substantial back-up services that are provided by the various conference departments. In the final analysis the members of these churches could have been 'locked out' of their church buildings since these are owned by the British Union Conference through a company, SdA Association Ltd.

However, the leadership was extremely reluctant to adopt such a hard line. Officially it was argued that there remained in all three churches many loyal and faithful members whom it would be quite unjust to penalize on account of actions of, what were held to be, a small minority of militants who had infiltrated the respective church boards. More generally the prospect of excluding from fellowship a large number of members whose faith was not in question was hardly compatible with Adventism's self-image as God's last remnant dedicated to gathering in the faithful from the four corners of the world. Again the fact that most of these members were black would not have enhanced British Adventism's public image especially if, as almost certainly would have been the case, such a confrontation had attracted the attention of the mass media. Ultimately an escalation of the conflict would run the risk of bringing about a major schism in British Adventism. Consequently, at the beginning of 1978, church leaders had virtually capitulated to the demand for a regional conference and were actually considering provisional schemes for the operation of such a conference.

So far I have attempted to identify the major factors which

resulted in a situation of polarization within the SdA movement in Britain. However, in order to assist further our understanding of the developments outlined above I want in addition to look briefly at two other factors, the first a basic characteristic of Seventh-day Adventism generally, and the second a structural feature of British Adventism; factors which seem to me to have played a crucial role in the emergence of overt and organized political behaviour in what had previously been, or at least striven to be, an apolitical movement.

7. SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISM'S INTENSIVE 'THIS-WORLDLINESS'

First of all, the emergence of political action in the sense of behaviour directed at producing change in the 'world' needs to be reconciled with Adventism's ostensibly other-worldly focus. However, it must be appreciated that Adventism, whilst on the one hand bearing most of the hallmarks of a fundamentalist pre-millennial movement with its strong orientation to imminent destruction of the existing world order, has, on the other hand, exhibited since its early beginnings an intense and wide-ranging this-worldly involvement. This-worldly involvement needs to be understood against the general background of North American protestantism, but also more specifically in terms of the period which saw the movement's first appearance. Adventism's immediate antecedents are to be found in the Millerite movement, a movement which attracted a large number of followers most of them expecting Christ to return sometime during the period 1843–44.[19] Although again unequivocally pre-millennial, the Millerite movement appeared at the end of an era which was characterized by a reformist mania, or, as the historian Whitney R. Cross has termed it, 'ultraism'.[20] The first decades of the nineteenth century witnessed in North America a succession of movements aimed at eradicating various social imperfections: slavery, drinking, gambling, prostitution, theatre-going and other forms of intemperance; or conversely, movements advocating vegetarianism, teetotalism, naturopathy, the emancipation of women or communitarianism. Behind most of the waves of reformist enthusiasm lay the general conviction that the total eradication of sin and worldly imperfections was not only possible, but that it would inaugurate the setting up of God's kingdom on earth, or at least in North America.

Now, although both Millerism's and Adventism's rejection of the world as totally beyond redemption would, at first sight, seem to be a far cry from the post-millennial optimism that preceded them, the historical conjuncture of the three resulted in a substantial measure of this reformist ethos flowing through into Adventism itself. Accordingly we note that very soon after Seventh-day Adventism had established itself as a separate evangelistic movement it

acquired a substantial interest in the field of health reform.[21] During the second half of the nineteenth century when anti-bellum reformism could be complemented by the ethos of the social gospel,[22] the movement went on to expand its health work as well as to diversify further its activities into the fields of education, and various forms of welfare work. By the turn of the century the SdA movement was operating schools, colleges, clinics, sanitaria, inner city hostels and food factories both in the US and overseas. In 1975 the movement's institutions throughout the world, in addition to its 1,800 churches, included 4,000 schools, 73 colleges, 2 universities, 32 schools of nursing, 136 hospitals, 261 dispensaries and clinics and 28 food factories. In that same year Adventism had over 430 million dollars invested in medical facilities alone.[23] Confronted with such an extensive this-worldly presence Edwin Scott Gaustad's observation that 'While expecting a kingdom of God from theheavens, [Adventists] work diligently for one on earth', seems particularly apposite.[24]

The counterpart at the level of the individual of this intensive and extensive activity in the world is a pronounced emphasis on the importance of a productive daily life. The Adventist is constantly exhorted to work hard, be punctual, thrifty, honest, reliable and to remember that everything he possesses rightfully belongs to God and that he is only their steward. In order to help him conduct his life in accordance with these precepts the movement naturally advises on the appropriate spiritual orientation but equally so on the practicalities of daily living. Accordingly, the Adventist has access to advice on virtually every aspect of routine existence from choosing a marriage partner to child-rearing, from good neighbourliness to the achievement of success in one's career. On this last aspect of life on earth the SdA movement has a good deal to say. In both the movement's literature and in the homilies one tends to hear at meetings, examples abound of brethren who, through a refusal to compromise their principles, have achieved success, including monetary success, in their careers. My own fieldwork in the UK has indicated fairly unequivocally that the connection between Christian virtue and earthly success is one that is firmly embedded in the minds of Adventists themselves.[25]

This type of relationship is not, of course, peculiar to Adventism, but in varying degrees is a feature of protestantism generally, especially North American protestantism. In effect one writer, Gary Schwarz, has likened Seventh-day Adventism to a twentieth-century version of the 'protestant ethic'. A major consequence albeit unintended, claims Schwarz, of the commitment to Adventist doctrine and the Adventist way of life is a striving for all the advantages that increased education, professional status and the like confer on the already-established middle classes.[26] For Adventist commentator, Howard B. Weeks, membership of the movement not only encourages ambition,

but actually promotes social mobility. One of the attractions of membership of the movement, claims Weeks, is that it offers the prospect of 'upward social mobility'. In support of his claim Weeks cites data which suggests that the proportion of American Adventists in professional and technical occupations may be twice as prevalent as among the general population, the proportion with a college education up to three times as prevalent.[27]

I am not able to embark, in this context, upon a detailed analysis of the occupational distribution of Seventh-day Adventists in the UK.[28] However, it does seem that British Adventists too are rather disproportionately represented in non-manual and professional occupations. More important, this observation applies, although to a lesser extent, to West-Indian born Adventists:

TABLE I

Occupational Group	*Seventh-day Adventists Gainfully Employed*		*National Sample*[29]	
	UK-born %	*Caribbean-born* %	*Whites* %	*West Indians** %
Professional and managerial	26.3	8.0	23.0	2.0
White-collar	55.2	50.0	17.0	6.0
Skilled manual	5.3	16.2	42.0	59.0
Semi-skilled	1.4	4.8	12.0	23.0
Unskilled	11.8	21.0	6.0	9.0
	N=76	N=62	*1% of sample unclassified.	

Confronted with such a high proportion of Adventists, both indigenous and Caribbean-born, in the non-manual sector it has to be admitted that Adventist and national samples are not strictly comparable as the former includes both men and women whilst the latter comprises men only. This clearly introduces a bias as women – in the majority in the Adventist sample – tend to be disproportionately located in the non-manual sector as compared to men. This pattern of distribution is intensified by Adventism's longstanding connection with medical work which has resulted in a sizeable proportion of Adventist women (and men) gravitating towards nursing and other professions ancillary to medicine.

But, despite this potential bias, it is certain that the West Indian sector of British Adventism contains a substantially higher proportion of individuals in middle-class occupations than in the West Indian population at large. It is also the case that this middle-class stratum was able to provide all-important leadership resources in the dispute

outlined above. It is noteworthy that most of the leading spokesmen in the Forum group were drawn from the teaching profession or from occupations in the social services, such as social worker or community worker. Furthermore, this middle-class input was not just a case of individuals who were generally speaking better educated, more articulate and more confident in their ability to change things than the average Caribbean immigrant, but in addition individuals who had experience of active participation in a complex organization. Again, this was a form of participation that was by no means confined to helping run the various departments in the local church, but involved members in representing their church at conference sessions, serving on standing committees at these sessions, and for some, sitting on conference executive and other committees. Involvement in this organizational process was to become a politicizing experience to the extent that the division between the white administration and certain black laymen assumed significance. We have already examined some of the major factors which worked to render this division significant. But, in addition to those already discussed, there remains a structural feature of British Adventism which for the more militant blacks endowed certain external models of power with a peculiar relevance.

8. THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH UNION CONFERENCE

As may be expected the financial structure of the British Union is extremely complex. However, for the purposes of the present discussion, it is necessary only that certain basic principles be understood.

Firstly, the local Adventist church is expected to be self-supporting. That is to say, church members, through what are called their 'free will offerings', meet the cost of local evangelism, lay activities, youth and kindergarten activities as well as operating costs of the church building itself. But, in addition to 'free will offerings', members are expected to tithe one tenth of their income. Tithes are passed on by the church to the local conference to which it is affiliated and the local conference passes on a tenth of its tithe income to the union conference, and so on up to the level of the General Conference. From the nine tenths of the tithe income which it retains the local conference is supposed to pay the salaries of its full-time workforce, including ministers, as well as meeting the administrative and other costs of its various departments. As it happens local conferences are not infrequently unable to meet their expenses, and must therefore be subsidized by other conferences. In effect it is a basic principle of the SdA movement's world organization that the wealthier subsidize the less wealthy.

What seems vitally to affect the economic viability of a conference

is not simply the number of members but their mode of distribution by church. It seems that, as in the world outside, so in the SdA movement economies of scale are achieved in larger units. For example, a large urban church with 250 members would have been paying in 1978 an annual tithe of around £30,000 but could be run by one minister who would cost his local conference between £5,000–£7,000. However, five churches each with fifty members would require two or three ministers depending upon their geographical contiguity. Now in the British Union Conference it is the case that the overwhelming majority of blacks are concentrated in about fifty churches whereas the white members are dispersed through around one hundred and fifty. The imbalance is even more apparent when one looks at the South England Conference (in effect the location of the bulk of the conflict under discussion), where approximately 2,800 black members are concentrated in mainly 14 churches, whereas 4,500 white members are distributed through 72 churches. From this it should be apparent that the white members need more ministers than black members, and that the whites are therefore being subsidized by the latter.

Under normal circumstances cross-subsidization both within and between conferences is quite usual and, as already suggested, is a key factor in enabling the SdA movement to expand its missionary frontier. But, in the situation of strain that existed in the British Union in the 1970s, this basic principle came to be questioned. For the more militant blacks the fact that they were helping to pay the salaries of ministers looking after white churches, as well as subsidizing institutions like the New Gallery from which they had been excluded, seemed to make certain images of exploitation particularly apposite. Accordingly in their efforts to mobilize support for a regional conference, the Forum group made overt reference in their literature to the 'Rhodesia situation', and to other images of racial and class conflict.[30] The impact of such images and of Forum literature generally on black members at large is extremely difficult to gauge. Neither is it easy to determine the extent to which the Forum group was an unrepresentative minority, as some members of the administration maintained, or a genuine vehicle for the expression of black grievances. However, the representativeness or otherwise of the Forum need not concern us here. The crucial point is that, for the reasons outlined, a 'political vanguard' did emerge within the British Adventist movement and that this is almost certain to have a long-term effect upon the basic character of the movement.

9. CONCLUSION

Firstly, it needs to be explained that, although at the beginning of

1978 the eventual establishment of a regional conference seemed to be a very strong possibility, the situation was transformed quite dramatically, as a result of General Conference intervention in March of that year. At a meeting held, somewhat ironically, in the New Gallery, the General Conference president asked a gathering of Union and local conference officials, pastors and lay representatives from the London churches, to consider a plan which favoured closer integration rather than the creation of a regional conference. This meeting, whose role was advisory, voted in favour of the new plan which was subsequently approved at the South England and North British Conference sessions in May. The plan, 'Integration and Growth', envisages that the process whereby black members are represented at conference level be speeded up; that efforts be made to meet the special needs of the black majority in the London churches through an increased emphasis on church schools, the establishment of a social and evangelistic centre for inner London youth, and other forms of community work. The General Conference also recognized a need for West Indian pastors to take care of the London churches.

The current 'communal' difficulties afflicting British Adventism are ultimately to be explained in terms of closer integration of the world economy, one of the consequences of which has been the transportation of sectors of the underdeveloped to the developed world. As it happens the SdA movement is well able to cope with the exigencies of operating in the underdeveloped world where by 1970 70 per cent of its members were located.[31] However, the juxtaposition of the two sectors within one geographical area, under a single administration and within a relatively short period of time, could not but place a serious strain on the organizational structure.

It is worthwhile drawing a brief comparison here between British Adventism and the movement's operation in relation to the blacks in the USA. Because a large black minority has existed in the US for a long period of time the SdA movement began to establish, as far back as the turn of the century, special institutional mechanisms for dealing with the special needs of this deprived sector of American society. What used to be called the movement's Negro Department for some considerable time placed particular emphasis on the educational and social needs of black ministers and workers. Nineteen-seventy saw the emergence of 'inner city' departments in many union conferences in North America. These departments allocated funds and resources to inner city development projects suggested by local churches. Many of these projects attempt to bring Adventism's health care facilities to the inner city, but they also aim to meet a variety of social needs, such as advising on marriage, family planning and career development, as well as providing recreational facilities.

North American Adventism, then, has over a considerable period, been able to adapt itself to the special needs and difficulties of its large black membership. In the UK, by contrast, a movement which because of its apolitical ethos was ill-adapted to change, at least change initiated from below, sustained over little more than a decade and a half, an influx of coloured immigrants almost large enough to put them in a majority position. The dominant reaction of the leadership to this influx seems to have been, like that of many among the laity, one of bewilderment. Although it is easy to pass judgement with hindsight one is led to conclude, taking into account the decisions discussed above, that the attitude towards the blacks of certain church leaders was not entirely positive. Perhaps some of them did regard Black Adventism as an alien force at odds with, and threatening to undermine, an unsensational but solid Anglo-Saxon Adventism that had been nurtured for almost a century.

If this view was not widespread among the leadership it was, none the less, the one that was transmitted to the blacks, or at least to the more perceptive blacks. And given the rise of black consciousness generally it was probably inevitable that the activists who came to articulate the needs, as they saw them, of their brethren should draw upon outside political models. It was probably just as inevitable that the importation of 'politics' into the movement, especially such radical politics, would not endear the Forum group and their supporters to church leaders. Although a number of ministers and conference officials were undoubtedly sympathetic to the problems of the blacks, none of them could agree with the methods that the activists had used because they were 'too political'.

Whether the agreement reached in the spring of 1978 will bring to an end the open expression of dissatisfaction by black Adventists is open to question. Whilst in the short term the assignment of additional resources to inner city areas, together with an increased recruitment of black workers, may help to alleviate some of the problems, the long-term prospect seems less hopeful. After all the current difficulties of black Adventists are very largely a consequence of their position as a low-status ethnic minority in a white-dominated society. Without being overly pessimistic it seems unlikely that this position will improve in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, in the face of an economic recession in western capitalism it is not at all unlikely that their situation will deteriorate; not simply because of declining employment opportunities which tend to have a disproportionate impact upon marginal groups, but also because such a recession could see an upsurge in racist ideologies.

Even should this scenario prove too pessimistic it is hard to see that the outward drift of young blacks, a major source of frustration for Adventist parents, will not continue, with exit for some of them

encouraged by the availability of alternative and more radical models of the world.[32] Under such circumstances it is more than likely that their parents will continue to petition the administration to build more schools, more community centres, simply to 'do something'. But perhaps not only black parents: it may be that the success of some of the blacks in extracting concessions from the leadership will have a 'demonstration effect' on members who have hitherto been politically passive. That is to say, white parents, white members in general, or women for example[33], are likely to intensify their demands adopting a more strident posture when pressing their various grievances on the administration.

In the final analysis current difficulties within British Adventism are not peculiar to it but are confronted by any religious movement striving to maintain the commitment of existing members as well as attract new ones within the context of an advanced capitalist society. Perhaps the most fundamental problem for any social movement which is constrained to operate in such a context is the availability of alternative and superficially much more sophisticated forms of involvement (one thinks here particularly of the mass entertainment industry).[34] However, the basic point being made in this paper is that the influx into the British Adventist movement of a large number of individuals who were experiencing deprivation on several levels not only exacerbated the problem of commitment but is extremely likely to accelerate the emergence of a long-term shift of emphasis in the SdA movement's main activities. Just as the presence of a large black minority in the US gave a major impetus to the development of the inner city work, so will the consequence of a similar situation in the UK work to push to the fore Adventism's long-standing involvement in social service work. In effect the shift may be even more perceptible in the UK mainly because the financial resources of the British Union Conference are extremely slender when compared to those of most conferences in North America. This almost certainly means that, in the absence of sustained and substantial funding from outside, an expansion of the social service work will necessitate cutbacks elsewhere. Paradoxically the area which seems most likely to become a target for economies is that of public evangelism, at least in the form of large-scale evangelistic campaigns. It should be pointed out that such campaigns are enormously expensive and, because of their low returns in the form of converts, have their critics within the movement itself. In 1978 there was a plan to use funds earmarked for evangelism in inner London to launch a form of community centre, and in addition to this, the closure of the New Gallery was under consideration. It is thus not at all unlikely that a movement, which at its origins and at the time of its first appearance in the UK had an overwhelmingly evangelistic

character, may come to be identified primarily as a social welfare organization.

I do not want to suggest that British Adventism will be entirely transformed into the 'general service' organization that the YMCA has allegedly become.[35] Unlike the 'Y', Adventism possesses a well-defined 'confessional heritage' which, together with the institutional structure that expresses it, will continue to place constraints on the movement's ability to adapt to the assumed needs of its clientele, both actual and potential. For example, with a view to these needs, the movement may succeed in modifying both the form and content of its regular sabbath morning meetings by, say, shortening their duration, by making sermons more 'entertaining', perhaps by introducing visual aids that are increasingly used in evangelistic campaigns and so on. But it is hardly conceivable that the essentially churchly character of these meetings be eradicated altogether. In other words, Adventism is likely to remain a church-based movement. However, the primary influence of welfare work will probably result in a peripheralization of traditional church activities so far as an increasing number of the movement's clients (as opposed to actual members) are concerned.

Paradoxically it is possible that Adventism's expanded involvement in health and welfare work, whilst in one sense attenuating the movement's evangelistic thrust, may in the long term give it the edge of ostensibly more powerful religious rivals, especially the Watchtower movement and the Church of the Latter Day Saints. There is, first of all, the current upsurge of public interest in health, health food and dietary matters – until fairly recently considered the province only of cranks – which may enable the SdA movement to capitalize on its expertise in these fields. More importantly the fortunes of any movement which is intensively and extensively involved in the 'world' are closely tied to the direction which is taken by the 'world'. It is interesting to speculate that in the event of the inability of welfare capitalism to sustain its present level of services, a renewed importance may be given to voluntary organizations with welfare capabilities. Such a turn of events could lead to a revitalization of British Adventism; a revitalization which would result not simply from an increased demand for the movement's services, but also from an upsurge in morale among more active members now able to throw themselves into meaningful 'socially relevant' activities.

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NOTES

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1. Clifford Hill. *West Indian Migrants and the London Churches*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963; and 'From Church to Sect: West Indian Sect Development in Britain', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 10, 1971, pp. 114–26.

2. See also Ari Kiev, 'Psychotherapeutic Aspects of Pentecostal Sects Among West Indian Immigrants to Britain', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 15, 1964, pp. 129–38; and David G. Pearson, 'Race, Religiosity and Political Activism: Some Observations on West Indian Participation in Britain', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 24, 1978, pp. 340–57.

3. D. S. Porter. *A Century of Adventism in the British Isles*, Grantham, Lincs: Stanborough Press, 1974.

4. Walter R. L. Scragg, 'Consultative Group In Britain Opts for Integration', *Light*, vol. 28, no. 5, 1978.

5. For a brief outline of SdA doctrine, see Robin Theobald, 'Seventh-day Adventists and the Millenium', in Michael Hill (ed.), *A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain – 7*, London: SCM Press, 1974, pp. 111–31. For a much more detailed discussion see Theobald, 'A Sociological Study of the Seventh-day Adventist Movement with Special Reference to Great Britain', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1979.

6. Malcolm J. C. Calley. *God's People: West Indian Pentecostal Sects in England*, London: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 127.

7. Sheila Patterson. *Dark Strangers: A Study of West Indians in London*, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965.

8. See Theobald (1979), *op. cit.* pp. 95–101.

9. See Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

10. For a comprehensive examination of the development of SdA evangelism see Howard B. Weeks, *Adventist Evangelism in the Twentieth Century*, Washington DC: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1969.

11. Quoted in *The Seventh-day Adventist Church in the British Isles: Reports for Five Years 1971–5*, p. 26.

12. See article by Colin Cross, 'Black Adventists Demand a Greater Share of Power', *Observer*, June 27, 1976, p. 14.

13. See Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–4.

14. Quoted in a newsletter (undated), circulated by the executive committee of the London Laymen's Forum.

15. See Arthur W. Spalding. *Origins and History of Seventh-day Adventists*, Washington DC: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1962, vol. 4, ch. 8.

16. The term 'referendum', the BUC President told me, was rejected because it was 'too political'.

17. *British Advent Messenger*, October 15, 1976.

18. The quotation comes from one of the London Laymen's Forum's newsletters (undated).

19. On Millerism see Whitney R. Cross, *The Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York 1900–1950*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950; and David T. Arthur, 'Millerism', in Edwin Scott Gaustad (ed.), *The Rise of Adventism*, London: Harper and Row, 1974.

20. Whitney R. Cross, *op. cit.*, ch. 13.

21. Spalding, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 346–65.

22. See Sydney E. Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972, ch. 47.

23. *Yearbook of the Seventh-day Adventist Denomination 1977.*

24. Edwin Scott Gaustad, *Historical Atlas of Religion in America*, New York: Harper and Row, 1962, p. 115.

25. See Theobald (1979), *op. cit.*, ch. 10.

26. Gary Schwarz, *Sect Ideologies and Social Status*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, ch. 4.

27. Weeks, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–9.

28. See Theobald (1979), *op. cit.*, ch. 10 and pp. 420–2.

29. Details of the national sample are taken from David J. Smith, *Racial Disadvantage in Britain*, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977, p. 25.

30. A. Nicholson and O. Baxter, 'Why We Are Against A Referendum', *London Laymen's Forum Newsletter* (undated); and G. Escoffery, 'Which Way Now?', *Comment: The Paper of the London Laymen's Forum*, vol. 4, no. 1, January 1977, pp. 3–5.

31. See Gottfried Oosterwal, *Mission: Possible*, Nashville: Southern Publishing Association, 1972, ch. 3.

32. At the North British Conference Session in May 1978 concern was expressed from the floor about the number of young black Adventists who were being attracted to Rastafarianism.

33. As of 1978 women were not ordained and rarely served as church elders.

34. See particularly Tom Burns, 'A Meaning in Everyday Life', *New Society*, May 25, 1967, pp. 760–2.

35. See Meyer N. Zald and Patricia Denton, 'From Evangelism to General Service: the Transformation of the YMCA', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 8, 1963, pp. 214–34.

Nicky Britten

Models of intergenerational class mobility: findings from the National Survey of Health and Development

ABSTRACT

Mobility data from the National Survey of Health and Development, deriving from the occupations in 1977 of the male survey members, are presented. Multiplicative models of the intergenerational mobility table, developed by Goodman, are described and fitted to the National Survey data. The models include parameters which measure the extent of upward and downward mobility, crossings between adjacent classes, and distance moved. The results suggest that the concept of barriers between adjacent classes may be less appropriate than distance moved. The best fitting model provides a simple description of mobility where the main impediment to movement is the distance involved. When disaggregated, the model shows higher levels of upward than downward mobility and a barrier to medium and long range downward movement. The crossings parameter model is characterized by barriers at either end of the class structure.

1. INTRODUCTION

Studies of social mobility have used a variety of methods to analyse the intergenerational mobility table. Possibly the best known of these methods involves the use of the 'index of association' proposed by Glass[1] in 1954, also referred to as the 'social distance mobility ratio' by Rogoff.[2] This index represents the ratio of the observed frequency in each cell to the frequency expected under a model of statistical independence, and was used in an attempt to measure the departure of observed mobility tables from 'perfect mobility'. Perfect mobility corresponded to a hypothetical state of affairs in which men were allocated to occupations irrespective of their fathers' occupations, and it served as a benchmark against which the association between fathers' and sons' occupations could be measured.

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However the model of statistical independence did not provide a good fit to mobility data and for this reason the index of association was unsatisfactory.[3] The properties of the index have been discussed by Tyree[4] who showed that its values are dependent upon the marginal distributions of the table, so that indices for tables having different marginals cannot be compared.

We are concerned here with models of social mobility developed by Goodman which do fit mobility data and which do take account of the marginal distributions. These models are of interest because they specify measures of the extent of upward and downward mobility and of barriers between social groups. Thus they meet Dahrendorf's criticism of the index of association, that it failed to describe the existence of barriers between strata which he considered to be the most important aspect of social mobility.[5] In applying these models to British and Danish data, Goodman[6] demonstrated that they fitted the data much better than the model of independence did, and thus they are attractive tools for the analysis of fresh social mobility tables. Hauser,[7] Hope[8] and Goldthorpe[9] have all developed models based on Goodman's work but the intention here is to apply and interpret the models in the form presented by Goodman.

2. NATIONAL SURVEY MOBILITY DATA

The data are drawn from the National Survey of Health and Development,[10] a longitudinal study of children born in Great Britain in the first week of March 1946. Although all the children born in this week were initially included, the present sample includes only one in four children of the manual workers. This reduction of the original population means that a mobility table based on the present sample will not be a population estimate and for this reason the tables presented here have been weighted to increase the number of children of manual workers to the original level. The figures are for men only and do not include those who had either died or permanently emigrated by 1972.

Table I gives the occupations of the male survey members in 1977, when they were thirty-one years old, tabulated against the occupations of their fathers in 1961, the year in which the survey members were fifteen years old. The total number of respondents in the table is 2,973, which combined with 2,509 survey members for whom information on one or both variables was missing, gives a sample of 5,482 men. The numbers for the unweighted table are 1,284 respondents and 1,048 non-respondents.

The categories used are those of the sevenfold schema of class positions defined by Goldthorpe, obtained by aggregating categories

TABLE I *Mobility table: father's class position in 1961 by son's class position in 1977. Actual numbers given*

		Son's class position in 1977							
		I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*	*VI*	*VII*	*Totals*
Father's class position 1961	*I*	130	62	14	27	24	14	13	284
	II	77	55	9	6	26	25	14	212
	III	76	60	22	23	37	23	36	277
	IV	49	30	21	78	25	23	34	260
	V	64	37	5	25	49	42	31	253
	VI	133	115	48	77	91	164	184	812
	VII	131	78	47	82	153	176	208	875
	Totals	660	437	166	318	405	467	520	2973

of the collapsed version of the Hope-Goldthorpe occupational scale. The classes bring together 'occupations whose incumbents will typically share in broadly similar *market* and *work* situations which . . . we take as the two major components of class position.'[11] Class I is the 'higher service' class and includes higher grade professionals, higher grade administrators and officials in central and local government and in public and private corporations, managers in large industrial establishments and large proprietors. Class II, the 'cadet service' class, includes lower grade professionals and higher grade technicians, lower-grade administrators and officials, managers in small business and industrial establishments and in services; and supervisors of non manual employees. These two classes together form the service class. Class III, the 'routine non manual' class, includes routine non manual employees in administration and commerce, sales personnel and other rank-and-file service workers. Class IV, here referred to as 'small proprietors', also includes self employed artisans, and all other own account workers apart from professionals, and may thus be equated with the 'petty bourgeoisie'. Farmers, both own account and employees and managers, are included in class IV. Class V, the 'blue collar elite', consists of lower grade technicians and supervisors of manual workers. Class VI consists of the skilled manual workers and class VII of the semi- and unskilled manual workers, including agricultural workers.

In an attempt to assess the effect of non response, we present in Table II the distributions of those respondents for whom one variable was missing together with the marginal distributions of Table I. Table II is based on the unweighted figures as we wish to determine if the differences between the respondents are statistically significant. There are slightly more fathers and sons from the two service classes and slightly fewer from the semi- and unskilled manual workers who responded, but for both fathers and sons the differences are not significant.[12]

TABLE II *Marginal distributions of Table I compared with distributions of those for whom one variable was missing.*

Class	*Percentage distributions of son's classes in 1977*		*Percentage distributions of father's classes in 1961*	
	Margins of Table I	*Missing information on father's class 1961*	*Margins of Table I*	*Missing information on son's class 1977*
I	26.4	23.8	16.7	14.1
II	17.9	14.9	11.8	8.9
III	5.2	7.3	13.6	11.3
IV	10.0	10.9	7.6	11.0
V	12.6	9.9	6.6	8.2
VI	13.5	17.8	18.6	17.7
VII	14.3	15.5	24.9	28.8
	N=1284	N=303	N=1284	N=538

Table I is used in the analysis and consists of the numbers of men in each father/son combination. However for the purposes of initial interpretation the inflow and outflow tables may be more informative.

Table III gives the outflow percentages; for each category it gives the proportion of sons entering the various classes as a percentage of the total number of fathers in that category. It shows that the majority of sons of class I and II fathers enter the higher service and cadet service classes, but also that these are the destinations of 31 per cent of sons of skilled manual workers and 24 per cent of sons

TABLE III *Outflow table: percentage composition of each class of fathers in terms of the destinations of sons*

Father's class position 1961	*Son's class position in 1977*						
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*	*VI*	*VII*
I	45.8	21.8	4.9	9.5	8.5	4.9	4.6
II	36.3	25.9	4.2	2.8	12.3	11.8	6.6
III	27.4	21.7	7.9	8.3	13.4	8.3	13.0
IV	18.8	11.5	8.1	30.0	9.6	8.8	13.1
V	25.3	14.6	2.0	9.9	19.4	16.6	12.3
VI	16.4	14.2	5.9	9.5	11.2	20.2	22.7
VII	15.0	8.9	5.4	9.4	17.5	20.1	23.8
All	22.2	14.7	5.6	10.7	13.6	15.7	17.5

of other manual workers. Nearly one third of sons of class IV fathers remain in class IV, and the sons of skilled and unskilled manual workers are more likely to remain in classes VI and VII than move into any other single class.

Table IV gives the inflow percentages and shows the composition

TABLE IV *Inflow table: percentage composition of each class of sons in terms of their origins*

		Son's class position in 1977							
		I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*	*VI*	*VII*	*All*
Father's class position 1961	*I*	19.7	14.2	8.4	8.5	5.9	3.0	2.5	9.6
	II	11.7	12.6	5.4	1.9	6.4	5.4	2.7	7.1
	III	11.5	13.7	13.3	7.2	9.1	4.9	6.9	9.3
	IV	7.4	6.9	12.7	24.5	6.2	4.9	6.5	8.7
	V	9.7	8.5	3.0	7.9	12.1	9.0	6.0	8.5
	VI	20.2	26.3	28.9	24.2	22.5	35.1	35.4	27.3
	VII	19.8	17.8	28.3	25.8	37.8	37.7	40.0	29.4

of each class of sons in terms of the fathers' classes in 1961. Each class recruits the majority of its members from the two manual classes except for the higher service class and class IV, which recruit from the two manual classes and from their own ranks in roughly equal proportions.

Having made a preliminary inspection of the data we proceed to the models. Before this can be done, the question of the properties of the classification must be considered, because most of the models assume an ordering of the categories, and some of them refer to the 'distance' between categories. Goldthorpe is unclear on the question of the ordering of the classes. He warns that 'our class schema should not then be regarded as having . . . a consistently hierarchical form'[13] but says later that 'in so far as the categories of the mobility table are hierarchically ordered, the lowest densities would be those in the cells furthest from the main diagonal'[14] and also 'there are further features of the pattern of fluidity . . . which derive from other characteristics of the classes that we have distinguished than their hierarchical ordering alone.'[15] Classes I and II retain the property of being higher up the Hope–Goldthorpe scale than the other classes, but these others consist of groupings which overlap in terms of their scale values. Thus Goldthorpe speaks of upward mobility only in the case of movement into classes I and II, and of downward mobility only in the case of movement out of classes I and II. In the following we proceed as if the classes were ordered, and refer to upward mobility in the case of movement from one class to any class 'above' it, and to downward mobility in the case of movement from one class to any class 'below' it, and bear in mind these reservations when interpreting the findings.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODELS

A verbal description is given of each of the models fitted to the National Survey data. Mathematical definitions of the models are

given in the Appendix. They are all multiplicative models developed by Goodman[16] for the analysis of contingency tables and are fitted using his computer programme ECTA. A simple example of a multiplicative model is the independence model (in Goodman's terminology[17] the I model) which postulates independence between the row and column classifications of the table and is the basis of the model of perfect mobility referred to in the introduction. The high frequencies observed on the main diagonals of many mobility tables suggest that the diagonal elements should be treated differently from the rest of the table, and so a number of the following models only deal with the incomplete table. The incomplete table in the context of this paper consists of all those cells which do not lie on the main diagonal. Most of the models contain parameters relating to subsets of the mobility table and in this manner different patterns of movement from fathers' to sons' occupations may be analysed. The presentation here is not exhaustive, but a full treatment is given in Bishop, Fienberg and Holland.[18] They warn of the dangers of building models on the same set of data that is used to test the goodness of fit, especially when there is a series of models some of which are special cases of others, and suggest that fresh data are needed to assess the goodness of fit once the model has been chosen.[19] The strategy adopted here has been to choose a number of models in advance and then to attempt to fit them simultaneously according to the goodness of fit statistic.

1. The independence model (I model) This is the model upon which the index of association referred to earlier was based, and postulates independence between fathers' and sons' occupations. It corresponds to a state of perfect mobility in which there is no association between class of origin and present class.

2. The quasi-independence model (QPN model) This and subsequent models require the assumption that the categories are ordered and that there exists a one to one correspondence between the ith class of the row classification and the ith class of the column classification, as it distinguishes the upper half of the table (which contains downward mobility) from the lower half (which contains upward mobility). The QPN model is one of several models of quasi independence proposed by Goodman, and corresponds to perfect mobility within the upper and lower halves of the table separately. This represents a random allocation of occupations once the direction of movement is known. Neither the I nor the QPN model contains any parameters.

3. The triangles parameter model (T model) In common with the previous model, the T model only distinguishes upward from

downward mobility. It contains two parameters, t_1 and t_2, which refer to downward and upward mobility respectively and provide a measure of their relative strength. All downward mobility is considered together and all upward mobility is considered together, so that differences in the distance moved are obscured. In order to define the parameter estimates uniquely, t_1 is set equal to one.

4. The diagonals parameter model for the incomplete table (D model) The D model specifies parameters $d_{\pm r}$ ($r=1, \ldots, 6$) relating to the minor diagonals of the table, and thus assumes a measure of distance r between the categories, where r is the distance of the minor diagonal from the main diagonal. It distinguishes upward from downward mobility, grouping together those moving the same distance from their class of origin and in the same direction, and giving a single parameter to each of these groupings. For instance, the parameter d_1 relates to all movements into the next class up, be they from class II or from class VII, and the parameter d_{-2} relates to all movements two classes down, be they from class I or from class V. The values of the parameters indicate the relative frequencies of long and short distance mobility in each direction, providing a detailed picture of the patterns of movement. In order to define the parameter estimates uniquely, the values of two of them must first be fixed, and so d_1 and d_{-1} are both set equal to one.

5. The diagonals parameter model for the full table (DF model) The DF model includes the same parameters as the D model with an extra parameter d_0 which describes the main diagonal. Thus in addition to measures of long and short distance mobility in either direction, this model contains a measure of immobility, referring to those who remain in the same class as their fathers. To facilitate comparison with the D model, the values of d_1 and d_{-1} are again set equal to one.

6. The diagonals parameter model for pairs of minor diagonals (DA model) This model is similar to the D model, as it deals with the incomplete table, differing because it groups together pairs of minor diagonals which are the same distance from the main diagonal. Thus it does not distinguish between upward and downward mobility. Each parameter d_r ($r=1, \ldots, 6$) relates to the group of cells which are all at a distance r from the main diagonal. The parameters give measures of the relative frequencies of long and short distance mobility regardless of direction. The estimate of d_1 is set equal to one in order to define the remaining estimates uniquely.

7. The diagonals parameter model for pairs of minor diagonals for the full table (DAF model) The DAF model includes the same parameters as the DA model and an extra parameter d_0 which relates to the main diagonal, and provides a measure of immobility.

8. The crossings parameter model (C model) The C model introduces parameters c_r (r=1, . . . ,6) which describe crossings between adjacent classes. Each parameter c_r for the crossing from class r to class r+1 also describes the same crossing in the opposite direction, from class r+1 to class r. Long distance mobility is represented by a larger number of parameters, each referring to a single crossing between adjacent classes, multiplied together, than the number required to represent short distance mobility. Thus in common with the DA and DAF models (and of course the I model), the C model does not distinguish between upward and downward mobility, but it provides measures of the barriers between pairs of adjacent classes. In order to define the estimates uniquely, c_1 and c_6 are both set equal to one.

4. RESULTS

In this section we present measures of goodness of fit for each model, parameter estimates and an interpretation of these results. The measure given is the chi square goodness of fit statistic based upon the likelihood ratio criterion.[20] The fact that the table used in the analysis has been weighted to obtain population estimates makes it difficult to assess how well the models fit the data. The statistic takes on large values, implying that the models do not fit. However it seems likely that these large values can be attributed to the weighting factor. We therefore adopt a procedure used by Bishop *et al.*[21] when studying operations performed in different institutions, such that each operation had to be weighted by an institution sampling factor before data from different institutions could be combined. Using their procedure, the unweighted data are used to assess the goodness of fit of each model, and the weighted data are used to determine the parameter estimates. For each model, Table V gives the goodness of fit statistic for both sets of tables and the probability values for the unweighted table.

Table V reveals that all the other models except the T model provide a better fit to the National Survey data than the I model, and thus parameter estimates based on them are likely to be more informative than the index of association which is based on the I model. The parameter estimates for all the models except the I and QPN models (neither of which contain any parameters) are given in Table VI.

The QPN and T models only distinguish between upward and downward mobility, the difference between them being that whereas the QPN model includes interactions between the direction of mobility and the class position variables, the T model does not. However, as with Goodman's results, the QPN model provides a

TABLE V *Values of the goodness of fit statistic for the unweighted and weighted tables, and probability values for the unweighted table.*

Model	*Degrees of Freedom*	*Likelihood Ratio Chi Square*		*p-value for unweighted table*
		Unweighted	*Weighted*	
I	36	281.0	463.4	$p<0.001$
QPN	20	27.9	71.1	$0.1<p<0.2$
T	28	151.2	234.9	$p<0.001$
DA	24	20.8	50.1	$0.5<p<0.7$
D	19	19.8	45.9	$0.3<p<0.5$
DAF	30	44.7	111.1	$0.02<p<0.05$
DF	25	43.3	105.2	$0.01<p<0.02$
C	25	29.3	74.3	$0.2<p<0.3$

much better fit to the National Survey data, implying that upward and downward mobility need to be distinguished from each other in order to obtain a well fitting model. Accordingly we should not pay too much attention to the triangles parameter, which measures the relative strength of upward and downward mobility, although it is worth considering its implications. The estimate of the t_2 parameter is less than one, which corresponds to less upward than downward mobility, and belies the considerable extent of upward mobility in Table I.

The remaining models all fit the data, and the models which include the main diagonal do not fit as well as those which exclude it. The DA model, taking the minor diagonals in pairs, fits slightly better than the D model which distinguishes upward from downward mobility. This does not corroborate the finding that the QPN model fitted better than the T model, but this may be because once the distance moved is taken into account, the direction moved becomes less important. The different parameter estimates for the DA model refer to mobility over different distances regardless of direction and setting d_1 to unity means that longer distance mobility is estimated relative to movement between adjacent classes. Whereas the C model specifies a parameter for movement between each pair of adjacent classes, the DA model includes all movement between

TABLE VI *Parameter estimates*

T	*DA*	*D*		*DAF*	*DF*		*C*
				d_0 1.29	d_0 1.28		
t_1 1.00	d_1 1.00	d_1 1.00	d_{-1} 1.00	d_1 1.00	d_1 1.00	d_{-1} 1.00	c_1 1.00
t_2 0.73	d_2 0.82	d_2 0.90	d_{-2} 0.70	d_2 0.76	d_2 0.86	d_{-2} 0.61	c_2 0.74
	d_3 0.77	d_3 0.80	d_{-3} 0.76	d_3 0.67	d_3 0.73	d_{-3} 0.64	c_3 0.82
	d_4 0.67	d_4 0.73	d_{-4} 0.63	d_4 0.69	d_4 0.79	d_{-4} 0.60	c_4 0.89
	d_5 0.36	d_5 0.42	d_{-5} 0.29	d_5 0.39	d_5 0.49	d_{-5} 0.29	c_5 0.74
	d_6 0.27	d_6 0.33	d_{-6} 0.18	d_6 0.32	d_6 0.43	d_{-6} 0.21	c_6 1.00

adjacent classes in the parameter d_1, all movement between classes separated by one other class in the parameter d_2 and so on. The estimates for the DA model diminish with increased distance moved as was the case with Goodman's results for Glass' data, indicating smaller expected frequencies for longer distances moved. The value of each parameter estimate, for each model, is higher than the corresponding estimate for Glass' table, implying that there is a greater amount of movement in the table generally, even though the classes used are not the same. The biggest drop occurs in passing from d_4 to d_5, so that moves up to four classes away are more frequent under the DA model than longer distance mobility.

The parameter estimates of the D model are a decomposition of the estimates of the DA model in the sense that each estimate (say d_2) of the latter has a value which lies between the values of the corresponding estimates (d_2 and d_{-2}) of the D model. For upward mobility, the values of the (positively subscripted) estimates again decrease with increased distance moved but this is not the case for downward mobility (negative subscripts). The estimate d_{-3} is larger than the estimate d_{-2} so that downward movement over a distance of three classes is more frequent than downward movement over two classes. The values of the 'upward' parameters are all higher than the values of the 'downward' parameters, indicating more upward than downward mobility, which is not consistent with the estimate from the T model, but seems more consistent with the data. For both upward and downward mobility the biggest difference is between $d_{\pm 4}$ and $d_{\pm 5}$, as was the case for the DA model, which corresponds to less long distance than middle range mobility in both directions. However there is also a big difference in passing from d_{-1} to d_{-2} indicating that movement into the next class down is relatively more frequent than movement two classes down, when compared with upward mobility over similar distances. Thus the D model shows that there is more upward than downward mobility and that the pattern of downward mobility is not as straightforward as that shown by the DA model and by upward mobility.

The DAF model corresponds to the DA model for the full table and has an extra parameter estimate d_0 which relates to the main diagonal. The value of d_0 exceeds one, giving a measure of the greater expected frequencies of cells on the main diagonal. The remaining estimates do not diminish as the distance moved increases, as was the case for the DA model. The estimate d_4 is slightly higher than the estimate d_3, indicating that movements over distances of three or four classes are almost as frequent as each other, and the drop in value from d_4 to d_5 indicates the lower frequency of longer distance moves. The estimates d_2 and d_3 are lower than the corresponding estimates for the DA model whereas the estimates d_4, d_5 and d_6 are slightly higher. Thus the inclusion of the main diagonal gives rise to decreased estimates of shorter distance mobility, although

less confidence should be placed in these estimates because the DAF model does not fit as well as the model for the incomplete table.

The values of the estimates of the DF model lie between the values of the corresponding estimates of the DAF model, as was the case for the D and DA models, except for the single parameter d_0 which has practically the same value. Again the estimate d_4 is larger than d_3 but for downward mobility d_{-3} is larger than d_{-2} so that there is not a steady decline as the distance moved increases, either upwards or downwards. For both upward and downward mobility there are relatively big differences between $d_{\pm 4}$ and $d_{\pm 5}$ indicating lower expected frequencies for long range mobility but there is also a big difference between d_{-1} and d_{-2} which shows that movement to the next class down is relatively more frequent than downward movement over long distances. The extent of upward movement is again greater than the extent of downward movement. However the estimates d_2 and d_3 are lower than the corresponding estimates for the D model whereas the values of d_4, d_5 and d_6 are higher. For downward mobility d_{-2}, d_{-3} and d_{-4} are lower than for the D model and d_{-6} is higher. Thus the inclusion of the main diagonal leads to higher estimates for long distance upward mobility, and less short distance movement in both directions, although it should again be borne in mind that the DF model does not fit as well as the D model.

The C model does not fit quite as well as the D or DA models but is a better fit than the models which include the main diagonal. This may be because the concept of barriers between adjacent classes is less appropriate than the concept of distance moved or it may be because the assumptions of the model demand too much of the categorization used. When estimating the values of the crossings parameters, c_1 and c_6 have both been set equal to one, equating the level of movement between the two service classes and between the two manual classes so that movements between other classes are measured against this level. The value of c_4 is highest indicating most movement between classes IV and V, and the values of c_2 and c_5 are lowest, indicating least movement between classes II and III and between classes V and VI. Altogether, the least frequent moves are those into and out of the service class and those into and out of the skilled and unskilled manual classes, and the most frequent moves, apart from those within these two groups, are in the middle of the class structure. This confirms the initial impression of immobility within these two groups.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have analysed the patterns of intergenerational class mobility for the National Survey data, in a manner that has taken

account of the effect of the changing class structure. This has been accomplished by means of a number of models which are detailed characterizations of mobility and which we have shown to provide a good description of the underlying processes, and to be more satisfactory than the independence model upon which the index of association was based. The models are derived from the work of Goodman, who gave a technical treatment but did not discuss the substantive interpretations of his results.

Two of these models are characterized by a straightforward distinction between upward and downward mobility, and the results suggest that the direction of movement should be taken into account in order to obtain a well fitting model. Certainly other studies of social mobility, for instance Richardson's,[22] have found upward and downward mobility to be essentially different phenomena.

There are four versions of the diagonals parameter model, all based upon the notion of distance moved, with only two of them allowing for the direction of movement. They all fit the data reasonably well, suggesting that the assumption of a measure of distance between the classes is not grossly misleading. The two models which do not distinguish direction of movement fit better than the corresponding models which do, implying that direction may be less important than total distance moved. The contrast between short and long distance mobility has been emphasized in other work: for instance the results of Glass' study showed that when there was a change of status from fathers' to sons' occupations, sons remained close to their fathers' level.

The best fitting model, the DA model, is typified by a lower expected frequency for each increase in distance moved, with the largest decrease occurring between middle and long range mobility. In this simple characterization of the mobility process, in which the further the distance involved, the less chance there is of moving, the main barrier to movement is distance. Thus upward movement into the service class from the manual working classes, and downward mobility in the opposite direction, are equally unlikely on the basis of their social separation. This model is conceptually simpler than Goldthorpe's model[23] of intergenerational mobility, which assigns density levels to each cell of the mobility table, indicating the relative likelihood of immobility for cells on the main diagonal and the relative likelihood of mobility for the off-diagonal cells. The density levels are allocated to the cells on the basis of the relationships between the classes involved, whereas the structure of the DA model is independent of the class schema used.

When the DA model is disaggregated into upward and downward mobility, the levels of upward mobility are found to be comparatively high and to retain this straightforward pattern. Downward movements are less frequent, and there is a marked difference between

the level of very short distance downward mobility (to the next class down) and downward movement over longer distances, suggesting that there may be some kind of barrier to medium and long distance mobility, which does not occur in the case of upward mobility. These results lend support to Richardson's findings that most downward mobility occurs over short distances and is a process of status consolidation of the 'risen working class'; although our measures of short distance downward movement do not only refer to movements from non manual to manual occupations as do Richardson's. Long range mobility is less frequent in both directions than short or middle range movements.

Neither of the models for the full table fit as well as the corresponding models for the incomplete table, probably because immobility and mobility are essentially different phenomena. The inclusion of the main diagonal gives rise to decreased estimates of middle range mobility and to increased estimates of long range mobility, in the DAF model. For the disaggregated model, there is no longer a decrease in expected frequencies with increased distance moved, in either direction. The inclusion of the main diagonal in the DF model leads to less middle range mobility and slightly more long range mobility in both directions. The disparity between short and middle range downward movement is more pronounced than it was for the D model.

The crossings parameter model does not fit quite as well as either of the diagonals parameter models for the incomplete table, suggesting that the concept of barriers between adjacent classes may be less appropriate than the concept of distance moved, or possibly that the latter violates the properties of the class schema less than the former. The pattern emerging from this model is one of barriers at each end of the class structure, between the service class and the intermediate classes, and between the manual working classes and the intermediate classes, with more fluctuation within these two groups and within the intermediate classes. This is in contrast to the 'buffer zone' thesis discussed by Goldthorpe[24] which posits the division between manual and non manual occupations as being the most important barrier to movement, and suggests that the 'buffers' may be located at either end of the class structure rather than in the middle. This reformulation of the buffer zone thesis would be supported by our estimates from the diagonals parameter models which show a fair amount of middle range mobility but far less long range mobility.

APPENDIX: *Definitions of the models*

For a given model let $\hat{f}_{ij}$ ($i=1, \ldots, 7$ and $j=1, \ldots, 7$) denote the maximum likelihood estimate of the expected frequency in cell

(i,j) of the table. The a_i (i=1, . . . ,7) and b_j (j=1, . . . ,7) are sets of positive constants.

I model $\hat{f}_{ij} = a_i b_j$

QPN model $\hat{f}_{ij} = \begin{cases} a_i b_j \text{ if } i>j \\ a'_i b'_j \text{ if } i<j \end{cases}$

T model $\hat{f}_{ij} = a_i b_j t_r$ where $r = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } i<j \\ 2 \text{ if } i>j \end{cases}$

D model $\hat{f}_{ij} = a_i b_j d_r$ for $(i,j) \in S_r$, r=±1, . . . , ±6 where S_r is the set of cells (i,j) such that i−j=r

DF model $\hat{f}_{ij} = a_i b_j d_r$ for $(i,j) \in S_r$, r=0, ±1, . . . , ±6 where S_r is the set of cells (i,j) such that i−j=r

DA model $\hat{f}_{ij} = a_i b_j d_r$ for $(i,j) \in S_r$, r=1, . . . , 6 where S_r is the set of cells (i,j) such that |i−j| = r

DAF model $\hat{f}_{ij} = a_i b_j d_r$ for $(i,j) \in S_r$, r=0,1, . . . , 6 where S_r is the set of cells (i,j) such that |i−j| = r

C model $\hat{f}_{ij} = a_i b_j c'_{ij}$ for $i \neq j$

where $c'_{ij} = \begin{cases} \sum_{r=j}^{i-1} c_r \text{ for } i>j \\ \sum_{r=j}^{j-1} c_r \text{ for } i<j \end{cases}$

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NOTES

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3. See also R. M. Hauser, 'A Structural Model of the Mobility Table', *Social Forces*, vol. 56, no. 3, March 1978, pp. 919–53.

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10. For more information about the National Survey see J. W. B. Douglas, 'The Use and Abuse of National Cohorts', in M. Shipman (ed.), *The Organisation and Impact of Social Research*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976, pp. 3–21.

11. Goldthorpe, op. cit., p. 39.

12. Fathers: $\chi^2 = 15.3$, df=6, $0.01<p<0.02$. Sons $\chi^2 = 9.4$, df=6, $0.1<p<0.2$.

13. Goldthorpe, op. cit., p. 42.

14. Ibid, p. 109.

15. Ibid, p. 114.

16. Goodman, op. cit.

17. The nomenclature is the same as in the 1972 Goodman paper.

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24. Goldthorpe, op. cit.

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New movements in the sociology of youth: a critique

INTRODUCTION

The Sociology of Youth was dominated for many years by two theoretical approaches: structural-functionalism and various forms of idealist analyses. It was structural-functional theory which introduced us to the concept of Youth Culture and subsequently youth subcultures.[1] The term Youth Culture was itself taken up in a more radical way[2] and subsequently the concept of Counter-Culture developed.[3] Opposing both of these positions, though sometimes confusingly intermingled with some forms of the Counter-Culture stance,[4] was a critique by Neomarxists.[5] However the quality of this debate was generally poor and relied heavily upon the concept of youth class.[6] In many ways these debates relate directly to the 'heady' days of the 1960s when the prospect of youth as a genuine source of radical social change was taken very seriously by the media and more generally in the public domain. With the decline of public interest so academic interest has also been reduced within these schools.[7]

Nevertheless, the study of youth has continued to thrive in British Sociology, though with a quite different theoretical emphasis. The origin of this 'new wave' undoubtedly is to be found in the debates of the National Deviancy Conference. The National Deviancy Conference emphasized two theoretical trends within Sociology. The first to dominate its discussions was social reaction theory. This can be seen most clearly in Stan Cohen's early influence.[8] The significance of this position for our present concerns is its rediscovery of the conceptualization of subcultures as 'problem solving'.[9] The 'problem solving' approach to subcultures was already established in the traditional literature through the work of Albert Cohen,[10] but it takes on a special significance in this context because of the second theoretical position introduced into National Deviancy Conference Debates. This second strand was Marxism. There is a controversy as to the legitimacy of this kind of Marxist analysis.[11] However its

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impact cannot be underestimated. It not only reintroduced class as a major explanatory variable in the analysis of youth; but class defined in Marxist terms. It is from these two theoretical strands in National Deviancy Conference debates that the 'New Wave' Sociology of Youth has arisen. It has come to dominate both theoretical discussion and empirical work in Britain in the late 1970s. The authors of this body of work do not hold a uniform position. In particular there are disagreements between Murdock on the one hand, with his emphasis on 'problem solving' and Hall and his colleagues on the other with their emphasis on class.[12] Yet as a whole it presents an important change in direction for the Sociology of Youth. In this paper I shall argue that this school has made an important contribution to the sociological study of young people. However, I shall also argue that it possesses serious conceptual and methodological limitations which threaten to undermine the significance of that contribution.

YOUTH, SUBCULTURES AND CLASS

Although I have acknowledged differences within the school, for the sake of convenience I shall concentrate on the position as articulated in the work emanating from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University and their journal Working Papers in Cultural Studies. In one volume of the journal[13] they state:

> our subject . . . is Youth Culture: our object, to explain them as a phenomenon, and their appearance in the post-war period.[14]

By 'Youth Culture' they mean the 'cultural aspects of youth'.[15] By culture they mean 'the level at which social groups develop distinct patterns of life, and give *expressive form* to their social and material life-experience . . . "Culture" is the practice which realises or *objectivates* group-life in meaningful shape and form'.[16] Thus the culture of 'the group or class is the peculiar and distinctive way of life of the group or class, the meanings, values and ideas embodied in institutions, in social relations, in systems of beliefs, in *mores* and *customs*, in the uses of objects and material life . . . Culture is the way the social relations of a group are structured and shaped, but it is also the way these shapes are experienced, understood and interpreted'.[17]

Each individual is born into a particular cultural context. These existing cultural patterns 'form a sort of historical reservoir – a pre-constituted field of possibles – which groups take up, transform, develop.'[18] So, to quote Marx:

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by them-

selves; but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.[19]

Despite the importance of the ideological hegemony of the ruling class to a Marxist analysis of contemporary society 'in so far as there is more than one fundamental class in a society . . . there will be more than one major cultural configuration in play at a particular moment'.[20] However, 'when one culture gains ascendancy over the other, and when the subordinate culture *experiences* itself in terms prescribed by the dominant culture, then the dominant culture has also become the basis of the dominant ideology'.[21]

They make an important distinction between the notions of 'culture' and 'cultures'. 'The singular term "culture" can only indicate, in the most general and abstract way, the large cultural configurations at play in a society at any historical moment'.[22] Cultures 'always stand in relations of domination – and subordination – to one-another, are always, in some sense, in struggle with one-another'.[23] In contemporary societies these cultures 'will be, in a fundamental though often mediated way, "class cultures"'.[24] Within these larger cultural networks there exist 'smaller more localised and differentiated structures'[25] which they term 'subcultures'. These subcultures though differing in important ways will also share some things in common with the larger culture. However they limit their discussion primarily to those subcultures 'which have reasonably tight boundaries, distinctive shapes, which have cohered around particular activities, focal concerns and territorial spaces'.[26] It is to these kinds of subcultures that they refer when they write of youth-subcultures. Indeed they limit their analysis further than that for while they recognize that there are persistent and regular features of the wider class-culture – like the culture of delinquency – which are subcultures, their own concern is with those subcultures which only arise at particular historical moments and 'then they fade, disappear or are so widely diffused that they lose their distinctiveness'.[27] The youth subcultures with which they are dealing are then short term subcultures, which involve numbers of young people, and act to differentiate these young people from others in the same class situation whilst at the same time springing from that very same class situation.

While they distinguish these subcultures of youth from the wider class culture they nevertheless wish to stress the similarity of class position and so the equally 'subordinate and subordinated' nature of both types of subculture. As they put it 'the young inherit a cultural orientation from their parents towards a "problematic" common to the class as a whole which is likely to weigh, shape and signify the meanings they then attach to different areas of their social life'.[28] It is within this cultural context that specific youth cultures arise, and the relation between class and subcultures they see

as a dynamic one. The function of working-class culture is to 'win space' from the dominant culture. What they mean by this is what Parkin calls 'negotiated solutions',[29] that is to say that working-class culture modifies the dominant values without actually attempting outright to reject them. Clarke *et al.*'s example of this is the acceptance of the rule of law but an ambivalence in face-to-face encounters with the upholders of law (i.e. the police). Subcultures within the working-class also 'win space' for the young. The difference between the response of young and adult lies in the different generational experience of the young:

> youth encounters the problematic of its class culture in *different sets of institutions and experiences* from those of its parents, and when youth encounters the same structures, it encounters them at *crucially different points* in its biographical careers.[30]

These institutions are those of education, work and leisure. Yet when they come to identify aspects of 'generational specificity' in relation to these areas of life it is clear that they do not mean generation,[31] but are referring to different age-status groups and their different institutional locations. Thus what is distinctive about youth's relationship to education is that they attend school and parents have only peripheral contact; the young face the problem of choosing and entering jobs and learning the cultures of work whereas for adults work is a routine aspect of life. In leisure the differences lie in the institutions chosen by youth for their leisure ('caffs', discos, youth clubs, 'all nighters' etc.). From these institutional differences they argue a 'generational consciousness' may arise. They distinguish this from the similar kind of notion associated with Youth Culture research and with counter-cultures by arguing that it is mediated by class. Thus the upwardly mobile working-class young will be more strongly associated with generational consciousness than others. As Phil Cohen says, subculture is 'a compromise between the need to create autonomy, difference from parents and the need to maintain the parental identifications which support them'.[32] This generational consciousness, they argue, took on a peculiarly intense form in the post-war period sub-cultures, 'which were sharply demarcated – amongst other factors – by age and generation. Youth felt and experienced itself as "different" especially when this difference was inscribed in activities and interests to which "age", principally, provided the passport'.[33]

Youth subcultures form an important part of their analysis of youth in the context of class. However it must be stressed that they are arguing that subcultures are only one of many different responses. What is more, these responses must be understood in terms of the position of youth. This they distinguish at three different levels: first the level of structures, by which they mean the basic material

and social conditions of class; secondly, cultures which are 'the range of socially organised and patterned responses'; thirdly, biographies, by which they mean the 'careers' of individuals through these structures and cultures. They also appear to limit the term subcultures to working-class youth:

> there are some problems in deciding whether we can speak of *middle-class* subcultures in the same way and within the same sort of theoretical framework.[34]

Though they recognize that some middle-class groups might be distinct subcultures they concentrate their discussion of middle-class youth in terms of the Counter-Culture.[35]

> Middle-class culture affords the space and opportunity for sections of it to 'drop out' of circulation. Working-class youth is persistently and consistently structured by the dominating alternative rhythm of Saturday night and Monday morning.[36]

The Counter-Culture, they argue, is not responsible for the undermining of traditional middle-class culture which was 'profoundly, unhinged . . . by changes within stemming directly from the needs of the productive system itself'[37] but that the emergence of countercultural forms 'mould the picture of the dominant culture to win over the attachment of a section of its "brightest and best"'.[38]

A number of problems are raised immediately. Three in particular are worth highlighting: the nature of the subcultures studies; the differences of youth styles, and the relationship between youth and adult responses to class position. The subcultures which they study are those 'which have reasonably tight boundaries, distinctive shapes, which have cohered around particular activities, focal concerns and territorial spaces.' What is more they are located in specific historical moments 'then, they fade, disappear or are so widely diffused that they lose their distinctions'. While they exist they share some things in common with the 'present culture' but are significantly different. Their definition of subcultures appears to have something in common with Yinger's concept of Counter-Culture.[39] Yet Yinger stresses that in studying such micro-groups one must be aware of 'non-cultural aspects of some "norms" – phenomena, that on the surface seem thoroughly cultural' because 'personality variables are directly involved in the development and maintenance of the group values.' His conclusion is that social psychology has much to contribute to our understanding of such subcultures. It might be that this point is taken up by Clarke *et al.* in what they call biographies – the careers of individuals through structures and cultures – yet the point has relevance because this part of their work is not developed[40] and their theoretical analysis concentrates upon structural differences and the functionality of subgroups within particular structural locations,

particularly class. After all, they are only studying certain kinds of ephemeral youth styles. The majority of even working-class youth they accept as conformist. Neither are they interested in long-term 'subcultures' like the so-called delinquent subculture. In identifying these ephemeral types of youth style as separately worthy of study they are required to pose the question – why do some young people adopt these styles and others do not? Precisely this question has been posed by Murdock in an article with McCron attacking subcultural studies. 'Subcultural studies', they argue, 'start by taking groups who are already card-carrying members of a particular subculture such as skinheads, bike boys or hippies, and working backwards to uncover their class location . . . The problem is not only to explain why styles such as the mods or the skinheads developed within particular class strata at the times and in the forms that they did, but also to explain why adolescents in essentially the same basic location adopted other modes of negotiation and resolution'.[41] Though some work has gone some way towards showing how particular subcultural styles can be seen as coded expressions of consciousness[42] they have not yet answered that question. Murdock and McCron do argue that subcultures differ from conventional youth in that 'they tended to orientate themselves around the styles sponsored by official youth agencies or mainstream teenage entertainment industry . . . these styles were not remade or adapted to any great extent, but were taken over more or less intact'.[43] However, they have not, as yet, explained why some youth do and others don't. Neither do they satisfactorily explain why there is such a multiplicity of styles.[44] They are careful to distinguish between working-class subcultures and middle-class counter-cultures. Yet within the working-class there are numerous distinctive youth styles. There are obvious differences by race and sex and by geographical location – though as Davies, somewhat unfairly, says 'they seem to be completely absorbed with Britain south of Hemel Hempstead'.[45] There are also distinctive youth subcultures existing side by side, competing or in conflict with one another. All of these subcultures are explained in terms of the same relationship to the 'parent' culture. However, there is no explanation of 'why the "parent" working-class culture produces a variety of distinct adolescent styles which, at any one time, may be competing (even warring) amongst themselves'.[46]

There are also problems about the relationship between adult and youth responses to class location. Clarke *et al.* argue at some length that adults and young share the same basic problematic. The difference in response to that problematic is to be found in 'the specifically *generational experience* of the young'.[47] Youthful subcultures then are to be understood in terms of generational experience. These 'generational' differences are to be found in the

locations within which youth experiences its class problematic. It does so 'in *different sets of institutions and experiences* from those of its parents and when youth encounters the same structures, it encounters them at crucially different points in its biographical careers'.[48] The institutions concerned are those of education, work and leisure. As a result of their different experience of these institutions a 'generational consciousness' may arise. This generational consciousness took on a peculiarly intense form in the post-war period subcultures when youth 'experienced itself as "different", especially when this difference was inscribed in activities and interests to which "age", principally, provided the passport'.[49] Although their analysis is posed in terms of 'generations', they are in fact discussing differences in the institutional locations of youth and adults. Youth exists in different relations to institutions from adults, which leads to differences in the nature of control and their experience of control, which in turn may lead to different subcultures. However, this has nothing to do with generational differences. There may of course be generational differences in post-war Britain between youth and adults within the working-class. However the differences in experience of institutional location clearly relate to age and not generation. At one point they write of post-war subcultures as 'sharply demarcated — amongst other factors, by age and generation',[50] but they never in fact distinguish between the two. Even in Murdock and McCron's article 'Consciousness of Class and Consciousness of Generation',[51] where they offer a critique of Mannheim's concept of generation, they still use youth and generation virtually interchangeably.

What their analysis amounts to here is an analysis of youth as an age-status. It is the age-status which explains the differences in institutional location. This is important for their analysis in three ways. First, age-statuses are distinct from other statuses in that their individual members inevitably pass through them. There is always youth, but for each youth, the status is transitional. This provides one possible basis for an attempted explanation of the ephemeral nature of so many specific youth styles. Secondly, in failing to make the distinction between age-status and generation clear they effectively ignore the possible significance of generational differences. What, for example, is the significance of generation for change in 'parent' working-class culture as well as youth subcultures?[52] Thirdly, the confusion is significant in terms of how the position has been developed. Hall *et al.*, for example, argue elsewhere that 'there can be no "sociology of youth" . . . Youth as a concept is unthinkable. Even youth as a social category does not make much empirical sense'.[53] If youth as a social category does not make much sense, where stands their analysis of age-status?

YOUTH VERSUS CLASS

Their claim that 'youth as a concept is unthinkable',[54] is suspect on other grounds. They claim that youth only has significance 'as a secondary and dependent or determinate factor affecting the individual or group within those social relations which structure not just their youth but their whole life trajectory'.[55]

In this paper they are arguing against what they see as Havighurst and Dreyer's contention that age is the major stratifying factor in social life:[56]

> that is, the person's age position is what determines his social position, and all the social, economic, political and cultural consequences which flow from that.[57]

They object to this partly as 'a fictitious construction of youth as a biological or psychological stage of life'[58] but more particularly because 'it involves the elevation of an age and psychological division of society above other dimensions such as race and class: it reduces the latter to subordinate variations on the main theme'.[59] Now whilst one must agree that any analysis of age within a capitalist society which takes no serious account of class will be of little value, what they appear to be doing is rejecting an analysis which argues for the pre-eminence of age at the expense of class with one stressing the pre-eminence of class at the expense of age; or as Marsland and Hunter put it:

> they seem to us to represent an account of youth which is constrained to deny falsely the significance of one set of forces on social life – the psycho-social forces organised by an age-system out of fear that their recognition may challenge the determinative pre-eminence of another set of such forces – those of class.[60]

Marsland and Hunter turn Hall's criticism upon himself. He and his associates, they claim, 'treat the concept of class unproblematically. They assume and assert... the general and unconditional pre-eminence of class forces'.[61] What is more, this isn't even good Marxism. There is no logical need within Marxism to reject youth as a sociological concept, as a stage of life or as a social category. Youth may not be a Marxist concept but to reject it as a sociological concept on these grounds is merely to reject sociology as ideological.[62] This does not appear to be what they are saying in this paper. They appear to reject youth as a stage of life and as a social category on the grounds that it must be seen as secondary and subservient to class. Ultimately a Marxist analysis requires us to understand society in terms of the relations to the means of production. This means that the analysis of other social categories has to be understood in terms of these relations; it does not mean that the social categories must be subsumed

within classes'.[63] Logically their argument should also apply to bureaucracy. Yet it is clear that Marxist theory recognizes both the relationship of bureaucracy to economic power and the significance of bureaucracy, *per se*.[64]

It is necessary, on this point, to make distinctions within the general position, for Murdock and McCron make it clear that the emphasis on class does not mean 'evacuating age. Clearly age is an important factor in structuring the social situation of young people. Some experiences . . . are youth specific . . . It is not therefore a question of simply substituting class for age at the centre of analyses, but of examining the relations between class and age, and more particularly the way in which age acts as a mediation of class'.[65] Indeed they go further than this and argue that 'age mediates the experiences and responses not only of adolescents but also of adults within the same class location and structures the relations between them'.[66]

Unfortunately, as we have seen, they also fail to distinguish between age and generation and so their call for a 'structural and historical analysis'[67] is somewhat hollow.

Despite what I have argued are major conceptual difficulties within this perspective, it has been remarkably successful in generating empirical support.[68] However, this empirical material suffers from precisely these same conceptual problems. The methodological problem arises out of its roots in the National Deviancy Conference, for the main methodological thrust of this school has been naturalistic methods.[69] This has led to numerous descriptive studies of small groups or gangs of working-class youth. However, since each group studied is bounded by categories of class, age and generation, none of which are actively pursued in the analysis, the conceptual difficulties are hidden. These naturalistic studies are organized in such a way that their thesis cannot be disproved. This methodological emphasis is particularly serious since their work claims to be socio-historical. Yet it is so only in a limited degree. It is historical only in so far as the explanations of youth behaviour and subcultural groupings are to be understood in terms of a Marxist analysis of a particular stage of Capitalism. Thus in Murdock's most recent researches he claims that youth can only be understood in terms of the relationship between consciousness of class and consciousness of generation.[70] However, generation and youth are seen to be synonymous within a given historical period. Whilst empirically this might be the case – it is a matter for empirical demonstration – it gets us no further in understanding the conceptual differences between the two. Their ability to study social change is therefore extremely limited.

What I find particularly unfortunate about the need to present the critique is that the CCCS attempt to restore 'class to the centre of the Sociology of Youth'[71] is not in itself original. Sheila Allen,[72]

for example, in a critique of Eisenstadt's work, argues for the overriding importance of class analysis in the understanding of young people. She argues that the problems of youth must not be seen merely in terms of the status of age categories but as a reflection of underlying class and other relations.

> Age relations (including youth) are part of economic relations and the political and ideological structures in which they take place. It is not the relations between ages which explain change or stability in societies, but change in societies which explains relations between different ages.[73]

Explanations based on age, including youth, are regarded as subsidiary to those based on class, on race, on sex. However, she does not deny all relevance to youth as a social category:

> In so far as young people are treated in a similar way, for instance in highly industrialised societies, the young are excluded from positions of power, then they can be considered as a meaningful category as a first approximation.[74]

However, '(t)heir responses to this exclusion cannot be assumed to be "standard" regardless of their experience . . . The problem of youth is that of being expected to be involved but being powerless. This is not a specific youth problem'.[75] Though age is of little significance to her analysis, generation is rather more so.

> This is not to say that generational experiences will not differ, and at times differ markedly, but we add little to our understanding by ascribing such differences to age.[76]

Though this analysis is considerably less well developed than that of CCCS, it also avoids some of its worst conceptual difficulties.

CONCLUSIONS

The contribution of the work reviewed to the sociological understanding of youth has been considerable. Structural-functional theory, Counter-Cultural theory and even the 'Youth Class' thesis all place a gross over-emphasis upon the importance of youth as a factor in the instigation of social change. Relations of Age or of Generations are not the fundamental driving force in contemporary society. Contemporary industrial societies are Capitalist Societies, or at least some form of neo-Capitalism,[77] and as such must be understood in class terms. When we study contemporary youth we do so in the context of a class society. We must applaud CCCS in their stated aim of 'restoring class to the centre of the sociology of youth'.[78] This is a major contribution.

Indeed it is their very success that creates concern. With a few exceptions,[79] they have come to dominate both theoretical discussion and empirical research in the sociology of youth. Yet the position contains serious theoretical and methodological problems which have not been adequately addressed in the literature. Hall is correct in calling for a proper understanding of youth in a class society. However we will not have an adequate sociology of youth in a class society until these problems have been resolved.

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NOTES

I should like to acknowledge my colleague, Keith Fleming, for his reading and critical comments on a draft of this paper.

1. See for example: Parsons, T., 'Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 7, October 1942, pp. 604–16; Coleman, J. S., *The Adolescent Society*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1961; Sugarman, B., 'Involvement in Youth Culture, Academic Achievement and Conformity in Schools', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 18, 1967, pp. 151–64.

2. Wilson, B., *The Youth Culture and the Universities*, London, Faber & Faber, 1970.

3. Feuer, L., *The Conflict of Generations*, London, Heinemann, 1969; Reich, C. A., *The Greenings of America*, Harmondsworth, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1972; Roszak, T., *The Making of a Counter-Culture*, London, Doubleday, 1969.

4. See for example: Keniston, K., 'A Second Look at the Uncommitted', *Social Policy*, July/August 1971, pp. 6–19; Horowitz, I. C. and Friedland, W. H., *The Knowledge Factory: Student Power and Academic Politics in America*, Chicago, Aldine Press, 1970.

5. The best of which is probably Marcuse.

6. See for example: Rowntree, J. and Rowntree, M., 'The Political Economy of Youth', *International Socialist Journal*, February, 1968.

7. Though quite important contributions to these major schools have been made in recent times. See for example: Marsland, D., *Sociological Explorations in the Service of Youth*, Leicester, Youth Bureau, 1978; Musgrove, F., *Ecstasy and Holiness: Counter Culture and the Open Society*, London, Methuen, 1974; Havighurst, R. J. and Dreyer, P. H. (eds), *Youth*, Chicago, National Society for the Study of Education, 1975.

8. See, for example, the work reported in Cohen, S., *Moral Panics and Folk Devils*, London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1972. Note also the present author's 'Adolescence: a study of stereotyping', *Sociological Review*, vol. 18, no. 2, July 1970, pp. 197–211.

9. See for example: Young, J., 'The Hippies — an essay in the politics of leisure', in Taylor, I. and Taylor, C. (eds), *Politics and Deviance*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Press, 1973.

10. Cohen, A. K., *Delinquent Boys*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1955.

11. See the debate between Taylor and Walton and Hirst in Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J., *Critical Criminology*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.

12. Some of this debate is summarized in Brake, M., *The Sociology of Youth Culture and Youth Subcultures*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

13. Working Papers in Cultural Studies, No. 718, September 1975, republished in Hall, S. and Jefferson, T. (eds), *Resistance through Ritual*, London, Hutchinson, 1976.

14. Clarke, J., Hall, S., Jefferson, T. and Roberts, B., 'Subcultures, Cultures and Class: A theoretical overview', in Hall and Jefferson (eds), 1976, op. cit., p. 9.

15. Ibid, p. 10.

16. Clarke *et al.*, op. cit., p. 10.

17. Op. cit., pp. 10–11. Compare this with the definition of Kroeber and Parsons.

18. Op. cit., p. 11

19. Marx, K., 'The Eighteenth Brumaire', in Marx–Engels: *Selected Works*, vol. 1, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1951, p. 225.

20. Clarke *et al.*, op. cit., p. 12.

21. Ibid, p. 12.

22. Op. cit., p. 13.

23. Op. cit., pp. 12–13.

24. Op. cit., p. 13.

25. Op. cit., p. 13.

26. Op. cit., p. 14.

27. Op. cit., p. 15.

28. Op. cit., p. 29. For a fuller account of how they view working-class culture as a whole, see Clarke, J., *et al.* (eds), *Working-Class Culture*, London, Hutchinson, 1979.

29. Parkin, F., *Class Inequality and Political Order*, London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1971.

30. Clarke *et al.*, op. cit., p. 49.

31. At least not in a Mannheimian sense.

32. Cohen, P., 1972, op. cit., p. 26.

33. Clarke *et al.*, op. cit., p. 52.

34. Ibid, pp. 57–60.

35. Contrast this with the detailed analysis of working-class youth culture in Mungham, G. and Pearson, G., *Working-Class Youth Cultures*, op. cit. Particularly the article: Clarke, J., and Jefferson, T., 'Working Class Youth Cultures', pp. 138–58.

36. Clarke *et al.*, op. cit., p. 61.

37. Ibid, p. 65.

38. Op. cit., p. 67.

39. Yinger, M., 'Contra-Culture and Subculture', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, 1960, pp. 625–35.

40. Though in one piece of work dealing with biographies their significance is underplayed. See Critcher, C., 'Structures, Cultures and Biographies', in Hall, S. and Jefferson, T., 1976, pp. 167–73.

41. Murdock and McCron, op. cit., p. 25.

42. See Cohen, P., 1972, op. cit. and Clarke, J., Hebdige, D. and Jefferson, T., 'British Youth Cultures, 1950–1970', Instituto Universitatio Orientale, *Annali Sezione Germanica, Anglistica, XVII* (i) and (ii), 1974.

43. Murdock and McCron, op. cit., p. 206.

44. The kind of interactional analysis conducted by Fine and Kleinman can offer explanations of this but only at the expense of any significance for youth at the macro level. See Fine, G. A. and Kleinman, S., 'Rethinking Subculture: An Interactional Analysis', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 85, no. 1, July 1979, pp. 1–20.

45. Davies, B., 'Youth Cultures: Myths and Political Realities', *Youth in Society*, no. 16, March/April 1976, p. 15.

46. Ibid, p. 15.

47. Clarke *et al.*, op. cit., p. 49.

48. Ibid, p. 49.

49. Op. cit., p. 51.

50. Op. cit., p. 45.

51. Murdock and McCron, op. cit.

52. See, for example, the discussion of conceptual distinctions between age strata, relations between age strata, and generations, and the impact of socio-historical changes upon them, in Bengtson, V. L. and Starr, J. M., 'Contrast and Consensus: a generational analysis of youth in the 1970's', in Havighurst, R. J. and Dreyer, P. H. (eds), *Youth*, Chicago, National Society for the Study of Education, 1975, pp. 224–66.

53. Hall, S., Jefferson, T. and Clarke, J., 'Youth: a stage of life?', *Youth in Society*, no. 17, May/June 1976, p. 19.

54. Ibid, p. 19.

55. Ibid, p. 19.

56. Havighurst, R. J. and Dreyer, P. H. (eds), 1975, op. cit.

57. Hall *et al.*, 1976 (b), op. cit., p. 17.
58. Ibid, p. 19.
59. Ibid, p. 17.
60. Marsland, D. and Hunter, P., 'Youth: A Real Force and Essential Concept?', *Youth in Society*, July/August, no. 18, 1976, p. 10.
61. Ibid, p. 11.
62. As in Hirst, P. Q., 'Marx and Engels on Law, Crime and Morality' in Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J., *Critical Criminology*, London, Routledge, 1975. See also: Hirst, P. Q., 'Radical deviancy theory and Marxism', in Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J., 1975, op. cit.
63. Jacques, for example, is able to discuss Youth Culture from a Marxist perspective without any apparent contradictions. See Jacques, M., 'Trends in Youth Culture', *Marxism Today*, April 1975, pp. 110–16.
64. Poulantzas, N., *Political Power and Social Classes*, London, New Left Books, 1975.
65. Murdock and McCron, 1976, op. cit., p. 10.
66. Ibid, p. 24.
67. Ibid, p. 27.
68. See, for example, the range of empirical work contained in Mungham, G. and Pearson, G., 1976, op. cit.
69. See: Roberts, B., 'Naturalistic Research into Subcultures and Deviance', in Hall, S. and Jefferson, T. (eds), 1976, op. cit., pp. 243–52, and Butters, S., 'The Logic of Enquiry of Participant Observation', ibid, pp. 253–73.
70. The empirical work on this is as yet unpublished, though the argument is contained in Murdock, G. and McCron, R., 1976, op. cit.
71. Ibid, p. 10.
72. Allen, S., 'Some Theoretical Problems in the Study of Youth', *Sociological Review*, vol. 16, 1968, pp. 319–31.
73. Ibid, p. 321.
74. Ibid, p. 328.
75. Ibid, p. 328.
76. Ibid, p. 329.
77. Blackburn, R., 'The New Capitalism', in Blackburn, R. (ed), *Ideology in Social Science*, London, Fortuna, 1972.
78. Murdock, G. and McCron, R., 1976, op. cit.
79. Marsland's research unit at Brunel University represents the only British Institution with a major programme of research in Youth in opposition to this position.

Bernard Ineichen

The housing decisions of young people*

ABSTRACT

The early adult years are a time when housing decisions of crucial importance are taken. Preliminary analysis of the housing careers of a sample of newly-married couples shows that despite some overlap of age, income and occupational status, owner-occupiers and council tenants develop as groups with contrasting social characteristics, partly as a response to structural factors within the housing market. A second investigation, concerning young adults who had grown up on a local authority estate, shows a similar divergence appearing.

The implications of this polarization for the class structure are briefly discussed, and the direction of further analysis indicated.

A. INTRODUCTION

The concept of mobility over the life-cycle is crucial in understanding housing behaviour.[1] Decisions to move house through the life-cycle tend to follow particular patterns[2] giving rise to the concept of 'housing career'.

The time of early married life is notably a time of high geographical mobility.[3] Most families in Britain enter one of the major tenure groups, owner-occupation or council renting, during that period, but because of the very different criteria on which entry into owner-occupation and entry into the council renting sector are awarded, it is possible that decisions taken early in marriage will make subsequent transfer from a council tenancy to owner-occupation difficult to achieve. A series of studies have been carried out to investigate the housing careers of various samples of young people. The present paper, which concentrates on the division among these samples into owner-occupiers and council tenants is a preliminary to the publication in full of the research's findings.

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B. FIELDWORK AND PREVIOUS PAPERS

The first study based on a one-shot interview with a sample of ninety-two couples marrying in Bristol in 1973 was funded by the Housing Research Foundation and the results published by them.[4] A second study was financed by the SSRC. This followed couples (Newly-Married sample: N=179) during the first eighteen months of their marriage, interviewing them two or three times. Preliminary papers have appeared dealing with the geographical location of the partners at the time of their marriage,[5] the adverse circumstances of the youngest wives[6] and the inter-relation of housing and fertility decisions.[7] Interviews have also been held with small samples of couples of different ethnic origin [8] and geographically mobile working-class couples.

Couples who had grown up in the council sector were identified as a particularly vulnerable group in housing terms. A further study was therefore mounted, funded initially by the DHSS/SSRC Transmitted Deprivation Committee, and subsequently by the Housing Research Foundation, to investigate the housing circumstances and housing aspirations of a group of twenty-year-olds (Council Estate sample: N=218) who had grown up on a large local authority housing estate. This sample is reported on for the first time in this paper.

C. FINDINGS

(1) *Newly-Married Sample* The establishment of an independent household at marriage is an almost universally desired practice in British society[9] and was achieved by 118 couples (65.9 per cent of the sample). This figure is rather higher than earlier studies[10] have reported. Fewer than half of these couples had a house to themselves, however, and almost a quarter were living in rooms.

The remaining sixty-one couples (34.1 per cent of the sample) were sharing with relatives: most often, with the wife's parents. Attitudes to sharing were generally unfavourable; a substantial minority were overcrowded, and in some cases there was evidence of friction. However, eighteen months after marriage, only eighteen couples (10.1 per cent of the sample) were still living with relatives, and only two of these couples had no plans at all to move. The knowledge that sharing was only for a limited time made it bearable for many.

Forty-six couples (25.7 per cent of the sample) started their married life as owners or co-owners of their home. By the end of the fieldwork this figure had risen to eighty-six (48.0 per cent). This group is relatively old and well paid, and of high occupational status; though it is notable that as well as including about half

of all non-manual and skilled manual husbands it also includes a few semi-skilled and unskilled workers. As well as about half of the wives in professional, managerial or office jobs, eight of the thirty-one wives in manual jobs are included. Only ten of the wives had given up work by the end of the study.

A further twenty-nine couples were working towards the goal of owner-occupation, making a total of 64.2 per cent of the sample 'probable eventual owner-occupiers'. The spread down the occupational scale is impressive: this total group includes over three-quarters of all skilled manual workers, over a third of the semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and half of the wives in manual jobs.

The length of time these couples knew one another before marriage is markedly longer than in the case of the rest of the sample. A difference in fertility is also apparent: only one of the couples who actually managed to buy was pregnant at marriage, and only seven had a child during the study. 20.0 per cent of the actual and potential owners had a child during the study, against 60.9 per cent of other couples. Yet the stated intention of the group is not to remain childless for very long: if the forecasts expressed at the first interview are fulfilled, half the group will have a child within three years of marriage.

Only one couple started their married life as council tenants, but altogether twenty-seven (15.1 per cent) achieved a council tenancy during the course of the study. A further thirteen anticipated achieving a council tenancy in the near future. These forty couples (22.3 per cent of the sample) are typified by extreme youth, low occupational class, low earnings and rapid fertility. Most of the wives were pregnant at marriage; by the end of the study, 87.5 per cent had had a child, and only a minority were working.

Within eighteen months of marriage, therefore, two distinct housing groups had appeared, with marked differences of age, class and income, although substantial areas of overlap remain. The differences are also particularly notable when fertility is considered: by the end of the study two in ten owning couples had a child against nearly nine in ten of the council renting group. Fertility increased the existing difference in earnings between the two groups. In almost every case, pregnancy and childbirth removed the wife's earning capacity altogether for a time. Very few of the wives intimated that they would be returning to work in the months immediately following the birth of their first child.

Most of the couples who were moving into the council sector in the newly-married sample had grown up in council houses. Rather more surprisingly, so had about half of the owning group. More of the actual and potential owners had grown up in homes rented from the local authority than in owner-occupation. The relation of housing origins and housing aspirations acted as a major spur in the setting

up of the second large survey, that of the housing decisions and housing aspirations of young people who had grown up on a housing estate.

(ii) *Council Estate sample* A comprehensive school serving a large council estate in suburban Bristol was chosen, and interviews held with 218 former pupils (117 boys, 101 girls), all of whom had grown up on the estate. Their age at the time was within a few months of their twentieth birthday.

Most of the boys, and 43 per cent of the girls, were in manual occupation. The educational attainment of the whole sample had been modest: only two were currently in higher education, but nearly half had left school without any formal educational qualification.

Approximately one-fifth of the sample were married, one-fifth engaged, and one-fifth had a steady boy or girl friend. Girls were much more likely than boys to be married or engaged. Married or engaged partners tended to have been found close at hand, and to have had similarly restricted educations. Boy and girl friends came from further afield, were better educated, and (at least in respect of boy friends) had better jobs.

Few of the unmarried (9/100 boys and 10/73 girls) were living away from home at the time of the interview. Three girls with babies were in the council sector, the rest in a variety of privately rented accommodation.

The forty-five married subjects, in contrast, were widely scattered throughout the housing market. Only seven were still in their parents' home, six in the privately rented sector, five (all girls) owner-occupiers, and nearly half (9 boys and 12 girls) council tenants.

Most of the married subjects in neither owner-occupation nor a council tenancy appeared to be moving towards the council sector. In contrast, those engaged at the time of the interviews (17 boys, 29 girls) expressed an overwhelming preference for owner-occupation, and among the remainder there was also a preference for owner-occupation, although this was not so strongly expressed. Only forty-four subjects (34 boys, 10 girls) were totally uncertain of their housing future; most were still living with their parents.

Two sub-groups provide a useful basis for comparison: those who have already achieved or are moving towards owner-occupation (N=40); and those who have achieved or have a definite intention of renting from the council (N=38). Two-thirds of both groups are girls.

Council renters are more likely to have a father in Class IV or V or unemployed, and to come from a broken marriage and a large family. Fewer of them have an educational qualification or a skilled or non-manual job. They are more likely to have changed their job at least twice.

Partners of the council tenants are less likely to have an educational qualification, and a non-manual or skilled job. They are more likely to come from a council rented home themselves. There is little difference in the groups with respect to the age of the partners or the occupational class of the partners' fathers.

D. DISCUSSION

These two studies indicate the degree of polarization which results from the present structure of the housing market. Newly-married couples entering the owner-occupied sector tend to be not only older and in higher status and better paid jobs: they have also deferred marriage and family building, and the wives have stayed in work longer. Those entering the council sector, on the other hand, are not only younger and earning less, they are also more rapidly pregnant, which both costs them the wife's earning power and produces another mouth to feed. It makes saving towards house purchase immensely more difficult if a sufficient sum has not already been amassed for a deposit. At the same time, existence in the privately rented sector may become more difficult, owing to the unsuitability of much privately rented accommodation. Entry may become almost impossible.[11]

The council rented sector, on the other hand, becomes attainable for the first time. Only one or two married couples interviewed in any of the samples had achieved a council tenancy while remaining childless. It is hardly surprising therefore that among the council tenants in the samples described here, like couples reported elsewhere,[12] pregnancy was sought as the only technique for obtaining a suitable home. Couples who, for whatever reason, remained childless are likely to find privately rented accommodation the only alternative to owner-occupation.

Access to council housing can be something of a game of snakes and ladders where some ploys (moving to an overcrowded house, having a baby) are rewarded, while others (moving to adequate housing, changing district) may be penalized. A not altogether serious charter for 'working the system' has been given by Niner.[13]

The effects of these rewards and penalties on family life can be considerable. As one subject in the Council Estate sample remarked, 'To get a council house, what you need is to get yourself in a mess'. The situation is particularly fraught when the quest for satisfactory housing involves young people in conflict or collusion with members of their extended families.

Their responses to the housing choices available to them

involve young people in decisions which create an expanding social gulf between owner-occupiers and council tenants. Earlier work in Bristol has suggested that home-owning manual workers may adopt some of the attributes of the non-manual neighbours.[14]

The present work indicates that families entering the council sector appear so disadvantaged that their chances of subsequently achieving owner-occupation must be slim. Housing factors appear to exacerbate rather than heal existing class differences: Disraeli's Two Nations are perpetually recreated.

To some extent the possibility of house purchase by sitting tenants can enable families to move across this gulf. They do however face a number of obstacles.

Firstly, many of the council renting families in these samples were allocated a flat in a high-rise block as their first council home. These were not available for sale.

Secondly, in order to obtain the tenancy of a house many families found they needed a second child. Taking this into account their youth, lack of work skills, and low earning power were likely to stretch their meagre financial resources very tightly for a number of years, reducing their chances of eligibility for a mortgage.

Thirdly, the quality of housing offered was unlikely to equal many of the homes available outside the council sector.

Fourthly, resale restrictions could make it difficult for families to proceed up the housing market in the manner of some owner-occupiers.

Their situation has particular poignancy for intending council tenants. In a time of shortage, the pressures of the queue for council housing effectively penalizes self-help and rational decisions. This is particularly acute for those attempting entry to the council sector via the waiting list. Yet in recent years the proportion of tenancies awarded to homeless families for example, has risen to one in ten. Only 71 per cent of tenancies were allocated to those on the waiting list in 1977.[15]

Such a situation reinforces the very disadvantages local authority housing was established to overcome. There is evidence that this situation is already upon us. Holtermann's analysis found severe deprivation 'both in inner areas dominated by private rented accommodation, and in council estates, some in the more peripheral locations, where problems of unemployment can occur on a scale at least as bad as private rented housing'.[16]

Further analysis of the housing careers of the young people interviewed in the surveys discussed in this paper is in hand. Examination by means of the 'career' approach will illustrate the ways motivation is restricted and shaped by the housing choices available; in other words, one of the processes by which structure is formed.

It will demonstrate how the involvement of young people with the housing market serves to expand, rather than reduce, existing social inequalities.

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NOTES

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2. N. N. Foote, *Housing Choices and Housing Constraints*, New York, McGraw-Hill 1960; D. Donnison, *Government of Housing*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967.

3. A. Spear Jnr, 'Home Ownership, Life-Cycle Stage and Residential Mobility', *Demography*, vol. 7, no. 4, 1970, pp. 449–58.

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5. B. Ineichen, 'A Social Geography of Marriage', in Wilson and Cook, *Love and Attraction*, Oxford, Pergamon, 1979, pp. 145–9.

6. B. Ineichen, 'Youthful Marriage: the Vortex of Disadvantage' in Peel and Chester, *Equalities and Inequalities in Family Life*, London, Academic Press, 1977, pp. 53–69.

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12. J. Busfield and M. Paddon, *Thinking about Children*, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

13. P. Niner, *Local Authority Housing Policy and Practice: a case study approach*, Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, 1975.

14. B. Ineichen, 'Home Ownership and Manual workers' life-styles', *Sociological Review*, vol. 20, no. 3, 1972, pp. 391–412.

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Ronald King

Bernstein's sociology of the school – a further testing

An article previously published in this journal reported the empirical testing of some aspects of Bernstein's sociology of the school,[1] using data obtained from a survey of 72 secondary schools in 1968–9 as part of a study of their internal organization.[2] In 1978–9, 45 of the schools in the original sample were re-surveyed.[3] The smaller number is mainly due to some of the original schools ceasing to exist and to others having been amalgamated as part of reorganization programmes. However, like the original sample, the more recent one is reasonably representative of the national distribution of schools by status; grammar 11 per cent, modern 24 per cent, comprehensive 65 per cent. It is therefore possible to examine the changes in the curriculum and organization of 45 schools that have occurred in the ten year period, and to use such matched data in a more robust testing of Bernstein's sociology of the school, which has been developed independently of original research.

As in the previous exercise the starting point is Bernstein's resumé of the relationships between a number of his paired concepts, instrumental/expressive, open/closed and mixed/pure, giving rise to a four-fold typology of curriculum and organizational elements: expressive-closed, expressive-open, instrumental-closed, instrumental-open. These replaced the earlier concepts of organic and mechanical solidarity, and of stratified and differentiated schools, and are themselves subsumed into the latter concepts of classification, framing and educational knowledge codes.[4] Closure corresponds to the earlier use of mechanical solidarity and stratified schools, and is subsumed into the later concepts of strong classification and framing, and a collection knowledge code. Openness is a development of the use of organic solidarity and differentiated schools, and is part of weak classification and framing, and an integrated code.[5]

Figure I is a simplified version of the original, showing the proposed relationships between the relevant concepts, and which 'provides a scale for the degree of openness or closure'. As before, these concepts were measured in the form of continuous variables

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FIGURE I *Formal Controls*



representing reasonable operationalizations of the specific examples of authority relationships, rewards and punishments, teaching groups, etc. suggested by Bernstein. (Table I)[6]

The postulated operation of the organizing principles of openness and closure or contrasted educational codes constitutes a structural element in Bernstein's theories, since it follows that conceptually related activities, either open or closed, will tend to be associated with one another. This enabled the previous testing, in that at a given

TABLE I *The Variables*

IC	1	The extent of streaming
	2	Ability specialization of instrumental activities
	3	Ability specialization of instrumental performance
	4	Ascription of learning group
	5	Standardization of instrumental performance
	6	Formalization of instrumental performance
EC	1	Frequency of detentions
	2	Formalization of expressive performance
	3	Ritualization of expressive performance
	4	Ritualization of ability – specialized expressive activities
	5	Emblemic ritualization of prefects
	6	Ceremonial ritualization of prefects
	7	Ritualization of prefects' induction ceremony
	8	Ritualization of head prefect
	9	Ritualization of teachers
	10	Ritualization of headteacher
	11	Number of prefectorial duties
	12	Number of head prefect's duties
	13	Pupil/teacher differentiation
	14	Social distance between pupils and teachers
IO	1	Extent of non-streaming
	2	Extent of setting
	3	Extent of options
EO	1	Ritualization of the House system
	2	Number of activities arranged for parents
	3	Parents' access to teachers

Legend: *IC* Instrumental Closed *EC* Expressive Closed
IO Instrumental Open *EO* Expressive Open

point in time there should be statistically significant correlations between the measurements of the supposedly related variables. However, there is also a related element of historicism in the proposal of changes occurring over time, and it is this that the re-survey of the schools, a unique exercise in this field, allows to be tested.

Bernstein suggests that changes are occurring in secondary schools representing a shift from closure to openness, or from collection to integrated code. A comparison of the mean scores for the variables in 1968–9 with 1978–9 may suggest that such shift has taken place, since although one closed variable is statistically bigger for the more recent period, one closed variable is smaller and three open variables are bigger.[7] But these results do not necessarily follow from the theories, which do not simply suggest that particular organization and curriculum elements are becoming more open, but that there is an institutionalization of openness or an integrated code, so that the opening up of one element should be related to that of another. The ascendency of the integrated code, the concomitant eclipse of the collection code, and the continuing polarization of the codes would be confirmed if when comparing 1968–9 with 1978–9, at the later date:

i. There were more statistically significant positive correlations and fewer negative ones between open variables, and the correlations were significantly larger.
ii. There were fewer positive correlations and more negative ones between closed variables, and the correlations were smaller.
iii. There were fewer positive correlations and more negative between open and closed variables, and the correlations were smaller.

Table II collates the relevant values and Table III summarizes the results. The correlations of open with closed variables are mainly compatible with the postulate of the polarization of antithetical codes. Those between closed variables are compatible with the postulate of the reduced importance of a collection code, although those for expressive variables form a strong exception. Most importantly, all the correlations of open variables are incompatible with the ascendency of an integrated code.

In the previous testing based upon the 1968–9 data it was concluded that the results gave 'only limited support for some of the propositions made by Bernstein about the sociology of the school'. This must be endorsed by this more robust testing. There is little evidence of a patterned trend towards openness in secondary schools. Bernstein's theories have been generated independently of original research, and so are explanations of a presumed social reality, which has been shown here to be, in part, empirically false. Since the theories do not adequately explain the actual changes that have occurred in schools doubts must be expressed about Bernstein's

TABLE II *Product-moment correlations of variables (N=45)*

	Nos	*1968–9*	*1978–9*	*Difference*
IO/IO				
EO/EO	1/3	57*		
	2/3	43*	$\overline{26}$	+
IO/EO	2/3	36*		
EC/EC	1/3	$\overline{44}$*		
	1/5	46*		
	1/14	$\overline{47}$*		
	2/9	$\overline{20}$	31*	+
	3/10	33*	$\overline{09}$	+
	3/14	44*	$\overline{26}$	+
	4/14	$\overline{28}$	15	+
	5/7		56*	
	5/8		49*	
	5/11		47*	
	5/12		48*	
	6/7	33*		
	6/9	41*		
	6/10		48*	
	6/11	30*	58*	
	6/12		44*	
	6/14		49*	
	7/8		43*	
	7/9		31*	
	7/10	34*		
	7/12		37*	
	8/10	35*		
	8/11		35*	
	8/12	38*	70*	+
	9/10	34*		
	9/11	30*		
	9/12		44*	
	10/11		30*	
	10/12		33*	
	10/14		46*	
	11/12	32*	37*	
	11/14		30*	
IC/IC	1/2	37*	$\overline{18}$	+
	1/3	33*		
	1/4	08	$\overline{46}$*	+
	2/3		31*	
	2/4	$\overline{23}$	28	+
	3/5	$\overline{33}$*		
	5/6	59*	11	+
IC/EC	1/4		48*	
	2/9	$\overline{21}$	27	+
	3/5	30*		
	3/7	42*		
	4/1	44*		

TABLE II (cont.)

	Nos	*1968–9*	*1978–9*	*Difference*
(IC/EC)	4/12	30*		
	5/6	29	24	+
	5/8		32*	
	5/11	35*	24	+
	6/1	39*	26	+
	6/2	13	32*	+
	6/4	35*		
	6/6	36*		
	6/10	07	50*	+
IC/IO	1/1	72*	04	+
	2/1	31*	42*	
	3/1	32*		
EC/EO	1/2	40*	21	+
	3/2	34*		
	3/3	34*		
	4/1	30*		
	4/2		45*	
	4/3	21	22	+
	9/2	08	40*	+
	12/2	26	17	+
	14/3	33*		
EC/IO	4/1	39*		
	6/2	02	52*	+
	8/2	29*	23	+
	11/2		32*	
	12/2	36*	28	+
	14/2	22	26	+
IC/EO	1/2		41*	
	3/1	37*		
	4/2	30*		

NB. Correlations omit decimal points

*Statistically significant at the 5% level or higher

+Difference significant at the 5% level or higher

Legend: As Table I

basically adaptive view of educational change, as a response to presumed changes in homologous, superordinate external structures, including the division of labour and the basis of social solidarity.[8] It also suggests that the real existence of the mediators of change, the educational knowledge codes, is at best doubtful, and that their application to the sociology of the school is hypostatic.

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TABLE III *Summary of results*

First Order Correlations	*Number of statistically significant correlations*				*Conclusion theory:*	*Number of correlations statistically significantly*		*Conclusion theory:*
	1968–9		*1978–9*			*Larger in 1978–9*	*Smaller in 1978–9*	
	+ve	*+ve*	*+ve*	*−ve*				
IO/IO	0	0	0	0		0	0	
EO/EO	2	0	0	0	Denied	0	1	Denied
IO/EO	1	0	0	0	Denied	0	0	
IC/IC	3	1	1	1	Confirmed	1	3	Confirmed
EC/EC	12	2	20	0	Denied	3	2	Denied
IC/EC	8	0	4	0	Confirmed	3	3	
IC/IO	0	3	0	1	Denied	1	0	Denied
EC/EO	3	2	1	1	Confirmed	2	2	
EC/IO	2	1	0	2	Confirmed	0	4	Confirmed
IC/EO	1	1	0	1	Confirmed	0	0	

Legend: As Table I

NOTES

1. R. A. King, 'Bernstein's Sociology of the School: Some Propositions Tested', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 27, no. 4, December, 1976, pp. 430–43.

2. R. A. King, *School Organisation and Pupil Involvement*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.

3. The research was supported by the Social Science Research Council.

4. The basic figure appears in, B. B. Bernstein, 'A Brief Account of the Theory of Codes', in, *Social Relationships and Language*, edited by V. Lee, Bletchley, Open University, 1973, as a 'Postcript' in B. B. Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control*, vol. 1, 2nd edition, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, and as Appendix B to 'Sources of Consensus and Disaffection in Education', in B. B. Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control*, vol. 3, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

5. A further pair of concepts, visible and invisible pedagogies, have been introduced by Bernstein in relation to pre-school and infant education. See, 'Class and Pedagogies: Visible and Invisible', in *Class, Codes and Control*, vol. 3, op. cit. (4).

For a comment, see R. A. King, 'The Search for the "Invisible" Pedagogy', *Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 3, (September 1979), pp. 443–58.

6. For details see King (1976) and King (1973), op. cit. (1) and (2). Not all schools in the 1978–9 sample had prefects so that the Prefect eliteness variable — the proportion of eligible pupils made prefects — was excluded.

7. See Table IV.

8. B. B. Bernstein, 'On the Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge', in *Class, Codes and Control*, vol. 1 and 3, op. cit. (4).

TABLE IV

	1968–9		*1978–9*	
	mean	*(S.D)*	*mean*	*(S.D)*
Standardization of instrumental performance	1.6	(1.9)	3.7	(0.9)
Ritualization of ability specialized expressive activities	1.5	(1.5)	0.5	(1.0)
Extent of non-streaming	21.3	(29.7)	44.3	(41.5)
Extent of setting	68.9	(35.1)	82.3	(20.3)
Number of activities arranged for parents	2.4	(1.3)	3.4	(1.0)

Differences between means significant at the 5% level or above

POVERTY*

Peter Townsend's book moves social policy analysis back to the central track of social structure and social stratification. At the same time it raises key issues for the conduct of the social services and economic policy. It is a marvellous book, expanding and deepening the tradition from which it comes – a tradition of avowed commitments, detailed data analysis and policy concerns. It does not appear at a propitious time for fanning interest in the perils of poverty but it may prove to be an inescapable obstacle in attempts to avoid the recognition that advanced capitalist societies contain many suffering people.

DEFINING AND FINDING POVERTY

How many are suffering? That depends on how society wishes to define poverty. Townsend pursues the noble objective of putting the conceptualization and definition of poverty in the context of social stratification, not just offering falsely precise delineations of poverty and near-poverty.

The official poverty line in both Britain and the United States claims to be based on a subsistence level of living. As Townsend in the present book and he, Abel-Smith, and Martin Rein have shown, the definition of poverty lines is both arbitrary and capricious.[1] A series of income lines adjusted for different household characteristics (number, age) and only slowly modified over the years is bound to be inadequate if our task is to understand or affect the plight of the poor.

One reason for this is that income is a poor (if necessary) indicator for stratification purposes because of its considerable variability. For example in a panel study of an American national sample, it was found that over an eight-year period 25.1 per cent were in poverty at any time, but only 1.1 per cent were in poverty for the whole eight-year period. In the same years, 7.8 per cent of all individuals were in the

*P. Townsend, *Poverty in the United Kingdom: A Survey of Household Resources and Standards of Living*, Allen Lane Books, 1979, 1216 pp., £15.00 (£7.95 paper).

lowest quintile for all eight years while 35.5 per cent were in that quintile in at least one year of the period. Only a quarter of the sample were in the same quintile in each year.[2]

Income variation also occurs within a year. In 1970, of families in Denver included in an income maintenance experiment because their annual incomes were below the poverty line, only slightly more than half (52.1 per cent) were below the poverty line in each of the twelve months. This study showed that 30 per cent of families that were classified as non-poor, on the basis of their annual income, were below the poverty line for that household type during that year for one or more months.[3] A major reason for moving below or above the poverty line was change in the size of the household unit. Thus, a death in the family automatically raises the income (and social stratification) position of the family, if income is constant.[4]

Some have chosen to interpret this variability – the fact that many are below the poverty line only at times during a year or over a longer period – as that poverty is a 'sometime thing', not disadvantaging people very much, for it is only a temporary condition for some. The Townsend conclusion is different as we shall see.

Townsend attempts to put the conceptualizing and counting of poverty directly in the context of social stratification by introducing the concept of 'relative deprivation standard'. Relative deprivation occurs when there is a significant disjuncture between the living conditions of many or most in society and a population that might be denoted as poor. Townsend's relative deprivation standard is a manifestation of quantitative differences becoming qualitative as Galbraith described it. 'People are poverty-stricken when their income, even if adequate for survival, falls markedly behind that of the community'.[5] Townsend presents a series of ingenious, specific, life-rooted indicators 'to provide an estimate of objective poverty on the basis of a level of deprivation disproportionate to resources.' It is different to be poor: '. . . misery – as poor people understand very well – is degrading.'[6] Townsend's indicators show how deprivation affects daily life; poverty is not a minor cold, temporarily irritating, leaving no telling marks. It infects all of life, the humiliatingly small as well as the debilitatingly large.

By Townsend's measure of relative deprivation many more people are poor than by the official count. Townsend's deprivation study transcends the economistic biases of much poverty research by introducing the sociological effects of poverty as indicators of poverty rather than only gross measures of personal or household income. This standard is a more compelling way of measuring the extent of poverty[7] than a poverty line, fixed in terms of income for various household combinations, and only adjusted for changes in the prices of the basket of goods and services purportedly purchased by the average poor household. For example, in the US, the poverty line

was compiled – in what many believe was a calculated politically-attuned decision – as $3,000 in 1959 for a family of four; this level turned out to be 49 per cent of the median family income for that family type. Since then, the line has been adjusted for price changes only; median family income has risen more sharply. The result is that the poverty line in 1974 was only 34 per cent of median income.[8] The poor are further below the standards of society today than they were in 1960. This way of drawing the poverty line decreases the number who are classified as poor. On the other hand, if half the median income is used as the measure of poverty, the percentage of the US population living below the poverty line has not declined in twenty years.

Where we think the poverty line begins affects how many are below it, how far below it they are, and how many are near to poverty conditions. It also affects the characteristics of the poor and near-poor. Townsend underplays the importance of the level of poverty lines for the characteristics of the poor. The lower the poverty line (i.e. the more extreme the poverty), the less that the poor are like the average family. This point is important for policy as well as for analysis. Most of Townsend's tables are about the incidence or frequency of poverty in a particular risk-population (e.g., the aged); few tables are about the *composition* of the poverty population, i.e., how many of the poor have a particular characteristic. The composition issue is usually the more important policy question.

The delineation of poverty is not a 'scientific exercise'. It is at base a value issue, as are most questions of statistics.[9] Townsend's attempt to find a scientific poverty threshold is laudable but still heavily influenced by values. It is his definition of poverty that makes his relative deprivation standard possible and 'scientific'. Townsend therefore may be overstressing his *objective* relative deprivation for subjective elements are important in the condition of isolation, separation from the mainstream. As Tawney taught, inequality is about personal relations, personhood, communication and community. More recently, Edward Thompson has taken Marxian class analysis out of its property-occupation rigidities and defined class as a question of relationships not of points in an abstracted occupational structure.[10] The Thompson injunction is difficult to carry through in concrete analysis; Townsend goes a way with it by showing how people are cut off by poverty. True, Townsend's indicators are about isolation from friends and family not from bosses and establishments. Although he does not deal with Thompson's main issue of power relationships, Townsend extends the concern with class-as-relationship by looking at the interactions with family and friends. The destruction of social bonds and ties can be a hallmark of some positions within a class structure.

Townsend's analysis of poverty as an issue of social stratification

has a second bow. His major way of analysing data is through demographic characteristics (e.g., age, disability, one-parent family) along the life cycle. By presenting life-cycle changes as affecting the risks of falling into poverty, Townsend informs the reader of the likelihood that most of us at some point in our lives stand a good chance of moving below a poverty line. Poverty, then, is not the condition of a few but a risk threatening the many at various points during their life-times. This view increases the likelihood of political attention to poverty.[11] Townsend made the life-cycle point in his 1954 article and it continues to be important in his analysis in the present book.[12]

The life-cycle approach, despite its apparent usefulness, bears several difficulties. Although Townsend wants to pose issues of poverty in the context of social stratification, the life-cycle approach, at least at its first level, does not involve social stratificational issues. Rather, it is a question of social structure generally. What is needed is to thread a class analysis through the life-cycle analysis, i.e., how does the life-cycle situation appear in different class groupings? Then, the life-cycle model can connect to social stratification, particularly if Townsend were to delineate more sharply his stages of the life-cycle in different classes. This suggests, as Townsend points out, that research on poverty must endeavour to include the institutions and relationships of society that produce or reinforce poverty.

All phase analyses, including the life-cycle, are troubling. They do not explain how movement occurs from one stage or phase to another. The phases are usually unconnected for as one phase leaves the stage, another somehow appears. It is important then to show how a phase leads to its successor. For example, how does being poor as a child lead to the particular vicissitudes of the adolescent or young adult? How does being raised poor and in limited educational circumstances in the Bourdieu orientation lead to the deprivation of social capital which entraps one at the bottom of the occupational ladder? The connection between the stages has to be elaborated in future research.

One way of interpreting the life-cycle-analysis as stratification-analysis would be to adopt Ossowski's conceptualization of 'inequality without stratification'. Ossowski argues that obvious and deep inequalities are not carried systematically through the family over generations.[13] By stressing the life-cycle analysis of poverty a rough fit to Ossowski's theoretical model can be made. Townsend, however, does find class-based intergenerational poverty. Townsend's data challenge Ossowski's interpretation of stratification forces but they also demonstrate that a straightforward class analysis is not sufficient if we wish to understand the nature of poverty.

There is great variability at each level of society and in the number

of levels of society and their particularity. The class issue is not the only or necessarily the main source of differentiation at a specific level (e.g., class factors may have less direct influence on the fate of the very poor than they do on the fate of the very rich). Ethnicity, race and sex are other important sources of variability within the various stratification levels of society.

The risk of poverty is much greater for some sub-groups in the population. In the American analysis of poverty, two important sub-groups have been the working poor and female-headed households. Townsend also finds these two groups as well as the aged and disabled over-represented among those living in poverty. The prevalence of poverty among the aged is pronounced and disturbing particularly when inflation is a permanent threat to those on fixed incomes.

What sociological as well as poverty analyses are slowly discovering is that they are both largely about women. A majority of the aged are women because of their enhanced longevity. Female-headed families are about females. Hilary Rose has made the ignored point that social policy is largely about women as wives, widows, mothers, workers, care-takers of households and that urban and community sociology as well as family sociology and increasingly the sociology of work are (or have to be) about women.[14] So is political sociology – the militants of European urban social movements are disproportionately women. The social networks which are important in community analysis are mainly maintained by women. As Townsend found when he did his specific analyses, class analysis must be at least supplemented by demographic variables, especially sex and age. For example, whether or not the wife works has a deep effect on the living standards of a family.

POLICY

Townsend's final policy recommendations do not flow from the analysis but are informed by a larger political economy perspective that includes the dominant institutions of society. The life-cycle analysis does not permeate the last chapter on policy although it is important in earlier chapters which conclude on needed changes in the transfer system. The final chapter is a bold and welcome departure from the usual social policy recommendations. These prescriptions usually ask for improvements in the cash-and non-cash transfer systems on the Titmussian assumption that public social policy could and should offset the inequalities and poverties generated by the market system. Townsend moves beyond social policy's traditional reliance on that approach. He criticizes the dependence on taxes to provide funds for inequality-reducing transfers. That way

encounters great resistance from many tax-payers. Rather, he seeks a more equal wage and subsidy/transfer system through a national incomes board which would simultaneously establish both wage and transfer payments, with a mandate to move towards greater equality. The important conclusion is that the promise of the tax and transfer systems alone in righting inequalities is unfulfillable. We would argue that it is achievable neither economically nor politically.[15]

Townsend has indeed transcended the pieties and aspirations of welfare-state reform. We believe that the long-term recommendations must go further. Townsend seeks to affect the basic process of distribution, not only the character of transfer payments, the usual province of social policy. This is a preventive orientation, seeking to reduce the production of inequalities rather than hoping for their softening through re-distribution. What is needed is to affect the very processes of production which affect distributive shares, not waiting until the point of distribution to try to affect through command decisions what gets distributed to whom.

What is produced and how it is produced affects who gets what. Industries with high use of capital goods are going to yield a higher share to the owners of capital than industries with a lower use of capital. Industries which depend on a few employees doing highly intricate tasks and many workers performing routine tasks will have a wider dispersion of wages than where jobs combine both high and low skill tasks.[16]

The effort then to achieve greater equality has to reach beyond the points of distribution to the processes and ingredients of production. The content of GNP – what is produced – and how it is produced generates the distribution of income. Ultimately, a more equal distribution of income requires a more equal division of labour, one which avoids concentrating all the positive tasks on one group and paying them higher wages than those who bear the more negative aspects of jobs.[17] As Harry Braverman, David Noble, Kathy Stone, and others are showing, the utilization of technology is not immutable and simply technically determined; nor has the division of labour ever been a simple function of technology and rationality.[18]

Keynesianism and Beveridge welfare statism were attractive because they could handle some of the basic economic and political predicaments of postwar Britain – the need to maintain demand, improve growth, provide full employment, assure public peace. The search for greater equality, if it is to be successful, must also connect with the current, broad, economic problems of stagflation in Britain. As will be learned, overall stimulation of investment will not be adequate as capital flows out of the country and speculation mounts inside. Expansion of particular industries, selective controls over imports and investments and the like will be important, even if restricted. The content of GNP and of investment are the significant

factors. Selectivity of production, if it emerges, could connect with an agenda of greater equality. Employment, equality, appropriate employment, useful exports must be connected. That requires activity at the points of production, not only at the moments of distribution or redistribution. Though distributive and redistributive policies will remain important and useful, they cannot be assigned the full task of greater equality.

This orientation applies if one seeks much greater equality within a somewhat altered capitalist framework or if one seeks a socialist society. For the latter does not guarantee greater equality. It can make any forms of it more likely and easier to achieve. But greater equality – economically and socially, politically too – seems to require a facilitating economic and political structure.[19]

Townsend's break with the orthodoxies of past social administration policy recommendations is courageous and significant. It will have to go further.

CONCLUSION

'The paradox of poverty amid affluence' and the periodic 'rediscovery of poverty' indicate that industrial societies do not understand how poverty is produced and maintained – by the basic processes of production and reproduction. Economic change – the increases in the number of transitions – burdens some people while improving the situations of others or even many. The reduction of certain barriers and cleavages may create new forms of stratification. De-stratifications do not permanently prevent re-stratifications. Quantity is not quality; the unanticipated and hidden may be the important; class is about inequalities and relationships not level or cardinal scales or even status congruence.

These are old social science wisdoms. We do not have a theory which encompasses them but Peter Townsend forces us to pay attention not only to the plight of individuals but to the needed flight of theory. Townsend has not fully solved the theoretical nor policy problems but he has tried. He should be paid homage for taking on the herculean and doing well. For if we do not honour our Townsends, the intellectually and politically brave would envy the cowards. A book of this comprehensiveness does not exist for the US and we Americans envy the British academic and political worlds which have an important and exciting work, a challenge to conservative and neo-conservative mythologizing, with which they must deal.

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NOTES

1. P. Townsend, *The Concept of Poverty*, London, Heineman, 1970; B. Abel-Smith and C. Bagley, 'The Problem of establishing equivalent standards of living for families of different composition' in Townsend, *The Concept of Poverty*; M. Rein, 'Problems in the definition of measurement of poverty' in Ferman, *et al.* (eds) *Poverty in America: A Reader*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1968.

2. The data are from the panel study of income dynamics supervised by James N. Morgan of the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan and published in many volumes under the general title of *Five Thousand American Families – Patterns of Economic Progress* by the Institute. We have relied on Van S. Puryear, 'The Underclass in the US: Some Conceptual and Statistical Dimensions', a graduate class paper, Department of Sociology, Boston University, May, 1980, as a guide to volumes I and II. The data are standardized for family composition in each year.

3. *The Measure of Poverty, A Report to Congress as Mandated by the Education Amendments of 1974*, Washington: US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, April, 1976, pp. 98–9.

4. We have interchangeably used family and household. The delineation of the two is crucial in defining the relevant unit whose income is above or below the poverty line for its characteristics.

5. J. K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*, Boston, Houghton and Mifflin, 1958, p. 323.

6. Neal Ascherson, 'The morose revolution', *New York Review of Books*, 14 May 1978, p. 18.

7. We say 'compelling' rather than 'accurate' for the latter word connotes a process of precision rather than an act of values and compassion. A precise indicator of this type is a difficult objective that Townsend himself does not yet claim.

8. *The Measure of Poverty, op. cit.*, p. 72; Table 7.

9. Mary Joe Bane concludes Appendix C of Christopher Jencks *et al.*, *Inequality*, New York, Basic Books, 1972, p. 358, by asserting that five different statistics applied to the same data give somewhat different results. There is no mathematical basis for preferring one statistic to another.

10. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, New York, Pantheon, 1964, pp. 9–10.

11. The committed social policy analyst faces a dilemma. On one hand, it is important to discourage the mode of thinking which portrays the poor as psychologically or even familially different from the rest of society. For when that happens, they are frequently regarded as unworthy of public aid or as degraded. On the other hand, the poor do need special attention and often particularized assistance. Universalizing their condition may reduce attention to the ones who are in greater need: particularizing their suffering and needs may lead to stigmatization and dependency.

12. Peter Townshend, 'The meaning of poverty', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 130–7.

13. S. Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, London, Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1963.

14. H. Rose, 'Towards a feminist political economy of welfare', an unpublished paper at the World Congress of Sociology, the Research Committee on Poverty and Policy of the International Sociological Association, Uppsala, September, 1978.

15. S. M. Miller and M. Rein, 'Can Income redistribution work?', *Social Policy*, vol. 6, May/June, 1975, pp. 3–18.

16. Social factors as well as supply and demand, skill and the technical division of labour are important. For example, the Work Laboratory at the

University of Aix-en-Provence has shown that French factories producing the same products as German with roughly the same technology have a wider dispersion of wages. This result seems due to the social-political fact that the French factories demarcate more job classifications than do the German. The point is similar to Boudon's conclusion that the greater the number of transition or branching points in a school system, the more difficult it is for people to complete the school cycle. Raymond Boudon, *Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1974, pp. 107–9.

17. See the discussion of 'task equality' in S. M. Miller, 'Types of equality: sorting, rewarding, performing', in Ashline, *et al.*, *Education, Inequality and National Policy*, Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1975.

18. H. Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, New York, Monthly Review, 1974; D. Noble, *America by Design – Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism*, New York, Knopf, 1977: K. Stone, 'The origin of job structure in the steel industry', *Review of Radical Political Economics*, vol. 6, no. 2, Summer 1974, pp. 113–73.

19. Marx understood the issue and frequently asserted in various writings that production is distribution. 'The structure of distribution is completely determined by the structure of production. The specific kind of participation in production determines the specific form of distribution.' (p. 95) 'A definite production thus determines a definite consumption, distribution, and exchange . . . ' (p. 99) Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, translated by Martin Nicolaus, New York, Vintage, 1973.

Peter Townsend was one of the members of the group around Richard Titmuss who 'rediscovered' poverty in Britain in the early sixties. This was at a time when the dominant orthodoxy among social democrats of the centre (both politicians and academics) held that full employment, the provisions of the 'welfare state' and the steady growth of g.n.p. would eventually eliminate poverty and also, inexorably, produce greater equality. Townsend's particular contributions were first to articulate his view that poverty can be 'defined objectively and applied consistently only in terms of the concept of relative deprivation'; second to describe the nature of poverty in Britain in the sixties and seventies and to lay bare the inadequacy of existing social policies; third, building on the framework first supplied by Titmuss, to provide a more comprehensive account of the complex systems by which resources, in the broadest sense of the term, are allocated to individuals in modern capitalist societies. The present volume is the apotheosis of this intellectual development.

It is, indeed, an encyclopaedic study of 1,200 pages. The central core of 'new' data is the result of a national survey of 2,500 households which Townsend and his colleagues conducted in 1968–69, but it is richly elaborated by other material from official sources and academic studies. In addition to global estimates of the incidence of poverty on the basis of different definitions, there are individual chapters dealing with the problems of particular groups – (the unemployed, low paid, older workers, disabled, one parent families)

and the bare statistics are brought to life by personal accounts of particular families, both 'rich' and 'poor'.

One of the most original and time-consuming aspects of the research was the attempt to measure resources as comprehensively as possible and to include not only financial resources as traditionally conceived, but also the fringe benefits of employment, state benefits in kind, and environmental resources. The Appendices provide the detailed descriptions of the sample selections and of the various methods of estimation used.

A great irony of timing is that the study – a long time in the making, as Townsend admits – was published in October 1979, six months after the return of Mrs. Thatcher's conservative government. In the eighteen months since then we have witnessed a frontal attack on the very social policies which Townsend criticizes as already inadequate. The numbers of unemployed have increased dramatically, social insurance benefits are not to be increased fully in line with prices, whilst the once sacred 'insurance' principle is yet again jettisoned with the elimination of earnings-related unemployment benefit and the proposal to make employers responsible for the payment of the first eight weeks of sickness benefit. These measures have led to the first cash cuts in national insurance benefits since the thirties. A final retreat from any conception of 'minimum rights for the many' as Townsend would call it, is marked by the new rules published by the Social Security Advisory Committee which have all the hall marks of a return to a principle of 'less eligibility'. Far, therefore, from the general picture painted by Townsend having been improved by the passage of time, the situation is now worse.

Nevertheless, passionate, caring and painstaking though this book is, it lacks an essential theoretical cutting edge which would enable us to carry further our understanding of the nature and causes of poverty. There are three respects upon which I shall concentrate. The first is Townsend's definition of poverty and his closely linked equivocal conceptualization of poverty in relation to inequality. The second is his failure to address comprehensively the importance of the ideological underpinnings of different views about inequality. The third is the weakness of his prescriptions for the elimination of poverty.

Townsend made an important contribution to the analysis of poverty in his elaboration of a relative concept – that condition where individuals 'lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary or at least widely encouraged or approved in the societies to which they belong'. But there are a number of problems with this approach which receive inadequate attention in the present study. For example, we may ask whether there is not room in our conceptualization of poverty for both an absolute (or

nutritional) poverty standard as well as a relative (or cultural) standard? The arguments for such a view are powerfully advanced by A. K. Sen in *Three notes on the concept of poverty*, I.L.O., 1978. – 'There is an irreducible core, of absolute deprivation in our idea of poverty which translates reports of starvation, malnutrition and visible hardship into a diagnosis of poverty without having to ascertain first the relative picture. The approach of relative deprivation supplements rather than competes with this concern with absolute dispossession'.

Then again, should there not be more discussion of the implications of adopting a relative standard in societies where the general level of living is increasing over time? For are we not in danger of finding that the poor are always with us? Both the sixth report of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (*Lower Incomes*, Cmnd. 7175, H.M.S.O. 1978) and the study by Fieghan *et al.* (G. C. Fieghan, P. S. Lansley and A. D. Smith, *Poverty and Progress in Britain 1953-73*, C.U.P., 1977), showed that the real incomes of the poor in Britain over a fifteen-year period (1961-76) had generally increased in line with the national increase in living standards. These reports also showed that the application of a *constant* poverty standard over time would reveal a very marked decline in the numbers in poverty over this same period, but still not a complete elimination. These are important issues which deserve fuller evaluation than they receive in this study.

But if we wish to use a relative definition is it possible to arrive at a measure of resources which encapsulates a 'cultural' definition of poverty? The supplementary benefit standard which has been traditionally used in this country in poverty studies, by Townsend and others (and also makes its appearance in this work), is itself relative. As a result of political decisions the supplementary benefits long-term scale rate was for some years linked to the increase in average earnings. But in origin it is a purely arbitrary standard stemming from post-war decisions, and is a poverty standard in only an administrative or political sense. Townsend recognizes this and attempts to construct a new, 'deprivation standard' or poverty measure.

On the basis of detailed questioning of his sample individuals were scored on certain aspects of situation and behaviour, e.g. whether they had a cooked breakfast on most days of the week, had a holiday away from home in the last year, ate fresh meat as often as four days a week, had a Sunday joint, had sole use of certain housing amenities, etc. Townsend argues that there is a high correlation between this summary index and a much wider range of indicators of deprivation compiled in the research. The score of the summary index was then plotted against net household income and a cut off point obtained,

below which the index of deprivation rose disproportionately. The level of income at the cut off point then supplied the 'deprivation standard of poverty'. On this measure Townsend found no less than a quarter of households in poverty in 1969 compared with only 7 per cent according to the supplementary benefit standard. The problem is, however, that the content of his index is both arbitrary and restrictive and does not derive from any systematic observation of what is 'customary'. Yet such observations are possible. The sophisticated analysis of large samples of expenditure and behaviour patterns would yield the necessary data. It is in this direction that experiments are badly needed if we are to describe meaningfully the condition of poverty in terms of prevailing notions of minimum standards and relative deprivation.

A further problem remains. To assert that a quarter of the population are in poverty surely requires more elucidation than Townsend provides. One missing dimension is any discussion of the amount of dispersion below the poverty line. There is all the difference in the world between a society where 10 per cent of the population are below the poverty line, but where all who are below it are there by only a small margin, and one where the 10 per cent are distributed very far below the line. But beyond this if as many as one in four households have resources below a standard supposed to represent that which is customary in the society, we might reasonably expect a fuller account of what determines 'custom'.

This problem is, in turn, closely related to Townsend's ambiguous treatment of the concept of poverty in relation to inequality. He uses these terms almost synonymously and in the historical chapter on poverty much of the data is about the shape of the income distribution. But to quote Sen again, 'Inequality and poverty are not, of course, unrelated. But they are not synonymous: nor can either subsume the other . . . economic equality – even broadly defined – cannot begin to capture all the uncomfortable issues of conflict implicit in poverty. The notion of poverty relates to deprivation with respect to norms that involve . . . going into such concepts as "rights", "entitlements" and "exploitation".' (Sen 1978, p. 9).

But this ambiguity in Townsend's approach is, I believe, related to his apparent lack of interest in the ideological basis for support for, or objections to, poverty and to inequality. At the end of this volume we are no clearer than at the beginning about what degree of inequality in access to resources, if any, Townsend would find acceptable, nor on what basis he would seek to justify his position. Yet in a society where there is less and less consensus about the outcome of the existing system of resource distribution it becomes ever more necessary to lay bare not only the nature, extent and consequences of existing *inequality* but what the advantages of greater *equality* would be. To many it would appear that those advantages

transcend the elimination of poverty, but this view is increasingly under attack.

Finally, we come to Townsend's programme for reforms. Here we find a disjunction between, on the one hand, his claim to locate his analysis of poverty in class 'structuration' and, on the other hand, the nature of the policy measures which he proposes. For they are not directed at control of the system which generates income from productive activity but at the abolition of 'excessive wealth' and 'excessive income'. I do not wish to imply that any single one or combination of his suggested measures might not be useful or important steps to be taken by a government committed to eliminating poverty or reducing inequality. But the last thirty years teaches us that deeper analysis is required. For despite the great demographic, social and economic change of this period, and despite, at times quite strong political pressures, as Townsend himself here helps to demonstrate, the position of the poor remains relatively unchanged. Their social characteristics are the same. At best they have shared in the general improvement in living standards, and that position has only been achieved as the result of considerable mobilization of public opinion. Today it is remarkable how little opposition has been voiced against the recent measures to remove even this guarantee of advance for the poor.

Slowly it is becoming apparent that the totality of the complex system of state intervention to redistribute resources through taxes and benefits, produces results both intended but also unintended. Moreover, the state system is only a part of the total resource allocation system of capitalist society as Townsend himself here argues, but forgets, apparently, when it comes to policy recommendation, where he remains within a traditional framework. Further research to establish the nature of the linkages and to increase our understanding of the effect of public attitudes and of political advocacy, is badly needed before policy measures commensurate with the problems can be formulated. It is to be hoped that it is in this direction that Townsend will now direct his efforts.

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The Nature of Sympathy
Max Scheler Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 (reprint) 274pp. £10.50

Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge
Max Scheler Rutledge & Kegan Paul 1980 239 pp. £9.50

We can do with translations of M. Scheler's major works because interest in continental thought, particularly on the philosophy of the social sciences, is increasing. To English readers Scheler's intricate and original ideas should prove stimulating precisely because they are unfamiliar and even unacceptable. As a sociologist he is, certainly, of the armchair variety relying on analyzing and speculating about familiar facts or data drawn from his enormous reading of history, science, psychology and sociology. Freud, McDougall, M. Weber, Simmel, Toennies, Sombart and Marx are among the authors he draws upon. His aim is to analyze the forces at work in society and assess the qualities of Western civilization as a whole. It is no accident, though, that he is as much a philosopher as a sociologist, for he firmly believed that both cognitive and moral claims can, and must, be based on metaphysics (a knowledge of ultimate reality).

The work on sympathy includes 'phenomenological analyses' of such mental states as love, sympathy and empathy which provide a basis for re-examining different moral theories as well as questions about the understanding of other people. The second book, which did so much to pioneer the idea of a sociology of knowledge, emphasizes that there are different kinds of knowledge such as scientific, religious and metaphysical and then traces their respective origins, their relations to each other and their links with social and political forces. The Marxist theory of ideology is among the views critically examined.

Scheler's theories are varied and subtle, his arguments intricate. No summary can do justice to them and it is useful to have the works available in full. The question is, how well this purpose is served by these two volumes.

The Nature of Sympathy which originally appeared in 1954 and has since been out of print is excellently translated by Peter Heath. It also has a very helpful introduction by Werner Stark. Such introductions tend – perhaps inevitably – to be a little sweeping. When one reads about the moral theories of 'the Kantians' or 'Kant's disciples' one wonders who is included, whether they all agreed with each other and why they appear to diverge from Kant in an unexplained way. However, Stark writes clearly, purposefully and knowledgeably. The newly produced book on the sociology of knowledge is much less satisfactory. Professor M. S. Frings' translation is poor; its cumbersome style, inaccuracies and barely comprehensible neologisms present a major obstacle to understanding what is an intrinsically difficult work. Here, to substantiate such a serious criticism, are a few examples. 'With world' (p. 71) only has meaning for someone who remembers that it is the literal translation of an ordinary German word for the world of one's fellowmen. 'Lived body' remained a mystery until I

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discovered that it was supposed to translate what in the German text is 'one's own body'. The 'life' in 'life-communal' (p. 123) is not only superfluous but puzzling and misleading. 'Ingenious' (p. 156) is only a correct translation in its now obsolete sense of 'endowed with genius'. 'Hierarchical law' mistranslates the German term which refers to order without specifying a particular kind. In other cases the English sounds all right but sounds unlikely. Could Scheler really have said, that, in the case of Galileo and G. Bruno 'the ecclesiastical authorities fell into the hands of philosophy and science'? (p. 86). If this is wrong what other mistranslations may have slipped in? It is, I know, difficult to translate such difficult German works faithfully and yet intelligibly but Professor Frings appears to achieve the worst of all possible worlds.

Neither is the introduction by K. W. Steckers, also the editor, as clear, systematic and helpful as one could wish. The trouble is I think that he has not stood back enough from the work in order to decide what needs explaining. When, for example, he uses such a phrase as 'the coming to be of vital urge' (p.15) it sounds like a bad translation rather than an illuminating comment in English. It is a great pity that this intrinsically important work has not been served better by its translator and editor.

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Seasonal Variations of the Eskimo: A Study in Social Morphology
M. Mauss Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 138 pp. £6.95

Sociology and Psychology: Essays
M. Mauss Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 135 pp. £6.95

Seasonal Variations is rather more than its title declares: it must surely be the first (1905) thoroughgoing functionalist account of any social system: although Mauss starts from the movements of seals to explain the concurrent movement of people he concludes that is not sufficient to explain the total social phenomenon. For Eskimos maintained their distinctive technology in different ecological circumstances; they conducted their ritual and economic lives during the periods of concentrated settlement with an intensity which cannot be explained simply by the migrations of animals. Rather, and this is an outstanding example of Mauss' characteristic principled imaginative leaps from the particular to the general, 'social life does violence to the minds and bodies of individuals . . . there comes a point when they must slow down and withdraw from it'; the alternation of hyperactivity with relative dissociation is a general phenomenon, observable in all societies. At least two of the four lectures included in the second book are of major importance. 'Bodily techniques' (1934, Brewster's translation already published elsewhere) argues that the diversity of ways in which we use our bodies (walking, running, jumping, standing still) can only be explained by socialization. Even after fifty years the lecture retains its excitement of discovery as Mauss describes how he came to create the argument. 'The notion of person, the notion of "self"' (1938) is similarly a seminal *tour de force*, arguing that the social expression of identity varies between status and contract societies; that the notion of sacredness of the individual is the historical product in particular of Christianity and in general presumably of religions with a doctrine of personal salvation.

The other two essays read rather oddly nowadays. The 'relations between sociology and psychology' are not as Mauss prospected them, partly because the two disciplines have changed so much since 1924. Mauss used reports of 'death by suggestion' and similar phenomena to illustrate the influence of society and psyche on health; if anthropologists no longer discuss this, it is partly because of the rebarbative language in which

the largely anecdotal evidence survives: natives are said to be extremely suggestible, and to have 'brains' in 'unstable equilibrium', and so on. Anthropologists at any rate in Britain have defined such matters as beyond their remit, although studies by psychologists of deaths consequent on bereavement in contemporary societies might lend some new respectability to the issues.

That raises a point about the production of Brewster's volume: the translator has done editorial work of stupefying detail, checking every reference in the original, correcting about a quarter of them, meticulously indicating each nuance of bibliographic certainty. But the intellectual commentary traditionally associated with these editions of *Année Sociologique* essays (now taken over by Routledge together with Cohen and West itself) is absent. Fox, in contrast, surveys the leading ideas, places them in the *oeuvre*, indicates later work, reviews the controversies. From this point of view, *Seasonal Variations*, in any case among Mauss' more considered work, serves the reader rather better than the occasional pieces which indeed reflect the exuberance of an irrepressibly fertile mind, but in two cases at least seem to need more than editorial apparatus.

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The Tragedy of Enlightenment
Paul Connerton Cambridge University Press 1980 162 pp. £10.50 (£3.50 paperback)

Although subtitled, An Essay on the Frankfurt School, this book is not, as the author warns us in the Preface, directly concerned with this school of thought as such. Nor should it be regarded as a comprehensive examination of Critical Theory. Rather, Connerton sets out to ask in relation to four thinkers generally considered most representative of critical theory (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas) what they mean by critique and the nature of the continuities and discontinuities in their investigations. The result is sometimes stimulating and intriguing but also confused and irritating.

Connerton's main thesis would appear to be that the Critical Theory of each of the thinkers has failed to deliver the goods. It is neither a fully coherent model, as the author claims is the paradigm of Marx's 'Critique of Political Economy', nor is it able to suggest a political practice relevant to contemporary society. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly there is a seeming inability to finally relinquish the Enlightenment philosophy of history. In addition, the German sociological response to the onset of capitalist industrialization contained particular and unique features. Together, Connerton argues, these set a framework in which the principles and problematics are, at the end of the day, contradictory to the critical enterprise. More specifically each individual writer, in attempting to tackle these issues, engenders particular problems in his own work.

Connerton develops these ideas through an analysis of some of the work of the four writers, particularly concentrating on themes emerging from Horkheimer's writings. Parts of this are interesting and useful expositions, as for example his consideration of Horkheimer's early essays, the 'Dialectic of Enlightenment' and the initial work of Habermas. Other aspects of the book are however lacking. Can we really take seriously for instance the charge that Habermas's use of the psychoanalytic model amounts to seeing 'a revolutionary struggle as a psychological treatment on a large scale' or the flimsy dismissal in ten pages of Marcuse's work as topological incoherence? Whilst the strength of the book lies in its exegetic powers, its weakness lies in its inability to follow through a myriad of themes and arguments in a coherent and articulate fashion. Many issues such as the notion of a critical public

and the importance of the socio-political context, particularly fascism, become obscured. The unnecessary repetition of certain arguments and ideas only serves to confuse the reader and render the final chapter, The Conclusion, completely redundant. The result then is disappointment that the arguments have not been elaborated or integrated but merely restated.

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Naturalism and Social Science: A Post-empiricist Philosophy of Social Science
David Thomas Cambridge University Press 1980, 213 pp. £12.50 (£4.95 paperback)

Here is a book to raise the spirits of naturalistic social scientists, who want the study of human society to satisfy the methodology of the natural sciences. Such people have been doubly challenged over the last two decades. Firstly, the positivist philosophy of science which used to serve as their model of scientific methodology has come under attack for being deficient in its analysis even of natural science. Secondly, within the social sciences it has been argued with increasing vigour that the meanings and values which pervade human affairs pose intractable problems for naturalism.

Thomas takes the view that the success of the first challenge has now been established but that this makes it easier to turn aside the second challenge, for arguments that succeed against positivism fail when applied to naturalism based on an alternative 'post-empiricist' philosophy of science, namely Mary Hesse's network model. His modest aim is to explore 'the implications which [this] specific naturalistic methodology has for the conduct of social study, without denying that there may be a viable non-naturalistic social study' (p. 94).

What Thomas concludes is, firstly, that the complexity of human life presents difficulties but not conceptual impossibilities to naturalism. Secondly, there are no significant differences in terms of meaning between the languages of social and of post-empiricist natural science. Thirdly, meanings, or actors' theories, as objects of social scientific study pose no special problems since they are potentially scientific and therefore can be accepted or rejected by social scientists in the same way as they assess other social scientists' theories. Fourthly, the study of society is scientific, but it must also be value-laden. This is because statements of post-empiricist theory are underdetermined by the world and values act as an extra criterion in our choice of social theory, it being a synthetic a priori truth that we find the concerns of social science morally relevant. Because moral considerations structure social scientific theories, 'it is both unreasonable and unfruitful to expect or to aim for the emergence of an exclusive social scientific theory' (p. 180).

To arrive at these conclusions, Thomas covers many issues that are important in contemporary philosophy of social science. Disappointingly, scientific realism is mentioned only obliquely, even though there have been a number of suggestions recently that it is realism as a philosophy of science that overcomes the defects of positivism and provides the basis for a new naturalism. Nevertheless, this is an enjoyable book. The argument is lively, perspicuous and free from jargon. Detailed discussions of realistic examples from the social science literature, especially sociology, are included so that sociologists reading the book do not feel like strangers to the analysis of their own subject.

Peter Halfpenny
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Quest for an American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the Chicago School
Fred H. Matthews McGill-Queen's University Press 1977 278 pp. n.p.

Matthews' study is a first-rate intellectual biography in which Park's life, and the historical events and intellectual trends likely to have affected him, are used to clarify both his ideas and the nature of his efforts to influence the development of sociology at Chicago and as a profession nationally. Matthews' familiarity with Park's entire *oeuvre*, including his newspaper articles and unpublished manuscripts, attests to the thoroughness of his survey. His use of Park's hitherto more or less unknown correspondence with his family, students and prominent contemporaries, such as Booker T. Washington for whom he worked at Tuskegee Institute, seems particularly appropriate in the investigation of this early advocate of 'attitude-revealing' human documents.

Matthews' success in the formidable task of constructing a view of the general perspective on group life and social change underlying Park's essays on particular topics, such as race and ethnic relations, is somewhat offset by less attention being paid to the complexity of his ideas, shifts in his concerns and changes in emphases in many of these areas.

Moreover, Matthews' interest in how Park's work reflects the 'variety of doctrines current in a confusing and overcrowded period in the history of social thought' overshadows a concern for either what was original and creative in Park's outlook, or the emergence of the innovative style of social research expressed in the monographs of his students. Thus, although Matthews has produced the best researched and most insightful study of Park to date, puzzlement regarding 'the rise and fall of the Chicago School' has by no means been put to rest.

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From Modernisation to Modes of Production
John G. Taylor Macmillan 1979 335 pp. £12.00 (£4.95 paper)

John Taylor's book is an ambitious attempt to provide a coherent theoretical framework for analysing the third world, based upon the concept of mode of production and of the articulation of two or more modes within determinate social formations. It tries at the same time to situate many of the conventional concerns of 'development' literature — industrialization, agrarian transformation, unemployment — within this overall system. For Taylor the necessity of such a new approach is underlined by the 'impasse' of the two main current approaches to development, orthodox sociology of development ('modernisation theory') and radical or neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment, and he criticizes each for what he sees as its theoretical weaknesses: the former for its unilinear optimism and the inherent limitations of structural functionalism; the latter for its economism and for the naïve belief that self-reliant economic development will occur once external capitalist influences have been removed.

As an alternative, Taylor argues that third world societies can be seen as marked by the complex combination of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production; these modes, theorized on the basis of an Althusserian approach, can be said to govern third world societies, with the capitalist mode gradually becoming dominant. He stresses the need to analyse both the forms of pre-capitalist social relations and the specific forms of capitalist penetration that operate under the dominance of foreign capital. Much of what is seen as characteristic of the peculiar social and economic problems of third world societies is the result of the articulation of various modes of production which produce a set of 'dislocations' between the political, ideological and economic levels of the social formation. Except in those cases where the conditions for a transition to socialism occur, the third world is condemned to a 'restricted and uneven' transition to capitalism, shaped by the require-

ments of imperialism on the one hand, and by the continued effectivity of non-capitalist modes and relations of production on the other.

Taylor's is an important book both for its critiques of prevailing theories of development and for the scope and rigour of the alternative advanced. The need for such an alternative, based on analysing the complex combination of internal social relations and external influences, has long been recognized, but the discussion has so far been dispersed in articles focussing on specific questions and scattered throughout the specialist literature. In drawing together and elaborating the insights of this recent work and in offering his own interpretation of how they can be unified into a coherent theory, Taylor's book will help to take the debate on development some way further. Yet his alternative has not transcended some of the on-going problems, which, despite his endeavours, remain unresolved.

In the first place there are reasons for doubting how far it can be said that third world societies as a whole are still marked by the articulation of modes of production each constituting a determinate social formation. This may have been true in the past, but a range of countries, from South Korea to Egypt, would seem to be ones where pre-capitalist modes have either dissolved or are so completely subordinated to capitalism that it is difficult to see how they could play any kind of *constitutive* role. Whilst 'survivals', 'elements' and 'divisions of labour' characteristic of pre-capitalist modes may persist in third world countries, these concepts require further theorization if they are to be of value; but even if they are adequately theorized, the presence of such 'survivals' does not amount to an articulation of *modes* of production. This latter concept may provide the starting point for the historical analysis of the third world but it does not seem to be one which provides the defining characteristic of *contemporary* third world formations.

As for external influences, at times Taylor treats 'imperialism' in too rudimentary a manner, so that it becomes virtually a unitary subject operating with foresight and deliberation upon a passive third world. Neither the complexity of the strategies and contradictory effects of advanced capitalist countries upon the third world, nor the active collaboration of local ruling classes within the third world itself are satisfactorily dealt with. The main difficulty with Taylor's use of the concept of imperialism is, however, that it is itself an adaptation from Lenin's texts of 1916 and Hilferding's *Finanzkapital.* Although his is a sophisticated re-interpretation of these theories, a more critical approach towards them is called for, and it would have been helpful had he included some discussion of the earlier more 'optimistic' accounts of the possibilities of capitalist development in the third world found in Marx's writings or in Lenin's *Development of Capitalism in Russia.* Whilst it is true that many of the problems identified by the classic theories of imperialism remain, the diversity of third world countries, and the substantial industrialization and/or improved market positions of some of them, have to find reflection in contemporary theoretical work. Taylor's analysis lacks this dynamic element, an absence compounded by the use of a selective and rather out-dated statistical base.

This problem indicates a weakness that affects more than his discussion of imperialism; for, despite his criticisms of 'under-development' theory, Taylor's book is still marked by some of the conventional empirical and theoretical assumptions of this school which exert an influence upon his text. This is evident in the rather too idealized picture of what capitalist 'development' involves, and against which the 'dislocations' and 'uneven' experiences of the third world appear too permanent; and we are therefore still presented with a theory that is too static and undifferentiated to resolve the conceptual problems that Taylor has begun to address. We can

perhaps look forward to some further clarification in the promised sequel to the present volume where Taylor will attempt to deploy his conceptual framework in the analysis of Indonesia.

Maxine D. Molyneux
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Education and Society in Modern Europe *Fritz Ringer* Indiana University Press 1979 370pp. £15.75

Fritz Ringer firmly corrects the single most pervasive error about educational expansion, namely that it was and is closely related to economic development. This obstinate assumption derives equally from technical-functionalism and vulgar marxism: 'economism' is only too alive and well in American sociology of education. He succeeds magnificently in laying this myth. Buried alongside it are the historical account which welds educational development to industrialization, the epiphenomenal view of education as a mirror of changes taking place in more decisive institutions, and the popular creed of class reproduction in which education becomes a passive mediator of capitalism.

Professor Ringer does so by examining enrolments during three stages (early, high and late) of industrialization, for Germany, France and, in lesser detail, England and the United States. In each economic phase he then investigates three statistical properties of national education, (a) its 'inclusiveness' (the proportion of the relevant age group to be enrolled), (b) its 'progressiveness' (the proportion of the more advanced pupils drawn from the lower classes) and, (c) its 'segmentation' (the degree to which different curricular paths are travelled by pupils of different social origins). As an exercise in quantitative historical sociology these chapters are of a remarkable sensitivity. He provides more than enough evidence to substantiate his main conclusions – firstly, that social stratification cannot be treated as unilinear in the nineteenth century, since status, power or even education itself produced disjunctions between the hierarchies structured by education and by class, and, secondly, that education sometimes played an actively incongruent role in the industrial revolution or in the crystallization of an industrial class structure.

So far, very good indeed; it will certainly not be Ringer's fault if this corpus of errors is not quietly laid to rest, though I fear that the old believers will continue to summon up its spirit. I therefore have every sympathy with him in his feeling that he had to batter these assumptions to death and even to structure his book around the three economic phases in order to do so. At the same time, being among the already converted, I regret that this preoccupation crowded-out a more positive approach to the analysis of education *as a partly autonomous element in society* – past and present. This of course is what becomes problematic the moment any version of economic determinism is abandoned.

What Ringer gives us here is rather disappointing, for he merely adduces cultural traditionalism to explain education's incongruence or lag in relation to other social institutions. In itself this is tautological; there is cultural-lag because education is concerned with tradition; but *why* is it so concerned, *who* makes this its concern, and *how*? Ringer rightly acknowledges in both the Introduction and the Conclusion that 'some kind of conflict theory is required'. This is indeed essential, not only for explaining cultural traditionalism, but even more importantly for linking the institutional patterns and enrolment rates which he describes to the forms of social interaction which generated them. He does not himself indicate, even in the broadest terms, what such a theory should look like. Nevertheless for any of us who are working on those lines, he has laid down both a challenge and a test. Any theory of this kind must be good enough to account for the subtle

patternings of enrolment and stratification which he has documented so well.

Margaret Archer
University of Warwick

Organization without Authority: Dilemmas of Social Control in Free Schools *Ann Swidler* Harvard University Press 1979 199pp. £8.75

Ann Swidler's is really two books in one, and it suffers as a result. Book One is the bulk of her published text, and Book Two is the third of her three sections, 55 pages. The join between the two is rather obvious, and not very satisfactory.

After a brief discussion of more traditional schools and their authority structures, and of authority and control in general, Swidler launches into her Book One, a study of two 'free' or 'alternative' secondary schools run by the Berkeley, California, school system around 1970. These schools are called 'Group High' (largely middle class whites) and 'Ethnic High' (largely black and Chicano poor). Although the book is supposed to be a study of both these schools, Ethnic High was in general a less successful, less interesting, and less exemplary school than was Group High. It is only negatively related to what Swidler has to say, and I will ignore it in this review.

Although she devotes a bit of space to the history and institutional context of these schools, Swidler's main concern is with matters of style: the sorts of things teachers and pupils say and do. She devotes much of the book to describing the ways students act, the way teachers try to get students to do things (apparently with little success), and the values teachers (and to a lesser degree students) espouse about free schools.

Swidler's Book Two is much more ambitious. In the last three chapters, she deals with the hidden curriculum of Group High, and tries to explain why this school, and other alternative schools like it, took the form they did at the time they did under the aegis of the social classes they did. Swidler tries to do this via a very brief review of some current theories of education, three she calls: the rebellion co-optation model (reform as social control), the educational upgrading model (secondary schools as mini-universities), and the post-industrial model (the new technocrats wanting schools reflecting their lifestyles). Swidler finds some merit in all three theories.

She ends up plumping, however, for a modified post-industrial model, saying that the form of this sort of alternative education is brought about by a new sort of middle class occupation, the knowledge specialist, and a new sort of firm, the technologically sophisticated firm (which, as described, looks a lot like a science consultancy firm). Swidler argues that the hidden curriculum of Group High mirrors the social relations in, and the formal structure (rather: lack of formal structure) of, these new firms as she describes them.

One point is worth noting here: Although she takes the rebellion co-optation and educational upgrading models to task for failing to account for certain aspects of the free school movement, Swidler's post-industrial model fails to account for what may be a crucial aspect of the free school movement: Why the free schools collapsed when they did (and the related matter of the 'return to standards'). Has this new sort of firm disappeared all of a sudden?

Swidler has, then, a study of a free school or two, organizations without authority, and she tries to explain the emergence of these sorts of organizations in terms of changing sorts of middle class occupation. To make her study convincing, she would have to deal with several questions she has not discussed.

First, she needs to look more carefully at the founding of Group High in particular, and free schools in general. The birth of these schools was attended by clouds of rhetoric and politics. In the absence of a sound discussion of

such births, we are left with a mechanistic model, linking blindly the styles of work and styles of schooling among certain groups in the middle classes. Many writers make such a link, and it does have appeal, but it needs to be worked out in detail in Swidler's book.

Second, Swidler fails to deal in any systematic way with the structures and forces of control in the free classrooms. She is quite aware that control is at issue, and is a source of concern for the staff, if not the students. This being the case, it is surprising that she does not provide more than a superficial discussion of staff–student power relations, largely as seen through staff ideology, and largely explained in terms of charisma.

The upshot of this second shortcoming is that Swidler appears to accept without demur all the staff (and student) talk of freedom and self-direction; self-expression, involvement and initiative – which talk has been heard before in American education. Swidler does not look at the actual workings of these values: Who is free to be self-directive and self-expressive in what ways, at what times, and in relation to which people. The things she says about what goes on in classrooms shows, even to the casual reader, that there is a quiet struggle for control between staff and students. True, it is a struggle couched in the language of non-control, but it is a real struggle. The free school may be free of authority in the strictly bureaucratic application of that word, but it is not, it seems, the den of self-expression and equality that Swidler or the school's occupants present.

In short, Swidler has tried to do too much with too little. She has not presented the sort of detailed analysis of the history and practice of these free schools necessary first to provide support for her sweeping, and often interesting, assertions, and second to flesh out her often nebulous categories.

James G. Carrier
University of Papua New Guinea

Organizations Alike and Unlike: International and Inter-institutional Studies in the Sociology of Organizations *Cornelis J. Lammers and David J. Hickson* (eds) Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 451pp. £7.95

Comparative analysis has undoubtedly been the dominant method of doing organizational research on both sides of the Atlantic since Udy's work in the late 1950's and Crozier's in the early 1960's. Indeed it has been the comparative method that has made such writers as Woodward, Etzioni, Blau and Hall household names in organizational research. The method, though, is far from coherent and includes typological, inter-organizational, inter-institutional and cross-societal analyses.

This volume, edited by two of the foremost European comparative researchers, is an attempt to take stock of the field of comparative analysis through contributions from both European and American researchers. The majority of the studies in the collection are either cross-societal or inter-institutional (with a greater emphasis upon the former). In fact, only the paper by Hofstede approaches what the volume title promises. This, though, is not necessarily a criticism of the book, but an acknowledgement of the difficulties of pursuing empirical research of this kind. Equally, the method tends to generate research emphasizing structural relations within and between organizations with little cognizance being taken of the 'social life' of organizations (the comparative studies comprising the Aston Programme possibly highlight this best).

Such constraints, which have developed into fundamental criticisms of the comparative method, are widely recognized and have been for some time. And yet this volume generates more of the same – material which may be helpful to organizational practitioners in the design of their organizations but which is sociologically barren because of the stress on formal structure and organization.

Similarly the bulk of the studies reported here have a curiously passive and static flavour to them. The chapters by Clark and Goldner go further in examining organizational processes as well as structure but the overall neglect of longitudinal studies is noticeable.

The editors' comments and conclusions in the last three chapters of the book are both helpful and insightful. Their observations abound with optimism about the future of comparative organizational analysis. However, their commitment to a version of a convergence thesis of organizations seems somewhat dated (as does the whole book – many of the papers deriving from a 1975 conference) and the call for the development of universal measures and indicators for the analysis of organizations worldwide merely emphasizes the probability of more of the same – the critics' voices have still to be heard; the inherent methodological constraints have yet to be overcome.

David Dunkerley
Plymouth Polytechnic

Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players: a Sociological Study of the Development of Rugby Football *Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard* Martin Robertson 1979 321pp. £8.95

This interesting study examines Rugby's development in the light of Elias's conception of 'civilising process' – the elaboration and refinement of social- and self-control seen as associated with modernization. The authors are critical of oversimple theories of modern sport such as advanced by Huizinga, Stones, and Rigouer, which – in comparison with Elias's 'sociogenetic' and 'configurational' methodology – are seen as failing to capture historical complexities. The 'improved' analysis of modern sport which Dunning and Sheard provide (Dunning is a past collaborator with Elias) arises from their exploration of the civilizing process in relation to what they call 'functional democratisation', i.e. the involvement of the formation and transformation of sports and games with class differentiation and class competition, increase in 'achievement motivation' within sport, the greater seriousness and cultural centrality of sport and the role of sport in social control. Rugby with its peculiar sharpness of institutional separation into amateur and professional, middle and working class forms, and its division also from soccer, is regarded as a Durkheimian 'crucial case' allowing clear identification of the decisive developmental processes in modern sport.

Both the methodology employed and the conclusions reached are less novel than the emerging Elias 'school' would have us believe. Nonetheless there are some valuable new ideas, especially in those sections of the book dealing with the Nineteenth Century origins of modern sports and of Rugby in particular. I found of most interest (although sometimes speculative) the detailed account of the part played by class competition in the institutionalization and separation of Rugby and soccer. The origins of these games in public schools is explained as the outcome of problems of social control and emerging standards of decorum which make it essential for established and aspiring schools to reform disorderly folk-games. Rugby's elevation as the socially superior game occurs only after soccer's adoption by the working class and with the development of professional soccer, and is further assisted by the hiving-off from the Rugby Union of the professional Rugby League in 1895. This latter split the authors explain in terms of (a) the less socially secure leadership within Rugby compared with soccer, and (b) battles over professionalization which occur later than in soccer, at a time when class competition had intensified. Here, the authors may have underestimated the difference made by the regional isolation of professional Rugby. Thus, the more limited popularity of Rugby compared with

soccer makes it a more ready vehicle for middle class exclusivity. But their argument is an intriguing one.

Elsewhere in the book the authors deal in largely familiar terms with such topics as: the inherent (quasi-religious) needs of modern societies for intra-area representative sports, the inevitability of all-out competition to this end, and 'player pressure' to increase financial rewards. 'Increased' violence in sport is explained in terms of the greater cultural centrality of sport, but much of this violence is 'mimetic' in character and the very anxiety over violence reflects increasing *standards*, the 'civilising tendency'. Regarding the tensions between professionalization, competitive success and 'spectacle' on the one hand and pure 'play' on the other, Rugby is again seen as a 'crucial case' and the authors provide a useful account of the pressures on Rugby Union as a player oriented sport facing spectator oriented tendencies.

In general, one might have wished for greater width of theoretical ambition from the authors. Allegiance to Elias's rulings on objectivity and neutrality and reluctance to 'universalise' may have inhibited the authors here. However, this study justifies its claim that the analysis of sport has general significance for sociology. It can be numbered among the increasing list of works which will help to rescue the sociology of sport and leisure from its past obscurity and isolation.

David Jary
University of Salford

Work, Mobility, and Participation: A Comparative Study of American and Japanese Industry *Robert E. Cole* University of California Press 1979 293pp. £10.75

A tone of healthy respect is increasingly creeping into Western writings on Japanese management and employment systems. Robert Cole's *Japanese Blue Collar*, written ten years ago, showed that Japanese workers were much like other workers underneath, that the same sort of conflicts plagued capitalism in Japan as elsewhere and that their different solutions in different societies could be seen as functional equivalents, neither notably better nor worse. His new book, by contrast, ends with a chapter on the lessons the US might learn from Japan, from quality-control circles (GM has already experimented with Japanese methods) to career-enlargement schemes based on guarantees of lifetime-permanent employment for blue as well as white-collar workers, with supporting government policies.

The book synthesizes various pieces of empirical enquiry: a statistical survey of inter- and infra-firm mobility among workers in Yokohama and Detroit, examples of how Japanese workers are organized into quality control circles, an account of the functioning of the personnel department in a firm of the Toyota automobile group and of its efforts at job redesign. The various parts are given a unity by two things: an explicit, US–Japan, comparative framework (a considerable improvement on the implicit comparison with an ill-determined 'West' of most descriptions of Japanese industry) and a central concern with different notions of what it is to have, and to get fulfillment or satisfaction out of, 'a job'. The pieces of the patchwork blend surprisingly well to make a first-rate book which should be read by everybody concerned with problems of job enlargement in particular or the quality of working life in general, as well as by those specifically interested in Japan or the US.

The mobility survey ends up telling us not so much about labour turnover as about how people define jobs. Detroit workers did, as expected, move more often between firms than Yokohama workers. But the expectation that the Japanese workers would, in compensation, move more from job to job *within* firms was disappointed. Cole concludes that this is more a matter of perceptions than of different frequencies of actual role changes. Japanese work structures use broader job titles and

workers have more broadly defined jobs: hence they are less likely to record changes in the mix of their activities as changes of 'job'. And behind that difference lies a crucial one in the reward structures. The rate-for-the-job principle dominant in the US makes for tight job specifications, so that everyone can be paid what he is *really* worth. The Japanese system can manage with a looser division of labour and definition of job titles because workers are paid chiefly according to education, seniority, age, or skill, and only partly according to (loosely hierarchized) job grades. (In one throwaway sentence Cole records that some employers who moved towards rate-for-the-job payment systems in the 1960's under the impression that they were more modern and rational, have since moved back.)

Another implication of the payment system is that, not being constrained by the intimate connection of 'who does what' with 'who gets paid for what', Japanese managers find it easier to follow all the enlightened 'job enlargement' prescriptions for the cure of worker alienation which have become a commonplace of progressive management doctrines throughout the Western world. Some of the quality control schemes which Cole describes have gone a good deal further than most British managers would dream possible in giving workers responsibility for planning work methods and improving product quality. One firm even has a decentralized system of departmental 'improvement groups' with all the tool-room facilities necessary to act on suggestions that come from the workers' quality control circles and *make* improved machines and tools for the department.

How far does the apparent efficiency pay-off of these schemes for 'involving' workers, come from the actual suggestions for technical improvement which they call forth, how far does the act of involvement itself raise morale, hence levels of conscientiousness and diligence, levels, in short, of efficiency? Cole finds it hard to answer that question (as would anyone else) but is inclined to give greater weight to the second effect, while rightly doubting whether all these schemes, anyway, contribute as much to productivity as the improvements in technology produced in standard fashion by R and D departments. Not even those last two things are clearly separable, however. Cole notes that technological innovation in the Japanese industry has been more a response to labour shortage than an attempt to solve quality problems by 'idiot-proofing' the process. Managers rely on, and are satisfied to rely on, high labour quality.

As for transferability, Cole's argument runs roughly thus. The Japanese system shows a fundamental humaneness about organizing people. But it also rests on a fundamental power relationship which has workers accepting managerial authority in a dependent way which can hardly be expected of self-respecting American workers. Nevertheless, any way of bringing about a greater coincidence of workers' and managers' interests is a good thing if the workers are not thereby conned into sacrificing their legitimate concerns, and quality control circles could well be one way of dong that.

Two gripes. First, 'fundamental power relationship' sounds good and hard-nosed, but what *does* it amount to in view of what Cole says about Japanese manager–worker income differentials, the role of supervisors as leaders rather than as authority figures, etc? The nature of authority relations in Japan really does need systematically taking apart. Secondly, wouldn't the very informative discussion of intra-firm movement be improved if the term 'internal labour market' were confined to systems of internal advertisement and competitive application, with some other phrase (institutionalized career systems?) for the practice of regular personnel shuffles and 'postings' which the large Japanese firm shares with the armies and civil services of many Western countries. As for the historical ques-

tion of how Japan *got* to be so different, Cole's second chapter offers some interesting observations, notably a comparison with Germany, but he still does not convince me that a 'late development effect' has nothing to do with it. Anyone interested in that particular controversy can follow it further in *Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 4 no. 2 and vol. 5 no. 1.

Ronald Dore
University of Sussex

The Working-Class Manager: Beliefs and Behaviour *S. G. Redding* Saxon House 1979 154pp. £8.50

A nice idea, but . . . . A study in 1972 done by Leggat for the NEDO showed that 55 percent of British managers came from a manual working-class background. This raises the interesting question as to what degree working-class images of society and work relations get modified and re-structured by the managerial role. Unfortunately Dr Redding's study provides no answer.

It is a study seemingly strong on statistical method but weak on sociology. The introductory discussion of 'beliefs' and class is confused and inconclusive; concepts of class and class-images seem to hinge around a mixture of Dahrendorf and the Luton studies, with no reference at all to the post-Luton debate.

The confusion is compounded by his choice of a variable for comparison. Redding surveys, via taped interview, some sixty middle and lower-level supermarket managers, half of which sample are from an older, more paternalistically formal supermarket chain ('Cheddar'), the other half from an American-influenced human relations-minded outfit ('Stilton'). The responses were grouped under factors such as social responsibility, conflict, participation, authenticity, discipline, reward and adaptability, and ranked according to 'strength of belief'. The results show little difference between the two styles of company — most managers believed strongly in their social responsibility to their staff, had a low perception of conflict, believed in the necessity of participation (for instrumental rather than ethical reasons), had a low belief in the necessity for discipline and a high belief in adaptability to people. Redding concludes that 'the depth of understanding of and association with their subordinates' can be attributed to the managers' class origins, and to having worked in the store themselves and come up through the ranks.

Unfortunately, because the only variable used is the 'style' of the enterprise, it is impossible to say whether Redding's assertion is valid — a more useful comparison *would* have been between managers of manual background and those of clerical or managerial backgrounds. As it is, the responses of his managers can only really be taken at face value — quite interesting in themselves, but difficult to place in any wider theoretical matrix.

It is also questionable whether the managers' tolerant attitude towards employee grievance, and the supposed reciprocal readiness of employees to approach their managers personally, may be due not so much to managers' identification with the grieving worker but rather to the low levels of overt conflict in the retail industry (conflict at any rate as reflected in *collective* action — several managers mentioned high labour turnover as a problem). This in turn, one suspects, reflects the low level of unionization — unions are not mentioned once by the managers. Thus, without prominent institutions of collective bargaining, no apparent grievance procedure or shop-floor representation, it is almost inevitable that the managers will be approached on a person-to-person basis.

One thing that struck me was that whereas, on the author's own evidence, the vast majority of supermarket staff are *women*, all the *managers* he interviewed who had 'risen from the ranks' were men. It would seem likely from

this that, unlike the 'girls' in the store, most men starting work in a supermarket do so with a strong expectation of eventual promotion to management; thus their 'beliefs' are likely to be fairly aspirant and company-minded even *before* they become managers. This would seem to make any attempt to trace the continuity of their working-class beliefs that much more perilous.

Despite these weaknesses, Redding is undoubtedly correct in seeking to distinguish the low-level manager from the managerial stereotype (although the Chemco studies perhaps offer more insights here). Also the food-retailing industry is an under-described area, not offering the immediate sociological panache of, say, assembly-line work relations. It is a shame however that we do not get more than a few glimpses of the specific problems of *control* in this service industry which, one suspects, could be the real springs of managerial beliefs and behaviour.

Christopher Baldry
University of Strathclyde

The Sociology of Science: Problems, Approaches and Research *Jerry Gaston* (ed.) Jossey-Bass 1978 220pp. £8.50

These essays were written for the most part by American sociologists working in the Mertonian tradition. Part 1 is devoted to 'The Norm of Universalism' and contains essays by Barbara Reskin on sex discrimination, Willie Pearson on racial discrimination, and Donald Ploch on research funding procedures in the (US) National Science Foundation. In Part 2 Harriet Zuckerman discusses theory choice and problem choice in science while Thomas Gieryn analyses the social conditions in which scientists opt to alter their research repertoires, adding new problem areas and/or dropping existing ones.

The most provocative of the essays by far are to be found in Part 3. Lowell Hargens discusses the relations between theory and method in sociology of science, suggesting that lines of inquiry have often been dictated more by the availability of techniques (especially the quantitative ones so respected by American practitioners) than by existing theory. Theoretical development is thereby impoverished. Donald Beaver considers the prospects for co-operation between historians of science and sociologists of science. Although an historian, he seems somewhat out of touch with recent (especially social) history of science: history and sociology are seen as complementary disciplines since the former is said to focus on individuals and scientific knowledge, the latter on groups and social activity. Furthermore he appears to envisage a division of labour in which historians generate fact while sociologists construct theory. It is intriguing to speculate how such conventional notions manage to survive in the face of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and the historical work which it has inspired.

Derek de Solla Price draws attention to historical patterns in the growth rate of science and technology since 1500, and Nico Stehr reviews the debate over Merton's 'scientific ethos'. His paper is a useful guide to the literature, and he observes rightly that most of the critics have tended to *substitute* cognitive norms for Merton's 'social' norms without attempting to identify an *alternative* set of social pre-conditions for scientific practice. Nevertheless Stehr somehow manages to present all the major critiques of the 'ethos' without drawing what looks to be the obvious conclusion: that Merton's 'institutional imperatives' are not deriveable from the nature of scientific knowledge-growth but are historically specific responses to the social environments with which scientific communities have been confronted.

The final essay by Joseph Ben-David offers a sociological explanation of the different directions in which sociology of science has developed in the USA and UK. He notes the pressure on American postgraduates in the '50s and '60s to do quantitative work in sociology departments while avoiding the kinds of theoretical debate

carried on by their British counterparts (largely outside sociology departments) during the '70s. Unfortunately Ben-David attributes the marked British interest in sociology of knowledge to ignorance of the difficulties in such work, thus failing to situate such differences in much longer-standing contrasts between American and European sociology (noted some forty years ago by Mannheim among others) or more generally between American and European intellectuals' roles (cf. work by Richard Hofstadter, H. Stuart Hughes or J. P. Nettl). To have contexted his phenomenon in this way, however, would have landed Ben-David with a full-fledged problem in the sociology of knowledge.

Jonathan Harwood
University of Manchester

Policing the City *Rob Mawby* Saxon House 1979 201pp. £10.50

The British Police *Simon Holdaway* Edward Arnold 1979 188pp. £3.95 (paper)

Policing Freedom *John Alderson* MacDonald and Evans 1979 276pp. £7.50

These three books on policing in England (*not* Britain) are very different one from another, not just in the audiences apparently addressed, but also in the ways in which the project of each is conceived.

Mawby brings a high level of expertise to bear on some key assumptions of labelling theory. Here we have quantitative techniques as they should be used. Most of the data are derived from information in police incident and other reports, and the author examines both the ways in which the police influence crime statistics, and the ways in which police discretionary activity identifies candidates for deviant status. Contrary even to his own expectations, he finds that police practices have little effect on the identification of suspects for 'hard core' offences, although 17–20 year old males are slightly more vulnerable to police activity than other people. While proactive policing was responsible for identifying approximately one third of offenders in the case of victimless crimes, even here the labelling hypothesis did not hold, for 'offenders discovered proactively were more likely than others to be *first* offenders' (p. 154). Moreover, as a final contradiction of the labelling hypotheses there was a tendency for a higher proportion of youngsters from 'bad' than from 'good' areas to be cautioned rather than charged.

This summary does incomplete justice to Mawby's findings. Indeed, if the book has a fault it is that of reporting everything without proper regard to relevance. This makes an important and straightforward argument more difficult to read than necessary, a problem exacerbated by the total lack of variety in the typeface used. However, one other message struggles through: this is that sociologists would be well advised to return to studies of living rather than the much easier studies restricted to people working. Not only would this automatically reinstate women as half of the subject, it would also make it possible to explain those fascinating cultural differences which Mawby reveals. For his study shows that while police, apart from anything else, lack the manpower and particularly the knowledge to be labellists, the systematically varied practices of ordinary citizens in Sheffield dramatically shape both crime and offender rates.

Holdaway's collection is also sociological in intent and in achievement. It is admirably free of rhetoric masquerading as theory (a not uncommon form in this area of sociology) and presents instead nine solidly researched discussions plus a concise and relevant introduction. Most of the papers are also theoretically relevant, and it is not invidious to single out here the contributions of McBarnet on the way in which legal powers of arrest officially structure police practices against the lowest social classes, and Reiner on police unionism. Miller's essay on the history of London policing can also be

interpreted as a contribution to a theory of society.

Manning, Chatterton, and James concentrate to a greater extent on intra-organizational matters, producing yet more evidence for the relative autonomy of grass roots policing. At the time of writing, following the Bristol 'riot', the problems highlighted in James' discussion 'police-black relations: the professional solution' even more insistently demand a solution.

Punch continues to emphasize the unnoticed social service activities of the police, revealing, although the author does not emphasize the point, the limits to police autonomy. And in the two remaining papers Hurd and Chibnall discuss media presentations which construct an ideology of policing to which policemen, at least, in part subscribe and which police officers in large part create.

Alderson's conception is the most ambitious, and it is therefore doubly sad that even he has fallen victim to the ideology described above. His aim is to construct a new philosophy of policing which enables tolerant account to be taken of changing norms through time and from place to place. He even touches on those important and taboo subjects, crying out for careful analysis, such as the relationship between the police and the military, between police and private security, and even the police and firearms. Yet the text is riddled with pious platitudes, not worthy of this most far seeing of Chief Constables, viz. 'the need to act without bias or prejudice, to be a servant of law and of society as a whole is the *sine qua non* of police action' (p. 82). Chief Constable Alderson has my sympathies, but prescription which is not based on sound and honest analysis of the current situation will inevitably have to fall back on ideological statements about what the police are, and what that situation is.

So, I end with a plea: will sociologists of the calibre of Mawby and of Holdaway's team please turn their attentions to John Alderson's questions about the police in the current social formation and the ways in which each can and should develop?

Maureen Cain
L.S.E.

Policing the Inner City: A Study of Amsterdam's Warmoesstraat *Maurice Punch* Macmillan 1979 231pp. £12.00

The odour of Amsterdam's Warmoesstraat seeps from the pages of Maurice Punch's rich ethnography of police work in that red light district. Having immersed himself in the local police station (the ethnographer's nose is not unimportant here either, for Punch perceived his acceptance by officers when one 'broke wind' in his presence), Punch researched to 'illuminate the reality of police work by going behind the often negative stereotype to observe and listen to a group of policemen whose values and behaviour are intimately shaped by the unique area they police . . .'.

This broadly based enterprise led to the collection of highly diverse material, by a sociologist virtually awe-struck when gladly released from the confines of his academic study. Punch demonstrates the process of occupational socialization into the police culture, which acts as a resource for tackling the vice, street crime and racial tension evident in this area of Amsterdam. Here, boundaries of societal tolerance have been loosened to attract, concentrate and so contain deviant activity. He reveals the hedonistic, crime focus of lower ranks; their routine surveillance of 'symbolic assailants', and their dismissal of peace-keeping work. The police are situated at the 'front-line' between toleration and dissent, deviance and conformity.

A wealth of data are marshalled into a basic argument that the occupational culture is on the defensive, 'A traditional craft in decline, and a work force whose frustrations and uncertainties reflect both pregnant issues in the wider society and the increasingly

ineffective and repressive role of law-enforcement in the inner city'. A core of occupational knowledge, brash and unsophisticated in substance, remains to provide the basis of rank-and-file policing. An ambivalent, almost bemused set of police officers feel themselves placed within a tangle of conflicting and absurd demands. Their response is to claim autonomy to police as they wish.

This study demonstrates the continuing potential of that tradition of sociological research greatly influenced by Everett Hughes' Chicago School. However, despite the richness of data and a flourishing text, a number of issues beg further analysis. For example, is the policing of the Warmoesstraat unique? Punch wavers on this point, at times suggesting particularity then employing American and/or British material to illuminate a related but general point. Data are available to permit more detailed comparative analysis and the closer integration of this study into the classical literature on the subject.

Punch suggests a relationship between the organization of policing and the local political setting. If, as he argues, the police are a 'front line' organization, it would have been profitable to extrapolate the relations between these differing systems of control. This would have strengthened his implicit criticism of Marxist analysis of social control. Detailed evidence could have been used to challenge Marxist analysts for their present lack of evidence and to assert the value of the Chicago tradition. Again, the effect would have been an integration of this study into broader developments within the sociology of social control. But these criticisms should not detract from the substance of this perceptive piece of ethnographic research, providing a fertile source of data on policing in a contemporary setting.

Simon Holdaway
University of Sheffield

The Dilemmas of Contemporary Religion *David Martin* Basil Blackwell 1978 104pp. £6.95

Contemporary Transformations of Religion *Bryan Wilson* Clarendon Press 1979 116pp. £2.25 (paper)

These short studies by David Martin are written in a very general kind of socio-logic, a kind of meta-history. He is concerned with the unobvious long-term patterns of religious formations, the latent models 'printed like a paradigm at the level of the subconscious, waiting to be activated by structural openings'. (p. 29)

The first of these sketches is very suggestive. Taking as his cue the concept of civic religion as concerned with immediate issues of power, he identifies two forms. The first is a matter of overt social power, a unity of cult and culture in which the given is also the ultimate – classically represented in the figure of the sacred emperor. The second form is the amalgam of proverbial wisdom, superstition and limited social relations that comprise folk beliefs. As he later stresses, some parts of Europe have only been effectively Christianized in comparatively recent times and in general vast sections of their populations are dominated by notions of cosmic fairness and cosmic fate, techniques for averting physical and psychic danger, that are pre-christian rather than post-christian. The accent of this civic folk religion is pragmatic; the mark of religious efficacy is whether the belief works, whether it fits the received daily patterns of life in an immediate way. It is this snugness of fit with what socially is and with what pragmatically works that for Martin reveals the *secularity* of civic religion in both its forms. Christianity stands in a dialectical relation to civic religion, infiltrating and transcending it. This is done by its choosing to give a continual *double entendre* to the natural language of society, merging the language of this world with that of quite another one, and by contrasting the natural

'community of generation' with a chosen counter-culture. In the catholic form of this basic socio-logic the counter-culture is that of the community of monks. They withdraw from the community of generation and the patriarchal pattern of dominance associated with it. The protestant form of counter-culture rejects celibacy and monasticism. It revolves around an individual relation to a personal saviour; its choice of distance towards the ordinary world is more psychological and less communal. It comes in three basic waves, penetrating lower and lower into the status system in, for example, Calvinism, Methodism, and Pentecostalism. In this long term development a further successor, not of a formally religious kind, might be seen in the counter-culture of the rebel which canonizes choice itself (and tends in Martin's eyes to be self-destructive). It is precisely as alternative forms of the same dialectic that conflict between successive forms is so intense: the protestant versus the monk, the rebel versus the protestant. The model has that striking simplicity which compels as much surprised recognition as doubt that something so straightforward can hold.

A similar penetration characterizes a later use of this socio-logic of christianity where it is argued that religions and ideologies have a basic architecture which determines their capacity adequately to combine with or replace one another. Martin fills out the analogy and comments that it is not only morphological similarity which will be significant here but also the presence or absence of a crucial common axis on the basis of which resistances to change can be remoulded. Thus confucianism and marxism fit extremely well since they are both monistic. Christianity is close in structure to marxism and for historical reasons shares many axes with it, but the fundamental dualistic axis in christianity prevents any real fit.

It is this dualism which gives christianity its high survival capacity. Its double focus, on this world and the next, deprives it, in the end, of stable total dominance in society, but it is just this which guarantees its surviving the wreck of the social systems in which it is implicated.

This is boldly stretched speculation which should prove immensely stimulating. The other papers are more mixed in quality. Both Martin and Wilson wrote widely on the student movement of the late 1960s and some slightly dated traces of their stances then can be seen. Martin as an avowedly 'quirky offbeat traditionalist' (p. 21) has, however, some astute things to say of that period. Whilst the essay form gives saliency to the generalizing mode of thought, it also reveals more rapidly the intuitions which are of a more ephemeral kind.

Bryan Wilson's book, as the text of three public lectures (the forty fifth series of Riddell Memorial Lectures), is necessarily of a quite different pitch. In the light of an irreversible process of secularization attendant upon the increased differentiation of modern societies, he is sceptical of the claims for religious revival based on the growth of cults or movements of charismatic renewal in existing churches.

Differentiation, impersonal and centralized control, rapid social and geographical mobility have led away from situations where a person's reputation was established slowly and in continual contact with neighbours. The new situation is one where social standing is made by skilful manipulation of roles, a process of passing through statuses without interiorizing the values that would formerly have accompanied them. It is to the consequent loss of self that the search for a recovery of self in exotic and therapeutic cults is a response.

Such cults however are weak in social influence for it is precisely from social instability that they derive their appeal. They both lack integration with the wider society and — more significantly — have no clear means of socializing their own second generation. Nor is there much joy in the vitality

of christian cults in the former Western missionary areas of the third world. The examples given are pentacostalism in Chile, the Kimbanguist Church in Zaire, and Jehovah's Witnesses in Kenya. The pattern here is seen as roughly parallel to the rise of protestantism in Europe and thus quite likely to reach its limit, as has protestantism itself, in the fuller process of modernization.

It is worth reflecting how the argument follows Troeltsch's insight sixty years ago that the church, sect and denomination forms of Western religious organization had reached their limit. He went on to ask, without too much confidence, whether new institutions would rise based more on the spirit of individuality, asceticism and mysticism. Wilson's answer is a clear No, for the West has passed the point of being influenced by religious teaching and practice. It is not only the social weakness of the cults which prevents them from providing the basis for a new religious culture: nothing can do this. Indeed, it is the social instability underlying this situation which is Wilson's basic theme.

The case is concisely and spiritedly mounted and within its chosen brief convincing. For a professional audience, however, some points are worth pondering further. It is obviously convenient in a brief compass to complement European examples with ones from third world Christianity, but this may lead to a too uniform sense of modernization. One might also note that religion is here taken in several rather different senses, apart from describing powerful institutions like churches. The sharp sense of religion as beliefs with explicit reference to supernatural sources, proposed at the outset, is supplemented by religion as reassurance of salvation, and — the author's main concern here — as the repository of custom and the framework for a disciplining of emotion. All of these factors may happen to be connected in religious systems, but the implications of them, taken separately, may be markedly different and thus qualify the overall argument.

Adrian Cunningham
University of Lancaster

Facing up to Modernity: Excursions in Society, Politics and Religion
Peter L. Berger Penguin Books 1979 283pp. £1.95

This book brings together a useful collection of articles by Berger: most have been published previously, but only a few would be well-known to a British audience. It reveals three clear facets of Berger: the phenomenological sociologist, the committed political protagonist, and the socio-theologian. Not all facets will be to everyone's taste; his writing on politics is specifically rooted in his own understanding of American political culture; and some of his writing on religion appears almost to have been designed for the pulpit. Nevertheless, his conviction, that sociology is a discipline which is at the same time both subversive and conservative, leads him into thinking which, when it really succeeds, shows him at his incisive and creative best.

The organizing theme of the book is the concept of 'modernity': one which may jar on British ears. His choice of this betrays his preoccupation with religion, for Berger's 'modern man' is the same being (sexism included) who exercises theologians and Christian moralists. For Berger, 'modernisation' refers to the cultural consequences of industrialization, at the heart of which is the creation of the individual — society dichotomy which has characterized so much of his work. However, his approach tends always to pull him towards the cultural rather than the structural as his 'real' focus, and he tends to move implicitly towards a model of culture which leaves aside questions about its economic and political base. Similarly, his 'real' interest in the individual-society dichotomy is with the individual: alienated, and driven inexorably into the private sphere to attempt to

create and maintain his (sic) identity. This preoccupation with the cultural and the individual leads him to see the essential task (for sociologists and for others) as addressing the question of 'how we, and our children, can live in a humanly tolerable way in a world created by modernisation'. (p. 112) Many sociologists will feel that such a question, in Berger's framework, postulates options of individual and collective choice which beg too many sociological questions.

Janet Finch
University of Lancaster

Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society *Gwyneth Kirk* Croom Helm 1980 226pp. £10.50 (£5.95 paper)

Gwyneth Kirk's book marks a welcome addition to the existing field of literature on urban planning, urban problems etc., and particularly so at a time when the new discipline of 'estate management' is rapidly gaining popularity. There has been a real need for some time for a book that would effectively link urban planning as practised by the professional planner, development as practised by the entrepreneurs and the effects of these upon an often unsuspecting public.

This book covers a wide, but closely related range of topics beginning with an outline of social and spatial structure, public intervention, political and administrative controls and the commercial development process. The theoretical approaches to urban planning are invaluable in laying the foundations for an understanding of the organizational context of urban planning, particularly at this period of time when planning has become an extremely complicated professional activity veering more and more to the academic vein.

It is only lately that the planning profession has begun to appreciate its changing role and it is with some reluctance and great difficulty that other disciplines are accepting the professional planner as a manager, advocate and state agent. Of late much interest has been aroused by 'public participation' and the extent to which the mass, silent, largely professionally uneducated majority could be expected to participate intelligently in the planning process. Definitions, therefore, of participation and both the official view of it and local political action are extremely important if one is going to appreciate the true nature of the very real difficulties and anomalies faced in urban planning.

Contradictions abound in our society as each year a little more good quality agricultural land is taken up for suburban housing development; as traffic congestion gets worse; public transport more costly and travel extremely time wasting.

The boom years in office building have seen many office blocks lie empty while thousands of people live in inadequate accommodation. New housing estates, whether in the suburbs or inner city areas, often provide drab, monotonous environments, while some housing is uncompromisingly brutal. Factories, warehouses, docks and railway yards lie unused and deteriorating, apparently obsolete. It is these negative aspects which constitute a severe indictment of the planning system and though well documented it is the reasons for these apparent contradictions which Kirk sets out to explore. To quote from the excellent introduction: 'Why, for example, development companies are interested in building offices when so many people have difficulty finding decent housing at prices they can afford. Or why abandoned industrial sites and cleared housing areas in some inner city neighbourhoods remain undeveloped, while productive farmland at the periphery of urban areas is built up, in the process of suburban expansion.'

The views given present an extremely well-balanced view illustrating the short-comings of planners which are outwith their control; the importance of political and administrative decisions for people's lives and opportunities is acknowledged as is the power of public

bureaucracy focussing on politicians and officials.

Above all the power of business interests are generally successful in obtaining favourable planning permissions. Successfully outlined is one of the dilemmas for the state, namely that while facilitating the capital accumulation process, public intervention in a market-based economy, including land-use planning, is limited by the need not to encroach upon the profitability of the private sector.

Altogether this book has proved to be the much needed text for those of us who are involved in both social planning and estate management. It successfully illustrates the various conflicting interests of involved parties and offers some valuable prescriptions. It is certainly a text worthy of recommendation both to the professionally oriented planner and to the estate developer/quantity surveyor as well as being of sound academic interest to the urban sociologist.

Brian A. Forsyth
Heriot-Watt University

The British New Towns: A Programme Without a Policy *Meryl Aldridge* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 219pp. + 17 plates £10.50

As the title states, this book is concerned with new towns as a 'programme without a policy', and indeed as Aldridge herself argues most books on new towns 'overlook or evade discussion of the more controversial elements of the policy'. In a similar vein she states that 'it is indicative of the problems of the thirty years of new towns as a part of public policy that I cannot, without qualification, thank the DOE for help in this project'. Perhaps quite an important weakness of the book is that Aldridge did not expand or take further this pertinent observation.

The early chapters of the book deal soundly and traditionally with new town history: the new town idea 1898–1939; the wartime years and post-war legislation; and so on. The important point she makes in this early part of the book is that 'there exists no formal mechanism to co-ordinate those policies of other central government departments controlling, for example, industrial relocation, major health and transport expenditure, which will be critical to the success or otherwise of new towns'.

Aldridge describes the early 'Mark One' new towns of the 1950's pioneered by Stevenage, and correctly concludes that despite 'international acclaim . . . and the intimations of financial self-sufficiency, or even profitability', they were an experiment that was not to be continued. And in her chapter 'Renaissance and Redirection 1960–74', she correctly points to the attitude held by many new town administrators and lobbyists, which rejects political accountability in favour of effectiveness.

There then follows some rather straightforward chapters on the 'ownership and management of New Town assets'; 'balance and self-containment'; and so on. Only briefly in these chapters does Aldridge raise the more interesting sociological issues of the new towns *and* issues concerning state and class. The chapters which make the book quite different from other accounts of new towns are those which deal with firstly the 1974–8 reappraisal, with Aldridge concentrating particularly on the Expenditure Committee's work, although her suggestion that 'key workers' have been shifted from first to fourth priority in terms of housing, has to be believed with considerable caution indeed. Secondly, Aldridge's concluding chapter is certainly the most interesting, and discusses the question in *at last* a critical vein, 'what is the new towns policy?'. She discusses the Town and Country Planning Association as an influential new town lobby and points to the Association's vested interest in the towns; she talks of the new towns' insulation from local and central government 'horsetrading'; she discusses the problem of the new town-



development corporations not being electorally accountable bodies; and, interestingly, she notes that most research of new towns is conducted by the new towns themselves and thus is pretty uncritical. 'What is the new towns policy?'. Aldridge points to the absence of coherent higher order goals, but rather a collection of more or less successful pet projects and a 'Boot Hill of failed hunches which could not be quickly rethought or replaced because of the slowness of the legitimation process'. She characterizes the 'policy' as 'reactive, unrelated and incremental decision making'.

Finally Aldridge argues that 'it is often assumed that the new towns policy has been explicitly concerned with reconstructing the social order, and in particular with the redistribution of wealth. A brief review of the new towns movement and later national policy throws some doubt on whether this was ever true or could be true in future without radical changes in *administration and attitudes*' (emphasis added), and yet Aldridge goes on later to note that 'it is clear . . . that the new towns' fortunes have advanced and receded with the *state of the economy*' (emphasis added). Perhaps Aldridge's analysis of the new towns would have been more satisfactory and productive if she had *started* with the relation of state and economy as represented in new town policy, and had bothered less with some of the more well-trodden areas.

Bob Mullan
University of East Anglia

Paternalism in Early Victorian England *David Roberts* Croom Helm 1979 337pp. £14.95

The potential interest for sociologists of a book such as this is enormous, given (i) the broadening recognition among sociologists of paternalism as an important concept for analysing the development of class relations; (ii) the recent advances by sociologists and social historians — often 'sociologically' oriented — in the growth of Marxist analysis of social policy; and (iii) more generally, the increasing awareness among sociologists of our own historical illiteracy. The book's potential, however, is likely to be only indirectly realized for those of us concerned with any or all of these three developments; the gulf between the discipline and practice of history on the one hand and sociology on the other leaps out from every page. The point is sustained by the facts that Roberts himself chooses to make no reference to any of these authors — and only a fleeting one to one historian who has influenced some of this work (E. P. Thompson); and that very few sociologists appear to have referred to Roberts' earlier work, *Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State* (1960).

In neither book is Roberts particularly concerned with the mass of people affected by either welfare policy or the paternalistic blandishments of the Sussex patriarchs, the shepherds of the Church, the captains of industry or the advocates and instigators of welfare legislation. Nor does he acknowledge that the mass of people may have consciously sought to affect their policies. Roberts is a historian — no doubt a very able one — of dominant ideas, and in this lies the major appeal of his later book. His treatment of paternalist ideologies — a complex set of social outlooks bounded by 'authoritarian, hierarchic, organic and pluralistic' assumptions about the way a very rapidly changing society should be — recognizes that for the early Victorian ideologies 'the essence of paternalism . . . was not benevolence as much as . . . control, guidance [and] superintendence' (275). And in portraying the various facets of this ideology, while occasionally lapsing into a crude functionalist posture and at the same time applying the concept so broadly as to make it far too inclusive, Roberts does give us a richly detailed picture.

In terms of its theoretical framework, the book is unexciting; but in terms of its descriptive content, it provides useful material for anyone

interested in the three developments I outlined above.

Paul Litvlewood
Glasgow University

Essays in Medical Sociology: Journeys into the Field *Renee C. Fox* John Wiley and Sons 1979 548pp. £12.25

The work of Renee Fox spans the history of medical sociology in the United States, from its appearance in the early 1950s' to its flourishing and institutional establishment in the 1960s' and 1970s'. For this reason alone a comprehensive collection of her essays should be of interest to anyone concerned with the application of sociology to medicine. Her involvement in the nascent subject arose from being a graduate student at Harvard where the teaching and personal influence of Talcott Parsons led her to a life-long concentration on the sociology of medicine. She has collected together twenty one pieces in this volume, of which three are extracts from her two most famous books – 'Experiment Perilous' and 'The Courage to Fail', two are hitherto unpublished articles and the rest essays that have appeared elsewhere.

The wide range of her research career is indicated by the subjects covered in the seven sections into which the book is divided:- medical education; organ transplantation and haemodialysis; kidney-donors and-recipients; medicine in Belgium, case studies of the process of medical research; bioethics; and finally the societal and cultural implications of medicine. The influence of Parsons is acknowledged frequently and is very apparent in her constant concern with the broader societal significance of medicine. As she puts it, medicine . . . 'occupies a strategic place in modern society . . . . It is a symbolic as well as concrete expression of the social structure and cultural tradition. And it epitomizes some, archetypically modern forms of competence, achievement and yearning'. Thus for example her interest in the growth of 'bioethics' – the study and debate of ethical issues raised by medicine, genetic engineering etc. – arises because in it she sees signs of a new evolutionary stage of 'modernity' of values in American society. Again the feelings of debt she found expressed by kidney recipients towards the live donors are analysed as a novel form of the universal gift-relationship first described by Mauss.

However, if she shares with Parsons a focus on the cultural and societal significance of medicine, she fortunately avoids the abstract over-elaboration so characteristic of her teacher and the sociological significance of topics discussed is drawn out by means of lucid ethnography. Her research methods are closer to that of the social anthropologist than the structural-functionalist sociologist and indeed subjects such as the autopsy in medical education or the cadaver kidney transplant seem as appropriate to the social anthropologist's method as any primitive ritual. She has thereby, perhaps more successfully than any other medical sociologist, brought out to the light of analysis experiences often too painful or taboo for our discipline.

Nevertheless there are reasons to wonder about the value of bringing this collection of essays together. Some of the material is of doubtful general or lasting interest. One hundred pages is devoted to four articles on medical research in Belgium, but her analysis would have been adequately represented by just one of the essays. Similarly several essays seem to cover the same ground regarding the existential and ethical implications of technological developments in medicine with the consequence that there is an inordinate amount of cross-referencing between essays. Above all, too many of the essays impress one with their humane and sensitive ethnography but desperately lack more sustained and exhaustive analysis of the issues raised.

Ray Fitzpatrick
Bedford College and Middlesex Hospital Medical School

Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence *J. Villamil* The Harvester Press Ltd. 1979 325 pp. £14.95

Dependency theory is now an official orthodoxy in the sociology of development. It has proved itself resilient to a variety of critiques and, as this volume illustrates, is capable of generating important and interesting empirical research.

The essays in this volume reflect some of the work done by members of the dependence cluster at the Institute of Development Studies. While any collection of this kind will naturally have a certain amount of diversity, the degree of common orientation of the papers is striking. The dominant influence is that of Osvaldo Sunkel, who has provided a clear and provocative analysis of the contemporary world order. According to him, the rise of transnational corporations has as its correlate the progressive disintegration of nation-states as viable entities, both in the advanced and in the underdeveloped countries. Arising from this tension, Sunkel claims to see tentative attempts at a reintegration of the global system in a new form.

Whether one concurs with this assessment of the impact of transnational corporations or not, the perspective adopted in this book has the very real merit of focussing attention on the problematic aspects of nation-states in underdeveloped countries. Several of the more concrete essays take up this theme and can be read with a great deal of profit.

Each reader will have, of course, specific criticisms to make of particular chapters, but on the whole, the essays deserve praise for the sensitive way in which they integrate a concern for the transnational context with attention to class structures and political institutions in the underdeveloped countries. Nevertheless, the generally positive and constructive tone of the book does present some problems. The knotty issue of the meaning of development and underdevelopment is generally ignored, as attention is directed to the issues of dependency and national integration. Since the concept of dependency cannot simply replace that of underdevelopment, this means that there is a serious lacuna in the volume. A systematic discussion of whether countries like Mexico and Brazil might shift their status and become 'developed' might have helped to sharpen some of the theoretical issues. And, more generally, many readers will miss a discussion of other approaches to the question of world development and dependency. For example, there is no explicit discussion of the points of agreement and disagreement between the IDS dependency cluster and the currently fashionable world-systems theorists. But perhaps, on balance, that is a point in favour of the book, since it enables the authors to get on with the job of showing what their approach enables them to do. And, on the whole, they do a good job.

Ian Roxborough
London School of Economics

Fictions and Ceremonies: Representations of Popular Experience *David Chaney* Edward Arnold 1979 156 pp. £7.50

This book is an investigation into the nature of contemporary popular art, and an enquiry into its potential for stimulating social and cultural change. Popular art is considered as the representation, in narrative fictions, of popular experience. After an introductory chapter, the argument of the book is pursued in three long chapters, and, at the risk of omitting some very interesting but essentially tangential sections in all three chapters, it can be summarized in the following way. All 'fictions', including those of popular culture, are versions of reality (p.12). They originate in the shared experience of their creators and participants, although sometimes in an unequal and stratified society an artificial impression of objectivity and truth is given by a particular sectional fiction (for

example in the presentation of the news in the media). Therefore, it is important to attempt to understand the grounds of that shared experience, in order both to comprehend the actual nature of narrative fiction in popular culture, and to assess the potential inherent in it for the creation of *new* forms of experience.

The first chapter deals with the nature of public experience, and makes some suggestions about the transformation from 'folk' to 'popular' culture by pointing to some key processes involved historically in the formation of contemporary popular culture. In particular, Chaney emphasizes the urban character of popular experience and its culture. The next chapter considers forms of realism, and takes the Brechtian view that in the contemporary age new, modernistic, forms of art are more 'realistic' than traditional Nineteenth-Century realism. (I felt here, however, that there was a tendency to equate 'modernism', 'abstraction' and 'popular art' uncritically; clearly they are often quite different things.) In the final chapter, Chaney goes on to suggest how popular art can be/become the basis for the reconstitution of popular experience and of community, fictional experience being seen as a 'constitutive metaphor' for possible experience.

Two very important arguments recur in Chaney's book. The first is his insistence that culture is produced within a stratified social order (p.11), and that the fictions must therefore always be understood in relation to the structures of the public sphere. The second is his critique of structuralist and semiotic approaches which 'hypostatize discourse' (p.28) and fail to examine the ways in which culture is actually created. Chaney claims himself to have presented an analysis which is constitutive rather than critical – examining practices and processes rather than texts and their content. However, a good deal more needs to be said about the dynamics of this than has been covered in this book, which does not attempt to analyze the particular ways in which our society is stratified, how that affects cultural production, who the cultural producers (and co-producing audiences) are, or exactly what conditions would make the kind of reconstituting of community through popular culture which is suggested a real possibility.

Janet Wolff
University of Leeds

Utopian Thought in the Western World *F. E. Manuel and F. P. Manuel* Blackwell 1979 896 pp. £19.50

For a long time there has been a need for a good comprehensive study of utopian thought. This is not it. In spite of the wide range of material covered in this book, both the selection and the analysis are marred by an incoherent theoretical framework drawing haphazardly on idealist and neo-Freudian modes of explanation.

The authors locate a series of 'constellations' in Western utopian thought. In practice, these are uncontroversial groupings of the content on a chronological basis, which naturally produces some thematic similarities as well as some important underplayed contrasts. Utopia 'proper' begins with Thomas More, who, as part of the Renaissance, is linked with Italian designers of ideal cities and the Anabaptists. This section is preceded by an account of the 'sources', Judao-Christian images of paradise and the classical utopias. The third 'constellation' embraces both the pansophist belief in the emergence of a perfect world through knowledge and science, which receives most of the attention given to the Seventeenth Century, and the ideological turmoil of the English Civil War, which is only briefly discussed. The chapters which follow, dealing mainly with the utopian elements in Eighteenth-Century French thought and the early Nineteenth Century system builders, form the most convincing part of the book; from here, in the sections on Owenism, Marx, 'Utopia Victoriana' and the Twentieth

Century, the book is at its most disappointing and is sometimes factually inaccurate.

The statement that Utopia begins with the Renaissance is puzzling. It is difficult to challenge, since the authors reject the possibility of defining what they mean by utopian, and claim the right to declare people Utopians, and thus include or exclude them, 'by fiat'. Renaissance utopias were, however, preceded by the millenarian aspirations of John Ball and by a flourishing Celtic mythology which was partly incorporated into medieval theology and is reflected in the 'Cokaygne' fantasy. Where you start is, however, less important than the implied role of 'forerunners'. We are told that 'looking for anticipations, forerunners, prefigurations of utopian ideas is a legitimate historical enterprise'. This is debatable, in that it is in no part of an explanation of the existence of an idea that it is a 'prefiguration' of what came later as it arises from its own social location; and conversely, later ideas are not caused by their precursors, although writers undoubtedly draw on and adapt from traditions. The point, though, as Heller (*Renaissance Man* RKP 1978) has shown with particular reference to the Renaissance 'rediscovery' of the Classical tradition, is that they adapt, rather than merely adopt, material. Ideas do not, as is implied here, cause ideas. People in concrete historical situations use ideas for their own ends. The pages devoted to investigating who, before Marx, had said something very similar to 'from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs' are thus of little import, besides missing the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations reference to Bakunin in this context.

The neo-Freudian input, besides leading to the (Jungian) suggestion that the recurrence of certain motifs in utopian dreams may be due to the collective unconscious, leads to far too much space being devoted to the childhood experiences of utopian writers and far too little to the historical context. In the case of Owen, where twenty pages does not yield an account one could recommend as a brief introduction to his views, they resurrect Owen's recollection that as a child ' . . . he stuck his finger into a keyhole and had to cry for help to extricate it'. They continue with the comment that 'explaining the meaning of fingers shoved into keyholes was not part of his psychological system'. Mercifully, in this case, they leave the reader to make his own inferences.

The English Utopians are, generally, dealt with briefly and badly. The section on Morris is subsumed under the heading 'Utopia Victoriana' and the generalization that 'no blood was shed in the storybook transition from anarchic industrialism to the agreeable planned society. The Victorian family was preserved intact . . . '. Neither Morris' *A Dream of John Ball* nor E. P. Thompson's study of Morris is cited in the references; of six quotations from *News from Nowhere*, three are inaccurate and all six references are wrong, and there is no discussion of the revolutionary transition. While one might defend brevity on the grounds that 'over the centuries the English utopian tradition has largely gone its own parochial way', there is no excuse for this kind of misrepresentation. In complete contradiction, they also (wrongly) state twice that Morris was, or claimed to be, a Marxist.

Perhaps the most fundamental flaw in the book is that Utopians are not really taken seriously. We are told that 'creating a utopian world . . . is psychologically a regressive phenomenon for an individual', an attempt to return to the womb. Particularly for the English, 'commonsense and self-evident propositions are left behind, and plain psychological data about man's nature and history are blithely ignored'. Such an approach, combining psychologism and the most question-begging evaluations, makes it impossible to tackle the real significance of aspirations for a better world born in a variety of social and political circumstances.

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

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

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

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Nora Hamilton

State autonomy and dependent capitalism in Latin America*

ABSTRACT

The importance of the state in promoting economic development in the 'dependent capitalist' countries of Latin America raises questions regarding the possibility of relative state autonomy with respect to dominant classes and foreign capital in these countries. Several conditions which might be conducive to state autonomy are suggested, the historical context of the Latin American states is briefly described, and the contemporary states in the relevant Latin American countries are examined. The conclusion is that there is no necessary connection between increased state control of economic resources and state autonomy. Although the state may be able to redefine (within limits) the terms of the incorporation of foreign capital within the national economy, it is unable to transform the structures of dependent capitalism within which it operates.

The importance of the state role in promoting economic development in what have been characterized as the dependent capitalist countries of Latin America has led to a re-examination of the nature and functions of the state in these countries.[1] In particular, the apparent ability of the state to control and direct national capital and even increase its bargaining position with respect to foreign capital raises the question of state autonomy – the freedom of the state from direct and indirect control by dominant economic classes and ultimately from structural constraints. The importance of state autonomy revolves around the question: to what extent, or under what conditions, can the capitalist state operate independently of class intervention and pressures – particularly those of the dominant class – and itself become a protagonist in the making of history? This question will provide the context for an examination of theoretical works on the class nature of the state and an analysis of the state in the relevant Latin American countries. The purpose is to determine

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more precisely conditions under which the state may achieve relative autonomy, as well as limits to this autonomy.

MARXIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE CLASS NATURE OF THE STATE

The works of Marx and Engels suggest a certain ambiguity on the question of state autonomy. Engels defines the state as an instrument of order and unity in a society shaken by conflict and torn by contradictions; its function is the maintenance of the cohesion and unity of a social formation divided into classes and of existing class relations. Here, and in Marx and Engels's definition of the state as 'an executive committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie', the class nature of the state is clearly indicated. At the same time, Engels suggests that the relation between the state and class society is not an easy one; the state seeks to free itself and establish its own identity; it is 'increasingly alien' to the society from which it emerges.[2] And both Marx and Engels cite numerous instances in nineteenth-century Europe in which direct control of the state by the bourgeoisie is not a necessary condition, nor even a particularly favourable one, for the exercise of state power on its behalf. The specific instance of the emergence of the second Bonaparte regime in France was described by Marx as the result of a deliberate abdication of power by a bourgeoisie unwilling to exercise it.[3]

In short, while the existence of a relation between the state and the dominant class is central to a Marxist theory of the state, the nature of this relation is not obvious, and is contingent upon historical and structural conditions.[4] The notion of the Bonapartist state has been expanded to include the possibility of state autonomy in certain historical circumstances in which no one class holds the balance of power; under these circumstances state action is decisive in determining the future social structure (within given historical and structural options). While in the case of Bonapartist France the state had a regressive role in reinforcing the old order, the 'Bonapartist' state may also have a progressive role, supporting the class which represents a more advanced mode of production.[5]

Thus one may derive three assumptions regarding the state: (1) that in normal circumstances, the state functions to preserve the existing class system, i.e. in the interests of the dominant class, (2) that this does not necessarily involve direct control of the state by the dominant class, (3) that in certain extraordinary circumstances, when, for example, the mode of production itself is indeterminate and no one class holds the balance of power, the state itself may have a decisive role in determining the future social structure (although within historically determined options). According to the first two

propositions, the state operates in the interests of the dominant class but is not, necessarily, an instrument of that class, i.e., it may be 'instrumentally' autonomous. The degree of instrumental autonomy of the state would presumably be positively related to divisions within the dominant class among different segments and economically competitive interests, with no one segment or interest able to exercise hegemony. 'Instrumental' autonomy may in fact be necessary for the state to act on behalf of *class* interests rather than those of a particular segment or interest group,[6] which does not necessarily mean that the state will be able to exercise this autonomy. Even in the absence of dominant class cohesion, its control over the means of production and thus of the material bases of the state, i.e., the dependence of the state on resources generated through production and on economic stability, enables the dominant class or class segments to exercise 'negative' sanctions by withdrawing investment, cutting back production, etc. The mere possibility of such sanctions is generally an important constraint on state action. Nor is there any guarantee that state managers will necessarily correctly perceive and act upon dominant class interests.[7]

But even in circumstances in which the state is able to exercise considerable instrumental autonomy, it is limited by its position within the class structure to options within that structure.[8] If, in the absence of dominant class cohesion, the state attempts to go *beyond* structural boundaries (e.g., expropriating private property, socializing the means of production), such action will in itself result in the rapid cohesion of previously antagonistic segments of the dominant class. In short, the ultimate sanction restraining the autonomy of the state to options within the existing structure consists of direct or indirect intervention by the dominant class or class fraction itself. The state's position with a class structure thus precludes the effective exercise of 'structural autonomy'.

While state autonomy is defined in terms of the relationship of the state to the dominant class and class structure, the state is constrained not only by its position within the class structure and the direct and indirect pressures exercised by the dominant class segments but also by the demands and pressures of subordinate classes and groups. State response to these pressures ranges from concessions – usually partial – to various forms of social control, including direct coercion. To the extent that the state acts in the interests of the dominant class it will seek to destroy the cohesion of subordinate groups and classes. But the struggles of these groups have resulted in modifications of the conditions of their exploitation and their gradual incorporation into political and social institutions of the dominant society through the mediation of the state. Class struggle also determines the form of the state: both democratic and authoritarian structures have emerged as a direct or indirect consequence of pressures on the

state by subordinate groups and the efforts of dominant classes and the state itself to cope with them.

Although these institutions and structures may co-opt and divide working-class movements and other non-dominant groups, the fact that the state *can* and to some extent *must* respond to these movements raises questions regarding the possibility of their using the state to bring about structural change.[9] There is also the possibility that the state may encourage or take advantage of the mobilization of subordinate class groups to promote its own autonomy with respect to dominant class interests. Such an alliance has obvious limits, however, since state managers must ultimately control these groups or risk an overthrow of the social order and with it, their own basis of existence. And, as indicated above, state managers may pursue their own interests only to the extent that these do not conflict with those of the dominant class or threaten the existing social structure.

In fact, given the isolation and competition of members or segments of the dominant class as economic actors, it has been suggested that the role of the state is to organize their unity as a class in the *political* sphere.[10] But whether the state, or those who control the state apparatus, will be able or willing to do this may depend on their own degree of cohesion and control over the state apparatus. Generally, the centralization of state power in the executive branch and the growth of the state bureaucracy, with the gradual removal of decision-making power from representative organs, has been looked upon as increasing the cohesion of the state and the power of state managers. At the same time, the different historical origins of state institutions, and their interaction with various classes and groups within a given social formation, suggest that the interests pursued by these institutions may be contradictory to each other as well as to those of state managers, and that inter-class and intra-class conflict may to some extent be carried on within the institutions of the state apparatus.[11]

It need hardly be added that non-dominant groups may lack cohesion. Not only are they sometimes divided by different class positions (e.g., within different modes of production) but to the extent that they are united by their class position efforts will be made by the dominant class and the state to 'disorganize' them, e.g., through ethnic divisions, stratification schemes, co-optation, preventive socialization, and coercion.[12] Thus non-dominant classes must achieve consciousness and cohesion on their own, not only in opposition to the dominant class but also in opposition to the state. Further structural constraints result from the position of a given state within the capitalist world system. The creation of a world market linking the emerging nation states of western Europe with other regions of the world was an important element in the

development of capitalism as a mode of production. The capitalist mode of production in turn accelerated the expansion of the world market and the process of a worldwide division of labour, centred on what became the capitalist core states of western Europe.[13]

The penetration of European capitals and states into other regions not only brought these regions into the world market on a peripheral basis (i.e., as suppliers of raw materials, and later as industrial markets, for capitalists of the core) but also affected their internal structures. Although the nature and extent of these effects have been debated[14] one result is that new modes of production, derived from the relationship of indigenous social classes with core capitals and states, were imposed on or co-existed with pre-capitalist modes. As a consequence, in these social formations, state autonomy must be conceptualized not only in terms of the relation of the state to internal classes but also, and perhaps primarily, in terms of its relation to foreign capital (often in alliance with dominant internal classes or class segments). And since foreign capital includes not only the particular economic interests involved (whether they be trading partners, owners of an export enclave, multinational corporations, or banks), but also the state of the dominant core country as the 'class conscious' agent of foreign capital, the problems confronting the would-be 'autonomous' peripheral state are formidable.

This is particularly true since the process of industrialization, generally recognized as a necessary condition for economic growth and independence, has historically required state intervention on behalf of industrial capitalists (and often in opposition to previously dominant feudal or agro-export interests). Where internal classes which could lead a transformation to a capitalist mode of production have been weak or non-existent, the state had to become directly involved in this transformation, or the social formation was relegated to a peripheral position within the world market. That is, groups controlling the state had to become relatively autonomous, i.e., sufficiently detached from their class base, to effect this transformation 'from above', as occurred in Germany and Japan, and as failed to occur in most of the states of eastern Europe.[15] Whether at the instigation of a dominant class segment (usually industrial interests) or a relatively 'autonomous' state, this transformation has invariably required the isolation of the relevant social formation — at least partially and temporarily — from the world market. It was indicated above that internal conditions favouring state autonomy include the weakness and fragmentation of a previously dominant class when the mode of production itself may be in question (due for example to revolution). Similarly, it has been suggested that crises within the world capitalist system which fragment dominant capitalist interests and/or lessen the ability of dominant capitals and states to intervene in peripheral social formations may

enable the state in certain of these formations (in alliance with indigenous classes) to restructure its relations with foreign capital.[16]

POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF STATE AUTONOMY: A SUMMARY

The above analysis suggests that limitations to state autonomy include the structural position of the state within a given social formation in which the means of production – and its own economic resources – are controlled by a dominant class, and the position of the social formation itself within the world capitalist order. Within these structural constraints, the autonomy of the state may be further limited by the direct or indirect intervention of the dominant class or segments of that class (including 'foreign' class segments, in some cases represented by foreign states) and the necessity to legitimize itself through response, however limited, to non-dominant groups. Instrumental autonomy refers to the ability of the state to exercise autonomy with respect to dominant groups; structural autonomy refers to the autonomy of the state with respect to existing structures. As indicated above, effective control of the means of production by a dominant class or by foreign capital is usually sufficient to preclude the structural autonomy of the state in view of its function to reproduce the productive system as well as its dependence on economic resources generated through the mode of production. Should the state attempt to 'transcend' structural boundaries, the dominant class will utilize its control of economic resources to 'redirect' the state to options within the existing structure. Such intervention may be individual and indirect (e.g., an individual capitalist transfers his capital to a better 'investment climate') or may constitute deliberate and cohesive efforts on the part of a particular interest group, class segment, or dominant class to influence the state through economic, political, or ideological means.

While a certain level of instrumental autonomy may be functional or even necessary for state action on behalf of a class rather than a specific class segment or fraction, structural autonomy, by definition, constitutes a threat to the existing order. Since direct or indirect intervention by the dominant class is the ultimate sanction of structural constraints, the state may presumably exercise structural autonomy only in conditions in which the possibilities for such intervention are considerably weakened. Several hypothetical conditions favouring such autonomy have been suggested above.

1. Structural state autonomy may be positively related to state control of economic resources. Since control of the economic resources of the state by the dominant class constitutes an important limit to state autonomy, state control of its own resources, especially through control of the means of production, may enable it to act

autonomously. In most capitalist countries, however, state control of economic resources has been utilized to rationalize the existing structure rather than to change it.[17] The increase in state resources has also generally been accompanied by an increase in the economic resources of private capital (national and/or foreign); thus an absolute increase in economic power does not necessarily mean a relative increase *vis-à-vis* private capital.

2. Structural state autonomy may be positively related to the indeterminate nature of the structure of the social formation. Such a situation may result when classes representing two or more modes of production are in conflict, or a formerly dominant class has been considerably weakened, and a 'Bonapartist' state is able to take the initiative – at least temporarily – in directing the social formation. Examples would include a post-war, revolutionary, or post-colonial society. State autonomy in relation to external states and classes may be positively related to a lessening of pressures from these forces, particularly if foreign capital can be said to constitute the dominant class fraction within the social formation. The lessening of these pressures is generally temporary, however, and contingent upon international conditions beyond the control of the state in question. In general terms, in these cases the autonomy of the state is limited to certain historical options based on the development of the productive forces within the social formation and its position within the world economic order. Ultimately, the logic of development of the new social formation, entailing the dominance of a given class within the newly established mode of production, will constrain the autonomy of the state. Thus, the state, within the limits of the historical options noted above, 'creates' its own structural constraints.

3. Structural state autonomy may be positively related to the capacity of the state to form alliances with subordinate classes. In contrast to state autonomy based on state control of resources or structural weakness, here it would be based on an assault on existing structures through an alliance with mobilized sectors of the subordinate class(es). In this case, the possibilities for state autonomy are limited by the fact that such an alliance may involve a loss of state autonomy with respect to subordinate classes. Either the state must control and channel the mobilization of subordinate groups – in which case the coalition which enables the state to control the dominant class will be considerably weakened – or the state itself will be eliminated or transformed through a revolutionary process. Also, as in other cases in which the state attempts to transcend structural boundaries, the result will be the increased cohesion and intervention of the dominant class and its allies.

THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

The modern organization of the nation state (as an institution claiming national sovereignty and monopoly of the means of force over a given territorial unit) had its origins in western Europe in centuries of inter- and intra-class struggles as well as the struggles of incipient states to maintain or extend their boundaries in relation to other social formations or incipient states. Their emergence coincided and was in many respects inter-dependent with the development of capitalism. The absolutist states of Europe formed the context within which the capitalist mode of production developed; capitalism in turn transformed the material basis and institutional forms of the state.[18] Subsequently, variations of the modern nation state have come to define all social formations, either as a direct or indirect consequence of penetration by European states and capitals or as a result of successful efforts by specific classes and groups within these social formations to resist such penetration. But the class nature of these states has varied, as indicated above, according to internal class struggles and the mixed modes of production resulting from the relations between internal and external forces, as well as the adoption and adaptation – with whatever degree of success – of political forms originating in the advanced capitalist countries.

THE COLONIAL AND THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIODS

Following the European penetration of the Americas beginning in the early sixteenth century these regions came to be dominated by large agricultural estates producing for internal markets or exports and worked by non-wage labour (generally based on debt peonage or slavery), which co-existed with other pre-capitalist forms of estate production (non-market), petty commodity production, and/or subsistence production based on small holdings or communal ownership. With independence (in the first decades of the nineteenth century), certain Latin American states came under the influence of a commercial bourgeoisie linked to agricultural, mining, and/or financial interests concerned with establishing and maintaining trade relations with foreign states, particularly England, as markets for agricultural and mineral exports and as sources of imports of luxury items and industrial goods. These interests coincided with those of England and other manufacturing countries needing industrial inputs, agricultural goods, and markets. Some national economies became dependent on the export of one or a few primary commodities and trade ties with one or two core countries (reinforced in some instances by foreign investments and loans).

With the rapid acceleration of capital export accompanying the

industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century in Europe and the USA, foreign loans and direct investments in Latin America increased rapidly, in some cases involving direct foreign control of the export sector (especially minerals and subsequently petroleum) and related infrastructure (railroads, communications, electric power). Even in those countries where the major export products remained under national control, as in Argentina and Brazil, the economies were heavily dependent upon export of one or two primary products in order to import manufactured goods and even food needs. Foreign capital also had an increasingly important role in the shipment and marketing of export products, and in some cases financed infrastructure, utilities, and communications systems. By the 1920s, the majority of the economies of Latin America had become more fully integrated into the world system and in many cases foreign capital had been to a certain extent integrated into the national economies, in some instances constituting a dominant segment of the capitalist class. While unable to exercise political hegemony, these foreign class fractions could often draw upon their own states to exercise hegemony on their behalf.

At independence, efforts were made in several countries to graft elements of a liberal, democratic state on what were essentially pre-capitalist and non-integrated societies. But by the early twentieth century what could be called a modern state had emerged only in a few countries. Throughout the nineteenth century, political power in most countries was fragmented, with control exercised by a succession of strongmen or *caudillos* acting primarily in their own personal interests – a pattern which today characterizes such countries as Paraguay and, until recently, Nicaragua. In other cases military intervention became more institutionalized, with military officers intervening in civilian (or in some cases, other military) governments which failed to meet with their approval. In certain countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, relatively long periods of civilian rule, based at least partly on democratic processes, were interrupted temporarily (particularly at moments of political or economic crisis) by military regimes which took control to 'restore order' and subsequently returned the government to civilians.[19]

The most successful attempt to institute liberal democratic institutions took place in Chile, which achieved political integration on the basis of a restricted representative system relatively early after independence. During the nineteenth century successive export booms in silver, wheat, copper and nitrates strengthened different segments of the dominant class and the material basis of the state. The eventual social and political accommodation of new economic interests into the dominant class structure and the tendency of dominant families to expand into different sectors mitigated the effects of inter-sectoral cleavages. Even after the major export sector

came under foreign control the dominant national bourgeoisie continued to control the state. And Chile continued to be characterized by a relatively stable, increasingly representative parliamentary democracy, based on a multiplicity of parties, which became a major vehicle for class struggle.

In contrast, the first half century of independence in Mexico was a period of anarchy during which Mexico became involved in wars with the USA which cost it half of its territory. Political stability and relative economic integration were achieved only in the last quarter of the century during the authoritarian regime of Porfirio Diaz, and Mexico's economic prosperity was linked to the expansion of commercial agriculture, particularly for export, and direct foreign control of the export enclave (mining and petroleum, as well as electrical utilities, railroads, and communications). But (in contrast to Chile) the Porfirian state was unable to accommodate new segments of the bourgeoisie. This failure, combined with resentment against foreign economic domination (by groups of the national bourgeoisie as well as workers in foreign controlled industries) and – most important – the rebellion of peasants who bore the costs of agricultural expansion in loss of land and increased exploitation, were factors in the revolutionary struggles in Mexico in the second decade of the twentieth century. The consequent destruction of the Porfirian state resulted in the emergence of a relatively autonomous 'Bonapartist' state, but while previously dominant sectors of the bourgeoisie had been weakened by the conflict, foreign interests remained dominant and continued to restrict the options of the state.

The domination of agro-export interests in many Latin American countries did not prevent the development of manufacturing. In several countries landowners or mine owners undertook the processing of primary products (sugar refining, flour milling, copper processing, etc.). By the end of the nineteenth century indigenous and immigrant groups had established factories for the production of food, tobacco, beer, textile, glass, furniture, and other consumer products, often through the expansion of commercial capital into manufacturing. But the expansion of industry was limited by the narrow development of the internal market, largely due to the continuation of land tenure structures inherited from the colonial period. Unable to gain control of the state, manufacturers were unable to utilize it to protect themselves from foreign capital competition or effect the necessary internal transformations for capitalist expansion. An attempt by Chilean President Balmaceda in the late nineteenth century to utilize the state for this purpose was defeated by the Chilean landowning and agro-export bourgeoisie, supported by British mining and financial interests, in the name of parliamentary democracy. Nevertheless, the diversification of the economy and the existence of manufacturing for an internal market (however limited)

was an important and perhaps necessary condition for the subsequent development of industrialization, even under state auspices.

THE EXPORT CRISIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE POPULIST STATE

But it was apparently only with the temporary isolation of these economies from the world market that Latin American states were in a position to push industrialization in their respective countries. This occurred as a consequence of the depression of 1929, which deprived trade-oriented economies of their markets, resulting in a drastic reduction in exports and imports and a consequent weakening of the dominant agro-export bourgeoisie, followed by the Second World War, which had similar results.[20] One effect of the depression and war on the dominant core states was to lessen their capacity for political and military intervention in Latin America.

Another factor in strengthening the position of the state was the mobilization of certain popular groups – notably the new working class in those countries with some industrial base (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile) and in one case (Mexico) the peasantry, which enabled the state to form new alliances with these groups and with industrialists. Under the impetus of the state a deliberate policy of import-substitution was implemented: tax incentives, exchange controls, and protective tariffs were introduced or expanded; state development banks were established, and the state undertook extensive investments in infrastructure and basic industries. In several countries the state took the initiative in the establishment of a basic steel industry; it also eventually established or gained control of electric power, petroleum, transportation and communications, sectors which had traditionally been under foreign control. The concession of wage increases to mobilized and increasingly organized sectors of the working class (and in the case of Mexico, an extensive agrarian reform) resulted in the expansion of domestic markets.[21]

It was during the 'populist' period of the 1930s and 1940s that certain Latin American states probably came closest to structural autonomy in the sense of freedom from external constraints and pressures by foreign capital and internal dominant classes. The existence of an industrial base and prior mobilization by popular classes were undoubtedly necessary conditions for the state to challenge previously dominant segments of the bourgeoisie – in some cases including foreign capital – and to institute a programme of autonomous, state-directed industrialization based on the creation and/or expansion of a national market. While in many respects state intervention represented a pragmatic response to problems resulting from the export crisis and the low level of capitalist development, it was indispensable in shifting the focus of capitalist development

from the export sector to manufacturing production oriented to an internal market. During this period industrialization expanded rapidly in the largest Latin American countries; in some cases the number of industrial establishments doubled. The process of eliminating structural obstacles to industrialization went farthest in Mexico, where it was supported by the intensive mobilization of peasants and urban workers resulting from the revolution as well as the current crisis, and where the ideology of the revolution had legitimized state intervention in the economy.

But even during this period state autonomy was partial. Trade ties with core countries were not broken and sometimes trade continued to be based on a dominant export product (as copper in Chile) or exchange with a single core country (as the USA, in the case of Mexico), subjecting these economies to the uncertainties of commodity price fluctuations and the economic shifts (and political pressures) of the relevant core countries. While Mexico was able to nationalize British and American petroleum companies, the retaliation by these companies (and their governments) – including a boycott of petroleum exports and other measures which resulted in the devaluation of the peso – demonstrated the high costs of such action.

At the same time, while state policies favouring manufacturing over export interests benefitted small and medium industrial enterprises which increased rapidly during this period, distinctions among different sections of the dominant class were rarely clear-cut. As indicated above, commercial and landowning groups sometimes expanded into industry; industrialists often bought land as a status symbol or married into landowning families. Intra-sectoral cleavages were sometimes more important than inter-sectoral conflicts. In many countries, what has subsequently emerged as the dominant internal segment of the capitalist class consists of inter-sectoral groups which include commercial and agricultural as well as industrial and financial interests, counterposed to small industrialists, merchants, and other relatively weak segments of the dominant class.[22] In some cases, inter-sectoral links prevented the development of a coherent state policy in favour of industrialization; in others, they resulted in resistance to state programmes which would expand the industrial market but were seen as a threat to the owning class as a whole. Thus prior to 1950 it was only in Mexico that a relatively thorough agrarian reform was carried out; the persistence of traditional agrarian structures well into the second half of the twentieth century has constituted an important block to industrial development in most Latin American countries.

Finally, state autonomy was limited by the fact that certain factions within the state were compromised with different segments of the bourgeoisie. In Mexico, opportunities provided by the revolution and the post-revolutionary state enabled revolutionary officers

and government officials to 'retire' into private business, making a significant contribution to the ranks of the capitalist class. This was undoubtedly a factor in strengthening the national bourgeoisie in relation to foreign capital. But these and other links between groups within the state and the bourgeoisie constituted an obvious constraint on the action of state managers who might appear to threaten the existing structures.

EMERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITARIAN STATES

Eventually, the failure or inability of these economies to develop their own technology (except in isolated instances) led to the development of certain bottlenecks to further industrialization and an increased dependence on foreign capital and technology when these again became available in the post-war period. Foreign technology was also necessary if goods produced were to be competitive on the world market. At the same time, post-war capitalist expansion in the USA, and subsequently Europe and Japan, and the growth of tariff-protected markets in certain Latin American countries under the impetus of import-substitution industrialization, particularly in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, resulted in increased foreign investment in manufacturing.

The result has been a new form of dependent development in those countries. By 1968 investment in manufacturing represented 34 per cent of total US investment in Latin America, while in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico the proportion of US investment in manufacturing was between 64 and 70 per cent. In many cases this led to the denationalization of industry as foreign firms bought existing enterprises or established subsidiaries which drove less efficient national firms out of business. In Brazil and Mexico, multinationals became dominant in the most dynamic industrial sectors – chemicals, transportation equipment, and machinery. In Mexico, by 1970 foreign capital was responsible for 12.6 per cent of the total value of production, 27.6 per cent of the value of production in manufacturing, and within manufacturing, 76 per cent of the value in chemicals, 62 per cent in machinery construction, 79 per cent in electric machinery, and 49 per cent in transport equipment. In 1972, half of the 300 largest manufacturing companies and 61 of the top 100 were foreign controlled. Brazil had a similar pattern, with half of the top 300 manufacturing firms, and 59 of the top 100, foreign owned. Within the top 300 firms, 78 per cent of the assets in electrical machinery, 84 per cent in transport equipment, 74 per cent in machinery and 69 per cent in chemicals were foreign controlled. Even in those sectors where national capital is dominant, there is dependence on foreign technology in the form of machinery imports as well as the use of foreign brands, patents, and processes.[23]

The alignment of forces which structured the populist coalition and nationally oriented industrialization in the 1930s and 1940s ceased to be viable for continued economic expansion in the 1950s and 1960s. While in the early phases of industrialization, increased wage levels had facilitated the development of a national market, subsequent government policies to promote capital accumulation led to a decline in real wages in several Latin American countries. Fixed income groups also bore the brunt of the inflation which accompanied economic growth as well as crises and production cutbacks resulting from the development of bottlenecks in key industrial sectors. Given their prior mobilization and organization, and consequent economic and political integration, these groups began to exert pressures through elections, strikes, and demonstrations; the growing sector of unemployed and marginally employed in the countryside and cities staged invasions of rural and urban land. During the 1960s, populist or reformist governments in several countries attempted to respond to these groups, generally within the limits of capitalist accumulation (Frondizi and Illia in Argentina, Goulart in Brazil, Belaunde Terry in Peru, Frei and subsequently Allende in Chile). But these governments were unable to provide solutions to the problems underlying the mobilization of these groups without threatening the dominance of the bourgeoisie and foreign capital, and one by one they were displaced by military regimes which have relied extensively on coercion to control formerly mobilized groups.[24]

At first it was possible to perceive the military regimes which took power in Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966) as reflecting previous patterns in those countries, where military governments had temporarily replaced 'ineffectual' civilian regimes, returning to the barracks once 'order' was restored. But it soon became evident that the new regimes constituted a departure from earlier military governments, having their own projects for development that involved the replacement of politics and ideology by technocratic, administered solutions to economic and political problems. In effect, this meant the repression of civil liberties and of political organization and mobilization, and, in extreme cases, the imprisonment, torture, and assassination of dissidents. The inability of the military regime which came to power in 1966 in Argentina to cope with the growing militance of Peronist and non-Peronist working class and guerilla movements resulted in a desperate and ultimately disastrous experiment with Peronism, followed by another coup in 1976 and a more openly repressive military regime.

The nature of the new military regimes in South America was most clearly revealed in two countries which initially appeared to be exceptional. In Chile, the political strength of the organized left resulted in the election in 1970 of a Marxist government committed to structural transformation. The increasing polarization over the

next three years, pitting the Chilean working class and other forces committed to socialism against the national bourgeoisie and foreign capital (supported by the US government) demonstrated the class nature of struggles which had taken less obvious forms in other parts of the continent. And the violent military coup in September 1973 in what had been Latin America's most conspicuous parliamentary democracy clarified once and for all the function of the new bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in dependent capitalist societies.

The second apparent exception was the military government of Peru. In part because of the more limited nature of capitalist development and political integration in Peru (in comparison with Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile) the military officers who took control of the state in 1968 at first had a progressive and even quasi-populist role, carrying out a series of reforms (including an agrarian reform) designed to eliminate institutions blocking capitalist development. They also sought to lessen Peru's dependence through expropriation of foreign holdings in the major export sectors, stringent controls on new foreign investments, and state control of basic industries. At the same time, in an effort to stimulate rapid development, they sought foreign loans, which were readily forthcoming in view of Peru's copper and fishmeal resources and the evidence (later shown to be misleading) of substantial petroleum reserves. By 1975, approximately 50 per cent of Peru's new investment came from foreign financing.

The contradictions implicit in dependent development soon forced the Peruvian military regime to more openly repressive tactics. A series of economic setbacks – a drop in the world copper prices, the failure of apparent petroleum reserves to materialize (and the continued necessity to import high-priced petroleum from abroad), as well as the rapid deterioration of Peru's anchovy fields – demonstrated the precarious nature of a development programme based on foreign loans, leaving the Peruvian government with a vast foreign debt it was unable to repay. An unsuccessful attempt by private foreign banks to stabilize Peru's finances was followed by an appeal to the International Monetary Fund for a stabilization loan. This was forthcoming only on the condition that the Peruvian military institute an austerity programme, including cutbacks in state spending, removal of price controls on basic necessities, and wage controls, which have weighed most heavily on low income sectors. Resistance by these sectors in the form of strikes and demonstrations resulted in a suspension of constitutional guarantees, attacks on workers which left several dead and numbers wounded, and the arrest and deportation of dissidents.[25]

The fact that the Mexican state has been able to provide the desired political and economic stability for national and foreign investment in the absence of a military dictatorship can be explained

by the success of the state in institutionalizing its control over urban and rural workers during its earlier progressive phase in the 1930s. An important element of this institutionalization was the incorporation of these sectors into state controlled structures – the government party and its sectoral organizations. This was possible, in turn, because the government of that period had in fact implemented certain revolutionary goals through an extensive agrarian reform and the nationalization of the oil industry and had promoted the right of workers to organize and strike. The large number of peasants who had experienced a real improvement in their condition, and the fact that an expanding economy permitted increases in absolute wages to important sectors of the working class (even while their relative position was declining) constituted the basis for relative stability in the following decades.[26] Efforts to form opposition peasant organizations, labour unions, or political parties outside the government party structure were co-opted or repressed. The Mexican state has had an advantage over the military regimes of South America in its ability to legitimize itself on the basis of its revolutionary origins. But the façade of revolutionary legitimacy has obscured high levels of coercion, and the ability of the Mexican state to maintain its legitimacy in view of its overt repression and the increasing poverty of masses of the population has been seriously eroded in recent years.[27]

The openly coercive nature of the military regimes in South America and increasing economic and political repression by the 'revolutionary' governments of Mexico obviously prelude the likelihood that these states will be able to augment their autonomy with respect to the dominant class through alliances with subordinate groups and classes. But those who control the state claim autonomy with respect to *all* classes.

In some cases, the absence of clear affiliation with the dominant class has enhanced the appearance of neutrality of those who hold government positions. For the most part, military officers in Latin America are not drawn from the upper class. In the case of Mexico, direct recruitment of government officials from the private sector has been relatively rare, in keeping with the revolutionary ideology on which the state bases its legitimacy.[28] But, as indicated above, direct control of the state apparatus by members of the dominant class has never been a necessary condition for the state to operate in the interests of that class. In the case of Mexico, reverse recruitment, with government officials 'retiring' into private business, has been a common practice since the early post-revolutionary governments, and undoubtedly constitutes an important element in the class nature of the state.[29] Other formal and informal mechanisms for interaction between the state and the dominant class are numerous and complex. Industry chambers, sectoral organizations, and advisory committees constitute formal mechanisms for representing business

interests to the government, but it is probable that members of the most important firms and economic groups, as well as multinationals, by-pass these organizations and negotiate with the government directly. Perhaps most important, the interests and orientations of private capital – or the dominant class fraction – are 'internalized' in the state, particularly the Ministry of Finance. A recent example was the modification of a proposed tax reform by groups within the Finance Ministry who eliminated measures most disagreeable to the private sector *prior* to the submission of the proposed reform to private groups for suggestions and recommendations.[30]

Two other manifestations of the autonomy of Latin American states have been suggested: the increased economic power of the state, and its measures to control capital, especially foreign capital, and promote independent national development.

The extensive and direct role of the state in accumulation has in fact expanded its control of economic resources. In Mexico, the public sector comprises over 500 firms which control the key sectors of petroleum, railroads, and electricity, and has substantial investments in other sectors, including mining, iron and steel, chemicals, sugar refining, paper, textiles, fertilizers, and transport equipment. Through the central bank (Banco de Mexico), the official development bank (Nacional Financiera) and a broad range of official credit organizations and special funds, the Mexican state is able to exercise some control over finance and investment. But in many cases, firms of the public sector provide services at reduced rates to private industries, or the state takes over industries which are confronting losses or bankruptcy in order to keep them in operation and maintain employment levels. Thus the state has taken over most of the country's sugar mills due to the unwillingness of the private sector to invest – in turn a function of the crisis resulting from price controls combined with rising costs.[31] The development bank and other official credit institutions finance private industries directly and indirectly through the purchase of securities, facilitation of foreign credit, and other measures. At the same time, tax rates are low – Mexico has one of the lowest rates of taxation in Latin America – and regressive. The expansion of the public sector and of state control of resources as well as other measures of the post-revolutionary government have served private accumulation.

In some cases the state has sought to rationalize the process of accumulation through the expansion of the state sector. During the Echeverría administration in Mexico (1970-6), this was attempted, in part due to investment cutbacks by the private sector (in turn a function of inflation and other economic problems). But expansion of the state sector resulted in increased political opposition by private groups and also an aggravation of Mexico's foreign debt, since needed fiscal reforms to increase government revenues – which

would affect the more powerful segments of the dominant class – were not implemented, and state expansion was financed largely by foreign loans. Between 1970 and 1976, direct foreign investments varied between $200.7 million (1970) and $362.2 million (1974), whereas *net* loans from abroad (disbursements minus amortizations) increased from $324.2 million to $2.930.9 million – $2,701.9 million of this to the public sector.[32] Echeverría's administration ended in economic crisis as increased domestic inflation, combined with the transfer of inflationary pressures from the USA and other countries into Mexico (e.g., through machinery imports), led to the devaluation of the peso. In return for stabilization loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the more openly pro-business administration of López Portillo accepted the IMF austerity programme with the attendent high costs for Mexico's low income population.[33]

In Brazil, despite its ideological commitment to private enterprise the state has expanded its role to meet investment needs which the private sector is unwilling or unable to meet. But any 'statist' impulses within the state apparatus are checked by the combined power of local and foreign capital and the need for capital and technological contributions of multinationals. In Brazil (as in Mexico and presumably other countries), different agencies and factions within the state pursue different objectives; those groups seeking to expand the role of the state are checked not only by foreign and domestic capital but also by factions within the state which identify with the needs of private capital.[34]

Both Mexico and Brazil are attempting to develop their own productive goods sector in order to lessen their dependence on advanced countries for technology. But to the extent that this sector is constructed on the basis of the existing industrial structure, it seems likely to aggravate a major problem resulting from technological dependency: the failure of industrialization to expand employment due to the use of capital-intensive technology. Thus while manufacturing production has increased rapidly in several Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) since 1950, the relative employment in manufacturing has increased very little.[35] The problem is aggravated where intensive mechanization has also occurred in agriculture, resulting in massive unemployment and underemployment and accelerating the exodus of workers from the countryside to the cities where no industrial jobs await them. According to recent official figures, unemployment and underunemployment levels in Peru were over 50 per cent; similar estimates have been made for Mexico. The high levels of open and disguised employment constitute a further factor in the increased coercive role of the state, which is unable to meet the basic economic needs of the population.[36] In both agriculture and industry, distorted

market structures have resulted. Mexico provides the USA with 60 per cent of its winter vegetables, but now has to import corn and wheat to feed its own population.[37] In both Mexico and Brazil, industrial expansion seems to be occurring on the basis of manufacture of consumer durables for a relatively restricted high-income population rather than an expansion of the market for non-durable necessities. Thus in Brazil, *per capita* output of such basic products as food, textiles and clothes actually declined between 1964–70, whereas that of automobiles increased by over 11 per cent.[38]

Latin American states have attempted to cope with problems of denationalization and foreign control of major manufacturing sectors by prohibiting foreign investment in certain sectors and insisting upon majority control. Control of natural resources (as in the case of Mexico), dispersion of foreign investors and trade partners among several core countries (as in the case in Brazil), and the presence of 'sunken' or 'committed' investment (in these and other Latin American countries) does give these states some leverage in negotiating with multinationals and foreign states.[39] But even where such legislation is not disregarded (e.g., through the use of national 'prestanombres' or stand-ins for foreign stockholders, as in Mexico) its net effect has been a closer integration of foreign capital with the state and/or national private capital through joint investments (in addition to loans, technology transfers, machinery imports and marketing arrangements). Joint investments by local (state or private) and foreign capital account for three-fourths of the value added in manufacturing industry in Brazil. A three-fold alliance has emerged which dominates these economies, composed of the state sector, multinationals, and the dominant fraction of national capital, which is often linked to foreign capital and in some cases with the state itself.[40] As indicated above, these linkages are complex and tend to vary from country to country. But while the state's increasing control of economic resources may enable it to assert what it perceives as the national interest in relation to domestic and foreign capital, it can do so only in a context in which it continues to promote private capital accumulation.

Given the economic and political coercion which the modern state in Latin America has found necessary in order to 'stabilize' the dependent model of development, most exploited groups and classes have lost any hope of utilizing the state for structural transformation or even serious reform. In several Latin American countries the state itself has become the object of mobilization against the prevailing order by urban and rural workers. Indications of this mobilization include the 'democratic tendency' within state-controlled unions and the formation of independent labour organizations in Mexico, the general strikes which followed the implementation of the IMF austerity programmes in Peru and continued labour militance under

the new Belaunde regime, and the militant strikes by metalworkers as well as steps toward the formation of a new labour party in Brazil. These and similar movements provide the best hope for an effective restructuring of the Latin American societies in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the economic resources of the contemporary state in the dependent capitalist countries of Latin America and the ability of these states to negotiate with foreign and national capital, they have little structural autonomy. In many respects, their structural autonomy would appear to be weaker today than in the 1930s and 1940s when their economic resources were considerably more limited. At that time they benefited from the reduction of exports and imports and the consequent weakening of the dominant export interests as well as the decline in pressures from foreign capital and core states as a result of the depression (and subsequently the Second World War). In several countries, governments took advantage of the situation to organize mobilized popular groups against previously dominant classes and around a programme of progressive reforms. Thus two conditions favouring relative state autonomy existed – a relative weakening of the position of the dominant class, including in this case foreign capital as a result of the depression, and the alliance of the state, or certain factions within the state, with subordinate groups and classes. Measures were taken to establish industrialization on the basis of the development of an internal market, and at least in Mexico structural reforms were undertaken to eliminate traditional agricultural institutions and begin the process of nationalization of the export sector. At the same time state autonomy was always limited. Although foreign political and military pressures were reduced, economic ties with core countries continued and structural changes were resisted by affected indigenous groups with some success. Nevertheless, certain states were able to utilize the opportunity to establish industrialization on a firm basis in their respective countries.

But subsequent development has reinforced the processes whereby these economies were incorporated into the world system and foreign capital was integrated into the 'national' social formations. The nature of this incorporation and integration has changed. Certain economies have moved from the periphery, as producers of raw materials for export and markets for industrial consumer goods, to the semi-periphery as markets for industrial investment capital and machinery. Whereas the integration of foreign capital was formerly based on control of an export enclave which was relatively isolated from the rest of the economy, today it is based on foreign investment and the use of foreign technology in the most dynamic industrial

sectors in close collaboration with national capital and the state. The basic structure of internal production has become internationalized. The processes of incorporation of the national economies into the world economy, and of internalization of foreign capital within the national economy, are much more advanced, and the degree of integration much more complex, than in the past.

The implications of these processes for the state are paradoxical. On the one hand, the role of the state in the process of accumulation involves direct control of the means of production, and the development of the productive forces – substantial in such countries as Mexico and Brazil – has increased its command of economic resources. They are thus, in objective terms, stronger than during the nationalist period, and within the context of their structural integration with foreign and national capital, able to exercise a degree of instrumental autonomy with respect to both. But their structural options are limited. Their relative strength does not enable them to change or transform the structures within which they operate but to redefine – within specific limits – the terms of the incoporation of their capital within the world economy and of the integration of foreign capital within the national economy.

An examination of the more advanced contemporary Latin American states suggests that there is no necessary relation between increased state access to and even control over economic resources and greater autonomy with respect to structural constraints. Although in some cases these states may be relatively free from direct pressures by dominant class segments and even foreign capital, this 'instrumental' autonomy is largely contingent upon their ability to promote the interests of capital within a context in which their structural options are increasingly limited. The Latin American states have had an important role in promoting development within a dependent capitalist context, but dependent capitalist development has in turn created and reinforced the constraints within which they now operate.

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NOTES

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

1. See, for example, James Malloy (ed.), *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 1977; Jose Luis Reyna and Richard Weinert (eds), *Authoritarianism in Mexico*, Philadelphia Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977; Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978; Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979.

2. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955; Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, New York, International Publishers, 1972, p. 229.

3. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, New York, International Publishers, 1963, pp. 105–6.

4. Thus for purposes of analysis it is necessary to define the state not in terms of its relations to the dominant class and its function within the class structure, which must be demonstrated for any concrete social formation, but as an analytically separable entity. Here the state will be identified as the institutions of the state apparatus — the civil and military bureaucracy — and those who control the state apparatus, sometimes referred to as 'state managers', or the government (constituted in various branches, levels etc.)

5. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, New York, International Publishers, 1970, pp. 80, 196; Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebook*, New York, International Publishers, 1971, pp. 219–20.

6. Ralph Miliband, *Marxism and Politics*, London, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 87; Nicos Poulantzas, 'The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau', *New Left Review*, 95, January–February 1976.

7. Claudia von Braunmuhl, 'On the Analysis of the Bourgeois Nation State within the World Market Context', in Holloway and Picciotto, *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate*, London, Edward Arnold, 1978, p. 174; Fred Block, 'The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State', *Socialist Revolution*, 33, May-June, 1977; Claus Offe, 'The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation', Mimeo, May 1974; Albert Szymanski, *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class*, New York, Winthrop Publishers, 1978, p. 273.

8. Maurice Zeitlin, W. Lawrence Neuman, and Richard Earl Ratcliff, 'Class Segments, Agrarian Property and Political Leadership in the Capitalist Class of Chile', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 41, 6, December 1976, p. 1008; Erik Olin Wright, *Class, Crises and the State*, London, New Left Books, 1978, pp. 15–16.

9. The fate of the Popular Unity government in Chile demonstrates certain limits to this possibility, but the Popular Unity coalition controlled only part of the government, with the legislative and judiciary branches and the military apparatus remaining under the control of or closely linked to the national bourgeoisie and foreign capital (Thomas John Bossert, 'Dependency and the Disintegration of the State: Lessons from Allende's Chile', paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, February 1978). Thus the question remains for the hypothetical case in which working-class parties control not only the executive but also the legislature and important factions within the military and police force. This is of course the possibility raised by Eurocommunism, but a discussion of this position is beyond the scope of this article.

10. Nicos Poulantzas, *Poder político y clases sociales en el Estado capitalista*, Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno, 1969.

11. Poulantzas, 'The Capitalist State . . .', p. 75; Miliband, *Marxism and Politics*, p. 84; Marcos Kaplan, *Formación*

del Estado populista en América Latina, Mexico, Ediciones Era, 1969, pp. 33–4; John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, 'Capital, Crisis and the State', *Capital and Class*, 2, Summer 1978, p. 95.

12. Poulantzas, *'Poder politico . . .'*, Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*, New York, Basic Books, 1969, pp. 180f.

13. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. III, New York, International Publishers, 1967, pp. 332–3.

14. The concern with the effects of external factors (including both the capitalist world market and imperialism, based on capital penetration from the advanced capitalist countries into pre-capitalist formations) on affected regions has led to an extensive literature on the development of underdevelopment: Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1957; Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1967; dependence: Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment*; Theotonio Dos Santos, 'The Structure of Dependency', *American Economic Review*, 60, 2, 1970; and world system analysis: Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York, Academic Press, 1974. Assessments and critiques of these approaches can be found in Robert Brenner, 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', *New Left Review*, 104, July–August 1977; Gabriel Palma, 'Dependency: A Formal Theory of Under-development or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?' *World Development*, 6, 7–8, July–August 1978, and various issues of *Latin American Perspectives*.

15. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*; Ellen Kay Trimberger, 'State Power and Modes of Production: Implications of the Japanese Transition to Capitalism', *The Insurgent Sociologist*, 7, 2, Spring 1977; Brenner, op. cit.; Theda Skocpol and Ellen Kay Trimberger, 'Revolutions and the World-Historical Development of Capitalism', in Barbara Hockey Kaplan (ed.), *Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy*, Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1978, pp. 123–4.

16. Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis', *Theory and Society*, 3, 4, Winter 1976.

17. David Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, 'Recent Developments in Marxist Theory of the Capitalist State', *Monthly Review*, October and November, 1975; James O'Connor, *Fiscal Crisis of the State*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1973, pp. 180–2.

18. Further historical and theoretical treatments of the emergence of the modern nation state and its relationship to the development of capitalism as a mode of production can be found in Barrington Moore, Jr, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966; Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*; Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978; as well as Braunmuhl, op. cit.

19. This cursory review hardly does justice to the variety and complexity of authoritarian and military regimes in Latin America. Nor is there any attempt here to provide an explanation of the relationship between the economic development of different Latin American countries and the type of political system which emerged. A summary discussion of these relationships can be found in Cardoso and Faletto, op. cit.

20. Ibid., pp. 100–1.

21. Ibid., pp. 100–39; Octavio Ianni, *La formación del Estado populista en America Latina*, Mexico, Ediciones Era, 1975, pp. 114–33.

22. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modern-*

ization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973, p. 56; Juan Eugenio Corradi, 'Argentina', in Ronald Chilcote and Joel Edelstein (eds), *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond*, New York, John Wiley, 1974, pp. 351-6; Zeitlin, Neuman and Ratcliff, op. cit., p. 1025; Salvador Cordero and Rafael Santin, 'Los grupos industriales: una nueva organizatión económica en Mexico', Mexico, Colegio de Mexico, Cuadernos del CES 23, 1977, pp. 3-4.

23. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications', in Alfred Stepan (ed.), *Authoritarian Brazil*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, p. 145; Bernardo Sepulveda and Antonio Chumacero, *La inversión extranjera en México*, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1973, pp. 54-8; Richard S. Newfarmer and Willard F. Mueller, *Multinational Corporations in Brazil and Mexico: Structural Sources of Economic and Noneconomic Power*, Report to the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 106-8.

24. On the emergence of crises and obstacles to further industrialization in Latin America, the effects of attempts to resolve these problems on mobilized popular groups, and the emergence of 'bureaucratic authoritarian' states as a consequence of these and other factors, see Cardoso and Faletto, op. cit., and Guillermo O'Donnell, op. cit., and 'Reflexiones sobre las tendencias generales de cambio en el Estado burocratico autoritario', Documento CEDES/G.E. CLASCO/no. 1, Buenos Aires, August 1975. A critique and further development of the bureaucratic authoritarian model may be found in David Collier (ed), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979.

25. E. V. K. Fitzgerald, *The State and Economic Development: Peru since 1968*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 28-30; Alfred Stepan, op. cit., pp. 256-87; Barbara Stallings, 'Privatization and the Public Debt: US Banks in Perú', NACLA *Report on the Americas*, 12, 4, July-August 1978, pp. 5-14; William Bollinger, 'Peru: The Left Gathers Force', NACLA *Report on the Americas*, 12, 5, September-October 1978, p. 45.

26. David Barkin and Gustavo Esteva, *Inflación y democracia: el caso de Mexico*, Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno, 1979, pp. 96-7.

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Robert J. Antonio

Immanent critique as the core of critical theory: its origins and developments in Hegel, Marx and contemporary thought*

ABSTRACT

My goal is to explain the intellectual and historical basis of *critical theory* – a term with vague and imprecise meaning for sociologists. Confusion about the approach is more fundamental than that usually attributed to its difficult, philosophical terminology. The central issue is that critical theory is *not* a general theory, but is instead a *method* of analysis deriving from a nonpositivist epistemology. The focus will be upon the method of *immanent critique*, its Hegelian-Marxist roots and its development as the central mode of critical theoretic analysis. Immanent critique is a means of detecting the societal contradictions which offer the most determinate possibilities for emancipatory social change. The commentary on method cannot be separated from its historical application, since the content of immanent critque is the *dialectic in history*.

Jay[1] suggests that critical theory is opposed to closed philosophical systems and that the precise shape of the approach is elusive because it is 'expressed through a series of critiques of other thinkers and philosophical traditions'. Jay's book describes the highly diverse works of critical theorists (in social theory, philosophical speculation, aesthetic critique, and historical description) and the broad variety of thinkers they address (e.g., Hegel, Marx, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Weber, Husserl and Heidegger). It is understandable why Susan Buck-Morss concludes that critical theory is 'a term which lacks substantive precision'.[2]

Despite its diverse elements, critical theory *does* have a definable core. However, this is often overlooked because it is an historically applied logic of analysis rather than a fixed theoretical or empirical content. Critical theory is based on an interpretation of Marx's thought.[3] It adopts Marx's analytic categories, continues his critique of capitalism and embraces his goal of emancipation. However,

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critical theorists do not retain the whole of Marx's theory, but instead argue that the development of managerial capitalism, state socialism and fascism require its partial revision. Marx believed that the 'laws' of capital were brought out by the 'free market',[4] so it is consistent to expect that corporate planning, oligopoly, streamlined bureaucracy and state intervention would require some theoretical innovations. Furthermore, Marx was aware of the expanding domination of the nascent bureaucratic state,[5] but did not live long enough to see its full development (especially in its state socialist form). Marx's appreciation of historical change, sensitivity to developing tendencies of capital and critical approach to all existing social formations projects a view that theory must confront the most serious crises of the day.[6] For these reasons, critical theorists believe that historically based criticism of Marxism is fully consistent with Marx's own method of analysis.[7]

Critical theorists attack orthodox Marxism–Leninism for embracing the 'Word' of Marx while ignoring his method. In striving for theoretical purity, Marxism–Leninism adopts the ahistorical formalism of nineteenth-century political economy, which Marx detested. Furthermore, it preserves certain problematic themes within Marx's work (e.g. optimistic conceptions of science, 'the party' and revolutionary proletarian consciousness) which deepen, rather than strip away, the mystifications of modern domination. Mechanistic interpretations transform Marxism into 'a pseudo-science of legitimation and domination', promoting rationalization of production at the cost of extreme domination in the political and social spheres.[8] When it becomes the official ideology of state-bureaucracy, Marxism promotes the expansion, rather than the 'withering away', of the state. As a result, Marx's *raison d'être – emancipation*[9] – is eclipsed by concerns for political expediency and administrative efficiency.

Western social science, based on the Kantian division of fact and value, is supposed to describe 'what is' without making value judgments. Only science provides *valid* knowledge and its epistemology offers no grounds for valuative truth. Values can only be objects of empirical inquiries, not the basis of scientific critique and praxis. Social scientists may strongly disagree about method, but almost always equate valid knowledge with correct, value-neutral description. Critical theorists attack western empiricism because it reifies conventional values legitimating capitalist society. Likewise, they reject Marxism–Leninism for ordaining dominant values as scientific laws and socialist state bureaucracy as the rational society.[10] Critical theorists oppose the inherent relativism of bourgeois social science, as well as the absolutism of Marxism–Leninism, because neither addresses the most urgent issues of the day (characterized by the rise of fascism, Stalinism, managerial capitalism, oligopoly and universal state-bureaucracy).

Critical theorists also reject metaphysics because the latter legitimated precapitalist structures of domination, and could be revived again for similar purposes (e.g., Nazi Germany exploited metaphysically based folk culture). Critical theorists desire to establish, from the ruins of Enlightenment reason, a basis for valid knowledge that is not fully empirical, purely ideological or metaphysical. It must provide a basis for considering questions of value, but still maintain the requirement for empirical and theoretical rigour in instrumental matters.

My goal is to explain the intellectual and historical basis of *critical theory* – a term with vague and imprecise meaning for sociologists. Confusion about the approach is more fundamental than that usually attributed to its difficult, philosophical terminology. The central issue is that critical theory is *not* a general theory, but is instead a *method* of analysis deriving from a nonpositivist epistemology. This paper will focus upon the method of *immanent critique*, explaining its Hegelian-Marxist roots and development as the central mode of critical-theoretic analysis.[11] Immanent critique is a means of detecting the societal contradictions which offer the most determinate possibilities for emancipatory social change. The commentary on method cannot be separated from its historical application, since the content of immanent critique is the *dialectic in history*.

THE HEGELIAN AND MARXIAN ROOTS OF IMMANENT CRITIQUE

Hegel's 'radical immanentist' philosophy holds that reason serves only 'Spirit'.[12] He rejects both metaphysics and empiricism for assuming realities beyond the subject – e.g., Platonic forms, things-in-themselves, sense data. Hegel argued that constituted objects as well as the forces of contradiction, negation and change are contained *within* Spirit.[13] Driven by 'Desire', the Hegelian subject engages in self-formative and self-transformative labour, causing 'the development of Spirit in *Time* . . . [and] *Space*'.[14]

Hegel argues that the subject loses control of its self-creation by positing its own products as external to itself ('self-estrangement'). However, through labour, the subject discovers its capacity for rationally transforming the reified object world. Estrangement abates gradually as the increasingly 'self-conscious' subject shapes its world progressively into more highly rational syntheses. Historically specific labour, through a process of 'determinate negation', moves Spirit toward a 'terminus' of complete freedom and rationality.[15] Hegel provides a critical analysis of reification (as objectification) aimed at demystifying the *human* construction of history. It is an *immanent critique* because *its critical standards are ones given in the historical process.*[16]

Marx departs from a reconstructed Hegelian foundation. He was attracted to Hegel's philosophy because it lacked the antagonistic division of 'is' and 'ought' usually found in German idealism.[17] Marx wrote, 'Setting out from idealism . . . I hit upon seeking the Idea in the real itself. If formerly the gods had dwelt above the world, they had now become its center.'[18] Marx concluded that immanent principles were necessary weapons in the struggle for progressive social change,[19] because they provide a basis for critique *within* historical reality. Later, this immanent grounding became the axis of his emancipatory critique of capitalism.

Marx retains the Hegelian view of humanity: it creates itself through labour, loses itself in estranged labour and overcomes alienation through reappropriation of the labour process. However, despite their mutual appreciation of labour, Marx alters Hegel's immanent critique radically. Marx states that

> *Hegel's* view of history presupposes an *abstract* or *Absolute Spirit* which develops in such a way that mankind is only a *Mass*, a conscious or unconscious vehicle for Spirit. Hence Hegel provides for the development of a *speculative*, esoteric history within *empirical* exoteric history. The history of mankind becomes the history of the *abstract spirit* of mankind, thus a spirit *beyond* actual man.[20]

Marx attacks Hegel for emphasizing '*abstract mental* labor'. He substitutes 'naturalism' for Hegelian idealism, replacing 'Spirit' with 'real, corporeal *man*'.[21] This 'actual, sensuous, real, finite, particular' human occupies a world of '*real natural objects*' mediated by human '*essential powers*'.[22] For Marx, both 'natural object' and 'essential powers' are objective and real; history reflects the interaction of humanity's objective, essential powers with real objects.[23] Labour transforms natural objects into human objects, creating a human history open to rational understanding.

Marx rejects Hegel's equation of objectification with estrangement – that 'reappropriation of the estranged objective essence' is simply 'a process of incorporation into self-consciousness'.[24] Marx argues that estrangement does not derive from objectification, but originates in the economically mediated process of social domination. He asserts that alienation can be overcome only by labour and struggle, not by a simple alteration of consciousness.[25]

Marx asserts that Hegelian philosophy makes the 'subject' a '*self-knowing and self-manifesting Idea*', while 'real men and real nature become mere predicates'.[26] He believes that Hegel, despite his claims to immanence, creates a metaphysical subject divorced from real historical individuals.[27] Marx implies that Hegel's idealist idiom generates an uncritical perspective toward the empirical world where 'real men' live their lives. In particular, it fosters the characteristic error of bourgeois social thought: confusing legitimations with the

real attributes of concrete social institutions. This error is manifested grossly in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* where he attributes a higher substantive rationality to the Prussian state and its institutions of monarchy, bureaucracy, limited sufferage and private property.[28] Marx attacks the work because its subject matter is portrayed 'as it thinks itself' rather than 'as it is'.[29] Marx abandons the concept of 'Spirit' in order to avoid the Hegelian conflation of ideology and social structure. The emphasis on the *contradiction*, rather than correspondence, between concrete social formations and their ideologies is the basis of Marx's immanent critique.

Like Hegel, Marx argues that immanent contradictions lead ultimately to an emancipatory terminus. However, Marx attempted to ground his standard of emancipation in concrete history, rather than in presuppositions about 'Spirit'. The emancipatory telos, according to Marx, derives from the struggle against natural necessity. Humanity, in labouring to satisfy its animal needs[30] confronts social and political constraints (unreconciled nature)[31] as well as material ones. Social structures, created expressly for the provision of animal needs, replace the direct struggle for survival with socially mediated necessity pitting 'man against man'. Emancipation originates as a battle against domination in the natural sphere, but is later extended to society in reaction to human exploitation. Marx holds that human needs become more elaborate as the means of production advance and natural necessity receeds. Emancipation, itself, becomes a need because other 'higher' needs require a social order promoting rationality and freedom.

Marx substitutes a history of class domination and class struggle for Hegel's historical phenomenology. For Marx, the movement toward freedom and reason is not an unfolding of labour in consciousness, but is instead, an historical transformation[32] born of social struggle and ultimately realized through the efforts of an historical agent of emancipation – the proletariat. This is the basis for an immanent critique that turns the treasured values of bourgeois ideology against the unfreedom, inequality and misery of developing capitalism.[33]

CRITICAL THEORY AND INSTRUMENTAL REASON

Horkheimer and Adorno say that 'with the extension of the bourgeois commodity economy, the dark horizon of myth is illumined by the sun of calculating reason, beneath whose cold rays the seed of a new barbarism grows to fruition'.[34] They state further:

> In their [the masses] eyes, their reduction to mere objects of the administered life, which preforms every sector of modern existence including language and perception, represents objective necessity,

> against which they believe there is nothing they can do. Misery as the antithesis of power and powerlessness grows immeasurably, together with the capacity to remove all misery permanently. Each individual is unable to penetrate the forest of cliques and institutions which, from the highest levels of command to the last professional rackets, ensure the boundless persistence of status.[35]

Critical theorists believe that the conditions of capitalist domination have been altered, but not so radically as to force abandonment of the critique of commodity production. Modern domination involves new forms of control, yet still contains the general contradictions emphasized by Marx. The 'new barbarism' is characterized by 'comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom', rather than the crude, direct exploitation of early industrial capitalism.[36] 'Domination is transfigured into administration' and 'the tangible source of exploitation disappears behind the facade of objective rationality'.[37]

The worker's consumption, freedom and general quality of life declined sharply during the transition from household to factory production.[38] Exploitation was transparent and workers sometimes resisted it.[39] The conditions of production were so cruel that they could not be legitimated internally. Thus, absolute reason (religion) remained an important ideology. Workers could not conclude from their condition that the ideal was real, but religions, such as Methodism, could promise rewards in an after-life.[40] Marx unmasked absolute reason as a means of legitimating the ugly realities of early industrial society. This, of course, was later combined with his broader critique of the secular dogma (political economy) of the bourgeois class.

Marcuse states that,

> The technical achievement of advanced industrial society, and the effective manipulation of mental and material productivity have brought about a *shift in the locus of mystification*. If it is meanful to say that the ideology comes to be embodied in the process of production itself, it may also be meaningful to suggest that, in this society, the rational rather than the irrational becomes the most effective vehicle of mystification.[41]

Marcuse implies that otherworldly and secular idealism are now unnecessary. In his 'one dimensionality' thesis, he explains, that a system that 'delivers the goods' legitimates itself in the process of commodity production and distribution.[42] Advanced industrialism preserves work's alienating qualities, but does not demand the quantity and intensity of labour characteristic of early industrial capitalism.[43] The reduced demands imply that the system is responsive to the worker's plight. Despite some continued privations, workers can remember lower wages, longer workdays, fewer benefits, and greater insecurity.[44] The wage labour system and worker

powerlessness remain, but are now counterbalanced by conditions which increase the '"social and cultural integration" of the laboring class with capitalist society'.[45]

The improving material fate of workers is a *prima facie* legitimation that promotes more efficient capitalist domination. The expansion of worker consumption must be considered in the context of corporate responses to the intensifying contradictions of industrial capitalism.[46] Corporate regulated commodity consumption defused increasing worker discontent, while at the same time it provided a new arena for capitalist valourization. Finally, the production of new needs and administered means of 'satisfying' them extended corporate manipulation beyond the workplace deep into social life.

Ewen states that

> The triumph of capitalism in the twentieth century has been its ability to define and contend with the conditions of the social realm. From the period of the 1920's, commercial culture has increasingly provided an idiom within which desires for social change and fantasies of liberation might be articulated and contained. The cultural displacement effected by consumerism has provided a mode of perception that has both confronted the question of human need and at the same time restricted its possibilities.[47]

Consumer society alters the conditions of 'class conflict'.[48] Despite continued exploitation, alienation and increased administration, workers now share, with those who control their labour, an interest in perpetuating the system. The material and symbolic significance of commodities results in workers feeling that they have more to lose than their chains. Except for the lumpenproletariat, most workers' immediate interests require maintenance of the corporate structure. Periodic dysfunctions (e.g., the 'oil crisis', inflation, layoffs) can cause considerable suffering, but generate ameliorative, instead of revolutionary, reactions. Most labour/management disputes now affirm rather than challenge corporate structure. Labour demands more security, commodities and leisure time, but with each gain it becomes more dependent upon capitalism. Despite occasional conflicts, the radical polarization of bourgeoisie and proletariat is being contained. Class conflict is, more than ever, a latent conflict of interests, rather than a 'class war'.

The contradictions of capitalism remain in mutated form, manifesting themselves not merely in the exploitation of labour, but in the ruthless power of capital over the organization of social, cultural and material life. The élite-concentrated ownership of American wealth has been stable (despite increases in worker consumption),[49] while the means of administering it have been extended and rationalized. The manipulation of needs through advertising, the development

of 'cybernetic' controls for state and corporate bureaucracies and organizational streamlining all contribute to increased administrative power. The 'separation' of ownership and management further rationalizes the pursuit of exchange value by placing the operations of the modern firm in the hands of specialists who must manage it in the interests of long-term profitability. This promotes profit and stability, while it frees capital owners for full-time management of their diverse capital investments. Finally, the technocratic division of labour covers the real interests and activities of higher management with a veneer of scientism. Control becomes distant, impersonal and indirect – it emanates from reified routines that take on a transcendental quality.

The contradictions of capitalism shift from the rude material privation of workers, to a dialectic involving depoliticization, over-administration, waste, environmental destruction and other consequences of the rationalization of the arbitrary power of capital. However, the broader contradiction remains between revolutionized means of production and social relations of production that are not yet fully socialized. Irrationality and necessity are perpetuated, despite the existence of means for overcoming them.

Critical theorists do not have faith in an *inevitable* emancipation arising from either an armed confrontation between the proletariat and bourgeoisie or from a scientific 'revolution'. Instead, they are deeply concerned with the pacification of the working class and with the functioning of science and technology as instruments of domination.[50] Critical theorists imply that Marx's faith in the proletariat and in science/technology introduce a quasi-metaphysical determinism into his analysis. This is reflected in his proletarianized, materialist version of the Hegelian unfolding of history to an eventual terminus in rationality and freedom. Marx's optimism was understandable in his day, though questionable. Today his position is not only implausible, but it also erodes Marxism's critical edge and opens it to ideological abuse. The *guaranteed* terminus justifies repressive means in the short term when people live their lives. The promise of emancipation, 'insured' by the advance of science and technology under the guidance of the 'workers' state', legitimates cultural, political and social repression.

Marx understood bureaucracy, but was insensitive to the possible despotic consequences of the bureaucratic centralization of state power during the 'transition' to communism.[51] Modern state socialism has transformed the 'temporary' dictatorship of the proletariat into an awesome and enduring instrument of bureaucratic domination. For this reason, critical theorists criticize state socialism with as much vigour as they attack consumer capitalism. The expropriation of surplus value, worker alienation and powerlessness, as well as political and cultural repression, exist in these 'socialist' societies.

The state-owned means of production managed by a planning élite, is contradictory to the Marxist ideology of democratically determined community needs. Critical theorists perform on Marxism what Marx did to Hegel. They criticize its ahistorical aspects from the perspective of the concrete conditions under which people *now* live. Thus, the immanent critique has two critical moments: one moving from ideology to social reality and the other in the obverse direction. The goal of the method is immanent truth which unifies what is, with the *determinate* possibilities for, what could be.

Schroyer describes immanent critique as a means of restoring 'actuality to false appearance' by first describing 'what a social totality holds itself to be, and then confronting it with what it is in fact becoming'.[52] Immanent critique attacks social reality from its own standpoint, but at the same time criticizes the standpoint from the perspective of its historical context. Horkheimer states

> Again and again *in history*, ideas have cast off their swaddling clothes and struck out against the social systems that bore them. The cause, in large degree, is that spirit, language, and all the realms of the mind necessarily stake universal claims. Even ruling groups, intent above all upon defending their particular interests, must stress universal motifs in religion, morality and science. Thus originates the contradiction between the existent and ideology, a contradiction that spurs all historical progress. While conformism presupposes the basic harmony of the two and includes the minor discrepancies in the ideology itself, philosophy makes men conscious of the contradiction between them. On the one hand it appraises society by the light of the very ideas that it recognizes as its highest values; on the other, it is aware that these ideas reflect the taints of reality.[53]

Horkheimer argues that immanent critique describes the dialectic in history which is driven by the contradictions between ideology and reality. Élites attempt to stall change by denying these contradictions; they portray a false unity of the ideal and real. However, the greater the ideological claims, the more dangerous they become to their social context. Immanent critique seeks, by revealing the contradictions of claim and context, to transform legitimations into emancipatory weapons. The goal is to replace the inaction based on the false correspondence with emancipatory praxis aimed at making the ideal real.

Critical theory alters the content, but not the form of Marx's immanent critique. Marx's rejection of religion and political economy are retained, but the critique is extended to modern epistemology (which equates truth with 'calculations that work').[54] This approach defines experimentally controlled observation as the ideal means for determining valid knowledge. As a result 'all things in nature become

identical with the phenomena they present when submitted to the practices of our laboratories, whose problems no less than their apparatus express in turn the problems and interests of society as it is'.[55] This radically instrumentalized form of reason eliminates questions of value from its inquiries – and from rational knowledge. In the process, it destroys negativity, hypostatizes the real and in the end, becomes itself a metaphysic of the concrete.[56]

Horkheimer states,

> According to the philosophy of the average modern intellectual, there is only one authority, namely, science, conceived as the classification of facts and the calculation of probabilities. The statement that justice and freedom are better in themselves than injustice and oppression is scientifically unverifiable and useless. It has come to sound as meaningless in itself as would the statement that red is more beautiful than blue, or that an egg is better than milk.[57]

Horkheimer believes that societal values (e.g., justice, equality, happiness, tolerance) have lost their 'intellectual roots' and although they still exist as vague aims 'there is no rational agency authorized to appraise and link them to an objective reality'.[58] Science grasps technical routines, while leaving questions of good or right to personal belief. Criticism of ends is relegated to the valuative sphere, which – partly as a result of earlier critiques of absolutism – has been discredited, relativized and made a matter of individual taste. Instrumental reason promotes bureaucratically administered life, because its value neutrality allows it to work for whomever controls it. In consumer capitalism instrumental rationality conforms to the interests of commodity production and its corporate agents, while it serves the party, state and planning élites under state socialism.

The means orientation of both Marxist-Leninist and bourgeois science contradicts the universal, humanist claims that provide their ultimate grounding. The most important issue involves the fact that instrumental reason cannot be used to evaluate ends, nor to judge the substantive rationality of instrumental routines. Marxist-Leninists and western scientists both claim to be striving ultimately for the creation of a rational society of abundance and freedom. However, their epistemologies do not provide a way of measuring their respective societies' progress against these ultimate ends. In fact, because of their foundation in instrumental reason, both approaches are easily harnessed to the prevailing system of domination for purposes that contradict these values.

The criticism of instrumental rationality, supplements the critique of absolute reason, and provides critical theory with a broader understanding of the links of knowledge to domination. Marx did not analyse instrumental reason critically, and so remained within the

incomplete dialectic of Enlightenment. Enlightenment reason has an extreme 'anti-authoritarian principle' – a reaction to the absolute ideologies of the preindustrial age. This principle given free reign, as instrumental reason, turns into irrationality. It brings about 'the abrogation of everything inherently binding' allowing 'domination to ordain as sovereign and to manipulate whatever bonds and obligations prove appropriate to it'.[59] Fully instrumentalized reason contributes strongly to the domination of nature, but at the cost of vastly extending *rational* domination in the social sphere.

Instrumental reason has two opposing elements:

> the abstract ego emptied of all substance except its attempt to transform everything in heaven and on earth into means for its preservation, and on the other hand an empty nature degraded to mere material, mere stuff to be dominated, without any other purpose than that of this very domination.[60]

The Enlightenment abolished absolute reason, but did not provide a rational basis for directing the technical development it helped generate. This made way for unbridled domination in both the natural and human realms. Marx's optimism about proletarian revolution, science and state centralization derives in part from his view of instrumental rationality as an exclusively emancipatory force. He considered domination to have its origins in necessity and did not recognize a new logic of domination within the 'scientific' means of overcoming necessity.

Critical theory emphasizes the contradiction between the ideology of the 'rational society' and the actual instrumentally rational domination of bureaucratic administration. It transforms Marx's critiques of religion and political economy into a broader critique of domination. The Enlightenment ideal of emancipation becomes the standard for criticism in every sector of life under consumer capitalism and state socialism. Critical theorists do not adopt ahistorical assumptions about either a 'terminus' or an agent that guarantees emancipation. Such assumptions become justifications for domination and must be rejected. As an immanent critique of domination, the truth of critical theory lies in neither absolute nor instrumental reason, but in the determinate negation of domination. This approach does not lead to a rejection of proletarianism or socialism, but instead emphasizes that both issues must be freshly and rigorously rethought in the context of their democratic ideologies.

CRITICAL THEORY AND EMANCIPATION

Marxist-Leninists condemn critical theory as a modern form of Hegelian idealism.[61] Critical theorists respond that when the

claims of Marxism–Leninism are contrasted with the realities of its role in creating and perpetuating state socialist bureaucracy, it can be rightfully accused, despite its dialectical-materialist slogans, of Hegelianism. The substitution of abstract promises for emancipatory *means* of organization transform the approach into a *metaphysic of the concrete.* Marxism–Leninism's advocacy of the primacy of theory, over fact, is easily translated into the contention that the ideal is real. This shares the one-dimensionality of western empiricism which, starting from an opposing premise, implies that the real is ideal. Critical theorists reject the approaches because both attempt to liquidate the creative tensions between ideology and reality. When the latter two are fused in one dimension, the means for crystallizing class consciousness are eroded.

Critical theory has emphasized primarily the negative moment of the dialectic. It has attacked domination, rather than describing explicit, determinate possibilities for new social formations. However, it is still clear that democracy, in as direct a form as possible, is the flip-side of the critique of state bureaucracy. Critical theorists imply that the 'democracy of the councils' (*self-managed* socialism) is the revolutionary alternative to both corporate capitalism and state socialism.[62] This would involve a debureaucratized public sphere where all citizens could participate in free communication and practical action to determine the 'consensual norms' governing social and economic life.[63] Emancipation is not reduced to a formal possibility, but is viewed both as a matter of immediate struggle and a long-term goal.

The emphasis on democratic organization is not an idealist fantasy, but arises from the fact that élite-controlled bureaucratic social formations, whatever their ideology, reproduce themselves and expand their hegemony rather than 'withering away'. Emancipatory action must establish an alternative to capitalist bureaucracy without restoring domination in the shape of revolutionary authoritarianism or socialist planning élites. Critical theory needs to focus increasingly upon the concrete, practical problems of creating democratic institutions and practices. Its traditional concern with metatheory and cultural critique provides an intellectual alternative to both empiricism and orthodox Marxism–Leninism. However, it is now time to translate this philosophic foundation into determinate critiques of social and economic arrangements, that have more direct bearing upon emancipatory praxis.

Critical theory, to retain vitality, must transcend theoretical archaeology (constant rehashes of Marx, Adorno and Horkheimer), repetitious attacks on positivism and endless debates about highly abstract theories (e.g., of Habermas).[64] The critique of domination must be translated into historically concrete and regionally specific immanent critiques of bureaucratic domination. These detailed

analyses should investigate the possibilities for democratization according to the particular needs and concrete conditions of nations and regions at different levels of development and with varying histories, social traditions and material cultures. Thus, despite the general emphasis upon socialist democracy, critical theory should *not* insist that a single model of post-bureaucratic society be imposed in all settings. In some contexts these models require extreme force. When this occurs, they seldom achieve their ultimate ends and often become the justification for hegemony by the élite allegedly attempting to impose the model.

Perhaps Marx's original contention holds true, that socialism is possible in only the most advanced industrial nations. Orthodox Marxism–Leninism has little to contribute in such a setting. Its authoritarian means of organization are best suited for concentrating power in the hands of a planning élite for purposes of rapid economic development. The creation of socialism should be considered a separate, and even contradictory, task that is as much political as economic. Once advanced industrialism is a reality, the battle against exploitation must be waged as part of a larger war against élite control. The desire for a democratic public sphere and mass participation in the planning and management of social life, replaces ideas of revolutionary vanguard, state centralization and planning élites. However, before this can occur, the social and political theory guiding emancipatory activity must be freed from its tie to bureaucratic centralism. This goal does not require creation of entirely new ideas, but instead a commitment to the realization of the incomplete project contained in democratic ideology. Emancipatory immanent critique should both portray the contradiction between state bureaucratic society and its democratic ideals (about rationality and freedom) and point to the determinate possibilities for overcoming the contradiction. The critique is not an idealist reduction because it aims to become a basis, not a substitute, for praxis.

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NOTES

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2. Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, New York, Free Press, 1977, p. 65.

3. See ibid., pp. 1–62; Jay, op. cit., pp. 41–85; Trent Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1973, pp. 44–100.

4. Karl Marx, *Capital*, volume 1, New York, International Publishers, 1967, p. 270.

5. Karl Marx, *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, New York, Anchor Books, 1967, pp. 151–202.

6. See Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, New York, Vintage Books, 1973, pp. 85–111.

7. Norberto Bobbio, 'Marxism and Socialism', *Telos*, no. 39, 1979, pp. 191–200.

8. See Kansas *Telos* Group, 'The Antioch *Telos* Conference', *Telos*, 32, 1977, pp. 188–92; see also Andrew Arato, 'Understanding Bureaucratic Centralism', *Telos*, 35, 1978, pp. 73–87; Castoriadis, 'The Social Regime in Russia', *Telos*, 38, 1978/1979, pp. 32–47; Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism*, London, Pelican, 1971.

9. Marx considered communism 'the *actual* phase of human emancipation and rehabilitation'. Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, New York, International Publishers, 1964, p. 146.

10. Soviet 'Marxists' eliminate practically all of Marx's thought pertinent to criticism of Soviet society. Their version of 'scientific socialism' aims at perfecting state administrative structure through 'scientific' management (see Gvishiani, *Organization and Management*, Moscow, Progress, 1972, pp. 77–173; V. G. Afanasyev, *The Scientific Management of Society*, Moscow, Progress, 1971, pp. 77–113, 186–253). Soviet administration is impervious to criticism because it reflects 'objective laws' of Marxism–Leninism. Soviet sociologists claim that critical theorists confuse administration, the 'necessary' state machinery of socialism, with capitalist bureaucracy. (See Eduard Batalov, *The Philosophy of Revolt*, Moscow, Progress, 1975, pp. 226–30.) Furthermore, they argue that any 'attempt to "liberalize" or "democratize" Marxism will . . . play into the hands of those anti-communists who are openly endeavoring . . . to discredit Marxism and undermine its influence on the masses' (Vol. I. Dobrenkov, *Neo-Freudians in Search of 'Truth'*, Moscow, Progress, 1976, p. 162).

11. Immanent critique is an important theme in critical theory, but its role should not be exaggerated. (See Schroyer, op. cit., pp. 29–36; Jay, op. cit., p. 63, Buck-Morss, op. cit., pp. 49–57, 63–9, 113–21.) Major critical theorists, such as Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, do not restrict themselves to a single method. Like other broad intellectuals, they engage in numerous modes of analysis. However, immanent critique provides unity to their work and distinguishes it from other approaches. Finally, this is the method, partially developed by the first generation of critical theorists, that contains the potential for an even richer critical theory of the future.

12. George Lichtheim, 'Introduction to the Torchbook Edition', Georg W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1967, p. xxiii.

13. See Alexandre Kojeve, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, New York, Basic Books, 1969, p. 232; Hegel op. cit., pp. 131–45.

14. Georg W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, New York, Dover Publications, 1956, p. 72.

15. Hegel, *The Phenomenology . . .*, pp. 116–21, 137, 507–610, 789–808.

16. Hegel argues that all forces promoting and retarding human development derive from human labour. Therefore, immanent critique must portray the retarding aspects of historical labour in its fully humanized, phenomenological form. For an explicit example of how his critique uses immanent standards, I recommend Hegel's chapter on 'Lordship and Bondage' (ibid., pp. 228–40). This material is one of the crucial

departure points for the development of Marxism out of Hegelianism (see Kojeve, op. cit., pp. 31–70; Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 148–70, 537–71.)

17. Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp. 8–9.

18. Marx, *Writings of the Young Marx . . .*, p. 46.

19. See ibid., pp. 62–3. Marx states that '*Philosophy* is the *head* of this emancipation and the *proletariat* is its *heart*'. Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1964, p. 59.

20. Marx, *Writings of the Young Marx . . .*, p. 382.

21. Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts . . .*, pp. 180–1.

22. Ibid., pp. 172, 180–1.

23. Ibid., p. 180.

24. Ibid., pp. 175, 179.

25. Ibid., pp. 106–19.

26. Ibid., p. 188.

27. Marx, *Writings of the Young Marx . . .*, pp. 374–84.

28. Georg W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 160–223.

29. Marx, *Writings of the Young Marx . . .*, pp. 152–202. Marx argues that Hegel's analysis of the Prussian state bureaucracy 'could be taken verbatim from the Prussian Civil Code'. Ibid., pp. 180–2.

30. Marx states that 'the first premise of all human existence . . . [is] that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to "make history". But life involves before everything else, eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus production of means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself.' Marx continues, arguing that 'the second point is that the satisfaction of the first need . . . leads to new needs; and this production of new needs is the first historical act.' Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, Moscow, Progress, 1964, p. 39.

31. The term 'unreconciled nature' refers to social relations of production in which natural necessity is refracted through partially rational means of overcoming necessity. Such systems may provide technically advanced goods and services, but at the same time preserve domination and struggle by perpetuating the unequal distribution of labour responsibilities and benefits.

32. I do *not* claim that Marx succeeded in developing an argument totally devoid of transhistorical elements, e.g., his claims about a communist 'terminus' to history are not historical.

33. Even Marx's mature works contained immanent criticism, e.g., his analysis of commodities, the labour theory of value and his discussion of unequal exchange. However, Marx's work was not exclusively an immanent critique. His rich legacy includes historical, structural, scientific and polemical aspects. Immanent critique provided a foundation and direction to his emancipatory project, but was *not* his only tool.

34. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, New York, Seabury Press, 1972, p. 32.

35. Ibid., p. 38.

36. Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966, p. 1.

37. Ibid., p. 32.

38. See Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, pp. 394–504.

39. For example, see E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, New York, Vintage Books, 1966, pp. 711–832; Malcolm I. Thomis, *The Luddites*, New York, Schocken, 1970; E. G. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, New York, Mentor, 1962, pp. 44–73, 238–57.

40. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 350–400.

41. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man . . .*, p. 189.

42. Ibid., pp. 1–18.

43. Ibid., pp. 26–7.

44. This commentary refers to conditions in the United States.

45. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* . . . , p. 29.
46. Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1976.
47. Ibid., pp. 219–20.
48. See Jurgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, Boston, Beacon Press 1971, pp. 107–22; Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT, 1978, pp. 232–71.
49. See Douglas Dowd, *The Twisted Dream*, Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers, 1977, pp. 127–64; Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America*, New York, Praeger, 1962.
50. For example, see Habermas, op. cit., pp. 81–122; William Leiss, *The Domination of Nature*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1974.
51. See Marx, *Writings of the Young Marx* . . . , pp. 177–90.
52. Shroyer, op. cit., pp. 30–1.
53. Marx Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, New York, Seabury Press, 1974, p. 178. The emphasis is mine.
54. Max Horkheimer, *Critique of Instrumental Reason*, New York, Seabury Press, p. 47.
55. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 49.
56. Ibid., pp. 70–91.
57. Ibid., p. 24.
58. Ibid., p. 23.
59. Horkheimer and Adorno, op. cit., p. 93.
60. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 97.
61. For example, Batalov, op. cit.; Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism*, NLB, 1976; John Horton and Fari Filsoufi, 'Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder in Theory and Method', *Insurgent Sociologist*, 7, 1977, pp. 5–17; Goran Therborn, 'The Frankfurt School', *New Left Review*, 63, 1970, pp. 65–96.
62. Max Horkheimer, 'The Authoritarian State', *Telos*, 15, 1973, p. 6.
63. See the following writings of Jurgen Habermas: 'On Systematically Distorted Communication', *Inquiry*, 13, 1970, pp. 205–18; 'Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence', *Inquiry*, 13, 1970, pp. 360–75; *Toward a Rational Society;* and 'The Public Sphere', *New German Critique*, 3, 1974, pp. 49–55; see also McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 1–16, 272–357.
64. This project has already begun among the current generation of critical theorists. See Arato, op. cit.; Jose Baptista, 'Bureaucracy and Society', *Telos*, 22, 1974/1975, pp. 66–84; Norberto Bobbio, 'Why Democracy', *Telos*, 36, 1978, pp. 43–54; Antonio Carlo, 'The Socio-Economic Nature of the USSR', *Telos*, 21, 1974, pp. 2–86; and 'Capitalism and Crisis in Yugoslavia', 36, 1978, pp. 81–110; Cornelius Castoriadis, 'The Hungarian Source', *Telos*, 29, 1976, pp. 4–22; Ferenc Feher, 'The Dictatorship Over Needs', *Telos*, 35, 1978, pp. 31–42; Claude Lefort, 'What is Bureaucracy?', *Telos*, 22, 1974/1975, pp. 31–65; Karel Kovanda, 'Czechoslovak Workers' Councils (1968/1969)', *Telos*, 28, 1976, pp. 36–54.

Robert Bocock

British sociologists and Freud: a sociological analysis of the absence of a relationship*

In this paper I shall try to understand, sociologically, why the majority of British sociologists have not concerned themselves a great deal with Freud's social theory. This contrasts with sociologists in Germany and France, many of whom have shown, both in the past and more recently, considerable interest in Freud.

I have tried to show in 'Freud and Modern Society' that there is a substantial *social* theory in Freud's work.[1] Freud has been more often seen by sociologists, following most psychologists and psychoanalysts, as a personality development theorist and therapist. This applies to those on the right, left and centre of the political spectrum. Such a reading of Freud is a distorted one. The personality development theory, linked with the therapeutic method, is one part of psychoanalysis, *viz.* ontogenesis, but it is linked in with the more social process, phylogenesis. The unconscious, for Freud, is 'in' social groups, social relationships, social institutions, and in individuals. Or rather there is no point in the distinction between a psychoanalysis of the collective unconscious and that of the personal. The unconscious is a term used to refer to emotions and feelings of which people ordinarily are unaware, but can become aware of by using their reason.

One exception to the failure to treat Freud as a *social* scientist occurred outside British universities. This was at the Tavistock Institute, which probably has a higher reputation abroad than here, in Britain, at least among social scientists. The Tavistock has been perceived as too biased towards managements' definitions of problems in organizations to be properly sociological.[2] Nevertheless it is one of the few sustained attempts to use psychoanalytic conceptualizations about emotions in organizational groups.[3] It will not be discussed here, for it would need a study in its own right, and, in any case, it falls outside the scope of this paper, concerned as it is with British sociology as defined by university departments.

This paper will be concerned primarily with understanding the

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lack of serious discussions of Freud's social theory, similar to the discussions of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, among British sociologists. Later sociologists who have used Freud in their own theory, writers such as Marcuse, Parsons, Habermas, Althusser and Lévi-Strauss, are approached by British sociologists without a serious focus on the way they have used Freudian theory. Some exceptions are C. Badcock's book on Lévi-Strauss[4] which has a chapter on Freud, and he has written *The Psychoanalysis of Culture*;[5] A. MacIntyre's study of *Marcuse*[6] discusses, in a cursory fashion, his use of Freud. R. Holmes, *Legitimacy and the Politics of the Knowable*,[7] R. Holland, *Self and Social Context*,[8] and the study of critical theory by David Held,[9] includes sections on psychoanalysis, and A. Giddens's[10] recent work makes use of the notion of the unconscious. Ronald Fletcher's *The Making of Sociology*, vol. 2[11] contains a short discussion of Freud. Laurie Taylor discusses Freud in *The Founding Fathers of Social Science*, edited by T. Raison.[12]

On the whole, however, British sociologists have ignored Freudian theory. This contrasts with the situation in the USA, Germany, and more recently, France. At the same time there has been an active and creative group of psychoanalysts working in Britain, primarily in London, in relative isolation from other disciplines because they have not worked in universities, except perhaps as student counsellors. Psychoanalysts have rarely been appointed to any academic teaching and research posts in British universities.

To some extent British sociologists have just reflected the general academic attitudes towards psychoanalysis. These attitudes have been largely formed in Oxford and Cambridge, and spread to the redbrick universities after the Second World War. The new universities of the 1960s continued this tradition of scepticism towards psychoanalysis, although sociology did manage to become established as a separate discipline in this period, in spite of Oxbridge suspicions of its academic reputability. Perhaps because sociology was so new, it dare not risk becoming involved with psychoanalysis. In any case psychoanalysis was involved with a field academic sociologists were particularly concerned to differentiate themselves from, namely social work training, which in the 1950s and early 1960s used what was seen as a Freudian approach to case-work.[13]

Interestingly, sociologists, although they have held a view of scientific method which has been a little less positivistic than that of most British psychologists, have, nevertheless, taken over the low evaluation and prestige given to social psychology in British academe. In the USA, on the other hand, social psychology and associated with it, psychoanalysis, has had more academic prestige among American psychologists. Even at Harvard, in the late 1940s and 1950s, Talcott Parsons could contact psychoanalysts, and he contributed to work which attempted to forge links between sociology and psychoanalysis.[14]

This point is, however, unimpressive still to many British academics who hold Talcott Parsons to be as guilty as Freud of producing high-flown, non-commonsensical, unreadable, writings. This frequently heard criticism of theoretical sociology illustrates the trained incapacity of many British academics to understand the nature, or the purpose, of social theory. Freud is seen as sharing this over-theoretical approach, especially in his essays on culture and social group life.[15]

Among non-Marxist sociologists, who are both theoretically inclined, and do not hold the British empiricist position themselves, there has been a strong emphasis on taking the subjective meanings of social action into account. This position was taken both by Weberians, who remained pre-Freudian in their understanding of subjective meanings, and by symbolic interactionists and phenomenologists. These types of sociology have no room for the concept of the *unconscious meanings* of words and actions. Peoples' accounts of why they do what they do are treated as plausible and unproblematic. It is assumed that there are no reasons for treating such accounts in any other way; no reason that is to be systematically suspicious in the way the psychoanalysist would be.

Behind this tradition of sociology there lies the philosophy of Husserl, and sometimes Sartre. In this phenomenological perspective there can be no causal structures operating on the free consciousness, the for-itself in Sartre's terminology. Freudian psychoanalysis is, therefore, seen as an illegitimate way of imposing a theoretical structure on lived experience. The task of the phenomenological sociologist is to understand the experiences of different groups, and to render accounts of various types of experiences and ways of construing the world.[16] The position seems to lead, inevitably and logically, to ethical and political relativism. The worlds of fascists, or racialists, or believers in black magic are describable, if access can be gained, as are the worlds of middle-class liberals, jazz musicians, prisoners, or drug-users. That is all the sociologist, *qua* sociologist, needs to do on this view.

Not surprisingly many have found the relativism of this position ethically unacceptable. Others found it unacceptable politically. Recently the sociology of deviance, once highly influenced by the phenomenological, or symbolic interactionist, position has moved towards a more Marxist theoretical framework to explain why laws are what they are, and why some are applied more than others.[17] However, even here in the sociology of deviance, in an intellectual atmosphere influenced by French structuralist Marxisms, there has not been a sustained discussion of psychoanalysis *à la* Lacan, or anyone else.

What kind of explanation can we look for in helping us to understand this British myopia? One type of explanation would compare the political development of England with that of other societies

over the last century or more.[18] This type of explanation is better than one in terms of national character, because national character can alter with changes in the polity. At the time of the English Civil War, for example, the English were involved in theoretical discussion, as part of a political and economic structural crisis, even though this discussion was often couched in theological terms. The ideas of Bacon, Hobbes and Locke, developed in the seventeenth century, have influenced later philosophy in the areas of epistemology and political theory in Britain ever since, without any major break. Any future structural crisis in England would, no doubt, produce a general theoretical level of discussion too.

More recently, Britain has had a continuous phase of political constitutional development which forms an essential background to an understanding of the atheoretical character of British political and academic life, and to the frequent suspicion psychoanalysis has encountered. The major event of the last century in this context has been the growth and development of the organized working classes into a trade union movement and a political party. In Britain this was done in large part by men and women who saw themselves as applying Christianity in political and economic areas of life.[19] This has meant that the British trade union movement and the Labour party were linked into the same dominant symbolic, mythic and value systems as the ruling classes. A similar situation arose in the USA, but there the unions did not see themselves as necessarily involved in creating socialism, Christian, Jewish, or any other type, as much as securing 'rights' for work people. Building socialism is an un-American activity, whereas claiming 'rights' is an America act *par excellence.*

In Germany, France, Italy and Spain, there has been an official culture which included workers as Christians, especially as Catholics, but, unlike Britain, there was also a large unofficial, anti-Christian, anti-clerical, Marxist-based sub-culture. This sub-culture has sometimes been anti-Freud (e.g. Timpanaro in Italy).[20] However, as in the case of the Frankfurt School in Germany in the late 1920s, early 1930s, and again since the end of the Nazi phase, and also in France since 1968, Freudian psychoanalysis has had a definite sub-cultural basis in these societies.[21]

Why? Because Freud provides a scientific theory for explaining religions – their values, their rituals and symbols, and the basis of their appeal to many people in a modern society. It is this theory which can explain why people fail to act rationally in terms of their economic interests, and remain subject to appeals to nationalism and patriotism, and to racial hatred. Freud's theory of culture generally, and of religion in particular, fills the lacuna some intellectuals in these societies have seen in Marxism. This lacuna concerns the part non-rational emotions, and collective sentiments, seem

to play in history. Both World Wars have shown the depths of the hold nationalism had in the hearts, if not the minds, of the working classes of Germany, Britain, France and Italy. Freud's social psychoanalytic theory seemed to conceptualize, and to theorize these sentiments and the unconscious meanings of nationalism, and of authoritarianism in religious groups and political movements of the left, centre and right, in the view of Reich and Horkheimer, Adorno, Fromm and Marcuse. Since the end of the Second World War other groups of Marxists, and non-Marxists, have turned to Freud to help the theorization of the non-rational in history, in politics, and culture. Marx's theory of 'false consciousness', and of the ideologies of classes, was not detailed enough to enable people to understand and conceptualize the processes seen at work in the twentieth century, especially in phenomena such as fascism, racialism, sexism, authoritarianism, terrorism, nationalism and religiosity.[22]

In Britain no such explanation of these phenomena was sought by either trade unionists, or by Labour party politicians. Indeed Freud was perceived as a threat by some in these groups because he was thought to be undermining religion. Because Freud was anti-religion he was anti-British; that is he was outside the unified British official culture which includes now the TUC and the Labour party. As a consequence, Freudian ideas have had no base in the Labour party for its members have seen no need for them.[23]

There is one overall ideology in Britain which most active politicians have accepted, and it is based on Judeo-Christianity, on the Bible. Not all active politicians need necessarily believe in Christianity, in the sense of accepting its dogmas about life after death, resurrection, or miracles. What they must show is respect for *the ethical principles* of the Bible, and they must not attack Christianity in public, or even mention it. It is there as a natural part of the British way of life. Only continental intellectuals and their followers in Britain, few in number and misguided as they are, on this view, are indecent enough to raise questions about someone's religious views and values.

The tradition of British empiricism, begun by Bacon, Locke, Hobbes and Hume, which developed and came to exert considerable influence on intellectual and political life, had been predominantly anti-theological in orientation. Even this tradition has now been absorbed by public spokespersons into the general British political approach. The critical anti-religious edge of this tradition has died away as it linked into a broader, Biblically based, socialism in the Labour party.[24] With the emergence of the Labour party as a party of government, especially since 1945, the critical edge is now blunted. In Popperian critical rationalism, the most recent, coherent statement, drawing on this tradition, critique, especially of religion, is notably absent.

The British political constitution is legitimated by a particular,

almost non-religious, version of Christianity. The monarch is still both head of state and head of the Church of England, and few politicians ever raise issues about this. Republicanism is not a practical political option in contemporary Britain. The Scottish Nationalists were as careful to avoid being perceived as republicans in the mid-1970s, as they were to avoid being seen as atheistical. The Silver Jubilee in 1977 was an occasion for the ritual expression of this British secular religion, whose central value remains 'The Family'. The Archbishop of Canterbury wrote in the official pamphlet of the Jubilee, sold widely to the general public:

> But at this time we specially celebrate, with thanksgiving to Almighty God, the presence, at the heart of our nation and Commonwealth, of a family which has set standards for us all to follow. This has been — and is — a steadying influence in a day when forces are at work which would break up the family as a strong and loving unit in society; and when that happens, the nation's strength is sapped. Her Majesty The Queen and His Royal Highness The Prince Philip have been at the heart of a happy family, the older members of which are already beginning to contribute to the life of the nation.[25]

In this culture there is no room for a major theoretical analysis of the family. The women's movement has been the most important exception to this, especially in a work such as Juliet Mitchell's *Psychoanalysis and Feminism.*[26] Nevertheless such serious intellectual work is unsuitable for the mass media, there being no slogans, or catch-phrases, that can be picked out for the newspapers, or television, and so it remains peripheral to the main means of cultural communication. Even many women in the women's movement have not become too concerned with such theoretical issues, preferring, and probably needing, to concentrate on more immediate and practical issues, such as rape, abortion, wife-battering, single-parent families, and the pay and promotion of women in work organizations.

There is an important feature of the British radical groups' approach to psychoanalysis, again with the exception of Mitchell's book, which is the assumption that psychoanalysis is primarily concerned with the personality, or the unconscious in the individual. Some Althusserians, for example, approach Freud in this way, *via* Lacan. Marx is the scientist for the analysis of the 'object', modes of production, in particular, capitalism, and Freud is the scientist for analysis of a different 'object', the unconscious, understood as being primarily in the individual personality.[27]

There has been another, more social, if not sociological, understanding of Freud, which places the emphasis as much on phylogenesis as on ontogenesis, on collective unconscious phenomena as on individual acts and states of being. This has been developed

primarily by critical theorists in Germany and the USA (Fromm, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas being the major figures). This focus of interest reflects Germany's history this century, especially in the attempt to understand Hitlerism, for Freud's theory did provide some conceptualization of how and why such a phenomenon might occur. ('Moses and Monotheism', written by Freud in the late 1930s, almost predicts the Final Solution, before it had been applied by the Nazis, for example.)

Critical theorists tried to historicise Freud's theory, which they saw as being too general to fit specific situations. This was a misunderstanding of Freud, who is better seen as providing a conceptualization of an ahistorical object, the societal unconscious. Freud's was a synchronic theory, not a theory about specific historical events. It is a structural theory as much about human society, what Freud termed 'kultur', and social group life, about authority and religion, as about individual personality.

Such a theory is clearly relevant to sociologists, but it is rarely discussed in British sociology. The reasons for this are partly to do with the general British antipathy to theory, which, as has been argued, is not part of national character, but is found because no new political theory is needed at this point in British history. British sociology has reflected this situation – it has been empiricist and fairly pragmatic. When British sociologists have been theoretically inclined, they have tended to discuss theoretical positions developed in the USA, Germany and France. Even then there has been little systematic discussion of Freud and the use of Freud in the works of major sociologists, such as Parsons, Rieff, Marcuse, Habermas or Althusser/Lacan.

There has been a general reluctance among British academics to become involved with discussing psychoanalysis, and few sociologists have tried to break with this tradition.[28] Rather they have remained wary of Freud and his followers because there has been no need to build up an alternative ideology to either Fabianism, or democratic socialism, or Marxism, which have been the main alternatives to the dominant, untheorized, British way of doing things.

This reluctance to discuss Freudian social theory also reflects the dominant empiricist epistemology of most British social scientists, both in the universities and in state bureaucracies, which leads to a suspicion of *all* social theories in any case. Freud's is seen by some, however, as being especially beyond the pale, because unlike Marx's theory, for example, it moves into realms to do with emotions, even unconscious ones. Such areas as this cannot easily be accommodated into the social sciences based on measurements of definable units of observation. The situation is made worse by Freudians' insistence on the concept of unconscious feelings, for these cannot be tapped in attitude inventories, or other questionnaire based techniques because they are unknown, by definition, to the respondents'

own consciousness. Many British academics have found, therefore, no room for a social theory based on such implausible, non-empiricistic, notions as unconscious feelings. Envy, love, hatred, dependency, sadism, masochism, guilt, emotions like these are not seen as playing a central role in political and economic actions. They cannot be measured, or grasped by empirical sense-perceptions, at least in any easy way, so for all intents and purposes, they are defined as not very real, or not very important causal factors.[29] It is assumed that they can be ignored quite safely by sensible British social scientists, especially by those concerned with understanding the actions of the English people themselves. (As we all know, the English are not governed by irrational feelings in their political and economic acts, even if some other nationalities and ethnic groups are unstable enough to allow emotions to dominate their political actions.)

In Britain there has been no major discontinuity in the élite's outlook on society, even in this century, with its two World Wars. (For these purposes the élite includes university professors of all disciplines, including sociology. Lecturers might be seen as in the sub-élite, the next level down. It is professors, for instance, who are more likely to chair Royal Commissions, or advise government departments.) By winning the two World Wars, or being on the winning side, the British élite and its major organizations, including public schools, Oxbridge, the civil service, and the main political parties, have been able to retain a reasonably positive self-image.[30] The British atheoretical approach to social and political affairs is seen as having been vindicated by the events of the first half of the twentieth century in the rest of Europe. Continental theorizing is sometimes seen as, in part, a cause of Germany's political problems in the first four decades of this century, and of French political instability too.

It is in this more theoretical, more philosophical, intellectual environment that some of Freud's conceptualizations have been taken seriously. In Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, not to mention the east European states, intellectuals, including sociologists, have needed a theory, or an ideology, a picture of man-in-society, to guide their thinking and their actions, in a way which is not true in Britain. In Britain so much more is shared and can be taken for granted, at least this has been the case until recently, about the type of chap, or woman, an academic, or a politician, or a lawyer, a doctor, a clergyman, a publisher, or a serious journalist, was likely to be. The ideology, or rather the lack of one, such a person would live by, could be taken for granted. The British upper middle classes have not perceived any need for psychoanalysis, except perhaps as a practically useful therapeutic aid for a few unfortunates who needed to be analysed during a disturbed phase of their lives. Sociologists seem to fit into this general patterning of the attitudes of the

British middle class, rather than being what some of them have wanted to be, or others have seen them as being, namely *bêtes noires.*

The USA offers a third variant of relations between sociology and psychoanalysis. Unlike Britain, the USA has had a working relationship between analysis and sociology, but in contrast to Europe, this has included non-Marxist sociologists. Its political constitution has enabled Americans to handle the assassination of a president, a cover-up about the true identity of the assassins, to fight and lose an Asian war, and to be ruled by a president who saw his opponents as state enemies, *without* a breakdown in the basic political system. This may happen in the future, but so far there is no major ideological movement with a new constitutional system to offer the American people which has any serious chance of attaining power.

Like Britain, the USA contributed to the victory of the Allies in two World Wars, so its official ideology, again a secular version of Christianity, has been vindicated by military victory. This means that, until recently, there has been a similar absence of theoretical soul-searching to explain events which seemed either too horrendous, or too difficult to integrate into the nation's self-understanding. It may be that this process of soul-searching has begun in the USA, after the events of the 1960s and 1970s, but, in any case, this would not explain the interest in Freud and psychoanalysis there because this interest had already developed in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.

What other kind of sociological-historical explanation can be offered to help develop an understanding of the interest in Freud among American sociologists? The USA had neither a strong socialist, nor a Marxist, ideology involved in practical politics, as has been the case with socialism in Britain and Marxism in continental European societies. The pragmatic attempt to achieve specific changes, usually legitimated by appeals to the Bible, and/or the Constitution in the first instance, as with Martin Luther King and the Blacks, has been the usual pattern of political change in the USA, without any explicit mention of a wider goal of creating a democratic socialist society in place of a capitalist one, as has sometimes been stated by British Labour party politicians.

Such a social, political context has left something of a theoretical gap for radical Americans, including some sociologists. Psychoanalysis has filled this gap in the past for people who were not religious, but were not so alienated from the political life of the USA that they were attracted to fringe Marxism. In any case in the 1950s, during the McCarthy era, such an option was very difficult to take for most academics who wanted a university post, or wished to hold on to one they already had. Freud came to the rescue for some in this situation. He had a theoretical critique of religion, a practical, therapeutic method, and a set of interesting concerns distinct from radical politics. He could, for example, be used to

legitimate a focus on either community mental health, or on individual growth, and development in work, in the arts and in personal relationships.[31]

These problems were probably more acute in the USA than in Britain and Europe, because the population was less rooted in any one place. Not only was the population built up from migrants, thereby making ethnic identity a central focus for many educated, second-generation Americans, but it was also internally very mobile, both socio-culturally and geographically, compared with Europe. American socio-cultural and economic conditions tend to foster concern with individual achievement, with getting the most out of life by a very activistic pursuit of happiness, especially in marriage and sexual relationships. Concerns about personal identity have been central for many mobile people in the USA, and psychotherapy and psychoanalysis have been developed and used to enable such individuals to gain some foothold in this socio-cultural environment.

Given this background social situation, the approach to psychoanalysis in America has been characterized by pragmatism. It has been seen as useful by providing some solution to issues concerned with personal identity and relationships. This contrasts with Britain, where most people have not been highly geographically mobile, nor so disturbed by upward social mobility, for reasons given by Ralph Turner in his paper on contest and sponsored mobility.[32] In spite of changes since he wrote that paper, changes such as the abolition of the eleven-plus selection system, the folkways and norms of a sponsored mobility system continue both in the private sector of education and even in comprehensive schools. One consequence of this is less disappointment among British young people, who expect less from schooling and college than their American counterparts. Given this different situation, there has been less demand for psychotherapeutic services in Britain than in America. Fewer people seek reassurance from a therapist, or analyst, in a sponsored mobility system than in a contest system, where aspirations are raised higher, among more people, and then are not fulfilled. The subsequent feelings of failure lead many to try to regain self-esteem from therapy. To the extent that aspects of the British system are closer to contest mobility patterns, since the expansion of higher education in the last two decades, then such demands can be expected to have appeared in Britain too. The growth of student counsellors, in the last decade, is not just a way of providing jobs for counsellors, but meets a growing need among students for therapeutic reassurance, or for the development of self-esteem.

None of this, however, has affected the absence of any serious relationship between sociologists and psychoanalysis. A small number of British sociologists have developed a sociology of psychotherapy, starting with Paul Halmos[33] and Maurice North.[34] However,

this work, along with that of Peter Berger,[35] studiously avoids dealing with Freud's theory as a theory of the social, and concentrates, explicitly, on the vulgarizations of Freud's thought and work, and on the distortions which have developed in psychoanalysis as a result.[36]

So far this analysis has been concerned with the past and the present situation in British sociology. There are signs, however, of changes occurring both in the wider culture and in sociology in particular, which could lead to a different situation developing in the near future.

These changes can only be suggested here in outline form. One concerns the failure of Christianity to provide a successful basis for a social and political philosophy for many of the most intelligent teachers, lecturers, writers and creative artists outside of formal political institutions. They do not believe in any religion based on theism, including Christianity.

This loss of belief has begun to occur also among politicians in the main political parties on a wider scale than was previously the case. The older generation of Labour party politicians were either themselves believers, or in sympathy with the moral values taught by Jesus as perceived by democratic socialists. More and more of the younger politicians are now neo-Marxists, both within Parliament and among activists outside.[37] They become neo-Marxist, or Marxist, because the main alternative outlooks seem intellectually unsatisfactory. Christianity has lost much of its ethical plausibility once its belief system is seen as untrue, or unlikely to be true. Pragmatic agnosticism appears as rather weak-minded and unhelpful in making a coherent political stance *vis à vis* either apologists for capitalism, who have been growing in number in the 1970s, or against Marxists of various types from Leninists, to Maoists, from dialectical Marxists to structuralist Althusserians.

Second, and related to this point, is the fact that since joining the EEC links have to be made by British politicians and trade unionists with their counterparts in Germany, France and Italy. The intellectual climate is different in these societies, in ways mentioned above, from that prevailing in Britain. Ideas produced by European intellectuals have been taken up by British political writers, often first by those outside universities, as in the case of *New Left Review* authors over the last decade or more.

It is here that there has been the most serious discussion of Freudian ideas, related to German and French Marxisms. Some groups continue to work on these related issues, using various types of Freudianism, usually Lacanian, as with *Screen* magazine, and *Ideology and Consciousness*. Frankfurt School psychoanalysis linked with neo-Marxism, as developed by Horkheimer, Adorno, Fromm, Marcuse and Habermas is studied but not *used*. It is discussed and taught by

an increasing number of British sociologists, although it has not been very productive in the area of specific analyses of social action, or of culture, in Britain.[38]

The decade of the 1980s may see a deepening of the problems surrounding the legitimation of state activities, both in Europe, east and west, and in Britain. In Britain the failure of the universities in the 1970s to produce a generation of graduates with a coherent political philosophy other than that of various forms of Marxism will begin to show, as it has already in teaching in colleges and schools, in social work, in the media and in the arts.

There are signs, however, that 'bourgeois' sociologists in Britain will recover their nerve. They have already started to subject the new Marxisms, produced in the last thirty years, to serious analysis and critique.[39] My concern is that in this process of critique and re-assessment the Freudian baby does not get thrown out with the Marxist bath water.[40]

There is a danger that this could happen in Britain, where the Popperian tradition of criticism of Hegel, Marx and Freud with one or two quick neological points about irrefutability, and statements such as 'theories which explain everything explain nothing', is very strong. What is needed is a move forward, not backwards to a 1950s-style Popperianism, with its piecemeal social engineering approach, for that will leave precisely the same gaps in political philosophy that various forms of Marxism so successfully moved into in the last two decades.[41]

CONCLUSIONS

Sociology has need of some mode of man-in-society if it is to operate at a theoretically sophisticated level, and move beyond mere descriptivism. There is such a model in Freud's works which is worth some sociologists trying to use and build upon in their sociological work. Attempts to do this in the last thirty years have been linked either with a Marxist, or neo-Marxist, sociology and political philosophy, or, as in Talcott Parsons, with a social systems approach to societies, the earlier, more Weberian, concern with social action and subjective meanings having disappeared from view in later Parsons.

The view that Freud developed a social theory, but that it does not need either social systems theory, or Marxism, adding to it, is the one most likely to help discussion in sociology at this phase of its development. The conceptual framework of Freud's social theory, which I have outlined elsewhere, needs to be brought into sociologists' analysis and discussion of the nature of sociology and its future direction.

It has been suggested here that the reasons for the lack of any

really fruitful relationship between British sociologists and psychoanalysis is connected with the nature of British political institutions, and their legitimation, as this has evolved over time. Crucially, Christianity was used to legitimate the incorporation and inclusion of the trade unions and the Labour party into the constitutional workings of British society. Elsewhere, in Europe, an atheistic, Marxist ideology developed among many union leaders and union members, partly as a result of the Catholic Church's opposition to workers' demands during the first fifty years of the twentieth century, and partly as a result of the role of the Communist parties' opposition to fascism in the 1940s.

In the USA, the special circumstances of a migrant, highly socially and geographically mobile society led to the development of a pragmatic orientation to psychoanalysis, and its use in social theory was affected by this. For example, Parson's use of Freud omits precisely the *social* theory in his work, concentrating almost entirely on the theory of personality, the super-ego and socialization. The absence, or presence, of an active and sustained relationship between sociologists and psychoanalysis has in part depended on these factors.

In British sociology there has been a unique situation of a legitimated, institutionalized socialism, really a form of Christian socialism, and a long, unbroken continuity in the formation of élites, which was sustained and reinforced by victory in two World Wars. No deep questioning of the kind which developed in Germany, France, or Italy arose in Britain. Psychoanalysis appeared to have no theoretical part to play in the development of a sociological analysis of this society.

Sociology, as a discipline, has had few enough first-rate contributors, that it seems a little perverse of sociologists to define their paradigms, or problematics, or areas of interest, in such a way as routinely to exclude one of the few original contributors to social theory in this century.

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NOTES

*I am grateful to Salvador Giner, of Brunel University, for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Keith Hopkins, June Huntington and Ken Thompson for discussions about the theme of the paper. Needless to say, they are not responsible for errors of interpretation in the paper.

1. R. Bocock, 'Freud and Modern Society: An Outline and Analysis of Freud's Sociology', in R. Fletcher (ed.) *The Making of Sociology*, London, Nelson, 1976. Also R. Bocock, and 'The centrality of instincts in psychoanalytic sociology', *British Journal of Sociology*, 28, 4, December 1977, pp. 467–80.

2. R. Brown, 'Research and Con-

sultancy in Industrial Enterprises', *Sociology*, 1, 1967, pp. 33–60.

3. See, for example, E. Trist *et al.*, *Organisational Choice*, and R. de Board, *The Psychoanalysis of Organisations.*

4. C. R. Badcock, *Lévi-Strauss: Structuralism and Sociological Theory*, London, Hutchinson, 1975.

5. C. R. Badcock, *The Psychoanalysis of Culture*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980.

6. A. MacIntyre, *Marcuse*, London, Fontana/Collins, 1970.

7. R. Holmes, *Legitimacy and the Politics of the Knowable*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976.

8. R. Holland, *Self and Social Context*, London, Macmillan, 1977.

9. D. Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory*, London, Hutchinson, 1980.

10. A Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, London, Macmillan, 1979.

11. R. Fletcher, *The Making of Sociology*, Vol. 2, London, Thomas Nelson, 1971, pp. 542–76.

12. Laurie Taylor, 'Freud' in T. Raison (ed), *The Founding Fathers of Social Science*, London, Scholar Press, 1979.

13. P. Halmos, *The Faith of the Counsellors*, London, 1965.

14. See, for example, T. Parsons and E. Shils (eds), *Towards a General Theory of Action*, New York, Harvard University Press, 1951.

15. The main reference here is Karl Popper's work, as in his *Conjectures and Refutations*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966.

16. P. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, London, Allen Lane 1967, draw on Sartre and A. Schutz among others. See also P. Berger's paper 'Towards a sociological understanding of psychoanalysis', in *Social Research*, 32, 1965, pp. 26–41.

17. See J. Young, 'Working Class Criminology' in Taylor, L., Walton, P., Young, J. (eds), *Critical Criminology*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 63–91.

18. P. Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism*, London, New Left Books, 1976.

19. See, for instance, M. Hill, 'The Halevy Thesis', *A Sociology of Religion*, London, Heinemann, 1973, ch. 9, and R. Bocock, 'Anglo-Catholic Socialism: A Study of a Protest Movement within a Church', *Social Compass*, 20, 1., 1973, pp. 31–48. Also D. Coates, *The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

20. S. Timpanaro, *The Freudian Slip*, London, New Left Books, 1976.

21. See M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, London, Heinemann, 1973 on the Frankfurt School 1923–50. And S. Turkle, *Psychoanalytic Politics: Freud's French Revolution*, New York, Basic Books, 1978. This is a sociological, descriptive, analysis of the French growth of interest in Freud since 1968.

22. Wilhelm Reich was one of the first Marxists to attempt to use Freud's ideas to understand authoritarianism, fascism, and religion. See *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, London, 1946, and New York, Noonday, 1970.

23. This point is best referenced by pointing to the *absence* of discussion of Freud's social theory in general, and his theory of religion, in particular by British writers, especially in the last thirty years. One exception was R. Lee, *Freud and Christianity*, London, 1948, in Pelican Books, 1967. This tried to reconcile Freud's theory with Christianity. The other major exception has been J. Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*, London, Allen Lane, 1974.

It may be just an accident, or more significant in terms of the interpretations given in this paper, that Lee was born and brought up in Australia, and Mitchell was born in New Zealand, but only lived there for the first four years of life.

24. A key influence on them, Shirley Williams and David Owen, ministers in the 1974–9 Labour government, have said in public television interviews, was R. H. Tawney. Books such

as Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, 1926, and *The Acquisitive Society*, 1921, were mentioned.

25. *Silver Jubilee*, published by The Queen's Silver Jubilee Trust, London, 1977, p. 27.

26. Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*, London, Allen Lane, 1974.

27. A key text here is L. Althusser, 'Freud and Lacan', in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, translated by B. Brewster, London, New Left Books, 1971.

There are some parallels, somewhat surprisingly, between the way Lacan, and his followers, treat Freud and the way Talcott Parsons did. Both groups see psychoanalysis as strongest in the area of personality theory, rather than in theory of society, but both have different theories of society to add to Freud: Marxist theory for most Lacanians, and social systems for Parsonians. Both groups stress symbolics rather than instincts in their interpretations of Freud. They remove sexuality and destructive agression from the theorization of human action.

28. A. Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, London, Macmillan, 1979, is an exception here. Giddens does include the concept of the unconscious in his attempt to develop sociological theory.

29. The same point can be made about the recent French flirtation with Freudian psychoanalysis. Lacan concentrates on language more than emotion. The assumption seems to be humans cannot feel independently of a symbol for the emotion. Here the influence of Lévi-Strauss is, perhaps, present. See C. Lévi-Strauss, *Totemism*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969, p. 140. See also the discussion of this in my book *Freud and Modern Society*, London, Nelson, 1976, pp. 79–82.

30. See P. Stanworth and A. Giddens, *Élites and Power in British Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974, and M. Archer and S. Giner (eds), 'England', *Contemporary Europe*, London, Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1973, ch. 8.

31. See P. Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, first published in the USA in 1966; Harmondsworth, Penguin University Books edition, 1973. Also P. Roazen, *Freud: Political and Social Thought*, New York, Vintage, 1970.

32. R. Turner, 'Context and Sponsored Mobility', *American Social Review*, 1960; R. Turner, *The Social Context of Ambition*, San Francisco, Chandler Press, 1964, and A. Halsey *et al.* (eds) 'Modes of Social Ascent', in *Education, Economy and Society*, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1961. The paper is discussed in E. Hopper, 'Classification of Educational Systems', in *Sociology*, 2, 1968, pp. 29–46.

33. Halmos, 1965, op. cit.

34. See M. North, *The Secular Priests*, London, W. Allen & Unwin, 1972, p. 34.

35. Also the discussion of P. Berger in my book *Freud and Modern Society*, London, Nelson, 1976, pp. 33–6.

36. H. Marcuse in *Eros and Civilization*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1955; Sphere Books 1969, where the Epilogue is relevant to this point, as is E. Fromm, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis*, Greenwich, Conn., USA, Fawcett Publications, 1970.

37. There was a story in the newspapers in January 1980 about the influence of Trotskyist Marxists in the Labour party (see *The Times*, January 1980).

38. For example, P. Connerton (ed.), *Critical Sociology*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976, p. 38. This book discusses the Frankfurt School. It concentrates more on hermeneutics than on psychoanalytic social theory. J. Habermas's major discussion of psychoanalysis is in his book, *Knowledge and Human Interest*, London, Heinemann, 1972, especially Part Three. H. Marcuse's main discussion of Freud is in his 1955, op. cit.

39. See, for example, F. Parkin, *Marxism and Class Theory, A Bourgeois Critique*, London, Tavistock, 1979.

40. A positive sign in British philosophy is the work of R. Wollheim, see his book, *Freud*, London, Fontana/

Collins, 1971; and a collection of critical essays, edited by R. Wollheim, *Freud*, New York, Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1974.

41. A. Ryan, *The Philosophy of the Social Science*, London, Macmillan 1970, has been fairly influential, well written and based on Popperian critical rationalism. See also Adorno *et al.*, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, Heinemann, 1976 (trans. by G. Adey and D. Frisby).

Christopher Hewitt

Catholic grievances, Catholic nationalism and violence in Northern Ireland during the Civil Rights Period: a reconsideration

ABSTRACT

This paper considers the causes of the violence that occurred in Northern Ireland from 1968 to early 1971; from the start of the campaign by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) until the opening of the campaign by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). Two explanations have been offered for why violence took place during this period. The most popular explanation put forward by journalists, academics, commissions of inquiry, and accepted by British politicians and policymakers, is that violence was a response by the Catholic population to serious and systematic discrimination against them by the Protestants. The second view, put forward by the Protestants, and dismissed by almost everybody else, is that Catholic support for NICRA and the violence associated with the civil rights campaign reflected traditional nationalism.

The paper is divided into four parts. The first section presents the conventional account of Catholic grievances. In the second section the economic and political situation of the Catholic minority is examined and it is found that the extent of discrimination against Catholics has been considerably exaggerated. In the third section it is shown that contrary to the popular view nationalism was not declining among the Catholic population and that there was a much greater association between nationalism and NICRA than is generally acknowledged. The fourth section presents a statistical test of the relationship between Catholic grievances, Catholic nationalism and the geographical distribution of violence.

CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES

There is a general agreement as to Catholic grievances. They were the

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franchise, gerrymandering, the allocation of houses and jobs by local councils, discrimination by private firms and a lack of economic aid leading to high rates of unemployment in Catholic areas. The Cameron Commission concluded that these 'social and economic grievances or abuses of political power . . . were in a very real sense an immediate and operative cause of the demonstrations and consequent disorders'.[1] Let us examine the grievances in turn.

The franchise issue provided NICRA with its most emotive slogan, 'One man, one vote'. The local government franchise gave extra votes to businessmen and disenfranchised a substantial number of those eligible to vote in the Westminster elections. Most writers claim that this system was grossly biased against Catholics. The *Sunday Times* says 'limited companies were entitled to nominate up to six extra voters: these were a good deal more likely to be Protestant than Catholic . . . about 250,000 adults were disenfranchised . . . The great bulk of them were Catholics.'[2] *The Times* claims that the disenfranchised were 'mostly the poor Roman Catholic element'.[3] According to Mansbach 'in Northern Ireland, a citizen had to own property to vote. Since Catholics were disproportionately renters this qualification disenfranchised more Catholics than Protestants.'[4] Downing similarly argues that the franchise allowed 'only owner occupiers and their wife/husband to vote. Since the poorer section of the society was most likely to be in rented accommodation and Catholic this restriction robbed a high proportion of Catholics of the vote.'[5]

Franchise restrictions together with the manipulation of ward boundaries led, it is claimed, to a situation in which Catholics were systematically denied control of local areas in which they were a majority. In the pamphlet 'One vote equals two' (published by the 'All-Party Anti-Partition Conference' based in the Irish Republic) it is argued that 'the universality of gerrymandering . . . can be cited for almost every local government area in the whole Six Counties . . . only a carefully organized plan could produce this uniformity of discrimination.' Since 'more than half the partitioned territory' has nationalist majorities gerrymandering is used to prevent 'a chain of Nationalist Councils running from East to West of the whole area'.[6] The view that gerrymandering was widespread and systematic is echoed by other writers. According to the *Sunday Times* the gerrymander in 'Derry was one of a pattern'.[7] Elliot and Hickie claim that 'gerrymandering takes place in Strabane, Dungannon, Downpatrick, Enniskillen and several other towns in Southern Ulster.'[8] Birrell says that 'the redrawing of the local government boundaries in 1923 and the restricted franchise lost to the Catholics the possibility of controlling areas where they formed a majority . . . Where the Catholic population is between 50 per cent and 70 per cent the arrangement of electoral wards has usually dispossessed them of power.'[9] Cameron concludes that 'The complaint that

electoral arrangements [were] weighted against non-Unionists . . . [was] abundantly justified.'[10]

In Northern Ireland with its low standard of living and high rates of unemployment the control of local authorities was important because the councils allocated housing and jobs. It is generally held that Protestant councils systematically discriminated against Catholics in such allocations. Various examples of such discrimination were widely publicized by Cameron and the press, and generally presented as though they were typical. For example, 'The Northern Government . . . and the local authorities are perhaps the biggest employers in the area. Invariably they hire Protestants.'[11] Or, 'There was the clearest evidence that in many areas Protestant-dominated councils had used their powers to discriminate against Catholics in the distribution of accommodation. They also pursued a firm policy of giving jobs in local government bureaucracy to Protestants wherever possible.'[12]

It is generally argued not only that Catholics were denied political rights and their 'fair share' of government goods and services, but that they suffered from economic discrimination. The Stormont government concentrated funds for economic development in the heavily Protestant areas east of the Bann while ignoring the more Catholic west. Protestant firms refused jobs to Catholics or only gave them menial jobs. Certain examples of discrimination such as the low proportion of Catholics working in the Belfast shipyards or the placing of a university in Coleraine rather than Londonderry are cited *ad nauseam*. Such economic discrimination is alleged to have produced an occupational structure where 'there are marked differences between the two communities'.[13] Liam de Paor compares the situation to that of blacks and whites in the USA: 'In Northern Ireland Catholics are blacks who happen to have a white skin.'[14] Hyams justifies the IRA campaign on the grounds that Catholics and Protestants are engaged in a *class* struggle: 'The sectarian struggle in Ulster masks a class war; speaking very roughly indeed, the Protestants can be thought of as the 'bourgeoisie' and the Catholics as the workers.'[15] Von der Mehden classifies the Ulster conflict as one caused by the coincidence of class and communal identity.[16]

THE SITUATION OF THE CATHOLICS

It is undeniable that Protestants did on occasion discriminate against Catholics. It is also impossible to deny that the Unionist regime was sectarian, making no attempt to recruit Catholics as party members or candidates. However, an examination of the evidence suggests that Catholic grievances have been exaggerated considerably.

The business electorate was of trivial significance and numbered

8,370 (some of course Catholic) or less than 1.3 per cent of the local government electorate. The assumption that Catholics constituted the majority of those disenfranchised is almost certainly incorrect. Contrary to the claims of some writers it was *not* necessary to own property to vote. Those disenfranchised were lodgers, servants and children of voting age still living at home. A survey by Budge and O'Leary of Belfast found that 28 per cent of the adult Catholics and 18.5 per cent of the Protestants were unable to vote in the local elections.[17] In Londonderry the figures are very similar to Belfast, 22.3 per cent of the Catholics and 18.6 per cent of the Protestants were disenfranchised. Assuming that the higher disenfranchisement rates of Belfast were typical of the whole province then Protestants made up almost 60 per cent of the disenfranchised.[18]

When the matter is examined carefully, the evidence does not support the view that local council elections frequently resulted in undemocratic outcomes. Furthermore in some cases local councils are cited as being gerrymandered when they were not. Occasionally the classification of an area as gerrymandered is due to an obvious careless error. For example, the *Sunday Times* says that 'Kilkeel, population three thousand, sixty per cent Catholic has returned a Protestant dominated council ever since 1937'.[19] In fact Kilkeel is 83 per cent Protestant. The *Sunday Times* has apparently confused it with the rural district surrounding it which is 60 per cent Catholic (and nationalist-controlled).

More often areas are incorrectly classified as gerrymandered due to an ignorance of fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants. In twenty-four of the sixty-seven local government areas Catholics are a majority of the *total* population. However, higher Catholic fertility means that the proportion of Catholics in the voting age population is noticeably lower. Therefore the comparison between Catholics as a percentage of the total population and the percentage of Catholic councillors, which is generally used to show electoral injustice is obviously misleading. Table I shows the Catholics as a percentage of the total population compared to their percentage of the voting age population and to the percentage of non-Unionist councillors for each area in which Catholics were a majority of the total population.[20]

There does not appear to be a serious or systematic bias against the Catholics. Their *average* under-representation, that is the extent to which the proportion of adult Catholics falls short of the proportion of non-Unionist councillors, is only 5.6 per cent. While under-represented in fifteen areas Catholics are over-represented in nine. In only seven cases did the under-representation of the Catholic population lead to an undemocratic outcome in which Unionists controlled the council. None of the four towns cited by Elliot and Hickie are included among the seven. Table I shows that the

TABLE I *Local council control and gerrymandering in all 'Catholic' areas*

	Roman Catholics as a percentage		*Percentage of*	*Character*
	of total population	*of adult population*	*non-unionist councillors*	*of council*
Newry	83.8	81.1	66.6	Nationalist
Keady	82.0	79.5	100.0	Nationalist
Strabane	78.1	76.3	75.0	Nationalist
Newry No. 2 R.D.	73.2	70.1	72.4	Nationalist
Warrenpoint	72.0	68.9	75.0	Nationalist
Downpatrick	72.0	68.8	91.7	Nationalist
Londonderry	76.1	61.9	40.0	Unionist
Kilkeel R.D.	61.8	58.1	75.0	Nationalist
Omagh	61.2	57.2	42.9	Unionist
Omagh R.D.	59.5	57.0	42.9	Unionist
Lisnaskea R.D.	59.0	56.8	38.2	Unionist
Ballycastle	61.7	56.5	83.3	Nationalist
Newry No. 1 R.D.	60.4	56.4	58.8	Nationalist
Armagh	58.4	52.9	40.0	Unionist
Cookstown R.D.	55.2	52.6	36.8	Unionist
Magherafelt R.D.	54.4	51.2	28.6	Unionist
Irvinestown R.D.	51.8	49.7	36.4	Unionist
Limavady R.D.	52.8	49.6	56.5	Nationalist
Dungannon R.D.	52.1	49.5	31.6	Unionist
Enniskillen	51.1	48.9	33.3	Unionist
Clogher R.D.	50.8	48.2	26.3	Unionist
Dungannon	50.3	47.5	33.3	Unionist
Ballycastle R.D.	52.6	47.3	52.9	Nationalist
Downpatrick R.D.	50.0	46.2	20.8	Unionist

Note: In 1967 the four Fermanagh districts were abolished and the county became the sole administrative unit.

proportion of nationalist councillors in Strabane was virtually identical with the proportion of Catholics, while Downpatrick had a noticeably *higher* proportion of nationalist councillors. To describe towns like Dungannon and Enniskillen as gerrymandered when controlled by the majority population of the town is a misuse of the term. Of particular interest are Ballycastle Rural District and Limavady Rural District in which Protestant majorities were governed by nationalist councils. If the Unionists had a 'carefully organized plan' to prevent Catholic control such a situation could not have existed.

That discrimination against Catholics by Protestant councils did occur on occasion is undeniable. Equally undeniable is the fact that Catholic councils also discriminated. For example in Newry 'out of 765 Council houses, 743 were occupied by Catholics and 22 by Protestants' while no Protestants at all were employed by the council.[21] Awareness of such discrimination was widespread among Northern Irish Protestants,[22] and acknowledged by honest Catholic leaders such as Bernadette Devlin. Devlin pointed out that discrimination 'is only less serious on the Catholic side because there are fewer Catholic bosses and fewer local authorities in a position to practise discrimination'.[23] Little attempt has been made to evaluate the overall significance of sectarian discrimination nor how common it was. The Loyalty Survey, based on a province-wide sample, shows two things very clearly; that discrimination by Protestant councils was insignificant in its impact and that the *greatest* bias appeared to lie in the treatment of Protestants by Catholic councils.

TABLE II *Allocation of employment and housing by council type*

	Whole province		*Protestant councils*		*Catholic councils*	
	Prots	*Caths*	*Prots*	*Caths*	*Prots*	*Caths*
% living in council houses	20.6	25.9	20.6	22.5	20.4	40.6
% working for council	5.6	4.3	5.7	4.1	3.7	5.3

Source: Loyalty Survey

Such evidence is generally ignored as is another important finding of the survey. The conventional picture of the NICRA campaign assumes that Catholic resentment against local council policies was one of the major factors in mobilizing mass support. However, when Catholics were asked if they 'expected to be treated fairly in dealings with the local council' only 10 per cent of those living in Unionist-controlled areas said that they expected unfair treatment, a figure not much higher than those living in nationalist areas.

Discrimination against Catholics by some Protestant firms did take place but Barritt and Carter show that the employment policies of non-Catholic firms were extremely variable, and many did employ Catholics. Also one must note that Catholic firms discriminate in similar fashion against Protestants.[24] To focus solely on the tendency of Protestant employers to hire Protestant workers produces a distorted picture of Northern Irish society. Social and residential segregation and communal solidarity means that where possible Catholics patronize Catholic stores, Catholic professionals and Catholic businesses, and Protestants do likewise.[25]

The claim that Catholics are severely disadvantaged in consequence of Protestant discrimination is not borne out by a comparison of the occupational structures of the two communities. The Loyalty Survey carried out in early 1968 shows according to Rose that there is 'a limited tendency for Protestants to have a higher occupational class than Catholics; the median Protestant, like the median Catholic, is a manual worker'.[26] Aunger's analysis of the 1971 Census data suggests that 'while there is a very distinctive tendency for Catholics to fall into a lower occupational class than Protestants, it would be misleading to over-emphasize this tendency' and his statistics are similar to those found in the Loyalty Survey.[27]

Furthermore, the assumption that Catholics, if not discriminated against, would have a similar socio-economic position to Protestants is perhaps invalid. Many writers have argued that there exist differences between religious groups in their educational aspirations, work habits, etc. The larger family size of Catholics may be a disadvantage.[28] One test of the significance of discrimination in Northern Ireland is to examine the relationship between occupation and religion in other religiously mixed industrial societies. In Table III the data are presented for four such countries. Discrimination against Catholics is not alleged in any of them. Given the popularity of the analogy between Ulster Catholics and American blacks data on the distribution of occupation by race in the USA are also given. Looked at in a cross-national context the comparison between blacks and Catholics is clearly ridiculous. Equally apparent is the similarity between the position of Catholics in Northern Ireland and other countries. In all cases Catholics are over-represented in the working class and under-represented in the upper-middle-class occupations. This implies that one must abandon the position that Catholics were severely discriminated against in Northern Ireland, and explain why socio-economic disparities in these societies have not led to sectarian violence.

One genuine economic grievance of the Catholics was, and is, their higher rate of unemployment. About half the Catholics live in areas where the unemployment rate is above the average for the province as a whole, as compared to about one quarter of the

TABLE III *Occupation by religion*

	Upper middle class			*Manual working class*		
	Prot.	*Cath.*	*Diff.*	*Prot.*	*Cath.*	*Diff.*
Northern Ireland (1968)	16	9	+7	48	58	−10
Great Britain (1963)	13	8	+5	58	63	−5
USA (1957)	24	17	+7	48	55	−7
Australia (1971)	21	16	+5	54	62	−8
New Zealand (1976)	29	24	+5	46	49	−3
	White	*Black*		*White*	*Black*	
USA (1960)	23	6	+17	53	75	−22

Notes (1) Figures refer to percentage of community in specified category.
(2) Upper-middle-class category includes 'Business and Professional' in Northern Ireland, and USA, 'Managerial, Professional and Administrative' in UK, 'Professional, Managerial, Graziers, Wheat and Sheep Farmers' in Australia, 'Professional, Technical, Administrative, Managerial, Proprietors and Farmers' in New Zealand.

Protestants. In *both* the high unemployment areas and the low unemployment areas Catholics, according to the Loyalty Survey, are twice as likely to be unemployed as Protestants.

IRISH NATIONALISM, PUBLIC OPINION AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Two assumptions have commonly been made about Catholic public opinion: that support for the civil rights campaign indicated a willingness to accept the constitutional position of Northern Ireland and that there was a movement away from Irish nationalism and towards left-wing ideologies.

'Hume', said *The Economist*, 'was more concerned with social justice than old nationalism' and able 'to carry with him a younger generation which wanted to change the living conditions of Catholic Ulster without worrying too much about a united Ireland.'[29] Birrell talks of 'the break-up of monolithic nationalism during the 'sixties and the left-ward trend of Catholic political preferences especially in Belfast'.[30] Hastings describes how 'in the 1960's more and more people began to turn aside from this albatross [i.e. the preoccupation with partition] and consider the state of the province in which for better or worse they had to live.'[31] Cameron refers to a reduction in Catholic concern with partition and to the declining appeal of nationalism.[32]

While repeated so frequently that they have become the conventional wisdom, no evidence exists to support these assumptions. Birrell bases his view on four surveys of party identification by

Catholics. Since only one is of Belfast his statement concerning a trend in that city is puzzling. The Belfast survey cited is for 1966 and shows that of those giving a party identification 20 per cent were nationalists.[33] A re-analysis of the Loyalty Survey shows that in early 1968 34 per cent of the Belfast Catholics were nationalists. Therefore in the period immediately preceding the civil rights demonstrations and violence the trend in Belfast is *towards* not away from nationalism. The three province-wide surveys, dated 1965, 1967 and 1968, are not strictly comparable since the 1965 survey excludes 'Don't knows' in calculating percentages, while these constitute 14 per cent of the 1967 survey and 12 per cent of the 1968 survey. If all three surveys are calculated on a uniform basis, of those giving a party-identification, 64 per cent, 43 per cent and 58 per cent were nationalists. Such data provide no support for any trend argument.

It is surprising that one obvious indicator of Irish nationalist sentiment, voting for parties committed to a united Ireland, is never used. Let us look first at the nationalist vote as a percentage of the total vote in the general elections for the Westminster Parliament. In the 1945, 1950 and 1951 elections the nationalists only contested four heavily Catholic constituencies, and in the other constituencies Unionist candidates were sometimes unopposed. Hence the figures somewhat exaggerate nationalist support. In the 1955, 1959, 1964 and 1966 elections, candidates standing for a united Ireland contested every constituency, which does allow us to examine the alleged trend away from nationalism. In the 1955 election, a few months before the 1956 IRA campaign began, the total vote for united Ireland parties was 168,360. This was the highest it had ever reached since partition and, expressed as a proportion of the voting-age Catholic population, was almost 51 per cent. As a percentage of the total Northern Ireland vote it was 26 per cent. The IRA campaign was effectively suppressed by the time of the 1959 election and the nationalist vote fell dramatically to 83,497 or 14.5 per cent of the total Northern Ireland vote. In the 1960s the nationalist vote increased at both the 1964 and 1966 elections. As a proportion of the total vote it was 18.2 per cent in 1964 and 21.1 per cent in 1966.

In the Stormont elections Catholics were a majority in twelve constituencies. Expressed as a percentage of the total vote in these constituencies the greatest electoral success of the united Ireland parties came in 1953. As with the Westminster elections this peak occurs in the election immediately prior to the outbreak of the IRA campaign, while the low point is reached in the election following the defeat of the IRA. The two elections subsequent to this but before the start of the civil rights campaign (1962 and 1965) show an *increase* in the proportion of nationalist voters. The same pattern is apparent if we look at who won the seats. Of the twelve constituencies, eleven were

represented in 1945 by parties standing for a united Ireland. The pattern of representation is remarkably stable. The nine non-Belfast constituencies were invariably Nationalist[34] except for Mid-Tyrone where in 1958 a split in the nationalist vote allowed the election of a Unionist. The Falls constituency always had a Socialist Republican or Republican Labour MP. Central constituency was represented from 1946 to 1965 by F. Hanna standing under various 'Labour' labels. Dock constituency shifted from a Protestant majority to a Catholic majority area in the 1950s with a consequent change in representation.[35] If the 1960s was really a period in which Catholics were shifting from nationalism to socialism it is remarkable that nationalist MPs were not successfully challenged during this period by leftist candidates. Yet in 1965, the last election before the civil rights issue emerged, *every* Catholic majority constituency was represented by an Irish nationalist! 'Monolithic nationalism', far from being *threatened* by a rising tide of non-sectarian leftism, was not even *challenged* in most Catholic constituencies.[36]

In Belfast where the leftward trend of Catholic opinion was supposedly strongest one would expect this to be reflected in election results. Budge and O'Leary's study of Belfast politics[37] provides two indicators of nationalist support; the percentage of votes and seats taken by the nationalists in all postwar council elections. Both indicators show an increase in nationalist strength through the 1960s prior to the disturbances, and no evidence of any trend away from nationalism, during the period as a whole.

To conclude, *all* indicators of nationalist sentiment among Catholics show an increase in the period just before NICRA became active. The low point comes in the late 1950s or early 1960s, thereafter nationalist support increases steadily. Immediately prior to the NICRA agitation nationalist sentiment was at a peak comparable to what it was just before the IRA campaign started in 1956.

This in itself should make one suspicious of the claim that Catholic demands for 'civil rights' implied a lessening of concern with partition. However, the argument can be tested directly. In the Loyalty Survey Catholics were asked if they would approve if 'Catholics began protesting very strongly against cases of religious discrimination'. Such a question obviously measures support for the civil rights movement and strategy. The answers can be cross-tabulated against approval or disapproval 'if Nationalists agreed to stop debating Partition and accepted the present Border as final'. The results are striking and contrary to the conventional view. Civil rights supporters were significantly *more* intransigent over the border and less likely to accept the existing position of Northern Ireland.

Protestant hostility to the civil rights movement was undeniably based upon the belief that the movement was 'the old Catholic enemy in new clothes', summed up by the graffiti slogan 'CRA = IRA'.[38]

TABLE IV *Association between support for civil rights protests and attitude to partition*

	Approve civil rights protests	*Don't Know*	*Disapprove civil rights protests*
Don't accept border	57	24	39
Don't know	16	49	23
Accept border	27	27	38
	100% (n=293)	100% (n=98)	100% (n=143)

Chi-square = 15.1 $p < .01$
Source: Loyalty Survey

'At Ulster Cabinet level the reformers were labelled wholesale as Republicans and subversives.'[39] Such Protestant views were generally seen by English journalists and politicians as totally without substance, based only on paranoia and bigotry. The civil rights movement was perceived by them as a moderate non-sectarian movement. By asking for reforms Catholics involved in NICRA showed their implicit willingness to accept the constitutional *status quo*. The involvement of people of Republican antecedents showed that they were moving away from Republicanism and willing to 'recognize partition and the separate existence of Northern Ireland'.[40] Lord Cameron concluded after investigating 'this matter with particular care' that there was no sign that [the IRA] are 'in any sense dominant or in a position to control or direct policy of the Civil Rights Association'.[41] Unlike nationalist meetings which were marked by the display of the Irish tricolour and the singing of nationalist songs, the first civil rights meeting supposedly closed with the marchers singing 'We shall overcome', and the *Sunday Times* account stressed that 'there had been no display of republican symbols, such as the Tricolour flag'.[42]

In part these evaluations are a result of naivety and ignorance of Northern Irish history and politics. The complaints about Protestant discrimination by the Campaign for Social Justice, NICRA and Peoples Democracy hardly constituted the novelty that some English observers took them to be. Such complaints have been part of the stock in trade of nationalist politicians since partition as the most casual reading of the *Irish News* (the Catholic paper) or the Stormont debates will show. The intellectual linkage between nationalism and civil rights was the belief that Northern Ireland was an artificial entity which required systematic discrimination to maintain it. This orthodox nationalist view is developed at length in the 'One vote equals Two' pamphlet. Left-wing Republicans in

the early 1960s developed a strategy 'to end partition . . . through a vigorous civil rights campaign'. Since many nationalists believed that a separate 'Six County' state could not survive if Catholics 'got their rights' we can explain why they joined the civil rights movement. They were not implicitly accepting partition by demanding civil rights but instead confident that this was the strategy which would end partition.[43] The subsequent behaviour of many of the founders of the civil rights movement supports this interpretation. Mrs McCluskey, one of the founders of the 'Campaign for Social Justice', was supposedly an example of the new type of Catholic interested in reforms but not nationalism. However, a year after the foundation of NICRA she 'called the Unity Convention of Nationalists . . . to nominate a candidate for M.P. in the Mid-Ulster by-election'.[44] The decision to launch NICRA came at a secret meeting in Maghera. Kevin Agnew, at whose house the meeting was held and who became chairman of NICRA for a period, was the candidate of the hard-line Republican faction in the same election. Devlin describes him as 'a very ardent Republican of the old school . . . a reasonable enough choice for the abstentionist policy' (i.e. the policy of total non-recognition of the Northern Irish state!).[45]

A genuinely non-sectarian movement which aimed at the reform of Northern Ireland rather than its overthrow would not have acted as NICRA did. It would have lived up to its non-sectarian claims by condemning discrimination by Catholic councils and businesses. Instead Protestants were treated to the hypocrisy of a civil rights march in Newry which ignored the sectarian policies of the Nationalist Council, and the sight of 'Catholic employers marching in protest against the Protestants they excluded from their factories'.[46]

Protestant suspicions that the civil rights movement was nationalist-inspired could have been reduced by an explicit endorsement from the civil rights leaders of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. Protestant sensitivity on this point was not paranoia. Every Catholic political group had always stood for a united Ireland and refused recognition to the Northern Irish state.[47] The IRA campaign of 1956–62 was only the most recent in a series of armed attacks by Catholics. Civil rights leaders were well aware of Protestant feelings on the constitutional question and supposedly willing to recognize the Northern Irish state. Yet they were strangely reluctant to say so.'[48]

The visible links between the civil rights movement and nationalist organizations were even more damaging to the claim that the movement was not nationalist-inspired. The very first civil rights march was suggested by a Nationalist MP, and he and a Republican Labour MP led the march and made speeches. In almost all cases where Deutsch and Magowan give details of NICRA meetings, nationalist and Republican organizations and individuals were participants.[49] IRA men played a significant role as stewards at meetings.[50] Any

intelligent Catholic leader would know that a movement with such conspicuous nationalist and Republican connections would alienate moderate Protestant support and provoke sectarian violence. The handful of Protestants involved in the early stages of the civil rights movement quickly dropped out, making a mockery of NICRA's pretensions to being a non-sectarian movement.[51]

The very first civil rights march from Coalisland to Dungannon displayed its nationalist, and even IRA sympathies in a blatant fashion. The bands played 'Who Fears to Speak of '98', an anti-British ballad commemorating the United Irishmen uprising in 1798, and 'Faith of Our Fathers,' a Catholic hymn which Devlin notes is frequently played at Nationalist gatherings and 'betrays the old mentality that equates Irish and Catholic'. At the close of the march rather than singing 'We shall overcome' the crowd sang 'A Nation once Again', the anthem of Irish Republicanism.[52]

THE DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENCE

The grievances of the Catholic minority supposedly explain not only the violence itself but also its location. *The Economist* and the *Sunday Times* both blame the violence in Londonderry upon unemployment in that town. Cameron implies that the unrepresentative nature of the local councils in Newry, Dungannon, Armagh and Londonderry explains the disturbances in those places. The assumption that violence was linked to *local* conditions is plausible since there is an obvious variation between areas in the amount of violence experienced. During the period under consideration riots occurred at only thirteen locations while more than three-quarters of the urban places escaped such turmoil. Just under half the local government districts had no terrorist incidents at all and only ten had more than two. The assumption that violence resulted from the local situation enables us to test the significance of Catholic grievances. If violence was a response to 'social and economic grievances or abuse of political power' then the geographical distribution of violence should be associated with the geographical distribution of the grievances. If violence was a product of nationalist sentiment then one would expect that violence would occur mainly in the traditional nationalist areas.

Violence data are from two main sources, Deutsch and Magowan's *Chronology*[53] and police records of explosions. Two hundred and twenty-four terrorist incidents[54] and eighty-eight riots are recorded during the period from the beginning of the civil rights campaign until the killing of the first British soldier by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in February 1971. It is difficult to be certain which side was responsible for some terrorist incidents, and a

few bombs were set by Protestant extremists to make it appear that O'Neill's reforms were encouraging IRA violence.[55] However, it is clear that the great majority of terrorist incidents were perpetrated by Catholics. The twenty-three incidents which appear, because of their target or other reasons, to have been carried out by Protestants are ignored in the analysis. The riots were of two types; 'communal' riots in which a Catholic crowd clashed with a Protestant crowd and 'political' riots in which a crowd belonging to one community attacked the police or security forces. As in the case of terrorism, Catholics played the major role in rioting. The twelve riots which did not involve Catholics are excluded from the analysis.

Two measures of Catholic grievances are used; the number of unemployed Catholic males in each local district and the number of Catholics in each district with a Catholic majority and a Unionist council. The measure of nationalism is the nationalist vote in the Westminster general election of 1964 (the last before the civil rights agitation began).[56] In estimating the number of nationalist voters and unemployed within each local district it is assumed that the proportion of Catholics unemployed or voting nationalist is uniform thoughout the employment area or electoral constituency. Unemployment statistics are not broken down by religion but the Loyalty Survey is the basis for assuming that the Catholic rate is twice that of the Protestants in each district.

TABLE V *The relationship between nationalism, Catholic grievances and violence*

	Riots	*Terrorist incidents*
Nationalist voters	.91*	.88*
Catholic males unemployed	.87*	.82*
Gerrymandering	.22	.07

*Significant at the .001 level.

The correlations between nationalism, Catholic unemployment, gerrymandering and violence are shown in Table V. The lack of any significant correlation at the .01 level between gerrymandering and either rioting or terrorism strongly suggests that this grievance, despite the attention that it received, was not a cause of violence. Unfortunately the data do not permit us to choose between nationalism and Catholic unemployment as factors in Catholic violence. The correlations between nationalism and violence are marginally higher, but both nationalism and Catholic unemployment are significantly related to rioting and terrorism at the .001 level. The problem is the high degree of colinearity between nationalism and Catholic unemployment (i.e. areas of high unemployment are usually strongly

nationalist). However, the statistical analysis does show that nationalism provides a good explanation of the distribution of violence.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding sections it has been shown that Catholic grievances were exaggerated and that nationalism was a much stronger force in the Catholic population and the civil rights movement than is generally acknowledged. Once accepted this interpretation explains otherwise puzzling facts.

Violence by deprived minorities typically takes the form of looting, as occurred in the black ghettoes of the USA throughout the 1960s.[57] Northern Irish Catholics who were supposedly in a similar position to American blacks almost never looted, attacking instead the symbols of the *state*. Such violence is manifestly political, and although strange behaviour for people concerned with 'civil rights' makes perfect sense if the rioters were nationalists trying to overthrow the Unionist regime.

Supposedly the civil rights demonstrators wanted reforms. Yet the violence was not reduced in the slightest by a 'one man one vote' franchise, the redrawing of local council boundaries, a massive house-building programme and an allocation system for housing that favoured Catholics. There are two reasons for this: first since the old system was not particularly inequitable, reforms could not have much impact, second the nationalists who predominated in the movement were not really interested in reforms.

The civil rights movement ceased to exist as a serious force after 1971. Its clearest legacy was the SDLP formed by six MPs who had been active in the demonstrations. At its inception the SDLP declared the 'reunification of Ireland . . . a primary goal'.[58] The supposedly non-nationalist civil rights movement thus gave birth to a nationalist party.

The other result of the civil rights agitation was the re-introduction of 'the Irish Question' into UK politics. It is this English dimension which explains why the Catholic protest took a civil rights form in the 1960s. Previous attempts to raise the Irish Question, during the Government of Ireland Bill in 1949, failed because they could only rely upon the support of a small group of Labour MPs of Irish Catholic descent or representing constituencies with large numbers of Irish Catholic voters.[59] The Catholic leadership was very conscious of the importance of English public opinion and made great efforts to influence it.[60] By presenting the Northern Irish situation in terms of discrimination by bigoted Protestants, the Catholic leadership was able to recruit support from most English left-wing and liberal opinion. They were aided by the lack of knowledge of

most journalists and politicians concerning Northern Ireland. For example, Hastings reveals an awesome ignorance of the constitutional issue when he remarks, 'The least an Irish Catholic could expect from being a part of Great Britain would be the rights that other English citizens enjoy.'[61] Also the British patriotism of the loyalists was seen as embarassingly old-fashioned if not akin to 'fascism' or 'racism'. Lack of understanding concerning the nature of the Northern Irish problem, combined with a bias against the loyalist majority and in favour of the Catholics, helps explain the failure of British policies.

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NOTES

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1. *Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Cameron Commission*, (Cmd 532), Belfast, 1969.

2. *Sunday Times* Insight Team, *Ulster*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Special, 1972, p. 35.

3. *The Times*, 24 April 1967, p. 8.

4. Richard Mansbach (ed), *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition*, New York, Facts on File, 1973, p. 27.

5. John Downing, 'Northern Ireland: Beyond Religion and History', *Thames Papers in Social Analysis*, 1977, p. 14.

6. All-Party Anti-Partition Conference, 'One Vote Equals Two', Dublin (not dated, apparently early 1950s).

7. *Sunday Times*, op. cit., p. 35.

8. R. S. P. Elliott and J. Hickie, *Ulster: A Case Study in Conflict Theory*, London, Longman, 1971, p. 41.

9. Derek Birrell, 'Relative Deprivation as a Factor in conflict in Northern Ireland', *Sociological Review*, 20, 1972, pp. 317–43.

10. Cameron, op. cit., p. 59.

11. Alan Bestic, *The Importance of Being Irish*, London, Cassell, 1969, p. 175.

12. Max Hastings, *Barricades in Belfast: the Fight for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland*, London, Gollancz, 1970, p. 28.

13. Elliott and Hickie, op. cit., p. 42.

14. Liam de Paor, *Divided Ulster*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971, p. 13.

15. Edward Hyams, *Terrorists and Terrorism*, New York, St Martins Press, 1974, p. 179.

16. Fred Von der Mehden, *Comparative Political Violence*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 56. Von der Mehden notes that it is perceptions rather than reality that is important.

17. I. Budge, and C. O'Leary, *Belfast: Approach to Crisis, A Study of Belfast Politics. 1613-1970*, London, Macmillan, 1973.

18. The 1961 Census records 270,949 adult Catholics and 591,390 Protestants. If the Belfast rates are representative then 75,865 Catholics and 109,407 Protestants were disenfranchised. The total number disenfranchised as estimated by this method is close to the actual total.

19. *Sunday Times*, op. cit., p. 35.

20. Sources are Northern Ireland Census 1961, 1967 local election data from *Irish Times* and *Irish News* and information supplied by D. P. Barritt. Age by religion figures are published only for counties and county boroughs. In estimating the voting age population it was assumed that the age distribution of each local district was the same as the county.

21. D. P. Barritt, and C. F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 67, 97-9.

22. Sarah Nelson, 'Protestant Ideology Considered: The Case of Discrimination', in Ivor Crewe (ed.), *British Political Sociology Yearbook*, vol. 2, London, Croom Helm, 1975, pp. 155-87.

23. Bernadette Devlin, *The Price of My Soul*, London, Deutsch, 1969, p. 54.

24. Barritt and Carter, op. cit., pp. 100-3; Devlin, op. cit., pp. 54, 164.

25. See E. A. Aunger, 'Religion and Occupational Class in Northern Ireland', *Economic and Social Review*, 7, 1975, p. 6. Rosemary Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster*, Manchester University Press, 1972, p. 6.

26. Richard Rose, *Governing without Consensus*, London, Faber & Faber, 1971, p. 280.

27. Aunger, op. cit., p. 5. Aunger finds that Professionals and Managers made up 12 per cent of the economically active Catholics and 15 per cent of the Protestants while in the Loyalty Survey the proportions were 9 per cent and 16 per cent. Although one would normally prefer a census to a survey, one should note that in the 1971 Census more than 9 per cent of the respondents refused to give their religious persuasion. The economic situation of the Catholics may have deteriorated as a result of the disturbances.

28. Hastings, op. cit., p. 23, notes the economic virtues of the Protestants. Rose, op. cit., p. 261 found that Catholics were more fatalistic than Protestants, as would be predicted by the Weberian hypothesis. My own close observations of Northern Irish Catholics suggest that they have a remarkably 'Protestant' work ethic.

29. *The Economist*, 23 August 1969, p. 21.

30. Birrell, op. cit.

31. Hastings, op. cit., p. 41.

32. Cameron, op. cit., p. 15.

33. Nationalism is here defined as including all parties that supported a united Ireland outside the UK. This includes the Nationalists, Sinn Fein, Anti-Partitionists, Republicans, Irish Labour, Republican Labour, Socialist Republican and National Democratic Party.

34. Rona Fields makes the strange claim that the Nationalist Party 'seldom won more than two or three seats in the Stormont Government'. *Society under Siege*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1976, p. 187.

35. Sydney Elliot, *Election Results in Northern Ireland, 1922-1972*, Chichester, Political References Publications, 1973.

36. One can make the argument that the differences between the various nationalist groups, e.g. Republican versus Nationalist, were of more significance than my analysis implies. McAllister argues that *within* the nationalist 'tendance' there was a leftward movement exemplified by the emergence of the National Democratic Party, but that such groups would not split the Catholic vote by challenging the nationalists. 'The National Democratic Party', *Econ. and Soc. Review*, 3, 1975, pp. 353-66.

37. Budge and O'Leary, op. cit.

38. David Boulton, *The UVF: An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion*, Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1973, p. 67.

39. *Sunday Times*, op. cit., p. 40.

40. Ibid., pp. 47–9.

41. Since Cameron's investigation failed to discover anything about the secret meeting in Maghera attended by the IRA Chief of Staff, at which the idea of NICRA was born, one can judge how careful his investigations were. Richard Deutsch and Vivien Magowan, *Northern Ireland: Chronology of Events*, Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1973, p. 154.

42. *Sunday Times*, op. cit., pp. 45–8.

43. See Vincent Feeney, 'The Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland', *Eire–Ireland*, 9, Summer 1974, pp. 30–40, for a revealing account of the origins of NICRA and the motivations of the Republican activists.

44. Fields, op. cit., p. 126.

45. Devlin, op. cit., pp. 170–2.

46. Ibid., p. 164.

47. In 1965 the Nationalist party under Eddie McAteer accepted the status of constitutional opposition, abandoning its previous policy of obstruction and abstention.

48. The only hint of recognition is a statement by the Chairman of the United Ireland Association in Britain which 'criticized certain small sections of NICRA which had stated their loyalty to the Northern constitution', Deutsch and Magowan, op. cit., p. 21.

49. Of ten events where details are given only two did not have nationalists playing such a role. In six cases the organizers or speakers belonged to the nationalist party, in two to the Republican Labour party, in four to 'Irish Labour' groups and in one case to the Republican movement. By contrast only two events had links with non-nationalist political groups such as the NILP or Liberal Party.

50. Deutsch and Magowan, op. cit., pp. 10, 11, 20; Hastings, op. cit., p. 68; *Sunday Times*, op. cit., pp. 48, 61.

51. Robin Cole, the leader of the Queens University Unionists, was briefly on the NICRA executive. Other Protestant students from Queens took part in the Linenhall demonstration and the Burntollet march.

52. Devlin's firsthand account, op. cit., pp. 92–6, is obviously the basis for both Hastings, op. cit., pp. 45–6 and the *Sunday Times*, op. cit., pp. 45–6. Hasting's version is so selective that it is deceitful.

53. Deutsch and Magowan, op. cit.

54. These include 191 bombings, 15 fires, 4 assassinations and attempted assassinations of civilians, 7 attacks on police or soldiers, 2 beatings-and-tarrings and 5 politically motivated robberies.

55. Boulton, op. cit., pp. 89–107. *Sunday Times*, op. cit., pp. 78–9.

56. The nationalist vote as a percentage of the voting age Catholic population varied considerably from 9.5 per cent in the North Down constituency to 69.1 per cent in the Mid-Ulster constituency.

57. Morris Janowitz, 'Patterns of Collective Racial Violence', in Graham and Gurr, *Violence in America*, New York, Praeger, 1969.

58. Deutsch and Magowan, op. cit., p. 73.

59. Robert J. Jackson, *Rebels and Whips*, London, Macmillan, 1968.

60. Rose, op. cit., p. 102.

61. Hastings, op. cit., p. 30.

Colin Berry

The Nobel scientists and the origins of scientific achievement

Sociographic analysis of the origins of high achievers, besides being relevant to the formation and functioning of élites, can suggest factors that may be important in promoting outstanding achievement. Although Cattell[1] has shown that creative research scientists share a quite well defined personality structure, and tend to be stable, self-sufficient, dominant introverts, we know rather little of the social and cultural context within which such a personality develops. The present paper attempts to shed light on this. Although earlier work has suggested some social and biographical common features of distinguished scientists, it has tended to be limited by incomplete samples (e.g. Moulin[2]) or by the use of national samples, (e.g. Roe,[3] Zuckerman[4]), which leaves unclear the generality of findings.

Nobel scientists have been chosen as a data-base because they represent a wide sampling across countries and across time (birth dates range from 1835 to 1940).

The criteria applied by the Nobel committees are not revealed, but they probably remain fixed over long periods, and it is notable that, compared with awards in other areas of human achievement, the Nobel science awards are remarkably non-contentious. Whilst it is true that a considerable number of 'prize-worthy' scientists do not win the Prize, very few winners have, with hind-sight, not been deemed worthy of it, a fact which helps account for the prestige it enjoys among professional scientists.

The areas of achievement for which Nobel awards are made are both broad and fairly well-defined, and within-science comparisons can be made, as well as comparisons with achievers in the non-science areas of Peace and Literature.

The present work examines the cultural origins of the Nobel laureates in terms of national, regional, institutional and family backgrounds. A statistical compilation was made of the basic biographical data of winners up to 1977 from published sources, supplemented by short questionnaires sent to about fifty living laureates. Consequently, full information on place and date of birth, places of

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secondary education, universities attended and father's occupation was available for all but a dozen or so winners. Religious and national origins, the early loss of a parent, special distinction of a parent and incidence of serious early illness were noted where the information was available.

NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES

To derive rational and consistent indices of scientific 'productivity' based on cultural origins, attention was given to national and regional background during the future laureate's childhood, rather than the country in which the Nobel Prize-winning work was done. Laureates were allotted to a particular country if they were both born and received their secondary education there *and* at least one parent was a national of that country. (Fifteen individuals who did not meet this criterion were omitted from the national and regional analysis.) Productivity indices for countries and regions within countries were obtained by calculating the number of winners per million of the relevant population in 1900, a year for which demographic data are readily available, and close to the median date of birth for science-winners in most countries. US indices were based on 1910 population figures because most American Science winners were born some time after 1900. To maximize ethnic homogeneity, both Germany and Russia were defined by their 1919 frontiers and Alsace-Lorraine omitted from France and Germany. Austria-Hungary, lacking a single predominant ethnic group, was treated as an entity in the national analysis.

As a first step in comparing cultural backgrounds, separate yield-per-million indices were calculated for prize-winners reared in the principal western religious traditions. A Jewish cultural background was ascribed on the basis of entries in standard works of reference or report in the questionnaire. Thirteen laureates of mixed descent or from a family having embraced an alternative tradition were omitted from the initial analysis on this criterion.

Table I shows the productivity indices for those countries which have produced more than one Nobel science laureate. It is immediately apparent that 'protestant' societies are more fruitful than 'catholic' ones. The difference is statistically significant, both for the data shown, and for all countries with Science winners (Mann-Whitney U-tests; $p < 0.02$). The productivity indices for Jewish communities are overall significantly greater than among compatriot gentiles (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test; $p < 0.05$).

Regional analysis of productivity (Table II) shows the yield is reliably higher in the major metropolitan centres than in their regions, and again higher in predominantly protestant than in

TABLE I *Number of Nobel Scientists per million of 1900 population for countries with more than one native-educated laureate (to 1977).*

	Protestant	*Catholic*	*Orthodox*	*Jewish*
Switzerland	1.8			66.7
Netherlands	1.8			0.0
Denmark	1.7			–
Sweden	1.6			–
Norway	1.4			–
Australia	1.4			–
UK	1.3			5.0
USA	0.8			20.0
Germany	0.7			20.0
Belgium		0.4		–
Austria–Hungary		0.3		6.3
France		0.3		17.7
Italy		0.1		33.4
Spain		0.1		–
Russia			0.05	0.8

Sources of underlying population estimates: Mitchell's European Statistics, US Bureau of the Census, Encyclopaedia Judaica.

Note: Dash indicates a Jewish minority of less than 20,000.

predominantly catholic regions. As before, for each type of source, the range of the scores is again low. Marked regional differences are evident in Germany and the USA. In the latter case (see map) regional variations are not accounted for by protestant–catholic differences alone because extremely low productivity is characteristic of the protestant ('Fundamentalist') south. The extreme regional imbalance is reflected in the fact that about 60 per cent of American-born Nobel scientists come from only two areas: New York City and the states of the Mid-West. The latter source has been predominantly protestant, the former Jewish.

Although the disproportionate contribution of the Jewish cultural tradition to the ranks of the Nobel laureates is clear, the evidence for the importance of religious tradition is circumstantial for protestant–catholic differences. The question remains whether the individual laureates are of predominantly protestant family background. Direct evidence on this point is hard to obtain, and the data are as yet incomplete. However, of the 'christian' laureates whose family tradition is known, 59 are of protestant origin (2 of

TABLE II *Regional productivity indices (by place of birth) for Nobel Science laureates expressed as proportion per million of 1900 populations*

	Regions		
	Catholic	*Protestant*	*Metropolitan centres*
Holland		1.7	2.0 Amsterdam
Sweden		1.4	8.0 Stockholm
Denmark		1.3	3.4 Copenhagen
UK Home Counties		1.5	1.5 London
North		1.2	1.8 Manchester & Liverpool
West		1.0	6.9 Bristol
Scotland		0.9	3.0 Glasgow
Midlands		0.8	2.0 Birmingham
Norway		0.5	8.8 Oslo
Germany (West) North		0.6	4.5 Hamburg
South	0.2		7.4 Munich & Stuttgart
Austria	0.5		4.0 Vienna
Belgium	0.3		1.7 Brussels
France	0.2		3.3 Paris

Jewish descent) and only 12 of catholic origin (of whom 2 had protestant mothers and 4 were of Jewish descent).

SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES

Analysis of fathers' occupations shows that the Nobel scientists have come overwhelmingly from professional and business families (Table III). An indication of the over-contribution of these backgrounds is given by comparing the data with the proportional class sizes for the USA in 1910 shown in the final column of Table III.

The percentage contributions of occupational classes to the Nobel Science ranks are strikingly similar for the USA and the rest of the world (Professional classes 50.7 *vs* 54.3; Business 28.8 *vs* 27.7; Employees 6.8 *vs* 10.4; Land 4.1 *vs* 5.7 per cent). In view of the social and institutional variations, this probably indicates that very robust underlying factors are at work. These factors cannot, however, be simply a matter of broad class differences, since some relatively small occupational groups within the professional classes contribute out of all proportion. About 20 per cent of Nobel scientists with professional fathers are the children of university professors and a further 19 per cent the children of doctors. If the professional-background group are split into those where the fathers were concerned with education, research and scholarship on the one hand and all other professional occupations on the other, it is also apparent



FIGURE 1 Nobel Prize-winners in Science: regional productivity in the USA (yield-per-million based on 1910 populations)

TABLE III *Percentage breakdown of fathers' occupations*

	Physics	*Chemistry*	*Medicine*	*Literature*	*Peace*	*USA (1910)**
Academic professional	28.0	17.0	20.1	5.6	8.5	
Non-academic professionals	20.4	31.1	36.3	42.4	34.8	10.9
Business	27.6	29.3	21.8	18.9	26.3	
Employees	11.2	7.8	6.4	6.3	3.4	57.9
Others (inc. land)	7.8	2.8	3.8	15.3	15.3	31.0
Lost fathers by age of 16 years	2.0	10.7	6.9	16.7	3.4	—

*Derived from Chinay, E., *Society: An Introduction to Sociology*, New York, 1961.

Note: Columns do not total to 100 because occupations of some laureates' fathers are not known.

that the children of academic professionals achieve success overwhelmingly in the sciences and hardly at all outside them, whereas children of non-academic professionals contribute at least as heavily to non-science areas (see Table III).

EARLY EXPERIENCES

There is a marked contrast in the early experiences of the Nobel Science and Literature winners. Over 30 per cent of the latter either lost at least one parent through death or desertion or experienced the father's bankruptcy or impoverishment, whereas Science Prize winners have experienced such 'disorder and early sorrow' rather rarely. The physicists, in particular, seem to have remarkably uneventful lives. Some suggestion remains that losing a father, especially around the early teens, may tend to push future laureates towards achievement in medicine or chemistry. Also, although hard to index clearly, a rising socio-economic background is a frequent feature of scientists' family backgrounds. In general, successful scientists tend to be produced within rising stable backgrounds, often academic or technical, whereas Literature winners more often originate from disturbed or declining backgrounds of traditional non-academic, professional occupational focus. These possibilities remain tentative at present and need to be tested on more widely-defined samples of high achievers.

Only a tiny handful of Science laureates were found to have suffered from physical disability or from serious or prolonged illness in childhood.

DISCUSSION

A salient feature of the Nobel data, when analysed in a way which takes account of cultural origins, is the narrow ranges of productivity values for each type of country or region. This suggests that Nobel awards are probably unrelated to national characteristics *per se*. Rather, national 'success' is related fairly directly to the numerical strengths within a country of protestant and Jewish traditions. Individual success tends to be related to certain class and occupational family backgrounds.

In asking the question what makes scientists of high achievement, Krebs[5] has pointed to the significance of research supervision by eminent older scientists. We are now on firmer ground in answering the further question of who gets access to and, more importantly, benefits from contact with these distinguished supervisors? To an overwhelming extent, the answer seems to be those in radical

protestant and Jewish family traditions from middle-class backgrounds. So powerful are the religious tradition effects, that 'protestant' and 'catholic' societies are distinguished more clearly on this limited data than by the measures of economic performance used in McClelland's[6] well-known study.

It has variously been suggested from past work that besides tending to be of protestant or Jewish origin, the fathers of Nobel laureates are almost always of 'very high social position' (Moulin[7]), and that a sizeable percentage of scientists come from the middle and lower classes (Mahoney[8]): also that loss or absence of the father or physical handicap in childhood is common (Roe,[9] Eiduson[10]). Roe also claimed that geographical origin is not important. The present results, based on an almost complete analysis for over 300 Nobel scientists, represents a larger and more exhaustive sample than Roe's and Moulin's studies together. Moulin, who reported on the origins of Nobelists up to 1950, was able to discover the father's occupation for only 77 of his 164 winners, and his conclusion on class clearly illustrates the dangers of sampling bias with incomplete samples of biographical data.

Little evidence was found here to support Roe's finding that distinguished biological scientists have frequently suffered early bereavement or that physical ailment was a factor with eminent chemists and physicists. Likewise, her conclusion about the unimportance of geographical factors is not supported. It should be noted that if, as much evidence, including Roe's, suggests, most eminent scientists have Jewish or radical protestant origins, the 'success' of countries or regions in producing them should reflect the relative numerical strengths of these traditions geographically. In fact, when differences in population size are taken into account, Roe's own data give a very similar distribution of origins to that shown here, including the over-contribution of the Mid-Western region which is also apparent from the work of Knapp and Goodrich[11] on the collegiate sources of science Ph.Ds.

The improbable-looking stability of the productivity data referred to might suggest that quotas of awards were being allocated. It is however difficult to see why the Nobel committees would differentiate between countries on the basis of their prevailing religious tradition or individuals on the basis of their personal backgrounds, or *how* they could do so, since any operation of quotas would require elaborate compilation of information and extended collusion between different Nobel committees.

The rarity of blue-collar backgrounds among the prize-winners can hardly be due to lack of potential ability in view of estimates of the incidence of very high intelligence in national populations outside the professional and higher business classes. (Terman's California study suggests from about one third; Parkyn's New Zealand

study about two thirds.) It appears that fairly high financial and social status *per se* may be important, as the winners as a group clearly come from limited types of social background. The unevenness in the contributions of middle-class occupational background seems to rule out simple notions of gross differences in socio-economic status. However, occupational focus alone also does not appear to provide an adequate account either. For example, most of the academic-sector fathers of Nobel scientists have been university professors rather than schoolteachers or even non-professorial academic staff. A possible factor may therefore be related to 'modelling' or 'level of aspiration' based on parental achievement, and it is notable that a large proportion (about 30 per cent) of laureates' fathers were themselves distinguished in some way. Some stimulus to achievement may also be provided by culturally mixed backgrounds in childhood, which about a quarter of the Science laureates have experienced.

As Zuckerman[12] has shown, the recruitment of the élite in American science is a strongly meritocratic process, in which the initially less 'privileged' gain steadily on those with greater social and financial advantages. By this process, future laureates typically gain access to one of about a dozen élite institutions (Harvard, Columbia, etc.), more often at the graduate school or post-doctoral phase than at undergraduate level. European Nobel Prize scientists have a similar history of association with élite universities. These 'élite' associations extend in some cases to schooling, e.g. in the case of English public schools, outstanding *Realgymnasien* in Munich and Hamburg, and to a handful of science-oriented public high schools in New York City.

It is not clear what the successful systems have in common, but educational practices such as scholarship provision and early promotion probably play a role. It may be significant that the American laureates both come predominantly from these regions where early school promotion has long been practised and are distinguished from the generality of their colleagues in the National Academy of Science by their precocity at every stage in their academic progress.

Although the private secondary school system provides a mechanism of social privilege in the UK, there is, even with incomplete data, an obvious over-representation of protestant (i.e. low church and non-conformist) backgrounds, reflecting the pattern noted by Hagen[13] among the leading innovators of the British Industrial Revolution. Thus if social privilege plays a role, it does so rather selectively, in ways which it seems we should relate to 'cultural advantage' – a concept that needs to be enlarged upon in developing a 'psychology of achievement'.

In line with this notion, the evidence on family cultural factors in scientific achievement in the present data points strongly to the great importance of religious 'core values' discussed by McClelland in his

'psychologising' of the Protestant Ethic notion. These cultural values include stress on the value of education and knowledge for their own sakes, and have little to do with religious belief or observance as such, surviving secularization over generations. A model figure may again be an important element in transmitting such values.

If the interpretations drawn from the data are substantially correct, the pattern of social origins of eminent scientists should be unlikely to change radically with the spread of opportunity in education and general rise in living standards. A comparison of distribution of fathers' occupations for those laureates born before 1914 and those born between 1914 and 1935 in the UK and the USA (the only countries with a substantial number of post-1914 winners) gives no indication of change (Table IV) except among American Jewish laureates, who show an *increasing* socio-economic

TABLE IV *Changes in social origins of Nobel Scientists: percentage breakdown of fathers' occupational class for laureates born before and after 1914. (a) Gentiles (USA and UK); (b) Jewish Laureates (USA only)*

	(a)		*(b)*	
	Pre-1914	*Post 1914*	*Pre-1914*	*Post 1914*
Professional	58.2	58.1	7.6	38.5
Business	26.4	22.6	57.1	53.8
Employees	9.1	9.7	14.3	7.6
Land	4.5	3.2	0.0	0.0
Others	1.8	6.5	14.3	0.0

In contrast to Table III, fathers dying during future laureate's childhood are included in the appropriate occupational categories.

status of the fathers between these periods. Although it may be argued that the impact of the extension of educational opportunity has been too recent to be reflected in this data, the rigidity of the pattern and the absence of differences between the USA and other countries is consistent with the 'caste' flavour of the data, and the fact that the son's performance is related to particular parental religious and occupational backgrounds.

The main change that has occurred over the years has been the demise of a number of countries as contributors to the ranks of the Nobel Scientists. Once-fruitful European regional sources such as Paris, Berlin, Silesia and Vienna have proved notably vulnerable to social and historical change. The distribution of years of birth of the laureates provides a picture which is discouraging for every major country except the USA. Compared with 17 Nobel scientists born since 1920 in the USA, the UK has so far had 3, and Germany 2.

Post-1930, the corresponding figures are 10, 1 and 0. Even in the USA the output remains dependent on two geographically and culturally circumscribed sources; Jewish New York and the small-town protestant Mid-West. Hence, both scientific theories of achievement and national planning in science should take account of the very narrow cultural base on which major contributions to science rest.

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NOTES

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Hugh V. McLachlan

Is 'power' an evaluative concept?

It has been argued that 'power' is, somehow, necessarily an evaluative concept. Lukes argues that 'power is one of those concepts which is ineradicably value-dependent', by which he means that 'both its very definition and any given use of it, once defined, are inextricably tied to a given set of (probably unacknowledged) value-assumptions which predetermine the range of its empirical application'.[1] According to Connolly, 'Contests over the meaning and interpretation of power are . . . part of politics itself . . . differences in judgements about power have an "unavoidably evaluative" dimension'.[2] These claims are obviously of profound interest to the social theorist. I shall consider the arguments used to justify them and suggest that they are defective. I shall also suggest that both authors present insufficient reason for adopting their particular redefinitions of the term 'power'.

I

Since I think that any apparent plausibility which there might be in Lukes's and Connolly's arguments stems from a confusion over the nature of a 'concept', I shall clarify what I consider to be the nature of a 'concept' and its role in linguistic classification before looking at the details of their cases.[3]

It is useful to distinguish between *naming*, *classifying* and *defining*. People often talk about defining *things*. For instance, Thomas talks about an actor's definition of his or her situation.[4] In relation to language, I think it is more useful to talk of defining *words* rather than things. To define a word is to say what the word means. For instance, to define the word 'bachelor' is to say what the word 'bachelor' means: it is to express the *concept* of 'bachelor'. The concept of 'bachelor' – an unmarried male adult human being – is what is meant by the word 'bachelor'. Actual bachelors have features other than that of being unmarried, male, adult and human. For instance,

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some have mortgages, some are sociologists and some are bald. But these features are not associated with the *concept* of a bachelor: they are not defining features of bachelors; bachelors who have mortgages and who are also bald sociologists are not bachelors by virtue of being bald sociologists who have mortgages. They are bachelors by virtue of being male, unmarried, adult, human beings. The concept of an 'X' is what is meant by the term 'X'. A concept of power is what is meant by the term 'power'.

If we define a word in a particular way, then the word has *by definition*, some particular meaning. For instance, we could re-define the term 'bachelor' such that being male was no longer a necessary qualification for being a 'bachelor'. This, in fact, is one of my objections to talking of defining things. If we talk of defining things, then we might be misled into saying something like: If an actor defines his or her situation as one of, say, oppression then it is, by definition, a situation of oppression. Well, obviously, this is a mistake since people can 'define' their situations incorrectly. In some senses, it is quite arbitrary how words are defined. For instance, the word 'bachelor' has a particular meaning. Yet, there is no reason why language could not have developed differently such that the word had a different meaning. But, given that it has been so defined, it is not arbitrary whether or not individual people are classified as bachelors: some such people actually are bachelors and others actually are not bachelors. If someone classified the Queen a bachelor then, given what the word means, the person, unequivocally, would have made a mistake. In terms of our definitions of words, such as 'bachelor', we classify actual things as, for instance, bachelors.[5]

II

Central to Lukes's case is the presentation of three different so-called 'views' of power and, in this section, we shall look at this presentation.

Lukes begins what he calls a 'conceptual analysis of power' by considering the pluralists and the definitions they gave of the term 'power'. We read that Dahl's initial concept of power was: 'A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do' and that this concept was modified by Dahl such that 'power' involved '. . . a successful attempt by A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do'.[6] Polsby's definition of the term 'power' is given later: one can conceive of 'power' 'as the capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of specified future events'.[7] These, then, are the concepts of 'power', i.e. the definitions of the term 'power' which are said by Lukes to be associated with the pluralists.

Lukes describes how the pluralists proceed when they are trying to

study actual power, as opposed to giving definitions of the term 'power'. They tend to study observable public political discussions and to focus attention on the stated policy preferences of those taking part, to note who initiated policies which were successful and who initiated policies which were unsuccessful, and to regard such success or failure as an index of power or of the lack of power. According to Lukes, the pluralists have what he calls a 'one-dimensional view of power' – although he does not say what is the dimension of which he speaks.[8] He writes that 'this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on *behaviour* in the making of decisions on *issues* over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as expressed policy preferences, revealed by political participation'.[9] It is not clear what Lukes means by a 'view' of power. Since he claims to be presenting a conceptual analysis of power, we might have expected a 'view' of power to be a 'concept' of power. But it is difficult to adopt this interpretation of Lukes's argument since he himself points out that this focus on behaviour in the making of decisions, and so forth, 'is not required by either Dahl's or Polsby's definition of power, which merely requires that A can or does succeed in affecting what B does'.[10]

The second 'view' of power which Lukes considers is called by him the 'two-dimensional view of power'. It is associated particularly with Bachrach and Baratz. Their central point is that there is a hidden face of power. Power is exercised not merely in the arena of publicly observable political debate: power is exercised in the determination of what particular issues will be allowed to enter the political arena:

> Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only these issues which are comparatively innocuous to A . . . to the extent that a person or group consciously or unconsciously creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power.[11]

There is no immediately obvious *conceptual* difference between the 'two-dimensional view' of power and that associated with the pluralists. In terms of Dahl's definition of 'power', i.e. in terms of his concept of 'power', A could have exercised power over B in the example used by Bachrach and Baratz. A could have succeeded in getting B to do something which he or she would not otherwise have done, i.e. remain silent. B could otherwise have discussed particular issues publically were it not for A's exercise of power which served to silence him or her.

However, the situation alters if B would not otherwise have

discussed some particular issues. Suppose that A creates barriers to the public airing of a particular matter because discussion of the matter would cause him or her embarrassment. It does not follow that because it is in A's interests to silence discussion of a particular matter that it is in anybody else's interests that the matter be discussed. The matter in question might simply be embarrassing for A and uninteresting for everyone else. Hence we cannot conclude that because A exercised power to suppress discussion of a particular matter that anyone would have acted differently had he or she not exercised the power. In this case, it does not seem that we can say that 'power' in Dahl's sense has been exercised since we cannot locate a 'B' who would have done something different had 'A' not exercised 'power'. Nevertheless, neither Bachrach and Baratz nor Lukes develop this conceptual point of difference.

According to Lukes:

> Bachrach and Baratz use the term 'power' in two distinct senses. On the one hand, they use it in a general way to refer to all forms of successful control of A over B – that is, of A's securing B's compliance. . . . On the other hand, they label one of these types [of securing B's compliance] 'power' – namely, the securing of compliance through the threat of sanctions. In expounding their position, we can, however, easily eliminate this confusion by continuing to speak of the first sense as 'power' and by speaking of the second as 'coercion'.[12]

The first meaning which Bachrach and Baratz give to the term 'power', the meaning which Lukes says he wants to adopt sounds very similar, and perhaps even identical to Dahl's concept of power. Given that this is so, it is not clear why Lukes thinks that there are conceptual differences between what he calls the one-dimensional view of power and the two-dimensional view of power. Lukes claims that a major advantage of the two-dimensional view is that ' it incorporates into the analysis of power relations questions of the control over the agenda of politics and of the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process'.[13] Again, Lukes's point is not clear. When Lukes talks here of 'analysis', I assume that he is talking of 'conceptual analysis' since he says that his book is a conceptual analysis of power. It seems clear that Dahl's concept of power does allow the question of the control of the political agenda to be raised: it is quite irrelevant whether or not Dahl himself focuses attention on or raises the question.

Lukes's own 'view' of power, which he calls the three-dimensional view, stems from his criticism of the view of Bachrach and Baratz. He considers the two-dimensional view to be an advance on the one-dimensional view. He thinks that Bachrach and Baratz are correct in saying that people might have preferences which are not discussed

in the political arena but he thinks that power might have been exercised even on occasions when action is in accordance with the preferences of those over whom the power is exercised: 'To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.'[14] He adds this further claim: 'Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?'[15] Well, I do not know whether this should be thought the supreme exercise of power; but there is no problem of accommodating this as an exercise of 'power' in terms of Dahl's definition of the term 'power'. If B would have preferred policy x rather than policy y were it not for the intended intervention of x, then, in terms of Dahl's definition of power, A has exercised power over B since A has succeeded in getting B to do something he or she would not otherwise have done namely, to prefer policy y to policy x. What does Lukes have to say about 'power' which is conceptually different from that which is said by Dahl?

Lukes's summary of his 'view' of power might provide a clue as to how this question can be correctly answered:

> In summary, the three-dimensional view of power involves a *thoroughgoing critique* of the *behavioural focus* of the first two views as too individualistic and allows for consideration of the many ways in which *potential issues* are kept out of politics. . . . This, moreover, can occur in the absence of actual observable conflict. What one may have here is a *latent conflict*, which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the *real interests* of those they exclude.[16]

The clue to which I refer lies in the mention of 'real interests'. This is a notion to which we shall return later.

III

We have looked at what Lukes considers to be three different 'views' of power. It certainly does not seem that there are obvious conceptual differences between them nor that: 'One feature which these three views of power share is their evaluative character: [or that] each arises out of and operates within a particular moral and political perspective.'[17] In this section, I shall present Lukes's argument for suggesting that the adoption of different concepts of 'power' is related to differences in values. I shall express his case in his own words:

> The absolutely basic common core to, or primitive notion lying behind, all talk of power is the notion that *A* in some way affects

B. But, in applying that primitive (causal) notion to the analysis of social life, something further is needed – namely, the notion that A does so in a non-trivial or significant manner. . . . A way of conceiving of power (or a way of defining the concept of power) that will be useful in the analysis of social relationships must imply an answer to the question: 'what counts as a significant manner?', 'what makes A's affecting B significant?' Now, the *concept* of power thus defined, when interpreted and put to work, yields one or more *views* of power – that is ways of identifying cases of power in the real world. The three views we have been considering can be seen as alternative interpretations and applications of one and the same underlying concept of power, according to which A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests. . . . Now the notion of 'interests' is an irreducably evaluative notion. . . . In general, talk of interests provides a licence for the making of normative judgements of a moral and political character. So it is not surprising that different conceptions of what interests *are* are associated with different moral and political positions. Extremely crudely, one might say that the liberal takes men as they are and applies want-regarding principles to them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by their political participation. The reformist . . . also relates their interests to what they want or prefer but allows that this may be revealed in more indirect and sub-political ways. . . . The radical, however, maintains that men's wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, and, in such cases relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice. In brief, my suggestion is that the one-dimensional view of power presupposes a liberal conception of interests, the two-dimensional view a reformist conception and the three-dimensional view a radical conception. (And I would maintain that any view of power rests on some normatively specific conception of interests.)[18]

IV

Two contradictory claims are made here. On the one hand it is claimed that the three 'views' embody the same concept of power. On the other hand, it is claimed that the three views presuppose a different conception of 'interests' which would suggest that they embody different concepts of power. In any event, the claim that any 'view' of power is evaluative is not substantiated. Let us consider these contradictory claims in turn.

The relationship between Lukes's notion of a 'concept' and a

'view' is not clear. He says that a 'view' of power is a means of identifying power; it is an interpretation and an application of the concept of 'power'. It is said by Lukes that the three views he considers are all applications and interpretations of the same concept. Well, what can Lukes mean by a 'view'? Suppose that we have a particular concept of 'social class'. Suppose it were said that, by stipulative definition, society is divided into two classes on the basis of whether people derive their total income from ownership of the means of production. Given this concept of class, how would one identify actual members of both classes? A means of such identification seems to be what Lukes means by a 'view'. Well, one might ask people what, if anything, are their occupations; one might ask the question of their neighbours or friends. One might attempt to gain access to their income tax returns or to their bank statements or to their census returns. One might observe how they actually spend their time. An indication of class membership might also be obtained by noting manners of speech and dress and the sorts of houses in which people live and there are, no doubt, various other strategies which could be adopted in identifying members of the different classes. People actually trying, for whatever purposes, to identify members of the different classes might adopt one (or all) of these 'views' of class members. But this would not show that the indicated concept of social class is evaluative or, somehow, problematical or that people who adopt one criterion of identification rather than another have different values. Of course, it is possible that, as a matter of fact some people might morally prefer some means of identification to others. But this is a contingent matter: it is irrelevant to a conceptual analysis of 'social class'. Given the differing behaviour and circumstances of members of different classes, as defined, it might simply be the case that there are various ways of identifying them. There need be no disagreement between people who adopt different means of recognizing members of the different classes. Indeed, it would perhaps be unwise to rely solely on one means of identification.[19]

And there is no difference in principle with the case of 'power'. If, as Lukes says (at one point), the same concept of power is being used – 'A has power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests' – then there might simply be different ways of identifying when power has been exercised. One way of identifying when power has been exercised might be to observe actual public debates and notice when the expressed preferred policies of particular people are adopted. Another way of doing this might be to consider whether the policies which some people would prefer were allowed to be publicly discussed. And a third way of identifying the exercise of power might be to note the extent to which the desires which people have are influenced by others. But there need be no

disagreement between someone who identifies members of a particular class by virtue of their self-proclaimed occupations and someone who identifies them in terms of their life-styles. This point is obscured by Lukes's curious use of the word 'view'. The way Lukes speaks, it sounds as if we are committed to adopting *one* particular view of power. But, of course, it is not like that. One can adopt all three 'views' of power, that is, one can say that the exercise of power can be identified in, at least, three different ways. It might be the case that people with certain particular moral beliefs will tend to focus on one particular means of identification rather than another, although I am not aware of any evidence which suggests that this actually happens. In any case, that would be a contingent and not a conceptual matter. From what Lukes says, there is no more reason for considering 'power' to be an evaluative concept than there is for so considering a concept such as the suggested concept of 'social class' and that is to say: no reason at all.

Let us consider now the second claim made by Lukes and quoted in the previous section. This claim contradicts the one we have just discussed. It is the claim that the three 'views' of power *presuppose different conceptions of interests.* Lukes thinks that all the 'views' of power share a basic concept of 'power', or, more accurately of its exercise: 'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests'. Let us include in the concept the different conceptions of interests said by Lukes to be presupposed. Then, the so-called 'liberal' concept of 'power' would be something like: A exercises power over B when A acts in a manner contrary to B's expressed policy preferences. The so-called 'reformist' concept of 'power' would be something like: A exercises power over B when A acts contrary not only to B's expressed policy preferences but to the preferences B would express were discussion of such submerged preferences not stifled. The so-called 'radical' concept of 'power' would be: A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's real interest where: 'Policy x is more in [B's] real interest than policy y, if [B] were he to experience the *results* of both x and y would *choose* x as the result he would rather have for himself'.

Here we have three different definitions of the term 'power': three different concepts of 'power'. Lukes does not indicate that this claim is quite different from his previous one. It is the difference between saying that people adopt three different means of identifying members of a particular social class, given a particular definition of the term 'social class' and saying that there are three different definitions of the term 'social class' which people have used or could use. Lukes presents an interesting redefinition of the term 'power': he suggests that we adopt a particular concept of 'power', which is different from that normally used. He seems to me

to misrepresent the positions of Bachrach and Baratz and Dahl and Polsby. What they mean by the term 'power' is not that attributed to them in the previous paragraph. For instance, what Dahl means by the exercise of 'power' is that A exercises 'power' over B when A succeeds in getting B to do something that B would not otherwise have done. This is logically unrelated to the notion of expressed policy preferences. And logically it is unrelated to any notion of 'interests', despite Lukes's claim to the contrary. We can see that this is so by noting that there is no inconsistency in either of the following statements: A succeeded in getting B to do something that B would not otherwise have done and what B did was in B's interest; A succeeded in getting B to do something that B would not otherwise have done and what B did was not in B's interest.

In any case, suppose that Lukes were correct in claiming that the people who adopted the three different 'views' adopted different concepts of 'power'. What would follow from that? It would not follow that the concept of 'power' is evaluative. There seem to be no problems related to values in 'applying' the different terms. For instance, we can surely recognize when someone expresses a particular policy preference and some other policy is adopted. As Lukes defines the term 'real interest' there certainly are problems in identifying what is in a person's real interest i.e. what a person would choose under certain specified circumstances. But these problems are epistemological ones; they are logically unrelated to any differences of values which might exist between people.

Lukes suggests that if three people present what he calls three 'views' of power, which are said to presuppose different conceptions of 'interests', then there is some sort of *disagreement* between them related to differences in their values. This seems to me to be a confusion which is perhaps related to Lukes's habit of talking about defining concepts rather than of defining words; of talking about defining the concept of power rather than of defining the word 'power'. It is, in some senses, senseless to dispute the meaning of a term although people often in fact do indulge in such apparent disputes. Suppose that someone said that by the term 'power', he or she means such and such and that someone else said, by the term 'power', he or she means something different. It does not make sense to say that there is a *disagreement* between them. It would be senseless to ask 'in what does power *really* consist?' although people do in fact try to ask such questions. There is no disagreement or conflict expressed by those offering different concepts of 'power' although there might appear to be to those who do not realize that different definitions of a word are being presented.

To illustrate this consider the following situation. Suppose that I am drinking whisky with a friend and that we discuss whether to continue drinking or go to bed. Suppose that my friend expresses a

preference to continue drinking and that I express a preference to go to bed and that I then wrench the bottle of whisky from my friend's grasp and lock the bottle in a cupboard. Suppose that, if we had continued drinking, my friend would have suffered from an excruciating hangover and that if he or she could have experienced that hangover and compared it with the experience of having stopped drinking and having gone to bed would have chosen the latter experience. Was 'power' exercised in that situation? Well, in terms of some meanings of the word 'power', 'power' was exercised; in terms of other meanings, it was not. I acted contrary to the expressed policy preferences of my friend. So, in terms of one meaning attributed by Lukes (and associated with the pluralists) to the word 'power', 'power' was exercised. I selfishly used physical force to get my own way and to prevent my friend from continuing to drink and this would be called an exercise of 'power' in terms of the meaning normally given to the word 'power'. I did not act contrary to the 'real interest' of my friend and so, given what Lukes suggests that he means by the term 'power', 'power' was *not* exercised.

Suppose that someone said: 'Yes, but was power *really* exercised?' Well, this would be to ask a senseless question equivalent to the question: 'What does the word 'power' *really* mean?' The word has no 'real' meaning: it has no meanings at all apart from those which we give it. Suppose that two people were arguing about the situation and that one person claimed that power was exercised and the other person insisted that it had not been exercised. If we learned that one person was using the word 'power' as it is usually used and that the other person had adopted Lukes's suggested redefinition of the word, then we would realize that we were witnessing a vacuous dispute. Notice too that, once again, Lukes gives the impression that people are committed to adopting *one* particular 'view' of power in the sense that they are committed to adopting one particular definition of the term 'power'. And, again, this is a mistake. We can use various definitions of the term 'power'; we need not even particularly favour one concept of 'power' rather than another. And we might prefer one concept in some contexts and for some purposes and in another context prefer to use some other concept of 'power' just as we might sometimes prefer to use a hammer rather than a screwdriver.

It might be the case that people with different values will use different definitions of the term 'power' although it is not obvious that they actually do and Lukes presents no evidence which suggests that they do. In any case, this would be quite irrelevant to the question of whether the concept of 'power' was evaluative or in any sense problematical. Anything, such as the state of our digestive system or a long forgotten childhood experience might cause us to use a particular concept; but the logical status of the concept is not affected by such contingencies.[21]

v

According to Connolly, some concepts are 'essentially contested':

> When . . . disagreement does not simply reflect different readings of evidence within a fully shared system of concepts, we can say that a conceptual dispute has arisen. When the concept involved is *appraisive* in that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement, when the practice described is *internally complex* in that its characterization involves reference to several dimensions, and when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively *open*, enabling parties to interpret even those shared rules differently as new and unforseen situations arise, then the concept in question is an 'essentially contested concept'. Such concepts 'essentially involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users'.[22]

Both Lukes and Connolly appear to think that power is such a concept.[23]

There is a confusion here between defining and classifying: between using a concept and using a word. There is a distinction between disagreement over the meaning of the term 'X' and disagreement over whether something is correctly classified as an X. Some people might classify Loch Ness as a monster-containing loch while other people classify it as a non-monster-containing loch. But it does not follow that such people are engaged in a conceptual dispute. Suppose that two people are disputing whether or not Soviet Russia is correctly classified as a socialist society. Now, they might be using different concepts of 'socialism'. However, they might agree as to what counts as socialism and disagree about the present nature of Soviet Russian society. For instance, they might disagree about the extent of inequality of wealth and opportunity. To suggest that two people might disagree over what is correctly classified as 'power' is not to show that such people would be engaged in a conceptual dispute nor that power is an 'essentially contested concept'. Connolly assumes that such 'contests' are necessarily contests about values but his reasons for making this assumption are not clear to me.

Both Connolly and Lukes suggest that power is an evaluative concept on the grounds that there is a moral presumption against the exercise of power. Connolly argues that an exercise of power involves the limitation of personal choice. He distinguishes persuasion from forms of power and argues that, when power is exercised:

> the agents involved have a capacity for choice; and . . . either the recipient's capacity for choice or his ability to act as he chooses has somehow been impaired. To persuade another . . . is to give him reasons that help to inform his choice. Neither his capacity

> for choice nor his ability to act on his choice has been impaired by persuasion. For those tacitly or explicitly committed to the principle that persons are worthy of respect, *the distance between persuasion and manipulation is a moral distance: it reflects the judgement that there is a moral presumption against the latter that does not obtain for the former.*[24]

It seems to me that whether any particular exercise of choice or of power is worthy of approval depends on so many factors that little can be said about the morality of exercising power *in abstracto*. Even if, *ceteris paribus*, persuasion is morally preferable to coercion, often, particular instances of coercion would meet with approval whilst particular instances of persuasion would meet with disapproval. For instance, one would approve of coercion to thwart a would-be rapist and, perhaps, a killer of particular types of whales. People might be persuaded to direct violence towards members of particular racial groups but it does not follow that one would approve of the persuasion or of the persuaders involved.

Connolly's argument might even be thought to be self-refuting. If there were a *prima facie* case for approving of the exercise of personal choice, would there not be a *prima facie* case for approving of the exercise of power if people freely choose to exercise it? A similar objection might be made to Lukes. He defines 'power' in terms of interests and claims that: 'if I say that something is in your interests. I imply that you have a *prima facie* claim to it, and if I say that "policy x is in A's interest" this constitutes a *prima facie* justification for that policy.'[25] Suppose A exercises 'power', in Lukes's sense over B. Look what happens if we apply Lukes's principle. A wants to exercise the 'power' (it is in A's 'interest') and B does not want the power to be exercised, or would not want it to be exercised if he or she were in possession of particular knowledge (it is not in B's 'interest'). Well, if we apply Lukes's principle, A would be said to have a *prima facie* claim to exercise power over B, and B would be said to have a *prima facie* claim not to have the power exercised and, *prima facie*, there is no reason for preferring one of the claims to the other. We cannot even appeal to the perhaps dubious principle that the claim of the powerless should be preferred to that of the powerful since when power is exercised by A over B, it does not follow that A is, in all respects more powerful than B. Presumably President Kennedy was, in most respects, more powerful than his assassin(s). The interests and 'real interests' of one person or group can obviously conflict with the interests and 'real interests' of other people and other groups; and an exercise of power which conflicts with the interests and 'real interests' of one person or group might well be justified because it protects the interests and 'real interests' of other people and groups.

Connolly makes the interesting claim that 'there is a particularly intimate connection between alleging that A has power over B and concluding that A is properly held responsible to some degree for B's conduct or situation.'[26] For this reason, he claims that there is a presumption against exercising power' that puts those against whom the attribution is made on the defensive.'[27]

I agree that, sometimes, one is morally responsible for exercise of power: roughly, we are morally responsible for the consequence of our exercise of power when we are conscious of what we are doing and knowledgeable of its predictable effect (or could reasonably be expected to be so conscious and knowledgeable) and where we can choose either to exercise or fail to exercise the power. Such responsibility is a necessary though not a sufficient condition for the rightful attribution not only of blame but of praise and there is no reason *a priori* for saying that the responsibility will lead to the just attribution of one rather than the other. Those, say, who thwart would-be rapists stand praised rather than accused of having exercised power. And it is not true that those who exercise power are always reluctant to admit responsibility for their deeds. For instance, the IRA are often keen not simply to admit but to claim responsibility for particular actions and this is to say that they want to be associated with particular exercises of power, of which they are proud.

Notice that the fact that those who exercise power are sometimes morally praised or blamed does not show that power itself is an evaluative, or somehow, problematical concept. For instance, there is a moral presumption in favour of or against driving on the left-hand side of a two-way, two-track street (depending on the local convention). Similarly, there is a moral presumption in favour of or against shouting 'Fire' in a crowded cinema (depending on whether the building is ablaze). Yet there is nothing evaluative nor problematical about the notions of driving on the left nor of shouting 'Fire'.

VI

In this section, I shall look at Lukes's claim, that his 'view [of power] is superior to alternative views' and seek a reason for adopting the definitions suggested by Lukes and Connolly of the term 'power'.

The reasons which Lukes offers for preferring his 'view' of power seem to me to betray a confusion over what is involved in discussing the *concept* of 'power'. His case is that:

> the one-dimensional view of power cannot reveal the less visible ways in which a pluralist system may be biased in favour of certain groups and against others. The two-dimensional view goes some

> way to revealing this – which is a considerable advance in itself – but it confines itself to studying situations where the mobilisation of bias can be attributed to individuals' decisions that have the effect of preventing currently observable grievances (overt or covert) from becoming issues within the political process . . . . The analysis remains superficial precisely because it confines itself to studying individual decisions made to avert potentially threatening demands from becoming politically dangerous. A deeper analysis would also concern itself with all the complex and subtle ways in which the inactivity of leaders and the sheer weight of institutions have political affects. . . . The three-dimensional view offers the possibility of such an analysis. It offers in other words, the prospect of a serious sociological and not merely personalised explanation of how political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from being made.[28]

There is a confusion here between suggesting some empirical means in terms of which power can be identified and offering different concepts of 'power'. For instance, to say that the 'one-dimensional view' cannot reveal particular ways in which people's preferences might not be discussed or expressed or the fact that people's preferences can themselves be manipulated is like saying that if we identify members of a particular class by their accents and dress, then that will not reveal to us the nature of their occupations or income tax returns.

Before looking at Lukes's and Connolly's concepts of 'power', I would like to present what I consider to be the normal lay concept of 'power'. I think that the term 'power' is usually defined in everyday speech in causal terms such that: 'A has the power to the extent that A can produce effects and A exercises power to the extent that A does produce effects'. A can be, but need not be, a person or a group. Not all power is power over people. One can have the power to run for a mile or to rip a telephone directory in half. One might have power of which one is unaware and one might exercise power inadvertently as when we unwittingly crush an insect underfoot or sexually attract or arouse a secret admirer.

My suggested normal concept of 'power' is morally neutral in the sense that it is logically unrelated to any moral belief and also in the sense that to say that someone has or exercises power is not to suggest a moral evaluation of the person. If I say that A exercises power over B when I mean that A affects B, I have given no reason for thinking either that what A does is morally commendable or morally wrong. A in this example might be furthering a revolution or, say, delivering a lecture.

When the term 'power' is defined in this way, people sometimes claim that somehow, this definition is too broad, 'for sociological

purposes'.[29] Suppose that we want to study the existence and exercise of 'power' (as I suggest the term is normally defined) in social life. Obviously, we will not be interested in all power and its exercise but there is no reason for us to stipulate in advance what power and its exercise will interest us. I think that an interest in studying power in social life arises from the following concerns. There is an obvious sociological interest in studying power and its exercise. If we can discover the cause of a social phenomenon, then we can correctly explain and predict its occurrences.[30] And to discover that power has been exercised in a particular way is to have discovered the cause of a phenomenon. There is a political interest in both the existence and exercise of power. Sometimes, even when power is not exercised, the fact that particular people and groups possess power which they could exercise is of political concern. Related to the political interest, there is a moral interest in studying power and its exercise. Sometimes, but by no means always, people deserve moral blame or praise for their exercise of power. Sometimes when people exercise power, they are morally responsible for some of the consequences of its exercise. It seems to me that, no matter what our interest is in studying power in social life, we do not require narrower definitions of the term 'power' than that of common speech. Suppose that my interest in studying power is a moral one and that I want to study power in society in order to allocate moral blame and moral praise. Well, most instances of the exercise of power will be of no interest to me but it does not follow that I would be wise to redefine the term 'power' such that all instances of 'power' did interest me *qua* moralist.

Lukes considers that, the central interest of studying power relations in the first place – is an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing of people's compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition'.[31] We might want to quibble about whether this was the *central* interest in studying power, but it certainly is one interest. And there is no need for a rarified definition of the term 'power' in order to study this sort of power. One might easily adopt the usual definition of the term 'power' and then proceed to focus attention on those instances where people's compliance is secured. There would be no apparent gain in redefining the term 'power' such that the exercise of 'power' *meant* such compliance.

Connolly's definition of the term 'power' is:

> A exercises power over B when he is responsible for some x that increases the costs, risks, or difficulties to B in promoting B's desires or in recognising or promoting B's interests or obligations. A has power as *potential*, then, when he could but does not limit B in the ways specified; A *exercises* that power when the constraint x is so introduced or maintained.[32]

Lukes's definition of the term 'power' or its exercise is: A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's real interest where: 'Policy x is more in [B's] real interest than policy y if [B] were to experience the *results* of both x and y *choose* x as the result he would rather have for himself'.[33] We can presume that these definitions of the term 'power' reflect Lukes's and Connolly's interest in studying power. But they can study such power without bothering to redefine the term. They could quite easily say that they want to study 'power', as the term is normally defined and then specify that they are particularly or even exclusively interested in studying power where power is exercised against someone's 'real interest'. (It is clear that by interest, Connolly means 'real interest'.)[34] There is no obvious gain in redefining the term 'power' such that only that which Lukes and Connolly are particularly interested in studying is, by their definition, 'power'.

There are disadvantages in adopting Lukes's and Connolly's suggested definition of the term 'power'. Now, anyone is entitled to redefine terms which are used in everyday speech and sometimes such redefinition is useful for some purposes. Normal linguistic usage is not sacrosanct. However, there is always a danger with such redefinition and this danger creates a *prima facie* case against all redefinitions.[35] The danger is simply that we will forget that we have redefined a familiar term and that we have proposed to use it in an unfamiliar way and this can lead to conceptual muddles. Lukes himself unwittingly illustrates this danger.[36] Lukes asks the question of whether power can be exercised by A over B in B's real interests. The answer which Lukes favours is that: 'A might exercise "short-term power" over B . . . but that if and when B recognises his real interests, the power relation ends: it is self-annihilating.'[37] As Goldman indicates:

> This misses the point entirely. It assumes there is a 'short-term' power relation prior to the time at which *B* recognizes *A*'s action to be in his interests. The point, however, is that Lukes's own analysis makes it illegitimate to speak of a power-relation *at all* when A's action is not contrary to B's *interests*.[38]

Let us recall the example where my friend and I were drinking whisky and discussing whether or not to go to bed and my friend expressed a preference to continue drinking (although it was in his or her 'real interest' to go to bed) and I grabbed the bottle of whisky and locked it in a cupboard. In terms of Lukes's and Connolly's definition of the term 'power', 'power' was not exercised since I did not act in a manner contrary to my friend's 'real interest'. Since I produced an effect in this situation, in terms of the definition of 'power' of common speech, I exercised power. In this particular example, I was also morally responsible for the consequences of my

exercise of power. It is, to say the least, counter-intuitive to say that power was not exercised by me in the imagined situation. One faces the question: 'If power was not exercised, then what shall we say was exercised?'

There are problems in adopting Lukes's and Connolly's definitions of 'power' which arise from the notion of 'real interest'. First of all, it is not clear to me what, if any, 'real interests' people have. Policy x is said to be more in our real interest than policy y if we would choose policy x after experiencing the results of both. It seems to me that the policy which we would choose would depend on a number of things, including our tastes, which change over time so that, at most, we could talk of a person's real interest at a particular time but not simply of his or her real interest. Suppose the result of policy x is that I eat and the result of policy y is that I drink. What is my real interest? Well, sometimes I would rather eat than drink, sometimes I would rather drink than eat but I do not 'really' prefer either activity. We cannot even say that it must always be in my 'real interest' always to have food and drink available since, after all, people do voluntarily commit suicide and who is in a position to know whether it is in our 'real interest' for our bodies to live or die? Second, it seems strange to say that what we would actually choose is our 'real interest'. It might seem less curious to say that our 'real interest' is that policy which morally we should choose or else that policy which we would choose were we to choose wisely. In certain circumstances, I might always choose to steal or to lie or cheat: it would sound very strange to say that to steal, lie and cheat is in my 'real interest'. I choose to smoke rather than not to smoke but it seems curious on that account to say that it is in my 'real interest' to smoke. If one were to talk of 'real interest' here it might sound less curious to say that my real interests lie not in the policies which I do choose, but in those which, prudentially or morally, I should choose.

The major objection to talk of 'real interest' is that it might produce an inappropriate emotive response. Suppose it were said that A had acted against B's real interest. Does it not sound as though A has behaved badly? Well, the situation could be, say, that B wants A as a lover and A has chosen someone else. If the event is described in this way and no mention is made of anyone's 'real interest', then A's behaviour does not sound reprehensible. Suppose that particular members of the National Front were to experience the results of policy x, where coloured immigrants were deported, and policy y, where they were treated the same as other members of society. It might well be the case that the National Front members would prefer the adoption of policy x to policy y. However, one would not want to appear to dignify their position by saying that we act contrary to their 'real interest' when we try to prevent the adoption of policy x.

VII

Neither Connolly nor Lukes establishes that 'power' is an evaluative concept. It appears that the concept or concepts of 'power' which we adopt are logically independent of our moral outlooks. Furthermore, if we say that someone has exercised 'power' in any of the senses we have considered we have not necessarily expressed a moral evaluation of the person. Perhaps if Lukes and Connolly had realized this they would not have been tempted to recommend the adoption of their suggested concepts of 'power'. In any case, since there are no apparent advantages in adopting their suggested redefinitions of the term 'power' while there are apparent disadvantages, we might, in the meantime, reject their suggestions.

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NOTES

1. Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, Macmillan, 1974, p. 26.
2. William Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*, Lexington, Massachusetts, Heath, 1974, p. 127.
3. Lukes distinguishes between a 'concept' and a 'view' of power. See Lukes, op. cit., p. 27. I cannot understand what point he is making and I cannot understand what Lukes means by a 'concept'.
4. See W. I. Thomas, *Social Behaviour and Personality*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1951, p. 88.
5. There is a distinction between classifying something as an 'X' and calling something an 'X'. For instance, I might classify a colleague as a brilliant scholar without voicing my view to anyone else. To call someone a brilliant scholar is not necessarily to classify him or her as such since, for instance, one might be lying or joking.
6. Lukes, op. cit., p. 12. Lukes considers the difference between the definitions to be 'the difference between potential and actual power, between its possession and its exercise' (Lukes, op. cit., p. 12), Lukes is confused here. If one has power and does not exercise it, one does not have potential power: one has actual power which is not exercised.
7. Ibid., p. 13.
8. This point is made by Goldman. See Alvin I. Goldman, 'Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View', *Theory and Decision*, 8, 1977, pp. 305-10. However, Abell writes as though it were self-evident what the various dimensions are. See Peter Abell, 'The Many Faces of Power and Liberty: Revealed Preference, Autonomy and Teleological Explanation', *Sociology*, 1977, pp. 3-24.
9. Lukes, op. cit., p. 15.
10. Ibid., p. 13.
11. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, *Power and Poverty. Theory and Practice*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 7-8.
12. Lukes, op. cit., p. 17.
13. Ibid., p. 21.
14. Ibid., p. 23.
15. Loc. cit.
16. Ibid., pp. 24-5.
17. Ibid., p. 26.
18. Ibid., pp. 26-7, 34-5.
19. See Hugh V. McLachlan and J. K. Swales, 'The Interpretation of Popper: A Comment on Brighton', *Quantitative Sociology Newsletter*, 1978, 120, pp. 54-62.

20. Lukes, op. cit., p. 34. This is taken from Connolly, who calls it a 'first approximation' to a definition of 'real interest'. See Connolly, op. cit., p. 64.

21. See Hugh V. McLachlan, 'The Is/Ought Question: A Needless Controversy', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 10, 1979, pp. 134–7.

22. Connolly, op. cit., p. 10.

23. See Lukes, op. cit., p. 9.

24. Connolly, op. cit., p. 94.

25. Lukes, op. cit., p. 34.

26. Connolly, op. cit., p. 95.

27. Ibid., p. 97.

28. Ibid., pp. 37–8.

29. For instance, Weber makes such a claim. See Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, New York, Bedminster Press, 1968, vol. 1, p. 53.

30. See Hugh V. McLachlan, 'Functionalism, Causation and Explanation', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 6, 1976, pp. 235–40.

31. Lukes, op. cit., p. 31.

32. Connolly, op. cit., pp. 102–3.

33. Lukes, op. cit., p. 34.

34. See Connolly, op. cit., pp. 62–103.

35. See Ardon Lyon, 'The Relevance of Wisdom's Work for the Philosophy of Science: A Study in the concept of Scientific Explanation', in Renford Bambrough (ed.), *Wisdom: Twelve Essays*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1974, pp. 218–48.

36. Perhaps one of the most notable examples of the dangers of such redefinitions is provided by Popper's use of the term 'science'. See McLachlan and Swales, op. cit.

37. Lukes, op. cit., p. 33.

38. Goldman, op. cit., p. 307.

REVIEW ARTICLE

Percy S. Cohen

Sex, gender and equality: or, the conversion of Melford E. Spiro

I

Among social scientists there is a conventional wisdom on the subject of sex and gender. Those who write in defence of it are usually women; but, with a few exceptions, men in these professions either give open or tacit support to it or they simply avoid the subject entirely.[1]

There are two parts to the received wisdom. The first is a determination, in describing, analysing and explaining social role differentiation and inequality between the sexes, to place as much emphasis as possible on social-cultural-historical hypotheses rather than on biological ones. The importance of anatomy and physiology is not denied – though it was, for a short while 'denied' by a few extreme feminists whose retaliatory needs extended to the 'putting down' (in several senses) of the male genitals – but is emphasized only in relation to the bare minimum of the facts of human life. Social arrangements, differential advantage, gender perception, thoughts and feelings about sex and gender and, even, theories concerning the importance of anatomy and physiology are all to be treated as social and cultural facts to be explained by sociology, social and cultural anthropology and social psychology. One of the few 'facts' of human nature to be mentioned is its plasticity. On this matter, all those who subscribe to this part of the conventional wisdom are good neo-Durkheimians – even when they are also good Marxists, as some are, or think themselves to be – in that they subscribe to the dogma that the social, even when it appears to be physical, is to be explained only in terms of the social.

The second part of this credo is ideological and prescriptive. Given the reasons why the reality of gender differences is what it is, it can be changed by political action: and the final goal of that change is to secure absolute equality between males and females. What that means is that, ultimately, there should be almost no correlation at all between physical sex and social role: sexual anatomy should, in no

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way, be social destiny. In the short run, the aim is to combat any sign of discrimination, however subtly and even unconsciously applied by oppressive males and collusively submissive females, in the allocation of tasks and rewards in all areas of social life. An allied aim is also to expose, as purely justificatory ideologies put forward by chauvinist males and their female allies, any theories which refer to human nature.

Although there is consensus on the types of explanation of sex and gender that may be proposed, there is also recognition that a variety of competing explanations is possible and permissible within the framework of that consensus. Almost everyone is now agreed that the origins of male domination are to be located in certain circumstances of early human life in which the exigencies of survival may have made it necessary. Similarly, almost everyone is equally agreed that, throughout most of recorded history, neither male domination nor gender differentiation have served any other needs but those of oppression, exploitation and differential advantage.

Once the condition of aboriginal man is dealt with, explanations begin to diverge. Some put more stress on the possession of male power as a condition of its own perpetuation; others pay more attention to the control of property, other resources, and women, themselves, who could be exchanged for support or even for goods or services.

In explaining the present or the recent past, much reference is made by Marxists to the wider contexts of capitalist and of pre-capitalist social formations, while much reference is made by non-Marxists to the intrinsic advantages of male domination and to the subtle and less subtle weapons exercised by men to perpetuate those advantages. On all of these views, so intent are men to retain their dominance and to compel or encourage female submission and submissiveness, that they not only discriminate against women in the allocation of the more desirable statuses and other rewards but, also, ensure that the value placed upon 'female tasks' continues to be lower than that placed on 'male tasks'.

Some theorists, especially, but not exclusively, Marxist, acknowledge that some parts of this analysis must be faulty: after all, upper-class males did, and probably still do, place a higher value on the 'female' role of an (upper-class) hostess than they do on lower-class 'male' occupations. Class and status differences do, to a greater or lesser extent, cut across those of sex or gender; and differences of sex and gender relations may, themselves, vary from one social class or status group to another.

Furthermore, everyone committed to the social scientific consensus acknowledges that there have always been some women who could, for certain purposes, pass themselves off as men; that certain women could exercise 'feminine' influence over powerful men; that

laws and rules of succession allow women, in rather rare circumstances, to be treated, for certain valued purposes, as if their sex was of no importance; that there have, of late, been some 'safe' and, for the most part, 'token' concessions to women, as a response to feminist militance and to other changing circumstances, which have, together, made such concessions either necessary or advantageous to those who have had it in their gift to grant them.

Some sociologists and social-cultural anthropologists have sought to avoid conspiracy theories by stressing how institutional structures and systems of inter-gender perception create situations for, and attitudes in, women which make it seem less troublesome for, or even more advantageous to them to submit to, rather than to rebel against male domination. In refining their analyses they have also introduced the hypothesis of the role of male 'gate-keepers'. One version of this hypothesis attributes great importance to the male control of property and of other resources and forms of wealth.[2] But a more subtle version of it focuses also on the manner in which male dominance also permits males to manage sets of values and criteria of evaluation and perception for determining who and what is appropriate to the performance of occupational and other roles.[3]

Needless to say, the conventional wisdom of social scientists is not necessarily that of laypersons. In fact, those social scientists who venture outside of academia, or even take note of the popular media, would be joined by the better informed feminists in conceding that many laypersons – not only 'male chauvinist pigs' but, also, female collusive 'birds' – do not share their theoretical factual and moral assumptions. Furthermore, the efforts of social scientists and of feminists to 'educate' the wider public are not helped by the counter-efforts of powerful and/or prestigious women. Prime Minister, Ms Margaret Thatcher, has not only not protested at being called 'the only real man in the Cabinet', she has also declared that she is not a supporter of (present-day) feminism.

It is not altogether clear whether all female (and male) opponents of militant feminism are agreed that sexual dimorphism makes absolute gender equality impossible. What is clear is that some of their spokespeople reject some of the social scientific supports of feminism. They certainly hold that it is mischievous to encourage women who would have been reasonably content with their lot to aspire to that which is not, in any case, either available or well suited to them.

And who is to say that such arguments are wrong? Until recently there was an almost unanimous chorus of social scientific voices to say just that. But, over the past decade, there have been some attempts to question the social scientific consensus. The doubters might, till recently, have seemed like mavericks, muttering to themselves in a lonely wilderness. But there are now more such 'mavericks';

some of them are social scientists of some renown; and they may well succeed in turning their wilderness into an arena of fierce debate.

II

There have always been dissenters from outside of the social sciences. But, from within, one of the first was Lionel Tiger.[4] He argued that human males have a 'genetic commitment' to bond together which is an evolutionary product of their primeval role as hunters. Given that they still tend to bond together and, also, to seek activities which are substitutes for hunting, there will, inevitably, be some correspondence between physical sex and social gender. Tiger does not claim that his hypothesis will predict the situation of each and every male and female in each and every society but will, rather, predict structural tendencies in human societies. Among these tendencies will be some degree of male domination in at least some spheres of social life. Tiger, a sociologist strongly influenced by physical anthropology and primatology – though not necessarily supported by all of their practitioners – defied the long-standing social scientific assumptions of almost total human plasticity and of cultural determinism; and, for the form of his defiance, was labelled a maverick from within the profession, despite his more popular success. His efforts did little to weaken the received wisdom of sociology. One reason is, certainly, that that type of argument can be turned against itself. For, one could postulate, just as plausibly, that there were good reasons for primeval female bonding which would result from the needs of mothering and from some minimum of co-operation within and between matrifocal domestic groups of female food-gatherers and their offspring who would be visited, sporadically, by male hunters. Given female bonding – and the evidence for its persistence up to the present-time and in many known human societies – and the social and cultural indispensability of mothering to the human child, we could hypothesize that there must, at some time, have been female power and authority which off-set those of males.[5]

Tiger's next application of ethology to human societies was in collaboration with Fox.[6] They elaborated the argument against total human plasticity and affirmed their own commitment to the influence of the 'biogram' on human conduct: in short, they adopted and applied the idea that the human 'wiring system' is, to some extent, programmed to make certain predictable uses of culture and society. They also accepted that sexual dimorphism is associated with differences in male and female 'biogrammars'. Their approach was far from that of attributing to fixed instincts the determination of social

and cultural phenomena: it was more that of showing how inherited dispositions are 'triggered' and used. They were not primarily concerned with the consequences of sexual dimorphism; but they did accept that it gave rise to differences between male and female 'biogrammars' in a number of respects. It is not surprising that, since they also accepted a general tendency in human societies to hierarchy, they also accepted that sexual dimorphism would produce some minimal degree of male domination in some spheres of social life. They were not opposed to social reforms to promote fairness in the treatment of individual females, in the correction of collective forms of discrimination and in the re-evaluation of the actual and potential contribution of females to the human condition. What they did oppose was the then fashionable assumption of feminist theorists that sexual dimorphism was nothing but anatomical. Their ideas had some considerable popular success but, while receiving some academic praise for particular applications, were treated, by those committed to the consensus, as 'maverick' or, even, as dangerous.

Perhaps the first sociologist to launch a single-minded assault on feminist social science was Steven Goldberg.[7] His arguments were treated seriously by some scholars – who did not necessarily agree with them – but were rejected as repugnant by the upholders of the received wisdom and, especially, by sociologists and their students. Attempts to treat them as serious commonly aroused amusement, incredulity or anger.[8] But what Goldberg did was quite serious. First, he documented the facts that all known human societies, including those that were thought to be exceptions, were characterized by some degree of gender differentiation and male domination. Second, citing the support of almost every living anthropologist, he rejected the evidence for any early or original matriarchy. Third, he sought to explain the 'facts' by asserting the effects of testosterone on the differential proneness to aggression of males and females. Fourth, he suggested that the norms and institutions of 'patriarchy' did also protect many women from having to compete with males and warned that, if the feminists were successful, such open competition would cause much misery for many females. Fifth, he argued that social justice could better be achieved by a change in social values which would up-grade nurturant, supportive and caring activities for which females were, on the whole, better equipped than males.

Goldberg had two principal explanatory hypotheses. One, borrowed from endocrinological enquiries into sexual dimorphism in primates and humans, asserted a natural tendency of human males to be more aggressive than females. Goldberg was not promoting a simple-minded proposition that male aggression will just 'out' but was, rather, proposing that life circumstances would 'trigger' more of it from males than from females. He did not deny that some males would be less prone to aggressiveness than some females, nor that

circumstances themselves would never elicit more, rather than less aggression from females and less, rather than more, from males. His second, more original hypothesis, was in a very recognizable tradition: in social activities requiring aggressiveness – such as fighting and controlling others – males would be better equipped than females; and, in competing for *any* valued roles and social rewards males, with their greater aggressiveness, would compete more fiercely and, therefore, more successfully than females.

Part of the first hypothesis would not gain support from all endocrinologists; though the assumption that males are, on the whole, from an early age, more aggressive than females in all (or most) known human societies is confirmed by most social scientists who have considered the matter thoroughly.[9] However, even if all of the first hypothesis were correct, the second could be faulted on a number of grounds. For, whereas in the very distant past greater aggressiveness might have been a singular advantage to males in all roles involving power, this need no longer have been the case later in human development when only a certain minimum of aggressiveness, linked with other more important talents and capacities, would be far more advantageous than a mere proclivity for marked aggressiveness; and, in competing for all prized social goals, certain skills, such as wiliness, charm and persuasiveness, which may be possessed equally by males and by females, may be of so much greater value than aggressiveness that their differential distribution among individuals would, in fair and open competition, predict far more success than would average male–female differences in aggressiveness itself. If these criticisms are apt, then one could only save Goldberg's second hypothesis by using it to explain the long-distant-past origins of male domination and, then, use that to explain its perpetuation by dominant males.

Goldberg could, indeed, be wrong. But feminists also accused him of being unscientific.[10] But what is unscientific about his procedures? If being wrong is unscientific then almost all science is just that. If Goldberg's theory can be opposed by another, which explains as much, while making fewer unsupported assumptions, then so much the better for its rival. But if science is the matter at issue it would not be difficult to show that Goldberg has done a far better job than those feminist critics who cry 'unscientific!'. Right – theoretical, empirical and moral – may well be on the side of the feminists and of their social scientific supporters. But this right cannot rest on a failure to pit pro-feminist hypotheses against those of their opponents in open and rational debate. Dismissing the opposition for not subscribing to the consensus, for being male-chauvinist and, therefore, for being unscientific, will not do.

Needless to add, Goldberg's proposal that the up-grading of roles of nurturance would do much for females and would, also do much

else to improve human societies, is treated as another form of 'tokenism' and as a rather shabby attempt to sweeten a very bitter pill of *his* own making.

But the situation in the human sciences has begun to change; so that the 'research programme' which informs the writings of Tiger, Tiger and Fox and of Goldberg can no longer be simply dismissed as being outside of the 'consensus'. One reason is that sophisticated biological or ethological explanations or part-explanations of social and cultural phenomena have become respectable in some academic circles if not in others. Another reason is that there is a growing impatience among social scientists with almost any accepted form of thought; and this impatience is accompanied by an appalling 'trendiness'. In such circumstances, proponents of biological ideas appear, to some observers of the social-scientific scene, to be introducing an element of solidity (and even of sanity) into the increasingly obscurantist debates – if debates they are – which surround every obscure pronouncement of every new metaphysician of the social and cultural world.

It is in this context that one must appraise two recent books on sex and gender in the Israeli kibbutzim. The first is by Tiger and Shepher.[11] The second is by Melford E. Spiro, who is not only one of the most distinguished of American anthropologists but is also one who might have been assumed to be within the 'consensus'.[12]

There are three principal reasons why the kibbutz has been chosen as a 'crucial' test of theories concerning sex and gender. The first is that the kibbutzim were intended, by their founders, to be a radical egalitarian experiment in *all* respects. The second is that social scientists could, and can still, study the kibbutz freely and, often, with encouragement and co-operation from within. The third is that the kibbutz movements have, and make available to others, a good deal of reliable statistical and other forms of information about themselves.

The main 'facts' that are now presented by Tiger–Shepher (and, also, by Spiro) have been well known for some time. But they have now strongly confirmed what might have, till now, been considered mere impressions. They show that gender differentiation has been steadily increasing in the kibbutzim, in that women have been moving back into occupational and other areas of activity which were once thought of as traditionally and appropriately 'feminine', and, furthermore, in that women have increasingly rejected, as 'unnatural' the one-time unisex image and have become concerned to look and behave in 'feminine' ways and to be seen by men as 'feminine'.

These trends were noticed and documented some years ago by a team of researchers led by the late Yonina Talmon.[13] Her approach to these matters was very strictly sociological. She proposed that a

number of trends which could be discerned in kibbutz social life could be characterized as a process of development from a *Bund* (a term borrowed from Schmallenbach) to a Community. A *Bund* was a group in which the identical equality of its members was not the initial social reality but was, rather, the intended 'objective correlative' of a shared, revolutionary ideology to which firm and almost total commitment was a precondition of membership. A community was what emerged out of a *Bund*, over time, and was characterized by a considerable increase in the number and types of social roles, statuses and situations. This emergence was a consequence of economic, political and other forms of organizational development. Talmon, like the early Spiro,[14] recognized the changing role of ideology, for, while the founders of the kibbutz movement had continually to remind themselves of their commitment to certain goals and had also to struggle against personal and collective back-sliding they could eventually, once ideology had become institutionalized, permit a number of changes which lent themselves to other changing circumstances; moreover, those who, from early childhood, or even from birth, had been trained in every aspect of collectivism and equality – which included the experience of children's age-peer homes, separated from those of their parents, and supervised by specialists – had less reason to back-slide in certain fundamental matters and could, therefore, permit themselves, pragmatically and, in some respects almost unthinkingly, other changes which did not endanger egalitarian socialism and participatory democracy among all full members of the kibbutz.

The very substantial evidence marshalled by Tiger–Shepher and their associates is far from being a simple accumulation of more 'facts' of the same kind as those presented earlier by Talmon. For Talmon, like the earlier (but not the later) Spiro, had taken as more-or-less given the nature of the sex-gender relations in the early, pioneering kibbutz and had assumed a low degree of differentiation and a high degree of equality. Of course, the ideology and ultimate goal of the pioneers was to eliminate all sex differences apart from those of anatomy and physiology. And, certainly, there was far greater gender equality in the early kibbutzim than there had been among eastern European Jews; and there was, doubtless, more of such equality than in almost any other society at that time. But the assumption of an early, pioneering identity of ideology and practice was an idealization, not an accurate description of a past social reality. For all male and female survivors of the early pioneering period could confirm that women, especially but not only pregnant ones, could not and did not always do the same work as men.

But the massive Tiger–Shepher evidence does not require any unwarranted assumptions about early pioneering kibbutzim, for it documents a twenty-year trend between the early 1950s and the

early 1970s and includes reference not only to well established but also to new pioneering kibbutzim. What is more, their evidence corroborates the hypothesis that while women have done much to create, accept and justify these trends, men have done relatively little, directly, to create and encourage them and have done a little to discourage them. They show that it has become more and more difficult to find women who will exercise certain positions of power and authority – except in emergencies and then only temporarily – other than those relating to activities in which women have become more involved; for example, women are far more willing to head committees on education, catering and entertainment than on internal and regional, economic and political administration. Cases are cited of women who, urged by others – though more often by men than by women – to assume certain roles of authority, refuse on the grounds that they would rather devote themselves to their children or grandchildren and that they regard such 'feminine' activities as no less valuable than those of administration.

They also show that there has been considerable effort to treat 'feminine' activities as no less valuable than male ones; however, they concede that such efforts are not always successful.

Tiger and Shepher (like the later Spiro) argue that what is true of the kibbutz is likely to be true of the whole world. They are not claiming that women elsewhere – including Israel, itself, outside of the kibbutzim – are likely to discontinue the struggle for 'absolute' equality. What they are claiming is that kibbutz women have come close to achieving some of the more daring goals of the women's movement but have also come to reject some of them.

Since one knows Tiger's earlier writings, one is not surprised that Tiger and Shepher explain these facts in terms of a sophisticated set of hypotheses in which ethological ideas play an important, but not exclusive, role. For the kind of ethology which they propose embraces a subtle sociological and psychological analysis. They even go so far as to argue, very convincingly, that the conventional social-scientific wisdom, itself, rests on assumptions of human nature which are not only unquestioned but are, also, rather crude.

Their point of departure has little or nothing to do with male bonding but has much to do with the 'biogrammar' of the human female which leads her, in circumstances which are even only minimally 'favourable', to establish a close mother–child bond. They do not argue that there is a maternal instinct which simply drives every human female in one direction and which is sometimes thwarted only by social and cultural circumstances. What they do assert is that the circumstances in which the mother–child bond can be established, and in which something in the mother can be fulfilled – the activities of mothering involve, for example, the all-important element of touch – will provide gratifications which women and their female

offspring are biologically predisposed to expect and to accept. This, in turn – though not this alone – will affect the gender self-perception of the young female in ways that it will not affect the young male and will also influence their definition of the most favoured roles suited to themselves. Similarly, anticipation of, and the actual practice of mothering will reactivate these tendencies in the adolescent and, more so, in the post-adolescent female.

But, some incredulous readers will protest, how does so much of this mother-child contact occur when specialists raise children in order that mothers be not tied to child-rearing? The answer to that, which every informed person would now give, is that kibbutz family and socialization arrangements have, largely at the instigation of mothers, changed in the direction of their increasing participation in child-rearing and of increasing family-centredness and 'privatisation'. Mothers in the kibbutz can now enjoy many of the pleasures, and suffer some of the trials, of child-rearing while, at the same time, knowing that they can and must do other work and can also continue to depend on the constant and substantial help of the child-rearing specialists which makes their own maternal activities more enjoyable than they would otherwise be.

Tiger–Shepher insist that all the pressures to return children to their mothers have come from mothers. They also insist that the original kibbutz arrangements to 'free' women from too much mothering were, almost certainly, created by males. After all, they remind us, are not revolutions made by men and are not the new rules, like the old, imposed by men on women? If this is so, then the final stage of the revolution – what Spiro calls the 'counter revolution' – has been made by women for women's right to be women! One might question their certainty that these rules were male-made: it is quite probable that their making was, at the very least, encouraged and supported by some pioneer women who sought to reject the traditional role of women and who, possibly, fought strongly against their own 'biogrammar'.

Like all *good* social scientists Tiger–Shepher are not content to show that their own hypothesis explains some well known facts together with some that are less well known. They also pit their explanation against those which they consider to be the best known contenders to see whether any of the last can explain and predict as well as their own. And it is here that they fail, somewhat, to maintain the very high standards which they set themselves. Two examples will have to suffice, though more could be cited. First, they consider a male-conspiracy hypothesis – difficult enough to corroborate strongly with kibbutz evidence – but not a more subtle hypothesis of a more covert form of male domination and 'gate-keeping' leading to female resignation or even to a covert form of 'collusion'. This last hypothesis would not lend itself to easy, direct

tests; but it might compete well with the Tiger–Shepher hypothesis if it were given the thoughtful consideration which it deserves.

The second example requires more detailed discussion. Tiger–Shepher reject the socialization hypothesis on the grounds that 'if the results of primary socialisation are unalterable why don't we witness the same failure in other aspects of kibbutz life?'[15] Let us agree that the early pioneer kibbutz women, who were the rebellious daughters of partly assimilated or traditional – though not, usually, of highly traditional or of orthodox – Jewish families of eastern Europe, had to renounce and/or suppress all manner of values and sentiments associated with their past; and let us also agree that they did so as part of their moral and practical commitment to a revolutionary experiment. To begin with, they rejected all private ownership of property and any inequality in the distribution of goods and services; they also rejected the whole idea of political power along with that of economic exploitation. They rejected many other things and put new ideals and practices in their place. But, as a central element of their utopian plan, they rejected the 'bourgeois' family. One reason for doing so was the plausible sociological assumption that the allegiances of family and kinship inhibit the formation of community-wide solidarity and that they serve to segment the larger 'kibbutz family' of ideological siblings. A second reason was the association of family with property. A third was the determination to free women from family and household so that they could work alongside men as equals. And, in some cases, a fourth was the belief that the 'bourgeois' family, unlike the community of comrades, created 'distorted' personalities.

Quite possibly these women, like the men, did have some difficulties in renouncing all private property and also privacy itself. But, in these matters, their renunciation could be buttressed by the increasingly successful practice of collectivism. Consequently, there is little likelihood that the old values would be secretly guarded and, in turn, transmitted to their children and, through them, to their grandchildren. But pre-revolutionary feelings about femininity, feminine roles and, for both sexes, parenting, would *not* be so easily eliminated for they would have gone much deeper and would have been much stronger than those concerning property. No doubt such feelings would have been highly ambivalent; but ambivalence also implies that there was some positive quality to them. After all, parenting and, in particular, the mother–child bond – and, therefore, the identification with the most fundamental of 'feminine' roles – all get to the child earlier, at a more impressionable age and, therefore, more forcefully, than does a concern with property. Consequently, the survival, in the women pioneers of the early kibbutzim, of some positive, 'feminine' sentiments, is likely to have been highly significant regardless of whether that survival was opposed by negative

feelings and also concealed by ideological affirmations. Furthermore, the disavowal of such positive feelings – if they were, indeed, so commonly and sincerely disavowed – would receive little buttressing from the reality of the situation; for women, especially, but not exclusively, when pregnant, did not, and were not usually expected, to perform 'male' tasks as though they 'really' were men. This reality would have affected the pioneering women themselves; but it would also have affected their children to whom they would also have, covertly, transmitted some of their sentiments. Consequently, the children would have grown up with certain sentiments and with a social reality to add strength to their appropriateness. In this way the generation of early pioneering women – and, perhaps, men – could well have transmitted a covert culture of sex and gender, which ran counter to ideology, to their male and female children who, on acting on it, would then transmit it even more effectively to their own male and female children.

This hypothesis is such an obvious rival to that of a 'biogrammar' of sexual dimorphism that it might seem surprising that it did not suggest itself to Tiger and Shepher. But it is not all that surprising in view of their similar failure to consider an even more obvious non-conspiratorial hypothesis of male domination. Clearly, when one is carried away by enthusiasm for an idea which challenges the received wisdom one does not always present alternative ideas in their strongest form. Certainly the hypothesis of covert transmission – which *assumes* that feelings about sex and gender do go much deeper, and are more powerful and are, therefore, more likely to be activated than are other rejected feelings – is not one which can easily be tested directly. But it is, in this respect, no weaker than the hypothesis of a gender 'biogrammar'; and it explains at least as much.

But, regardless of whether Tiger–Shepher do propose the best possible explanation for some tenacious and seemingly 'primordial' human feelings, thought and conduct, they do make us aware, through their presentation of the material and of the theoretical issues, of the weaknesses of the conventional wisdom. They may also be right in accusing some feminists of reinforcing male-chauvinist views of 'feminine' roles and of 'feminity' by implying that they are, in fact, inferior to 'male roles' and to 'masculinity'.

III

That Tiger should propose an ethological solution comes as no surprise. But Spiro's renunciation of the view that culture largely determines what we think of as human nature, and his conversion to the view that human nature is, to some extent, an independent set of factors influencing culture and society were, he tells us, forced upon

him by a consideration of the trends in kibbutz social life and, even more, by a reinterpretation of some of the psychological evidence gained in his kibbutz research in the early 1950s. It is very clear from the brief, masterful and condensed foreward, by Weston La Barre, from Spiro's own short preface and from the first page of the first chapter, that Spiro has moved away from the social scientific received wisdom and that he is about to launch on an elegantly concise and brilliantly, though tightly, argued explanation of why he has done so.

Spiro's earlier views on sex differences, role differentiation and gender equality in the kibbutz were as follows. Given differences of anatomy and physiology, men and women did not and could not all do identical work; nevertheless, there could still be equality between them in most respects. On the whole, there had been a successful and almost total revolution against traditional values and practices. Furthermore, the manner of child-rearing – in which children lived together as though the sexual differences of anatomy and physiology had no bearing on how they were to be treated – would produce a generation which would take gender equality for granted. Some differences in work capabilities and in availability for agricultural work, due to pregnancy and child-bearing, would be relatively minor influences on gender equality which could be kept in check by an unquestioned set of moral principles. Spiro had noted some psychological differences between young, native-born, males and females; but, though he had considered them important, had not thought to put undue emphasis on their consequences for gender equality.

Now, twenty-five years later, after revisiting Kiryat Yedidim (the kibbutz in which he carried out his earlier fieldwork), having reviewed the literature on the kibbutzim of the intervening years (including that of Tiger and Shepher, who were about to publish when Spiro was back 'in the field') and, having carried out a minor survey of several other kibbutzim, Spiro has not only revised his interpretation of the kibbutz material but has changed his mind on the general connection between sex and gender.

On his earlier assumptions, and given the 'facts' of kibbutz socialization as he then interpreted them, Spiro would have predicted that gender equality would have become even more firmly established than it had been. What he has now found has led him to undergo what he describes as a personal 'Copernican revolution'.

The first set of 'facts' which Spiro considers are those which are fully documented by Tiger and Shepher and which are adduced by him only in very general terms: those relating to occupational differences and to differentials in the exercise of power and authority. But Spiro's initial explanation is quite sociological. As the kibbutzim have been committed to economic growth and to rising living standards they have also been committed to increasing agricultural production and productivity. In view of this they have continued, as they did in

the past for ideological reasons, to value 'productive' labour higher than 'service' labour. As a result, since males are far more highly represented in agricultural labour than females, the labour of males has been more highly valued than that of females. However, not all males do work, predominantly or, even at all, in agriculture; while some women do, to a greater or lesser extent, work in agriculture. The higher prestige goes not to males as males but, rather, to males as productive workers.

To characterize the present situation Spiro distinguishes between equality in the 'identity' sense and in the 'equivalence' sense. In the first sense males and females are held to be equal in all respects despite the anatomical and physiological differences between them. In the second sense, fundamental differences between males and females are acknowledged; but the values attached to these differences and to their consequences are equal. He holds that equality as 'identity' was the idea of the early pioneers but that it was partly abandoned by acknowledging the full implications and consequences of anatomical and physiological differences; though it was not at all abandoned in regard to certain fundamental rights of members *qua* members. He also concedes that 'equivalence', in which females have an increasing interest, in view of their concentration in the service sector, has not been fully achieved because of the survival of the invidious categories of 'productive' and 'service' labour. He sees this as one source of female discontent. There is a second: the relative narrowness of occupational scope for women in the kibbutz by contrast with women in the cities. Presumably, Spiro takes it as unquestionable that males, despite the narrow range of occupations open to them, are more satisfied because 'productive' labour is its own moral reward.

If Spiro had left matters here it would look as though there were simply a conflict of goals — economic development, on the one hand and full gender equality on the other and that the latter has had to be partly sacrificed to the former. But he also argues that that very outcome is, itself, significant.

But of what? It might just signify that women were simply 'realistic' about complete equality in the 'identity' sense and were, for some time but, perhaps, no longer willing to accept less than full equality in the 'equivalence' sense. It does not necessarily signify that some aspect of sexual dimorphism, other than physical strength, has been at work.

Even the question of physical strength and labour is not so easily resolved. There are societies in which women perform tasks that are no less arduous than those performed by males in the kibbutz. Is the difference to be attributed to race? Or is it cultural expectation and training, from childhood, which affects the capacity for 'back-breaking' physical labour on the part of males *and* females? No one

questions that the human male is, on the whole, larger and potentially stronger than the human female. It does not follow that kibbutz women should withdraw or be withdrawn from 'productive labour.

Furthermore, one should ask why – and by *whom* – such a high value should still be placed on physically arduous manual labour? After all, many kibbutzim have come to depend, for their high living standards, not only on efficient agriculture but also on industrial enterprises whose 'productive' labour is unlikely to tax the physical strength of the majority of kibbutz females; most have adopted methods, in at least some areas of agriculture, which depend less on muscle than on technology and organization; many have adopted high return agricultural projects for which female labour is not altogether unsuited; some highly skilled agricultural tasks, such as operating and maintaining machinery, do not require great physical strength; and, finally, some kibbutzim – not the most left-wing – even hire labour, if only seasonally, for some of the more arduous, unskilled tasks, while those kibbutzim which are, in principle, still totally opposed to the 'exploitation' of labour of others, either rely on volunteers or adopt less labour-intensive enterprises.

Why then the continued emphasis on the supreme value of hard, manual labour? And who is it who continues to accord it that value? The standard answer would be as follows. In the beginning there was a complete 'cultural revolution' in the kibbutz; and one of its aims was to transform the self-image of the Diaspora Jew. Such a fundamental goal cannot easily be renounced. Moreover, if it were, then the invidious distinction between 'productive' and 'service' labour would be replaced by that between 'skilled' and 'unskilled'; and the latter would smack more of class division than would the former. In short, the former division protects the status of those who have remained committed to agricultural labour – even the most obviously manual – because their commitment is underpinned by a sacred ideological principle. Also, in short, the sacrifice of gender equality – that is, in the 'equivalence' sense – is considered a price to be paid for socialist egalitarianism. But considered by whom? Has this matter ever been fully unravelled and debated so that males and females be asked to commit themselves to this moral 'trade-off'?

And yet the reality is not quite what it is 'considered' to be. Kibbutz economic management is conducted by skilled accountant-economists who know that their material welfare is dependent on intelligent agronomy and industry (in much of which women could participate more than they appear to wish to do). The services which are paid for by all of these 'productive' activities also make the latter possible while also, themselves, contributing to the quality of life which is desired. It would not be beyond the bounds of ingenuity, then, to engineer a greater degree of 'equivalence' than there appears to be.

Or, is there something else at work? Are the 'productive'-'service' distinction and the equation of productive capacity with 'brawn' being maintained, as twin devices, in the interests of 'masculinity'?

Spiro's insistence that gender 'equivalence' is more realistic than gender 'identity' should, in the light of the kibbutz evidence, be queried. He should, in fact, consider several possibilities, rather than just two. First, while there can be an ideal of complete gender 'identity', its realization is unlikely not only if males will not tolerate it but, just as much, if females do and will continue to consider it undesirable and, even, 'unnatural'. Second, sex and gender differences can be and are, in the kibbutz, to a considerable extent, ignored, in that females have many of the same rights, duties and obligations as males. Third, all activities considered 'feminine', whether carried out by women or by men, could be considered no less worthy than 'masculine' activities, whether carried out by men or by women. Fourth, some activities considered 'feminine' will almost inevitably, be considered less worthy of esteem than male activities, for example, housework.

Although Spiro seems to emphasize these occupational and other such trends, which attest to the resurgence of 'femininity', it is not really on these 'facts' that his earlier anthropological assumptions 'founder' but, rather, on the results of psychological tests administered in the 1950s. The evidence, in the light of its recent reinterpretation, shows that, in Kiryat Yedidim, there were significant differences between pre-school boys and girls in patterns of play and in the adoption of role-model fantasy play; that these differences – because of the nature of the content of the responses, not merely because the subjects were pre-school children – could not conceivably relate, in any direct way, to the cultural norms applied in kibbutz upbringing nor to the social world which the children then observed; and that these differences do – though they were not earlier seen in this way – predict the present role-differentiation in those adults who were the one-time pre-school subjects of the tests.

In explaining this Spiro immediately rules out external factors. But he also rules out cultural factors which, in his view, fail to account for the differences. Furthermore, he excludes the covert cultural transmission hypothesis on the grounds that male children would have received the same 'ambivalent' messages from their parents – or mothers, in particular – but did not react to them in the same way as females did. But did they receive the same messages? And, in any case, what was their content? Even if they did receive the same 'ambivalent' messages might they not all have been 'instructed' that mothering *is* feminine *is* mothering? In which case, why should males not have reacted differently from females?

Spiro's explanation of the 'facts' emphasizes 'pre-cultural' factors. These last might not be simple, biological, sexually differentiated

species drives. They might be psychobiological and or psychosocial human universals. An example of the first would be needs relating to the differential experience of the human organism; an example of the second would be needs relating to the initial mothering role of the female. Spiro is not dogmatic about which 'pre-cultural' factors are all-important and considers it probable that they interact in ways which we are only beginning to understand. What he is insistent upon is the importance of those factors which may invariably interact with genetically inherited patterns but which are different from them.

Critics of Spiro would remind him that there is still much scope for the cultural transmission of gender identity within the circumstances which he calls 'pre-cultural'. He, in turn, would defy the critics to explain his (reinterpreted) data in such terms.

Spiro's 'data' may be sparse. What impresses are the arguments, especially in the final chapter, which are beautifully interwoven with that 'data'. They compel recognition.

What is more, Spiro is not making a totally defiant stand against the conventional wisdom. He does not attribute the degradation and oppression of women — which occur and have occurred in so many societies but hardly on the kibbutz — to 'pre-cultural' pan-human invariants. He concedes that some males exhibit a strong parenting need and some females a weak one. Nor does he think that sexual dimorphism characterizes only the differences *between* males and females. And he strongly urges greater measures in the direction of gender 'equivalence' in all human societies and thinks that the kibbutz could do better than it has done.

However, one may question the assumption, which Spiro shares with others, that the kibbutz case does approximate to a 'pure' experiment. The argument in defence of this view is that if, with all possible ideological goodwill, the kibbutz does not produce a trend towards but, rather, one against gender equality, then there must be something in human nature which resists any attempt to override sex and gender differences completely. On the other hand, the kibbutzim were, it should be remembered, founded by east European Jews who not only did not but, for the most part, could not, for centuries, practise agriculture (to say nothing of hunting!). Consequently, kibbutz males, in their attempt to 'normalize' themselves, could well have given greater emphasis to the value of agricultural labour, as a 'masculine' pursuit, than might other males who would attach no great moral worth to it regardless of whether it is performed by males or females.

IV

There is one (pre-cultural?) factor of which Spiro takes little account. It is the gender asymmetry of the mother–child relationship. Assume

that the following description is true for some if not all human societies. At the outset children, whether female or male, form a close tie with one or more 'mothers' which involves some identification between mother and female child. The female child is prompted by cues from within and from without, to continue this feminine identification despite some degree of identification with males also. If all occurs 'normally' – and there will be not only inner motives to identify with males but also some promptings, which may be unconsciously collusive, from outside to do so – there is no need for the female to renounce the early, strong identification but, rather, a different need to use it, to a greater or lesser extent, in forming her own mature identity. However, if all goes 'normally' for a male child there will, indeed, be powerful inner and outer promptings to weaken, off-set or even to repudiate the early identification with a 'mothering' female. Much that happens in the formation of male identity will depend on how that discontinuity occurs and is managed.

One likely consequence of the male repudiation of femininity is the male assertion of masculinity. That, in turn, may contribute much to a last-ditch stand, on the part of males, in defence of some degree of male domination.[16] Of course, in some circumstances, males will not be conscious of their 'chauvinism'; and in others they will almost certainly deny it vehemently because, on the plane of conscious morality and ideology, they may genuinely favour equality of rights or, even, interchangeability between the sexes in as many spheres of activity as is possible.

However, neither the origins nor the persistence of male domination in human societies is to be reduced, in explanation, to the factor of male denial of femininity. (Nor, for that matter, is it to be reduced to the male denial of their envy of women.[17]) What is being claimed is more reasonably modest. If we are, as Spiro suggests, to look at factors which are universally or, perhaps, just commonly situational in human societies, then we should look at one (or more) of the kind which we have considered.

We are arguing that the unconscious male repudiation of femininity may, as an obstruction to greater gender equality, show itself more clearly when other, more obvious obstructions are threatened with strong action. We are not arguing that this particular obstruction will become more apparent *only* when there is a successful movement in favour of female rights; it may become more noticeable (that is, to those who do take note of such things) when social circumstances of quite a different sort – for example, those of subjugation which undermine the 'manhood' of the male members of the subjugated population more than they do the 'womanhood' of females – create in males a feeling of being treated as though they were 'no better than females'.

Nor are we suggesting that this obstruction can be neither obviated

nor rendered less effective. Rather, we would argue that these feelings are activated, mobilized and strengthened more by some social circumstances than by others and that some males – perhaps, in *some* societies, the overwhelming majority – can, in favourable circumstances, contain them or express them in ways that are not necessarily inimical to the rights of females.

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Melford E. Spiro, *Gender and Culture: Kibbutz Women Revisited*, Duke University Press, 1979, 116pp. $9.75.

NOTES

1. The most distinguished, persuasive and scholarly defence of the social scientific conventional wisdom is to be found in Michelle Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (eds), *Woman, Culture and Society*, Stanford, 1974. See, especially, the Introduction, by both editors, and Rosaldo's 'A Theoretical Overview'.

2. See, Peggy R. Sanday, 'Female Status in the Public Domains' and Karen Sacks, 'Engels Revisited: Women, the Organization of Production and Private Property', in Rosaldo and Lamphere, op. cit.

3. This hypothesis has been expounded by Yael Atzmon in a paper being prepared for publication. Atzmon, like Sanday and Sacks, places great emphasis on the barriers between the private and public domains. But her account of what the barriers are and of how they are *manned* is original in having a wider embrace than that of Sacks.

4. See Lionel Tiger, *Men in Groups*, New York, 1969.

5. I am grateful to my wife, Ruth Cohen, for reminding me of the relevance of this counter-hypothesis. It does not necessarily assert an aboriginal dominant - female - mothering - matriarchy. It is meant to show that, using what we know of some human societies and buttressing it, selectively, with what we know of some primates that are now thought to be close to humans, and applying this to what we might suppose about the early human condition, we can make at least three cases: that male dominance is an aboriginal state which has left its genetic mark on humans; that female dominance is the aboriginal state; that aboriginal attempts by one sex to dominate the other in one sphere were off-set by success on the part of the other sex to dominate in other spheres and that male dominance is, therefore, a 'fact' of human history not a 'fact' of human biology.

6. See Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, *The Imperial Animal*, London, 1972.

7. Steven Goldberg, *The Inevitability of Patriarchy*, New York, 1973.

8. This comment is based, partly, on the personal experience of trying to persuade fellow sociologists, and to encourage undergraduate students, of both sexes, to treat such explanations on their merits and not, simply, as weapons of war.

9. On the question of greater male aggressiveness, see Eleanor E. Maccoby and Carol N. Jacklin, *The Psychology of Sex Differences*, Stanford, 1974. But, for a critical appraisal, see Eleanor E. Maccoby's review of Goldberg, ibid., in *Science*, 182, 1973.

10. When Goldberg was 'confronted', on British television, by three, very

hostile, feminist critics, 'being unscientific' was one of the allegations repeatedly made against him.

11. Lionel Tiger and Joseph Shepher, *Women in the Kibbutz*, New York and London, 1975.

12. Melford E. Spiro, *Gender and Culture: Kibbutz Women Revisited*, Durham, North Carolina, 1979.

13. Yonina Talmon, *Family and Community in the Kibbutz*, Harvard, 1972.

14. See, Melford E. Spiro, *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia*, Harvard, 1955; and *Children of the Kibbutz*, Harvard, 1958.

15. Tiger and Shepher, op. cit., p. 264.

16. That there is such an asymmetry has been commonly noted by psychoanalysts who, in this and other matters, follow Freud. But I had, for some years, thought this hypothesis, concerning male denial of femininity, to be original. This is the hypothesis that the pressure for a male 'switch' in identification produces such a repudiation of femininity. This was not to argue that male femininity is a product solely of early identification with one or more mothers, nor to deny that the male potential for 'femininity' might also be biological. It was to stress the effects of the identification 'switch' on all males – at least, on all males who do have an early identification with one or more females – and to postulate that the nature of that 'switch' might explain differences in the kind and degree of male repudiation of femininity. The question of what would happen to males raised solely by males, especially in their early years, was considered and shelved.

Before I had found the opportunity to use this hypothesis, which I considered relevant to the male defence of male dominance, I discovered that I had been partly anticipated by a very distinguished psychoanalytic theorist, Robert J. Stoller, who writes: ' "repudiation of femininity in men", rather than reflecting a biological force, is a quite nonbioligical defensive manouver against an earlier stage: closeness and *primitive identification with mother*.' See, Robert J. Stoller, 'The "Bedrock" of Masculinity and Femininity: Bisexuality', in Jean Baker Miller (ed), *Psychoanalysis and Women*, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 275. The article was first published in the *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 26, 1972. The anticipation by Stoller is partial only in that he does not then apply this hypothesis to the more general question of the male 'investment' in domination.

However, I am greatly indebted to the anthropologist, and my good friend, Phyllis Palgi, who recently reminded me that I had probably 'internalized' the hypothesis of male denial (though not its specific application) when first reading Margaret Mead over thirty years ago. Mead wrote: 'then the whole system becomes an endlessly reinforcing one, in which each generation of little boys grows up among women, identified with women, envying women, and then, to assert their endangered certainty of their manhood, isolate themselves from women.' See, Margaret Mead, *Male and Female*, London, 1949, p. 88. Mead, as was then her wont, refers here to particular types of society. Also, not surprisingly, she has much else to say about sex and gender identification which anticipates a great many other later insights which owe more to her than is always acknowledged.

However, our rather simple argument of male denial seems to be overlooked or, perhaps, by-passed by Chodorow who, basing herself on the psychoanalytic writings of Bribring and also of Slater, as well as on the anthropological writings of Whiting, seems to be urging a more complex argument about male identity in *some* sets of circumstances. Discussing the 'preoedipal' relationship between mother and son, she emphasizes the possibility that the mothering of a son may be sexually 'toned' and that the 'son's maleness and oppositeness as a sexual other become important, even while his being an infant remains

important as well'. See, Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender*, London, 1978, pp. 106–7.

17. See Bruno Bettelheim, *Symbolic Wounds*, Glencoe, 1954. Since Bettelheim's statement that males are envious of the female womb and its function, a number of suggestions have appeared in psychoanalytic literature that males do envy the female body for the good products which emerge from it. If these suggestions are prompted by the writings of Melanie Klein then the reference is also to the envy of female nurturance and, in particular, to the female breast. But in Klein's writing both male *and* female infants envy the mother her breast. See, Melanie Klein, *Envy and Gratitude*, London, 1957.

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METHUEN

The Inheritance of Inequality *L. Broom, F. L. Jones, P. McDonnell and T. Williams* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980 196 pp. £10.95

Origins and Destinations: Family, Class and Education in Modern Britain *A. H. Halsey, A. F. Heath and J. M. Ridge* Clarendon Press 1980 240 pp. £11.00 (£4.95 paper)

The book by Broom *et al.* is the first major report of a 'second-generation' study of social mobility in Australia. It is based upon a survey of Australian men and women between the ages of thirty and sixty-nine undertaken in 1973; the findings in this volume, however, refer only to the 3,166 males in the sample, and those for women are to be published in a subsequent book. It is to be hoped that the latter will include a few pages on the survey methodology. The reader who is unfamiliar with earlier publications of the researchers is left to comb the book to find out which and how many respondents were interviewed and has to infer the sampling method by extrapolating from the assumptions required for use of the various statistical methods employed in the study.

The authors commence their analysis with a derivation of variables based upon a modified application of the Blau/Duncan model orginally used to examine mobility in the USA. The independent variables, including father's occupation, the material circumstances of the family of origin, whether or not parents were immigrants, whether or not they were brought up in an urban or rural community, respondents' basic and further education, are then related to each other and to the dependent variables of first occupation, current occupation and income by a series of equations which are applied to yield appropriate zero-order and partial correlations and regression coefficients. The results of this analysis were that in general the basic relationships between the status of the family of origin and the status of respondents found in other studies were applicable to a muted extent in the Australian case, and these were mediated by different factors between generations. Among pre-Second World War generations, whether or not the family were immigrants or lived in a rural or urban area were important determinants of occupational status; among post-war generations, the significance of these variables was much reduced and that of education increased dramatically.

In subsequent chapters the links between various components of the mobility process are disaggregated. Thus, an analysis is made of the relationship between education and occupation, particularly first occupation. Perhaps the most interesting finding under this heading was of the critical importance of formal educational qualifications relative to other aspects of education in determining first occupation. Credentials, rather than length or nature of education, determined the point of entry to the occupational hierarchy. This picture of apparent meritocracy in the labour market was further emphasized when post-school training was considered; if this resulted in a qualification (except one related to a particular trade which merely meant the worker being fully accepted into his initial occupation) it exerted a significant impact upon the chances of job-life mobility. This effect was strongest among the younger generations of

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Australians. Education, both basic and post-school, was likewise found to exert a strong effect upon incomes.

The implication of these findings is that the most important determinant of stratification in Australia is access to educational institutions and performance within them. Clearly if this was in some sense 'meritocratic' it would yield an overall view that Australia had in some sense realized the 'American Dream'. The authors of the study suggest that access to education in the country was only determined by family background to a limited extent; the latter variable measured in terms of respondents' backgrounds could only explain one-quarter of the variance in access to or achievement in the educational system; there was no evidence at all of 'third-generation' effects, i.e. grandparents' background and status influencing those of both grandchildren and the middle generation.

The apparent meritocracy of stratification in Australia raises questions for theories which stress the extent to which inequalities are transmitted and reproduced between generations in capitalist societies; the comparable analysis of Halsey *et al.* for the British case reinforces such questioning, if not from the standpoint that educational chances in Britain are, or rather were, determined by meritocratic procedures. The authors are centrally concerned with whether or not twentieth-century educational reforms in England and Wales, particularly the 1944 Education Act, have significantly altered the relationship between class background, access to educational institutions, and educational performance. Their evaluation of this question is based upon a secondary analysis of a sub-sample of the 10,000 males living in England and Wales in 1972 who were interviewed in the course of the Oxford Social Mobility Project. The limitation to males stems from the requirements of the latter; the fact that the original study was done for other purposes also imposes constraints upon the information available from respondents. For example, the presence or absence of strong norms of educational achievement had to be represented by such variables as parents' own education and siblings' schooling; no IQ data were available and values for this variable were 'guesstimates'.

Much of the book is taken up with tracing the familiar contours of the relationship between class and educational changes, documenting and quantifying differences in relationships at each stage of the educational process and how far access at one point determines access at others. The finding which has received the widest publicity was that the correlation between class background and type of secondary school entered was virtually as strong among generations educated prior to the 1944 Act as among those schooled under the tripartite system. The authors evaluate two possible explanations of this correlation. First, it could represent meritocracy, in the sense that, although the post-1944 selection system was based upon measured intelligence, the distribution of this between children from different class backgrounds was such that the overall pattern of class chances remained similar to that found among generations educated under the older system. This argument is rejected on the grounds that, even controlling for the relationship between class and measured intelligence, there was still a class bias in access to the various points of the educational hierarchy. The strength of this refutation is much diminished by the fact that the IQ variable was arrived at by taking IQ scores from a small study done some thirty years ago, and adding or subtracting a few points to allow for differences in definitions in class between the two studies; an invitation to the reader who disagrees to calculate his own IQ scores and see what it does to the evidence hardly encourages confidence in the results, and contrasts strongly with the generally highly sophisticated methodology employed in the study. The authors appear to be on more substantial

ground when refuting Bourdieu and the 'cultural capital' theory as an explanation of their findings. The data shows a degree of mobility between educational generations, and a level of performance among the 'nouveau educated' well above what might be expected if the pattern was simply that of the reproduction of 'cultural capital'. However, these objections surely provide ammunition for those disposed to argue that the 'tripartite' system was meritocratic in some sense; how otherwise would substantial educational mobility occur or children from less-educated backgrounds perform as well as others within similar educational institutions? One answer might have been that such mobility was 'forced' by structural change in the economy and the labour market, but the authors, in rejecting Bourdieu, deny that forcing was a major factor.

The central impression left by this book is that, despite the plethora of tables and statistics (which are well-presented and innovative in the use of log distances to give an immediate appreciation of the relativities in contingency tables), the authors have been concerned to present a particular view of class and education most commonly associated with Fabians. Their conjuring with IQ values may ultimately do their cause a disservice; but if their evidence is coupled with that of the Australian study the two books clearly pose problems for those theorists positing substantive continuity on inequalities of life-chances between generations.

Stan Taylor
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An Introduction to Sociology *Robert Bocock, Peter Hamilton, Kenneth Thompson and Alan Waton* (eds) Harvester Press 1980 509 pp. £14.95 (£2.50 paper Fontana)

This Open University reader sets out to provide new students of sociology with an introduction to the discipline. 'Sociology repeats itself', says the editors' introduction, 'it moves on, then seems to slide sideways and finally backwards. What looks new is often a restatement of a position articulated in the past development of the subject . . . . Sociology is not best seen, therefore, as a science which moves on and progresses, forgetting its past in a way the natural sciences do.' This commitment to the 'humanistic tradition' is both the strength and the weakness of the text.

Section I on Individual, Culture and Society begins with Dennis Wrong's 'The oversocialized conception of man in modern sociology' and ends with Jock Young's penetrating critique of the new deviancy theory from *Critical Criminology*. In between are extracts from Freud, Marcuse, Sennett and Plummer. Wrong's 1975 Postscript sets the scene superbly well for what follows: an attempt to remedy the defects of the functionalist perspective: 'the neglect of biography, of the motivational depths and complexities of the human heart, and of the somatic, animal roots of our emotional lives.' Doubts are less about the importance of the pieces selected, but rather about their appropriateness and comprehensibility to new students of the subject. Sennett's thought-provoking 'Destructive Gemeinschaft' may well be a seminal paper for our times. And so may Marcuse's. But whether they will enable the new student to increase his understanding of the fundamental problems of social life must be questioned. And the danger is that students become over-dependent on their teachers for interpretation and understanding.

Section II, Class Structure and Society, provides a guide to the perspectives of Marx, Poulantzas, Dahrendorf, Aron and Ossowski. But having accepted that the 'central problematic' of sociology is social class, the section devotes only one piece by Poggi to an exploration of power and the state.

Section III, Change, History and Society, will be especially appreciated by many for its readings on what is

often the weakest section in sociology courses. Pieces from Gorz, Gans, Habermas, Lipset and Touraine will provide the more advanced student with some of the most challenging insights into problems of order and change, and explore the key problem of legitimacy as the basis of stability.

'Sociology can never be finalized. It will always appear as a threat to those who do not want or cannot cope with, open-ended . . . discussion of social problems.' The difficulty with the humanistic tradition is precisely this: there are no limits to the perspectives on the human condition from imaginative and creative intellects. The need for a science of society is precisely to try to put to some sort of rigorous empirical test competing images of man and society. It is for this reason that it is necessary to challenge imperialistic claims which would eliminate a scientific perspective from the sociological tradition. Whatever the inadequacies of crude positivism, and however crucial the sociological imagination, any text which fails to introduce students to the complexities of political arithmetic not only sells them short but reduces sociology to a philosophy of society in which theories are judged solely by 'logical consistency, coherence, and the sense that the different theories make of changing human societies'. Somehow the bridge must be made between theory and the 'real' world. With these reservations, the book deserves a central place in mainstream courses.

Stephen Cotgrove
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Multi-Dimensional Sociology *Adam Podgórecki and Maria Los* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 344 pp. £10.50

Please think for a moment about an examination question which reads 'Discuss the dimensions of sociology'. Would you answer in terms of space and time or structure and culture or the paraphernalia of political economy? Would the answer's shape be determined by quibbling over the meaning of 'dimension'? Or, and now be honest, would you skip the question'? To make a multi-dimensional sociology four layers need to be laid down like plates on top of each other. First, a serious critical reading across the board from Parsons to Gramsci via Husserl and Horkheimer. Second, the struggles and tensions in a specific society have to be faced. Third, if these two 'plates' are moved about on top of each other new intermediate concepts are produced – multi-dimensional sociology is not a memory test but rather a creative project. Fourth, there is the question of ontological purpose – why do sociology at all? The book is not organized in this way; neither its methods nor assumptions are made especially clear. The reader must wait to discover the position that 'the concept of mankind is what sociology, in the final analysis, is all about' (p. 166).

Much of the text is drawn from Polish society and sociologists. It is fascinating to realize that the seeds of 'Solidarity' were so securely planted. It is also vital that Polish sociologists are a special breed of committed and gifted intellectuals; their 'unique European experience' combining with 'academically elaborated western rhetoric' (p. 333). So much develops from the view that 'the basic contradiction within the *economy* consists in the fact that workers' effects contribute to the greater and better equipped *political* oppression and control' (p. 131). But the authors do not then let fly with a burst of liberal or libertarian sentiments. This is a work of serious eclecticism marred only by putting too much in and so leaving the reader with the impression that anything goes.

Part One is a dissection of schools of thought. All have their weaknesses whereas their strengths are to put checks on each other's 'perspectives', 'realities' and 'levels'. Page after page skips from thinkers and their positions to the barbs which critics

have successfully landed in their sides. Students looking for a catalogue of 'pros and cons' need look no further.

Part Two is more interesting, as the title 'Social Structure and Consciousness' might suggest. There is 'incipient relative naturalism', 'meta-attitude', 'tertiary social control', 'class ethos' and 'national ethos'. All are defined and discussed in such a way that eclecticism is shown to be a productive enterprise rather than a magpie-like collection of bright but insubstantial bits of thought. With renewed effort the authors could now scaffold these concepts together – meta-attitudes do seem to grow into a syndrome or ethos, for example.

Part Three is called 'Sociology and Practice' and made me unsure about the authors' ultimate destination – where does eclecticism go to after all? Podgórecki declares himself for humanity and its highest standards. Los is enthusiastic for models of applied research which 'include four basic types and three less visible but patently breaking through orientations' (p. 295). The Epilogue should be read first, the authors' point of arrival illuminates the 'hidden agenda' more than any other piece in the text.

The target population, the intended audience, is high on this agenda. There are those traditionally minded sociologists who have avoided realities and pretended that they could ignore the dehumanization around them. When human attributes are denied validity there is always a fight for self – and collective – determination and this is where the authors believe sociology should begin. I could not agree more.

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History of Sociological Thought *Jerzy Szacki* Aldwych Press 1980 624 pp. £22.50

A history of sociological thought from Plato to the present day is an awesome project for a reader, let alone an author. But there is continuity and vitality enough in his book to suggest that Szacki's prefatory remark concerning the fascination of the subject is by no means disingenuous.

Szacki states his ambition to be the 'modest' one of providing a popular handbook directed to a non-academic as well as to an academic audience. History of sociology is to be understood as the history of ideas and doctrines that have come to be embodied in sociological theory and Szacki clearly believes that some continuity and coherence exists or can be interpretively given to a selected body of reasoning.

In defending the position that this is a worthwhile undertaking he adduces three arguments, but the different points of this apologia are not equally convincing. On the first; to maintain that the ideas about a social process are necessary to the understanding of that process is to exploit multiple equivocations between what *is* known, and what *could* be or perhaps *ought to* be known, as well as that of the relationship between the observer and the observed. And it completely begs the question of different interpretations and problems of ordering and the relationships of the ideas. He is on stronger ground in his second and third contentions. These are: (i) the continuing vitality and rediscovery of what appear to be 'old' ideas and the consequent utility of knowing that one's latest brainwave is not completely without intellectual antecedents and (ii) the liberating effect of recognizing the existence of alternative frames of reference. Clearly, history of sociology is not unique in providing the latter but its utility need not be denied.

Whatever the justification for the enterprise, what of the achievement itself? First, the basic requirement of a popular text has been admirably met in terms of clear exposition which is not overburdened with detail. Szacki's very slightly 'foreign' English expression adds to the attractive literary

quality of the text. Almost inevitably, however, the enormous condensation required posed problems which were not uniformly overcome and there are sections which will be virtually incomprehensible to the uninitiated in spite of the prose being perfectly translucent.

In spite of first appearances the book is indeed about the history of sociology and spends little space on remote precursors. Chapter 1 — 'From the City State to Modern Civil Society' — is a rapid, interesting tour from Plato to Vico which is a good read on its own while being adequately integrated into the comprehensive history. This indeed is an additional virtue of the book, many of the divisions of the material lending themselves to single or multiple chapter readings that have a completeness of their own. But 'precursors' can be regarded as dealt with by page 173 of this large book, a not disproportionate amount of the text.

Szacki is not explicit about the theoretical position underlying his structuring of the material, which is interesting and possibly contentious. Broadly, the position appears to be that comprehensive 'progress' is achieved in theory through integration of whatever is commensurable in the two great positivistic and humanistic streams of reasoning, coupled at the lower level with advancement within these traditions. Consequently, the heart of the book is in the accounts of positivism and interpretive sociology. Notably little sympathy is exhibited for critical sociology in any of its forms. C. W. Mill's virtues are thus associated with his contribution to conflict theory rather than with any development of the former. Szacki is interesting too in his treatment of the Marxist tradition, making a strong distinction between Marx and the Marxists and stressing Marxism as a political doctrine and programme which has often been in contest with Sociology. Effectively, Szacki ends the story with Parsons and Merton. Beyond this, exchange theory is treated with the 'new humanistic' micro-sociology, which includes ethnomethodology, as a response to functionalism. The first of these is quite scathingly dismissed, the second rather more tentatively so. Hermeneutics is not treated at all, principally, it seems, on the ground that its interest is methodological rather than substantively theoretical.

It is to be hoped that this book will attract a wide readership. Both students and practitioners can gain from the comprehensive overview of sociological history as well as from the more detailed, and hopefully provocative descriptions of the differing perspectives and the judgments of continuities and significance. It also deserves some critical consideration and appraisal from his specialist peers, for the book risks being regarded as possibly less profound than it may in fact be because of its pretensions to popularity. Its price is likely of course, to limit it to library shelves, but given the cost the publishers have little excuse for allowing a substantial number of quite trifling but irritating misprints to mar the text.

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Social Darwinianism and English Thought: The Interaction Between Biological and Social Theory *G. Jones* Harvester Press 1980 234 pp. £22.50
Darwinism and Human Affairs *R. D. Alexander* Pitman 1980 317 pp. £9.50

These two books, while very different, deal with two sides of the same coin, namely, past and present efforts to apply Darwinism to human societies and behaviour. Each thus raises an interesting question: first, how is one to treat the history of such ideas and second, given their somewhat murky past, what useful purpose is served by continued efforts to promote such applications.

With reference to the first of these questions it should be said that Social Darwinism has proved extremely difficult to define and analyse. Anyone

courageous enough to write about it at all deserves congratulation. The main strength of Miss Jones's book is its gathering together of a large amount of information about the whole area of discussion. As such the book is a good starting point for the complete novice and general reader while also containing much of interest to the specialist. In addition the text is prefaced by some useful remarks on the difficulties of doing history of ideas and particularly of the desirability of avoiding the more crass kinds of teleology that sometimes pass for knowledge in that field.

Miss Jones approaches her theme in a fairly orthodox manner. In practice her study rests on the convenient notion of influence (in its variant forms) and the usual kinds of sociologistic reductionism (Parsons was a functionalist because of the Cold War, for example). Given the difficulties of talking about Social Darwinism already stated this method produces a virtually uncontrollable pot-pourri of similarities, analogies and parallels, some of which may be useful, some of which are completely without content (the comments on Popper and Polanyi, for example). The difficulties here seem to me to lie with the approach to natural selection. In this text the concept itself is exempt from criticism or even examination (the general tone of the book implies that Miss Jones thinks it is 'scientific') and therefore it is never quite clear what it is that Social Darwinism derives from Darwinism — indeed Chapter 1 appears to say that virtually nothing at all was so derived. The effect of this is that while it is strongly implied throughout that Darwinism spawned all sorts of ideological products it is never clear whether this was something to do with Darwinism or with illegitimate applications of it.

The question of natural selection forms a bridge to consideration of Professor Alexander's book. His faith in natural selection is even more robust and he stands firmly in the new tradition of 'sociobiology' to which he has contributed a sizeable clutch of papers of which the present work is largely a consolidation and restatement. The book is in three parts: first, a defence of Darwin, a restatement of Darwinism in the form of new concepts which reinforce its strengths and remove its weaknesses; second, a clearing away of past confusions, errors and difficulties in the application of biological concepts to societies and cultures; and finally the analysis of human kinship and the institutions of law and justice. It is plainly impossible to comment adequately on these three rather different projects though it might be said that the book is trying to do too much. One can only therefore point to some areas of special interest or importance.

The status and functioning of the concept of natural selection is clearly a matter for biologists but it is surely possible to doubt whether Alexander *et al.* have solved its difficulties in the decisive manner he claims. In my view Alexander's contribution here is not helped by his philosophical views which might be described as no-nonsense early Popperianism. Thus his comments are often open to serious objection (the equation of non-falsifiable with useless, for example). The same applies to his comments on the circularity problem, i.e. the problem that arises if adaptiveness is defined in terms of reproductive success. Alexander does not seem to be aware of the difficulties to which Manser and others have drawn attention.

Obviously Alexander shares the view that the various concepts associated with the sociobiology school provide the wherewithal to restate Darwinism in a much more powerful fashion and to deal with irritating problems like altruistic behaviour. The two central concepts are inclusive fitness and kin selection and these in turn have generated a number of other eye-catching images — nepotism, reciprocity, and most notoriously Dawkins's selfish gene. The discussion of these concepts has become sufficiently complex and technical to limit

authoritative comment to the participants — they appear, for example, to have had considerable success in explaining insect behaviour. But clearly non-biological comment is allowable on an author who claims to explain or at least lay the foundation for explaining incest taboos, conscience, law, justice, ethics and science, to name but a few. For what its worth, this reviewer was struck by a parallel with much of Darwin's *Descent of Man*. As the analysis comes closer to human institutions and practices, the arguments become more vague, more loosely formulated and increasingly resort to various discredited sociological views decked out in biological language. One example must suffice. According to Alexander nation-states are to be seen as rooted in the function of predator protection and this is then related to an entirely unilinear set of stages of increasing complexity of political organization. But this, of course, leaves out such irritating side issues as why some nation-states break up, why some die and are recreated, how the nation-state form may be forced on others via colonialism and so on.

Alexander's book leads this reviewer to conclude that while ritual denunciations of sociobiology are quite pointless, the ideas put forward by him are too close to those discussed by Miss Jones for social scientists to worry about their imminent replacement by insurgent biologists.

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Georg Lukács: From Romanticism to Bolshevism *Michael Löwy* New Left Books 1979 219 pp. £10.95

The work of Lukács is as controversial now as it was during his lifetime: he is praised as a 'Romantic Existentialist'; condemned as a 'Stalinist'; and scornfully dismissed as another 'Bourgeois Humanist'. Löwy's study promises something different; his aim is to examine the intellectual and political development of Lukács from within the framework of a 'Sociology of the Anti-Capitalist Intelligentsia'. He describes his work as 'not only a Marxist study of a Marxist thinker; but a Lukácsian analysis of Lukács' (p. 10). It is neither; for Löwy employs a method, derived from Goldmann, which is only formally Marxist or Lukácsian. Although the book offers valuable information, its method eventually obstructs a deeper critical insight into its subject.

The methodical starting point of Löwy's study is the 'category of totality', ascending from the 'ideology' of a writer to a 'world view' which is itself part of a wider historical-political conjuncture. He identifies early twentieth-century romantic anti-capitalism as an example of the 'tragic world view' and suggests this world view is politically ambiguous because it is the ideology of a 'social category' of intellectuals. This 'social category' has a commitment to qualitative values which are eternally denied in the quantitative money society of capitalism. While this may make them anti-capitalist, their precise political complexion will be most heavily influenced by the 'mediation in totality' of the intensity of class struggle.

Löwy inserts Lukács into this world view considering the complications arising from the influence of his Hungarian background. Yet despite the compelling detail his analysis remains unsatisfactory and its weaknesses may be traced back to his method. Despite all 'dialectical' protestations to the contrary, the 'world view' remains a descriptive framework and thus differs radically from the 'method' of Lukács. In the section 'The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought' in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) Lukács demonstrates that the antinomies in thought are not descriptions but rather the expression of the antinomies in reality. The descriptive or 'contemplative attitude' of the world view is fundamentally different from Lukás's form of presentation which is simultaneously

critique, for it remains confined to an impressionistic concatenation of given social facts. The world view presents an *ersatz* totality which affirms a mostly formal mediation between thought and social reality.

This results in a distortion of perspective: the method brings less important detail to the fore while allowing important implications to slip away into the background. This is exemplified by Löwy's almost exclusive concentration upon the role of ethics in Lukács's passage from the tragic world view. The move to a dialectical world view is seen in the *Aufhebung* of the rigorous separation of 'is' and 'ought', 'means' and 'ends' in the 'immanent end' of the proletariat as Utopia within itself. Löwy regards this as a 'transcendent synthesis' (*sic*) (p. 205) which after 1924 was succeeded by a 'reconciliation with reality'.

The decline in the quality of Löwy's analysis after his discussion of Lukács's path to Bolshevism arises from his failure to confront the problem of epistemology. Lukács subsequently regarded his development as both epistemological and ethical, describing his early *Theory of the Novel* (1914) as being informed by a 'conception of the world which aimed at a fusion of "left" ethics and "right" epistemology'. Löwy describes the mutation of the ethics while almost ignoring that of the epistemology; yet they cannot be separated. The contemplative attitude of the right epistemology and the abstract thought of the left ethic are complementary, as is evident from their sublation in *History and Class Consciousness* into the proletariat as subject/object of history: in its practical activity the proletariat transcends epistemology and ethics.

This perspective permits a more sensitive appreciation of Lukács's position after 1924, when the 'actuality of the revolution' had faded. The problem for Lukács was to avoid any relapse into a right epistemology or left ethic; positions which seemed inevitable given the political situation. Löwy's uncertain analysis of 'Lukács and Stalinism' is at its most perceptive when it recognizes that Lukács had his own line regarding Stalinism and the Popular Front; but it is apparent that Löwy can neither appreciate the source of Lukács's 'line' nor the integrity of his dilemma. Lukács 'retirement' from political activity was not marked by despair and utopianism but by patience; waiting for the next moment of objective possibility. Victor Serge records Lukács as saying: 'Marxist revolutionaries need patience and courage; they do not need pride. The times are bad, and we are at a dark crossroads. Let us reserve our strength: history will summon us in its time.'

Löwy's book establishes the foundation for an understanding of Lukács intellectual and political career; but its method precludes the necessary reassessment of his place within the development of Marxism.

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Equality, Justice and Rectification: An Exploration in Normative Sociology
Derek L. Phillips Academic Press 1979
325 pp. £13.20

Derek Phillips's *Equality, Justice and Rectification* situates itself in a tradition of political theorizing stemming from Locke, Hobbes and Hume and most recently revived in what is rapidly becoming a new genre of syncretic 'moral philosophy', associated with John Rawls's contractual theory of justice, Robert Nozick's entitlement theory of property rights, the legal philosophy of Ronald Dworkin and the related writings of Hannah Pitkin (*Wittgenstein and Justice*, 1972), C. B. Macpherson (*Democratic Theory*, 1973), Joel Feinberg (*Doing and Deserving*, 1970), Sisela Bok (*Lying*, 1978) and others.

At the heart of this literature is the search for a 'normative' or 'moral' theory of social justice, a theory providing grounded principles and

standards for evaluating existing relations, laws and institutions 'from a moral standpoint that is independent of those laws and institutions'. Phillips connects the quest for such rational moral standards regarding economic inequality and injustice with the theoretical quest of grounding political thought and practice in a moral framework. Only such a framework can unify inquiries into what 'is' and prescriptive inquiries into what 'ought to be'. This characterizes the central aim of the book: 'to combine and integrate political, moral and legal philosophy with the results of social scientific inquiry.'

The text is divided into three parts. Part 1 – Equality – is largely descriptive, summarizing the empirical work of Coleman, Jencks, Boudon and others on economic inequality. Part 2 – Justice and Property Rights – explicates the liberal tradition of political, moral and legal philosophy culminating in Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* and Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia.* Phillips treats Rawls's contractual theory and Nozick's entitlement view of property as the leading candidates for the position of a generic theory of social justice – and much of the book is a combinatorial reading of their arguments and concepts. The outcome, what Phillips calls 'Rights Theory' represents a digest of their views of property rights; this forms the promised 'moral basis' for a contemporary normative discussion of justice and equality. Part 3 – The Rectification of Inequality – applies the 'theory' to the idea of societal reparations for past injustices.

In essence 'Rights Theory' is a revised form of eighteenth-century social contract metaphysics; Phillips postulates a state of nature that is already social, with 'individuals' already possessing natural rights to freedom and equal respect, from which 'emergent rights' (e.g. property) are created. An entitlements theory provides answers to three types of question: How holdings (Nozick's term) were originally acquired? How they have been transferred to others? and What rectifications to unjust acquisition ought to be made? The product of a rather exhausting tour through neoliberal analysis is a sterile picture of the creation of property through a 'voluntary', 'unanimous agreement of persons holding unequal resources and exercising their natural rights to freedom and equal respect in a state of nature'. In short, we find ourselves in an abstract, hypothetical and atomistic society in which property rights are freely created; Phillips's overriding 'moral' concern occludes many fruitful sources of sociological analysis (the Marxist tradition is skimmed, the work of Macpherson is briefly mentioned, Barrington Moore Jr's *Social Injustice* is absent, as is much theorizing in the areas of underdevelopment, imperialism, structured educational inequalities, historically specific analyses of racism, sexism, and other forms of exploitation).

Two related omissions seriously flaw this work: first, given the centrality of 'property', Phillips devotes surprisingly little space to any detailed analysis of its variegated meanings – let alone study of property relations in concrete historical formations; the work lacks both a conceptual and concrete history of property. As a consequence of this the notion of 'Rights theory' presupposes common-sense preconceptions of 'property' without beginning to reflexively explore its own assumptions; second, in criticizing Nozick's entitlement theory (which holds that the justice of present 'holdings' can be decided by uncovering the justice or injustice of original acquisitions) for failing to explain how such 'holdings' arise, Phillips preempts a concrete social archaeology of property relations by maintaining his 'moral' perspective. Instead of sociology 'we require a theory of property that allows us to construct a morally based explanation of how property rights arise or are created'. The elementary notion that 'property

rights' are rooted in violent historical acts of appropriation by one group or class against another is literally illegitimate 'since ignoring any moral considerations would mean completely abandoning my goal of setting forth a morally based theory of acquisition' (p. 218). This strange requirement stipulated by 'normative sociology' pushes analysis back to the founding fathers of the liberal form of life.

If Phillips's theoretical framework is one-sided, partial, and abstract its practical implications to the admittedly complex topic of Rectification is utopian; applying the ideal of freely negotiated property contracts to three case studies (German reparations for the Third Reich, American Blacks and Indians) we are faced with 'moral arguments' for the 'correction of earlier violations of people's rights' by what effectively amounts to a state-sponsored and state-administered programme of material reparations; even Nozick's anarchist suspicions that the state may be ultimately co-responsible for these injustices seems beyond this type of liberalism; we are left with a 'normative' view of the welfare state which, like the proverbial physician, is to heal itself.

Part 3 of this book is undoubtedly enlivened by a sense of concrete societal injustice and a lucid awareness of the many tortuous and vital problems linked with public policies of preferential discrimination, reparations, and the like, yet the concrete analysis of these 'historical injustices' seems to lie beyond normative sociology. Phillips' conception of a sociology centered on the topic of the just society and a rational theory of social justice is a step in the right direction, yet we must first realize that creating such a society is not synonymous with 'correcting' inequalities, healing ancient wounds or mending broken promises.

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People Studying People: the Human Element in Fieldwork *Robert A. Georges and Michael O. Jones* University of California Press 1980 178 pp. £2.00 (paper)

The authors of this book set out to demonstrate that 'the human element' is and ought to be an essential part of fieldwork, and argue that more attention should be paid to it. They proceed by analysing a variety of written accounts of fieldwork experiences, mainly by anthropologists but also from sociology and folklore. Using this material, they document the issues that can arise. Fieldworkers are observed as well as observers, and their relations with their subjects have consequences for both, as well as for the outcome of the research; excellent fieldworkers have chosen their topics for personal reasons, and plans have often been modified by accidents or unanticipated events; confrontations with subjects and with self are continuous, and rapport always under negotiation; clarifications are needed by all parties, and compromises forced; strange experiences evoke reflection and introspection on matters normally taken for granted; the 'results' include personal consequences for both researcher and subjects.

Most of these points are well taken, yet at the end one is left wondering what the book is for. The data have been used in an anecdotal way, since one is not told how the accounts used were selected, nor is the question of which fieldworkers are likely to have provided suitable material faced. The strategy of secondary analysis is a promising one, but full advantage is not taken of its possibilities; there is no systematic discussion of the variables which may produce one outcome rather than another, and the conclusions are more like lists than typologies or hypotheses. Ethical issues are hinted at, yet not explicitly aired. Perhaps this shortfall of analysis goes, ideologically, with the repeated emphasis on the 'human' as opposed

to the academic. 'The information obtained, rather than the experience lived, remains the focus of most field-based studies' – and this way of stating it implicitly deplores the fact; but, valuable as it is to stress that the information *depends* on the experience, the obtaining of 'information' is, surely, the object. Textbooks are criticized for paying inadequate attention to human contingencies in their instruction, but this book states the problems without making any suggestions as to how they might be solved. Its function, thus, is to sensitize rather than to prescribe or to analyse. Taken in that light, it is a fairly useful contribution to an increasing literature (of whose existence it shows little awareness); it is not in itself a significant step towards improved methods.

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The Prism of Sex: Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge *Julia A. Sherman and Evelyn Torton Beck* (eds) American University Press 1980 286 pp. £11.10

To the various authors of this collection of essays, the 'prism of sex' refers to the gender specificity of perceptions and knowledge of the world. The dominant perception, by virtue of its maleness and, as a corollary, its omission of women's experience, is one-sided and limited. It 'has all too often become a prism that has locked male scholars into a one-sided mode of thinking, and has locked women out of the pursuit of knowledge altogether.' In an attempt to examine how the 'prism of sex' has affected several fields of knowledge, the essays focus on academic disciplines within the humanities and social sciences. The structuring theme of each essay is the male bias of that which passes for 'real' knowledge within the discipline in question.

The 'discovery' of such a bias is certainly no new discovery for feminists working within these various disciplines. Feminists need no reminding that 'the pursuit of knowledge remains largely a male domain.' However, where authors move beyond the general claim of the myopia of the male prism to the offering of concrete examples, we are occasionally given fascinating and important insights into the degree of its limitations and distortions. Jane T. Shulenberg in 'Clio's European Daughters', shows how consideration of women's experience crucially challenges the traditional historical periodization. Thus, for example, the early Middle Ages, known as the 'Dark Ages', were, for women, far from 'dark'. Compared with later centuries, it was a period in which women had far greater freedom, status and prominence.

Many of the essays illustrate the dismissal by the androcentric 'objective' viewpoint of the gynocentric as 'subjective', emotional, intuitive and, above all, unscholarly. Virginia Shapiro in 'Women's Studies a Political Conflict' argues that to accuse political scientists of sexism must be shown to involve accusations of poor scholarship, a violation of their own canons of adequacy. In '(Why) are there no Great Women Critics?', Susan S. Lanser and Evelyn T. Beck point out that the term 'woman critic' sounds a virtual misnomer. While women are grudgingly tolerated as artists/writers (given that artists have always been allowed certain 'feminine' qualities, such as sensitivity and expressiveness), woman as thinker or theoretician is seen as a contradiction in terms. Thus, for example, we find that although Edmund Wilson and Mary McCarthy were both novelists and critics, she is remembered only as a novelist, he primarily as a critic. This essay, one of the best in the book, begins to indicate in what ways a 'gynocentric way of knowing' could challenge the dominant definitions of literature. We need to question the devaluation of much women's writing as 'fragmented', and recognize how this may well correlate

with the fragmentation of time in women's everyday experience. We need to rethink the orthodox hierarchy accorded to the star qualities of 'irony' and 'complexity' *vis-à-vis* derided 'sentiment' and 'simplicity', usually associated with women's texts. In a similar vein, Dorothy E. Smith's long-winded essay on sociology stresses the need for women sociologists to begin from their own concrete experience, making themselves 'as women, the subject of the sociological act of knowing'. Yet rather than simply remaining at the experiential level, she sees the work of the sociologist as the location of that experience within the wider social relations and structures.

Jessie Bernard, in her 'Afterword' to the essays, asks the pertinent question: does the contribution of women merely substitute one bias for another? Her answer is in the negative. She sees the filling of lacunae as attempting 'to render the pursuit of knowledge equitable, fair'. Herein lies a central problem with many of these papers. While certain authors recognize the need for feminism to *transform* existing categories of knowledge, others, such as Jessie Bernard, see the filling in of lacunae as in itself sufficient, as complementing the male prism rather than shattering it. The recognition of the complex forms of women's subordination includes recognition of the role of the dominant modes of knowledge in that subordination – modes of knowledge which do not simply omit women, but in their very concepts and language actively oppress. Feminist academics should be moving on from the examination of bias in knowledge to the construction of an alternative conceptual apparatus. This book is merely the preface to such an enterprise.

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The Dignity of Labour? A Study of Childbearing and Induction *Ann Cartwright* Tavistock 1979 184 pp. £7.95
Becoming a Mother *Ann Oakley* Martin Robertson 1979 328 pp. £5.95
Women Confined: Towards a Sociology of Childbirth *Ann Oakley* Martin Robertson 1980 334 pp. £12.00 (£4.95 paper)

With an increased medicalization of birth, the removal of most births from the home, and ever more ingenious toys for the boys in the form of high-technology intervention in the childbirth process, the curious sociologist may well wonder whether mothers still have a part to play.

In two very different studies, Cartwright and Oakley look at the process of childbirth, the former concentrating particularly on induction, and the latter on women's experiences of the transition to motherhood. In the past year or so there has been a certain amount of cynical publicity on the use of induction following statistical breakdowns showing a tendency to office-hour births Monday to Saturday with a particularly low chance of being born on Christmas Day. However, there has been no systematic and representative study of women's views on induction, and Ann Cartwright's book fills this gap, looking at 'who is induced and when, why, and how these inductions are carried out'.

This careful and highly necessary study which seems to indicate that induction is becoming rather less fashionable is supported both by clear statistical evidence and verbatim quotations from mothers and midwives. It is perhaps significant that of the three groups approached in this study, mothers, midwives and obstetricians, it was the mothers who were the most co-operative with a response rate of 91 per cent, followed by 81 per cent for midwives and 58 per cent obstetricians. One may well pause to reflect whether these proportions are directly related to the true interest a particular group has with childbirth and induction.

Within the context of such a careful

study, it was a disappointment to see no discussion given to the vexed question of the social class classification of women. Cartwright uses the Registrar General and the husband's occupation, and since she gives no rationale for looking only at legitimate births (when almost one in ten births in England is not legitimate) one can only assume that these mothers were excluded not on moral grounds, or on the grounds that they were more or less likely to be induced, but on the grounds that they have no convenient husband to 'give' them a social class classification. In spite of this rather social shortcoming, the study gives some indication that things are not as bleak as they might be. Cartwright's study found little evidence that inductions are often done mainly for the convenience of the hospital or staff, and the study also indicated that 'only' between a quarter and a third of labours are induced, rather than the two-fifths indicated by the Hospitals In-Patient Enquiry.

Ann Oakley's *Becoming a Mother* is a portrait, expressed largely in her respondents' own words, of how it feels to have a first baby in the late 1970s in a large industrial city. Many of the women interviewed, says Oakley, said that 'they were misled into thinking childbirth is a piece of cake and motherhood a bed of roses'. The book is constructed around the conclusion (reached themselves) that they would have been better off with a clearer view of what lay in store for them.

Oakley's sample, admittedly not as representative nationally as Cartwright's, since they were drawn from bookings at one hospital, showed 41 per cent of women with induction or acceleration of their labour, and a rather alarming (although not altogether surprising) 60 per cent of women who said that they did not feel in control of themselves or what was going on, thus throwing a whole new gloss on the concept of alienated labour. Oakley's novel presentation of her data makes for compulsive reading for the voyeuristic sociologist although those without such tendencies may prefer *Women Confined.* The endnote, a short chapter on 'Being Researched', should provide a useful addition to methodology reading lists. It begins with a cautionary quotation from one of her respondents: 'Well quite honestly, I said I hope this research is worth it. I said to my mum, I've got this lady coming to see me this morning . . . . I said I hope it's not a load of old rubbish. Because there's been so much research on such rubbishy things I feel money's been wasted.' But the book ends on a promising note. One can be sure that the Social Science Research Council has got its sociological money's worth from funding the research, and the quotations in the final chapter testify the human value of the work. 'If I'd known you were coming', says the final respondent, 'I would have made a cake; I was looking forward to your coming dear . . . . Oh it has helped to talk, it has, it does help you.'

In *Women Confined,* Oakley argues cogently for a sociology of childbirth. Sociology, whatever some intending students may feel, is not on the whole a discipline which approaches too closely – let alone attempts to 'solve' the problems of everyday life. Particularly in recent years, the central concerns of sociology have been solidly located in theoretical debates and away from the factory floor, the shipyard or the tea room. But even in those cases where the sociologist has been out of the library and onto the street, it has normally been only a temporary measure for the generation of data. Childbirth stands in a rather different relation to at least some practitioners of sociology, but in so far as it has been raised as a question, it has tended to be a question asked of female applicants for posts rather than a question of disciplinary and scholarly interest.

Although not claiming to write a book about women 'in general', the author looks in *Women Confined* at the way in which womens' treatment

as mothers – a role at once elevated and degraded by society – is linked to their oppression as women. What makes the book unusual as a sociology text are her final proposals for the future stemming from her research. In arguing for the real present needs of the objects of sociological research, Oakley demonstrates an unfashionable and direct concern with the here and now. But in spite of Oakley's spirited attempts, it is difficult to put the glass slipper of childbirth onto sociology's ugly foot. As she writes in her introduction, 'The trouble with sociology . . . is that it is not merely sexist on the surface but deeply and pervasively so.' Oakley is all too well aware of the theoretical and methodological implications of this fact, which render a sociology of childbirth highly problematic. The experiences of everyday life cannot always fit easily into sociological (or for that matter medical) categories. Women's experiences, since women are sociologically deviant in any case, are even more problematic. Thus, in attempting to make her study comparable with other work, Oakley on occasions uses paradigms and concepts with which she is uneasy, while attempting to develop a corrective to the traditional approach.

Both in terms of volume and intellectual content, Oakley has arguably made the greatest contribution to a sociology of sexual divisions as well as to feminist interpretations of sociological work. *Women Confined* is a significant step *towards* a sociology of childbirth. The fact that this is a difficult area, sociologically speaking, is itself revealing of a deeply divided discipline in terms of gender divisions.

Helen Roberts
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The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies *B. Rogers* Kogan Page 1980 199 pp. £8.95 (£3.95 paper Tavistock)

The Domestication of Women centres its argument around the purported transference of western male ideology regarding women, in general, to the women of the Third World. The main feature of this ideology centres on the theory of 'situational analysis', which points to the discrepancies between ideal belief and actual practice, which western women have been subjected to. The sexual division of labour is an important aspect of this ideology and the author allocates a substantial portion of the book to the demonstration of the argument that male development planners have imposed on women in developing societies a discriminatory cultural-ideology. This discrimination begins with distorted research and data collection, which ignores vital, unpaid subsistence work carried out by rural women; and it ends by providing segregated women-only projects that concentrate on inadequate domestic science-training, leaving women in a despised, displaced state. These projects that were intended to help women in reality hinder them, by reinforcing western stereotypes of women's place in the home, causing entrapment in low-productivity jobs, and in some cases actually teaching women bad nutrition, by encouraging, for example, the eating of oranges for Vitamin C content, while readily available native crops contain greater Vitamin C concentrations.

The argument outlined briefly above, which the author offers, is not a new one, having been put forward by many women researching the development process, especially those included in the book *Women and World Development* prepared by the Overseas Development Council under the auspices of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The contribution Ms Rogers has made to the field resides in her varied presentation of source material, both unpublished and relatively inaccessible.

There are many weaknesses in this book, however, and they can briefly be outlined in four ways. First, a great

deal of confusion is caused by the absence of a clear view of class. The word woman is used interchangeably, whether the author is referring to rural, middle or national bourgeoisie classes. Women of the national élite, it is stated, are oppressed by the west, and have less opportunity to maintain an independent income than their western counterparts. It is not noted that many wives of the privileged classes in developing countries have equal if not greater access to educational and occupational opportunities, since these chances for advancement are more limited to the upper classes than they are in the west. It can also be seen as doubtful as to whether placing national élite or western professional women in development planning positions will have any real effect on policies regarding rural women, keeping the class interest of the women concerned in mind.

Second, Rogers locates the determining factor causing severe inequalities to women in developing societies with male development planners and their corresponding, mainly United Nations, agencies. This can be seen as a very limited view, because it ignores the vital role which different facets of the world economy play, that *indirectly* effect women significantly in rural developing economies. Placing the criticism with the development planners can be likened to blaming the axe, rather than looking for the reasons why it was wielded in the first instance. It also seems futile to look to these very same male western-biased development planners as the future champions of women's rights in the Third World.

Third, the dearth of scope in this book extends itself to the lack of distinction or comparison made with socialist alternatives to development and their effect on women, the position of women in China or Cuba, for example, could have been used for comparative purposes. Added to this, any other alternative strategies that specifically accommodate the needs of women in the rural economies of developing societies were also left largely unexplored.

Finally, it seems to escape the author's attention that western industrialization is regarded by many of the developing countries as the technological panacea. This being the case, it would follow that those in the developing countries who have a vested interest in the industrialization process would also adopt corresponding western values. The nature of industrialization is not explored in this book and this leads to many oversights, such as the omission of the role that multinationals play in the indoctrination of western values. Global concerns, through advertising products, for example, such as dried milk for babies, which is costly as well as inferior to a mother's milk, can play an enormous part in the subjugation of women in the developing world. I believe that Ms Rogers summed up her book quite adequately, by stating in the postscript that, 'This study ends where the real issues begin.'

Ruth Taplin
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Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation *Peter Saunders* Hutchinson 1979 383 pp. £12.50

Over the past decade, a revolution has occurred within urban sociology. From being a rather decrepit rag-bag of ideas, it has been made more coherent and relevant to the discipline as a whole. In truth, this was not a palace revolution, for the invasion came from the foreign forces of French structuralist Marxism. Nevertheless, with the benefits came disbenefits. The anti-empiricist and ahistorical predilections of Althusser and Poulantzas were too readily adopted, and with a theological fervour which drove out of the temple unbelievers and healthy sceptics alike.

Peter Saunders is of a more permissive theology. His plea is for a greater degree of theoretical pluralism and epistemological tolerance. Despite the book's title, its remit is much wider,

namely to examine critically some of the perspectives available to the student of 'urban' phenomena, such as structuralist Marxism (as practised by Castells), instrumentalist Marxism (e.g. Miliband) and neo-Weberianism (e.g. Rex and Pahl). He reviews in an open-minded way their contribution to issues such as the relation between property ownership and class structure; the nature of urban politics; and the question of the 'local state' and bureaucratic power. On the question of domestic property ownership, Saunders rejects both the neo-Weberian attempt to redefine class solely in terms of non-productive factors, and Marxian treatments of housing tenure divisions as having purely ideological significance. Because owner occupancy is an accumulative form of tenure, it opens up the theoretical possibility of new forms of class relations.

Saunders claims that the significance of urban politics lies in its concern with 'collective consumption', the collective provision of socially necessary factors aiding the reproduction of labour-power, but he rejects Castells's account as too functionalist and teleological. Similarly, structuralist accounts of state intervention are judged rather unhelpful given their claims to account for all situations, despite their view that the state and the economy are 'relatively autonomous'.

The second half of the book is taken up with an analysis of urban politics in Croydon. The empirical work for this study was carried out in the early 1970s, before the conceptual upheaval in urban sociology had its impact on empirical research. Saunders has striven to rework his study in the light of the subsequent developments, but ultimately it is unsatisfactory if judged as a test of these ideas, although very acceptable as a study of the ways in which a dense and cohesive network of businessmen and politicians seek to control and depoliticize the agenda of local politics. In this respect, the first chapter of the book, on power, which sits rather oddly on top of the intervening ones, is particularly appropriate to the second part of the book.

In its short life, this book has already become a central text in the field of urban sociology and urban politics. Its evenhandedness, its rigour and its crisp presentation of perspectives has earned it that role. It raises many fundamental questions about treating 'the urban' as a real object of analysis, for the city has perhaps a declining sociological significance in advanced capitalist societies. If 'urban' sociology has lost something in this respect, it has gained more, for in its theoretical and empirical concern with the state, class struggle and political action, it has become central to the analysis of society and thus to sociology.

David McCrone
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The City and Social Theory *Michael Peter Smith* Basil Blackwell 1980 315 pp. £12 (£3.95 paper)

The explanation and comparison of five major thinkers regarding the city and alienation as undertaken by Michael Peter Smith in this book is an illuminating experience. It is a rare opportunity to have the views of Freud, Simmel, Roszak, Wirth and Sennett put together, in such a concise form, thus allowing the reader to make quick comparisons on many points. In addition the section 'Social Theory and Social Reality: a Critique' is worthwhile in that it covers many of the vaguer ideas regarding alienation and city life, e.g. the myth of vanishing primary groups which examines the views of the 'neighbourhood solidarity' theorists such as Gans, Jacobs and Suttles. The importance of disruptive political and economic structures and disruptive 'host' cultures is also woven very skilfully into the discussion. Furthermore it is also pointed out that much public policy is justified on the grounds that it serves large-scale population aggregates. This

is often referred to rhetorically as the 'community-as-a-whole' with its attendant mythology. It does of course stand up against Wirth's ecological approach and exposes much of Wirth's belief that planning could and should remain apolitical which stemmed from his failure to appreciate the positive functions of political conflict. Simmel and Sennett on the other hand saw the city as overstimulating or harmfully understimulating respectively and the evidence would suggest that these views have also to be radically revised in a similar manner to those of Wirth. The changes of exposure to external stimuli that the emergence of an automobile society has brought about is extremely important. Recent psychological research suggests that too little mental stimulation may be as problematic as too much. Too little stimulation can lead to chronic boredom. Smith points out that many aspects of the external environment of contemporary city life offer people relatively monotonous surroundings. In addition to superhighways, the monotony of factory work, suburban residential enclaves, home life for suburban housewives, and even standardized shopping malls have often been associated with chronic boredom. Perpetual diversity is further reduced by the decline in patterns of mixed land use and of the ethnically and socially more heterogeneous residential areas discussed by Sennett; most important perhaps being the destruction of numerous small-scale shopping outlets and social gathering spots by publicly and privately induced urban redevelopment.

One of the most important sections, to my mind, albeit a very short one, is that on the myth of pathological density and crowding. This is a field which has had a great deal of vague and contradictory work done on it and yet at the same time has advanced scarcely any in the realm of real 'knowledge'. As Smith points out, it is mistaken to assume, as planners and urban social theorists often have done, that people who live under crowded conditions automatically suffer from being crowded; or that high population density necessarily entails social pathology. It is welcoming to note the reference to Freedman's very valuable work 'Crowding and Behaviour'. Because the 'stress-producing situations' in which residential crowding occurs are usually associated with lack of income and lack of social choice, it is to these factors that we must look if we are to alleviate human misery, rather than to the pursuit of purely demographic strategies designed to decrease urban densities.

Much could be said about the other sub-sections in the book but perhaps a résumé of the headings would be sufficient to excite interest, e.g. the myth of 'technocracy' and the cult of nature, diversity and injustice, the myth of primitive communal solidarity, the myth of primitive aggression and acquisitiveness, the cult of calculative egoism, the mystification of human suffering, the cult of creative individualism and the realities of social structure. The final chapter on advanced capitalism, social theory and urban political conflict more than justifies, in my opinion, the potential adoption of this book as a basic text for any course on urban sociology. For the normal academic it is a 'pleasant but thought-provoking read' but for the student, 'pushed for time', it is a very worthwhile source book drawing together the often fairly complicated contradictory views of the many sociologists, anthropologists, ecologists, etc. working in the 'urban field'.

Brian A. Forsyth
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Workers' Control in America *David Montgomery* Cambridge University Press 1979 189 pp. £10.00
Workers' Control Under Plan and Market *Ellen Turkish Comisso* Yale University Press 1980 285 pp. £14.40

Workers' Control in America is an excellent collection of essays on US

labour history. It is far from being a comprehensive history of trade unionism and industrial relations in the USA, but it connects with central issues in the sociological analysis of American labour. The main concentration is upon the rise and repercussions of mass production. By 'workers' control' Montgomery means the essentially reactive control exercised by groups of workers, through formal and informal channels, to changes in technology and management scale, ideology and practise. Critical of mainstream approaches to industrial relations Montgomery argues that 'the famous terms of "collective bargaining" and "wage and job consciousness" have never been adequate to describe the aspirations of American workers'.

The first chapter on 'Machine Production in the Nineteenth Century' demonstrates how craftsmen exercised considerable autonomy and control over work organization and production. Subsequent chapters analyse the gradual diminution of workers' roles in managing their own work as 'modern' management controls and ideologies develop. The losing struggle for workers' control in the work place in the first third of this century is linked to the broader strategies of trade unionism and the mobilization by management of the resources of the state to back up its authority over labour. A succinct and penetrating concluding essay surveys the advances, constraints and tensions of the New Deal formula which incorporated labour more centrally in the political system, and gave trade unionism greater legitimacy, but at the cost of enmeshing it within a scheme of legislative and regulatory control. Informed by an antipathy for the limitations placed upon industrial workers in the management of enterprises, and an awareness of the historical and comparative potential of the labour movement, this is a valuable volume for the student of trade unionism, and American society and class structure.

Workers' Control under Plan and Market, in contrast, examines the far greater potential scope for workers' self-management afforded by the assumption of power of a revolutionary communist regime, daring enough to depart from Soviet-style authoritarian centralism, in an effort to gain widespread popular support and involvement in its economic programme. The Yugoslav experience is analysed in theoretical terms derived from the perspectives of Proudhon and Gramsci. The scope for enterprise autonomy and self-management is clearly shown to be dependent, not only upon the values of maximizing worker involvement in self-management, but also upon the sometimes conflicting imperatives of national, regional and local politics. Comisso argues that in a centralized planned economy committed to the goal of workers' control, pressures build up for decentralization and a measure of market autonomy from regions and enterprises handicapped by national investment priorities; on the other hand, once there is a measure of market autonomy and enterprise control over profits, failing enterprises, poorly performing regions and disadvantaged strata, will seek more central control. This perennial pendulum is seen as inevitable in any system committed to the value of workers' control and sensitive to popular attitudes. Workers' control, as such, does not solve the problems evident in capitalist or centralized state socialist systems. Rather, it provides a more democratic institutional framework for coping with the very same problems of national resource allocation, regional and class inequality, and conflict resolution. The argument is a useful antidote to the more utopian views of the subject and emphasizes the practical problems confronting implementation of the concept. It is explored at the local and national level and through a case study of a particular enterprise. The volume is a useful addition to the literature.

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Case Studies on the Labor Process *Andrew Zimbalist* New York and London Monthly Review Press 1980 314 pp. £8.95
Contested Terrain *Richard Edwards* Heinemann 1977 272 pp. £4.50 paper

The publication in 1974 of Braverman's *Labor and Monopoly Capitalism* which aroused a great deal of interest and debate amongst British social scientists, was particularly welcomed because of its attempt to bring the labour process into the arena of radical debate. And many commentators appeared to accept, perhaps with some qualifications, his central thesis about the long term trend for jobs to be deskilled. Nevertheless there has been considerable criticism particularly of Braverman's reliance on an assumed universal and unproblematic adoption by management of Taylor's scientific management and his neglect of worker resistance to managerial control. The implication of important recent work in Britain is that the labour process must be viewed as the outcome of the struggle between contending groups, and not as a simple reflection of a consciously designed managerial system.

Case Studies on the Labor Process is a collection of papers, all of which focus on a particular type of work and according to their editor, derive much of their inspiration from Braverman. They include a paper by Noble on machine tools, Gartman on the assembly line, Zimbalist on printing, and Yarrow on coal mining. There are several papers on white-collar situations and two on the struggle entailed in the operation of piecework systems. The introduction to the book is especially significant, for in it Zimbalist attempts to defend Braverman against his critics. Overall it is a rather weak defence, as it simply argues that Braverman did not ignore the class struggle or assume that all jobs are deskilled. Rather, according to Zimbalist, Braverman's argument, is that in the long run capital has succeeded in imposing its techniques of control over the work process even though at any point in time there will be 'new and initially scarce skills'. What resistance there has been has only been able to delay management's initiatives and new technology, and thus in effect can be ignored, at least theoretically, or used to point to the need for fresh political initiatives.

According to Zimbalist, the case studies confirm the deskilling thesis. Whilst this may be true – an achievement which may owe as much to the authors' selectivity and bias towards Braverman as it does to the situations they are purporting to describe – they yield a complex picture which I am not sure can be captured in Braverman's terms with his unilinear conception of history. There is enough struggle surfacing in the book to question its assumed irrelevance to the production system. Indeed several authors admit as much. Zimbalist's paper is a case in point, for in the printing industry, technical development past and present may be seen from his account as reflecting compromises and struggles between management and worker strategies. Read with a more critical eye than Zimbalist's and in the light of recent debate about Braverman these cases may then be of considerable use to all those interested in work organization.

It is less clear whether Edwards in his *Contested Terrain* accepts the deskilling thesis. He builds his basic argument, like Braverman, on the need for managerial control but, unlike Braverman, on the failure of Taylorism to achieve this. Edwards argues that there are essentially three forms of control: simple, based on direct supervision, technical, where control is built in to the machine, and finally bureaucratic where control is achieved through organizational rules, for example concerning discipline, wage scales, appraisal systems, job evaluations and promotions. Taylorism was an attempt to move from simple control which largely failed because of worker opposition. Nevertheless it was an experiment from which

managements learnt a great deal. Indeed what Edwards claimed they learnt from it is not that dissimilar to that implied by Braverman and Zimbalist, and particularly the need to separate conception from execution. Where he differs from Braverman is in pointing to the growth of bureaucratic control, the kinds of formal procedures discussed by institutional economists and industrial relations specialists from Kerr onwards. He thus gets away from the task level at which Braverman mainly works, and does not start from an assumed atomized work force. Like Friedman he stresses that in the twentieth century the problem for management has not simply been a question of the discretion of the individual worker, but rather the resistance they have faced 'to their effort to compel production'. Despite this the examples Edwards presents to illustrate his argument that work organization has progressed from simple and technical modes of control to its current bureaucratic form are from non-unionized firms such as IBM and Polaroid.

The strength of this book is its attempt to link the labour process to labour market theory through the use of the concepts of internal and dual labour markets, the increasing realization of which he sees as part of a managerial policy to divide and segment the working class. Its weakness is that its stage theory of control strategies results in a rather functionalist and 'a-historical history'. Furthermore, Edwards side-steps the issue of skill, although in his discussion of the employers' concept of the 'good worker' in which he placed emphasis on the value of co-operation *à la* Blackburn and Mann, the implication is that technical skills are largely irrelevant. Above all else Edwards still presents management as omniscient, conspiratorial and able, at least for a period of time, to successfully solve its problem of control.

These two American books underline the need for more British work on the labour process and also for comparative studies.

Stephen Wood
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The Theory of Power and Organization
Stewart Clegg Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 176 pp. £7.50

Stewart Clegg's dog Dazzle puts in a welcome appearance in this book. They obviously get on well but the difference between them is that Dazzle is reactive whilst Stewart is reflexive. Clegg is indeed an advocate of the 'critical' approach to organizational analysis. As Research Fellow to the European Group for Organisation Studies he was set the task to examine recent European work on the theory of power, with particular reference to the analysis of organizations. After an initial suspicious inspection of the pitch he tells us that he has estranged the topics of his discourse — power, organization and Europe. What is to be done? The problematic character of power and organization theory must be displayed, together with sociology, and the field of enquiry must be reconstituted.

The problem of sociology is sorted out in a dozen very cryptic pages with glancing references to Wittgenstein, Habermas and Foucault as beacons in a dark world. Clegg tells us that critical sociology must transcend the transcendental framework within which sociological discourse was so often constituted. It will, he says, take 'as its empirical domain all discourse, all theory, all texts, to treat each as seriously or as ridiculously as the other. It will not accept that the text, the discourse, or the theory resides in a possibility constitutable only by the reality which it reports and purports to correspond to. Nor will it accept that the text's possibility is purely a matter of convention. Instead it will commence analysis with the proposition that any text is inscribed in the relation between convention and correspondence, between discourse interest, between appearance

and reality constituted in the text' (p. 23). So there it is. I do not understand what is meant by empirical domain, what the status of the proposition in the last sentence is other than assertion, nor what is to be regarded as appropriate or valid methods of obtaining knowledge. Is this the road to demystification and the abolition of false consciousness?

Clegg has not abandoned the thought that empirical work is possible. In the Preface he looks forward to this based on the application of the model, developed in the book, of the organization as a structure of sedimented selection rules. He proposes this as an approach to comparative historical research. To get to this position (which is summarized in the Table on p. 122) Clegg discusses the work of a range of writers on power and organizations. He spreads his net quite widely from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Marx, Parsons, Gramsci, Althusser, Lukes, Giddens, Poulantzas and Wallerstein. However, given his substantive interest in Taylorism and Mayoism there is surprisingly no reference to Bendix, Baldamus, or Georges Friedman (whose seminal discussions of Taylorism pre-date Braverman and should not be neglected) and only a passing mention of Wright Mills.

Clegg's ground-clearing operation consists of an attack on individualistic/subjectivist concepts of power, which singles out Lukes's work for special treatment. Giddens, despite his references to structure and structuration, is also seen as individualist and voluntarist in his approach. So we need a structural analysis which mainly turns on an affirmation that Gramsci and Althusser are on the right lines. For one as concerned as Clegg properly is with language he does not make things easy for the reader. For example he writes of the possibility of 'a reflexive reciprocity between the mode of production and hegemonic dominance' and considers that 'it is on such occasions as this, when the theorising power of hegemony reflexively reconstitutes the mode of production of its own practice, independently of the conscious knowledge of particular agents engaged in production, that I believe we may refer (in the sense of Clegg, 1975) to the concept of a "form of life"' (p. 94).

But despite the semantic and epistemological problems raised by this book all is ultimately revealed. Clegg is a man with a message. All this slippery talk about power and the inadequacies of organization theorists who can't distinguish between the organization and its environment is transcended. We must reconceptualize organizations in the world system. Enter Wallerstein unreconstituted and unreflexively to allow this absolutist conclusion: 'Organisational control is not a feature of an isolated organisational system and its environment, but a sedimented structure of selection rules for dealing with one system: the world system' (p. 149). Come along Dazzle, its time to take Stewart for a walk. He needs some fresh air.

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State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism *Colin Crouch* (ed.) Croom Helm 1979 264 pp. £10.95 (£4.95 paper)

This is an important and stimulating book. Although its title makes it appear as just another of those many books which have appeared recently on 'The State', it is in fact a very useful summary and extension of the recent debates. A synthetic summary statement by Colin Crouch is followed by a series of papers on different aspects of the state/economy relation. Papers by Strinati and by Longstreth discuss industrial relations and industrial finance, a paper by Harloe reviews some recent French accounts of 'the urban question', Martin examines social democracy in Sweden, and Skidelsky gives a magisterial account of 'Keynesian' politics.

Crouch begins his discussion with an attempt to answer the question which is ignored by many Marxist writers but is central to their theories: why does the state operate in the interests of capital? In trying to answer this question, and therefore setting out the conditions under which the state will *not* operate in the interests of capital, he draws upon American 'pluralist' theory in an attempt to construct a genuine synthesis of the two traditions. He first takes up the notion of 'overloaded government', which he sees as the political corollary of monetarism, seeing the current problems of government rationality and expenditure as consequences of the pressure of demands upon the democratic state. Crouch adds the twist to this, that the ability of the state to meet such demands depends upon definite economic conditions of growth and prosperity. When these conditions disappear, the state faces problems of overloading. Next Crouch draws on theories of the corporate state to suggest that corporatism may be preserved as one way of attempting to insulate the state from popular demands and so of avoiding the problem of overloading. In particular, corporatism is a means of regulating labour and labour demands, though when employed in a 'liberal' political context it can open up all sorts of issues to consideration by labour leaders. Both of these arguments — corporatism, and the overloaded state — are seen by Crouch as confirming the distrust of the state by the dominant class and the relative responsiveness of the liberal state to popular demands. Hence the problem for Marxist theories which claim that the state operates in the interest of capital. Drawing on Lindblom, Crouch argues that although the liberal state is open to a variety of interests, it is dependent on the continued accumulation of capital. The ability of the state to respond to popular interests is therefore constrained by the need to maintain accumulation. Crouch presents a diagram to summarize his argument, but unfortunately his description is marred by a typographical error — this is unfortunately true of much of the book. He attempts to show the relative importance of 'structural', 'élite', and 'polyarchic' factors in the determination of state policy and concludes with some remarks on the likely future development of western liberalism.

Skidelsky's contribution focuses specifically on Keynesianism as a political strategy, and on the conditions under which it may or may not succeed. In brief, he argues that Keynesianism shows a declining ability to control the economy because the assumptions upon which it is based — the insulation of economic policy from conflicting political demands and the acquiescence of leaders of business and labour — have ceased to correspond to social reality. Both the political factors outlined by Crouch and the decay of traditional, pre-capitalist norms which legitimated acquiescence have undermined the assumptions of Keynesianism.

Whilst Martin analyses Kenyesianism in Sweden and Harloe gives an essentially conceptual critique of Castella and Lojkine, the remaining papers focus on specific features of the state/economy relationship in Britain. Frank Longstreth examines the formulation of British economic policy in terms of the opposition between financial capital and industrial capital; and Dominic Strinati examines strategies of control over industrial relations in terms of the differences between different fractions of capital. Whilst both papers give considerable attention to the conceptual formulation of political representation and the autonomy of the state, neither gives a satisfactory conceptualization of 'fractions' of capital. Categories such as 'manufacturers', 'industrialists', 'financial sector', 'multinationals', 'money capital', etc., are used, but no rationale is given for considering these as fractions of classes. Nevertheless, both papers contain much useful information and a number of interesting ideas. The book

as a whole is not only useful for researchers, but deserves a place on student book-lists for any course which wants to consider the state/economy relation seriously.

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Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis: Elements of The Sociology of Corporate Life *G. Burrell and G. Morgan* Heinemann 1979 432 pp. £9.50 (£5.95 paper)

Like many other authors, Burrell and Morgan emphasize the large choice of perspectives which is available for the studying of organizational phenomena. Unlike most other authors, they argue that these perspectives can be readily located within the four quadrants of a matrix in which the two axes are: vision of social science; assumptions about societal domination and change. The task of the student, according to this, is to become aware of the range of choices and of the assumptions underpinning them. Indeed, they argue that each quadrant should be developed in isolation and that the real need is for closure (p. 398). How is the matrix constructed? One dimension represents the sociologists' vision of the social sciences expressed as a continuum where the contrasting poles are subjectivist assumptions about ontology, methodology, positivism and human nature, and the other pole is the objectivist position. The second dimension refers to assumptions about change in society. One pole refers to perspectives which stress regulative change and the other pole indicates radical/transformational change of society. The four quadrants are: structural functional (e.g. regulative objectivism), interpretative sociology (e.g. regulative subjectivist), radical humanism (e.g. radical interpretive) and radical structuralism (e.g. radical objectivism).

The core of the text is an exposition of the various perspectives which fall into each of the quadrants. The authors show the differences and similarities of approach in each quadrant by general sociologists and by specialists in organization studies, but their concept of sociological inquiry is much looser when discussing organization studies. There is a minimum of critical assessment of perspectives, yet sufficient insightful comparison to merit attention. If we accept the authors' broad objectives – and not all sociologists will find these relevant – then the value of the book lies in the arrangement and exposition of existing perspectives plus the anticipation of desirable developments.

Burrell and Morgan claim that most of the perspectives so far used to study organizations have been drawn from the quadrant which is regulative and objective. The quadrant includes: contingency theory, the Aston Programme, 95 per cent of the articles in the Administrative Science Quarterly, Quality of Working Life/Sociotechnical School, institutional analysis (e.g. Selznick) and Silverman's early (1970) variant of the Action Frame of Reference. Each is briefly outlined. Compared to other texts also covering these perspectives, the accounts are so brief that students are likely to be uncertain about the differences in objectives between say the action frame of reference and sociotechnical analysis, though they might be less surprised than their precursors to find the same analyst using both eclectically.

The regulative and interpretive quadrant is rather empty and therefore the stress is on presenting the potential. Considerable attention is given to showing that existing efforts are subject to ontological vacillation and that one key problem arises over the treatment of structuring.

In many respects, the two radical quadrants are presented in the most exciting fashion. The humanist/interpretive quadrant gives organizations a precarious ontological status. The perspectives in this quadrant give stress to notions of totality, consciousness, alienation and the practice of critique. Once again, there are few exponents.

Finally, the radical structuralist quadrant is presented as a major opportunity for development within which students have an initial choice of point of departure between radical-Weber and 'Mediterranean Marxism'. The stress is on structural oppression. Although Burrell and Morgan suggest that this quadrant is largely neglected, this will surprise many Europeans. It is astonishing that no reference is made to these studies, especially since Teulings's analysis of the role of large enterprises in the Netherlands (e.g. coal mines, Philips) is so relevant to the themes in this section.

In reviewing the approach of Burrell and Morgan, it is relevant to consider their suggestions alongside another recent text in the same area by Clegg and Dunkerley. In many respects, these two books are complementary in their strengths. For example, Clegg and Dunkerley also consider various perspectives and their accounts of these are more extensive. Also there is a stronger commitment to an analytical position: structural oppression. On the other hand, Burrell and Morgan's treatment allows the student to develop a critical posture towards the choice of quadrant. In that respect the Burrell and Morgan book is fruitful.

P. A. Clark
University of Aston Management Centre

More Bad News *Glasgow University Media Group* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980 483 pp. £17.50

Following *Bad News* (1976) this second volume deals with the same content analysis of national television news coverage of British industrial relations during the early months of 1975, the time of the 'Social Contract'. *More Bad News* has three main themes: the reporting of the 'Economic Crisis and the Social Contract' (the TV news is found to attribute Britain's economic troubles to wage inflation and over-demanding trade unions); the words used in the news bulletins (here there is massive reconstruction via videotape of the words spoken and heavy emphasis on the point that the pictures are usually subordinate to the words); finally the *video* content is analysed (again with impressive detail and some heroic efforts to unravel the visual language).

This second volume is much less controversial than the first, and some will regard it as not much more than appendices to *Bad News*. Broadly it will confirm and strengthen opinions held about the earlier volume, although in some respects it differs greatly from it. The breathless under-analysis of *Bad News* here reverts in some cases to wordy over-analysis.

With this second volume we now have a 793-page analysis of twenty-two weeks of television industrial relations news. For anyone interested in video content analysis these books are invaluable; for anyone interested in teaching theory and/or methods in the mass media, these volumes are a treasure trove of teaching examples — they include a remarkably large number of both virtues and vices.

More Bad News again displays the enormous strengths of studying all the news over an extended number of weeks (and thus seeing it in fuller detail even than do the journalists, who have days off). The special problems of video content analysis are here confronted with enormous energy, determination and insight. This research is also an excellent attempt to marry heavyweight empirical data with heavyweight theory — and it succeeds better in this than do all but a very few studies based on sample surveys and perhaps better than any other previous content analysis study. *Bad News* is a splendid example also of how to combine quantitative with qualitative content analysis — these Glasgow authors have done in depth what some of the rest of us have merely advised. A final virtue: this controversial study has blown away some previous untruisms — at least in the case of British TV news, the common belief that pictures

dominate words is not valid.

But despite, sometimes matching, these great virtues, *More Bad News* like its predecessor contains some large weaknesses. In my view the basic weakness in this study – as in so many others – lies in its initial planning, which was simply too rushed. The first volume was written within a matter of weeks, but its planning was even more sketchy. The pilot phase was quite inadequate for such a complex, costly and unusual project. The decision to play the game of eight-a-side sociology may have been wise but it was too rushed. A team of eight authors needs a manager or a captain or some kind of direction and strategy which this team lacked. Some of the key decisions were made too early and without understanding of their implications; for example the definition of industrial relations is dubious, as was the decision to junk tapes of most non-industrial relations news.

This led to a second major error. The study is much too narrow. The authors remain at the end – while full of sophistication about television studio practice – crucially ignorant of too many of the basics of news and even of industrial relations journalism. The study turns its back not only on the television correspondents, the press, radio, and news agencies (whence much of this news practice comes) but also chooses to ignore even the press content analysis of industrial relations conducted in the same year by Denis McQuail for the Royal Commission on the Press.

The authors are also remarkably uninterested in trade unions – what is the significance of the fact that official trade union leaders are so prominent in industrial relations news? They fail to confront the point that most news is negative – and that the trade union claim in effect is to be given the 'extra-fair' positive news coverage which business acquires in the press via financial advertising. They are also too dismissive of audience research. The subtleties of bias against the unions are fascinating to sociologists, but they only have wider relevance if the audience is influenced by the biased message.

Finally these authors have a sour and negative tone not only about television news, journalists, politicians and trade unions but also about other sociologists who have worked in this field such as Philip Schlesinger and Michael Tracey. This sour and humourless approach is not merely a matter of bad research manners which subsequently makes research needlessly difficult for others. It also led these authors into a classic boob in their famous illicit observations at ITN, where they swallowed some manifestly tongue-in-cheek remarks as gospel news practice. The general tone adopted by these authors is also extremely unpersuasive and makes their whole enterprise counter-productive.

More Bad News is a book for specialists. *Bad News* is now paperbacked so its many virtues and vices are more widely available.

Jeremy Tunstall
City University, London

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

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

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PARTING WORDS

As this is the last issue for whose review section I am responsible I should like to express my appreciation not only to the successive Journal Secretaries but also to the patient reviewers and authors who have often had to wait inordinate lengths of time for reviews to appear.

Leslie Sklair

John Carroll

The role of guilt in the formation of modern society: England 1350–1800

ABSTRACT

All of the classics of sociological theory were preoccupied by the question of the rise of modern society and what caused it. This article returns to that issue in the crucial case, that of England. It argues that the first and foremost requirement for modernization was a radical change in disposition away from that typical of the Middle Ages. It draws upon the excellent historical research now available on late medieval to Puritan-Revolution England to develop a theory of progressing stages of cultural evolution, fuelled by increasing guilt. The resulting guilt theory of English history focuses on the impact of changing disposition on culture and social structure, and vice versa, and concludes with an investigation of the historical circumstances that nurtured the birth of the guilt-hounded individual. In passing, this article substantially amends Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis, it rejects Tönnies *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* model as almost totally wrong, and it finds Marx's stress on class conflict to be largely inapplicable.

The central question about the rise of modern society is what transformed the typical man of the Middle Ages - violent, immoderate, perceiving the world in childlike extremes, his mind inhabited by a phantasmagoria of devils and angels, ghosts and holy relics - into the self-controlled, disciplined and inward Puritan who had come to occupy a dominating position on the stage of seventeenth-century England. It was the capacity of the Puritan for systematic and sustained work, and for rational, calculated organization that was to constitute the human prerequisite for the development of industrial society. The Puritan's medieval forbear, with his weak powers of concentration and consistency, his low opinion of his own ability to control his environment, his resort to superstition to explain events and protect him from misfortune, was by disposition incompatible with the workings of modern society. In short, without a radical

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transformation in the motives and enthusiasms of individuals in the key social strata conduct would not have changed and any new social order would have foundered. This is why the question about the formation of modern society has to be put first in terms of disposition.

It is easy to demonstrate that the question about disposition reduces to one about conscience: how was it that the Englishman became so self-conscious about his conduct that he needed a new and incomparably stricter moral code to live by, a moral code that he successfully internalized. In turn this is a question about guilt, about how it was that guilt started to bite home in the late Middle Ages and progressively increase its sway over disposition. To resolve this question is the ambition of the current article. In the process we should automatically resolve the issue of whether Weber was right in giving the answer Puritanism to his great question: which were the singular circumstances existing in northern Europe, and more especially England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that enabled the growth of a social form that had appeared nowhere else in the history of human civilization, that of capitalism? For Weber to have been essentially correct it is necessary for Puritan culture to have caused a sudden rise in levels of guilt, not the other way round, first there was guilt and then a guilt-hounded population was drawn to Puritan beliefs as a more appropriate rationalization.

The argument will proceed as follows. First of all we shall plot increases in guilt as illustrated in changing cultural forms, and then go on to enquire into causes. In addition we are in a position to try out a general theory of the various stages through which a culture evolves as a society loses its naïvety under the influence of guilt, and moves in the direction of civilization. We are able to do this because of the wealth of historical material on the English Reformation period.

(a) THE STAGES OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION

There are six distinct stages of cultural evolution to be distinguished in the case of English society's transformation from a naïve culture in the early Middle Ages to its guilt-hounded twentieth-century form. These stages have clear parallels in the cases of both ancient Greece and ancient Israel, forcing the conjecture that the theory may have some universal applicability.

Developing from a starting point of naïve culture the next four stages are respectively those of superficial guilt, rampant, uncultured guilt, parricidal guilt and civilized guilt. The sixth stage, matricidal guilt, does not develop in England in a fully-fledged form until the twentieth century, although traces of it did appear in the eighteenth century. It will not be discussed here. A guilt culture, in contrast to a

naïve culture, appears in three different forms, those of parricidal guilt, civilized guilt, and matricidal guilt. Superficial guilt is an intermediary stage and that of rampant, uncultured guilt is one of transition, and is highly unstable.

(i) *Naïve culture (before 1200)* Homeric Greece, the Israel of the kings, and early medieval England were all naïve cultures. They were characterized by a simple warrior ethos, spontaneity of emotion, and an absence of guilt, notably in the sense of individuals blaming themselves for misfortune. Events were seen as being determined by gods, by magic, or they were accepted as due to the order of things. The human ideal was the great warlord. The early Middle Ages were so much under the sway of military affairs that when a neighbourhood war was not actually being fought men were either preparing to attack or to defend themselves against attack.[1] The social hierarchy was predicated on reciprocal military obligations. The chivalric ideal was too weak to avert the reality of the first crusade being one of hatred and slaughter. The warriors were unashamed in the sadistic joy they took in the destruction and torment of others.[2] In any alternative morality that did emerge, pride was taken to be the leading vice.[3] But the placing of even such a tentative halter on the warrior's passion was a first indication of failing naïvety. In thirteenth-century England, and indeed through the following two centuries, strong strains of naïve culture survived.

(ii) *Superficial Guilt (1200–1530)* Our model of a superficial guilt culture is that of medieval Catholicism. There are signs of a similar culture in Greece of the archaic period but the paucity of historical material prohibits any precise conclusions. Similarly we do not have enough evidence to lay bare a superficial guilt stage in ancient Judaism.

The hallmark of a superficial guilt culture is the view that man sins but is not innately sinful. There is sin, and as a consequence guilt, but remission is always possible. In practice all sins are venial. Man is not irretrievably fallen. He sins in the sort of way he catches a common cold: he soon gets over it. There may be times in which he suffers bouts of chronic anxiety, which he may interpret as indicative of sin, and which may drive him to extremes of piety. But he recovers from his anxiety and forgets his piety with an equal alacrity.

Medieval Catholicism did hold to a belief in original sin, but that sin was washed away with baptism, leaving the infant to start life with a clean slate. Thus the fall did not burden the living; Catholicism did not cast any of the shadow of a true sins of the fathers theology across its flock. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to minimize the role of guilt in the activities of the medieval Church. The Church's success depended in part on its function as the administrator of

penance. Its followers suffered from enough guilt to make *potestas clavium* (the power of the keys) a binding belief – the power of the priests was precisely that of remitting sins.[4] In fact the Church had survived after AD 450 in a prevailing mood of moral laxity because of its contrasting rigour, above all manifest in the penitential rites that it maintained. In practice this meant exacting from all serious offenders, once in their lifetime, a thorough and humiliating course of public penance followed by severe disciplines.[5]

The major deterrent from sin was fear of hell and of the devil and his hosts. More concretely, the threat of plague and the many other ways in which death would suddenly strike exerted the driving motivating force behind religious practices. Remission, at least from the time of St Thomas, could be gained through contrition and confession. The deadly sins required in addition penitential works prescribed by the priest. Good works included fasting, alms, pilgrimages, crusades, gifts to the Church, and increasingly from the thirteenth century, indulgences. In the fourteenth century the rosary and the stations of the cross gained popularity. Thus it was that total relief could be obtained from even the so-called deadly sins.

The Middle Ages had a concept of moral guilt, as does every society. There were techniques for detecting whether a person was guilty of such a crime as theft – for instance applying a hot iron or immersing the suspect in cold water. But such techniques were not based on the assumption that the criminal would feel an inner sense of culpability, which would then be revealed; they rather assumed divine or magical intervention to influence the trial.

There were times when medieval men were overwhelmed by a sense of sin. For example, some of the worse plagues, or rumours of approaching plague, inspired flagellation cults. Members of these cults believed that plague was sent by God to punish sinners. If a man could purge himself of sin then he would be immune. It was typical of the Middle Ages that expiation should take an unambiguously physical form: the flagellants lashed themselves with scourges carrying knots or iron tips until the blood ran down their backs. They believed that their blood might mingle with that of Christ, cleansing them of sin. The ephemeral nature of the sense of sin is marked by the short-lived presence of these cults: they died out as soon as the threat of plague receded.

The examples of techniques used to detect guilt and the psychology of the flagellation cults suggest that inner controls were non-existent. Medieval man had not developed parts of his character that might help him control his passions. Conscience was in a primitive state. Thus men wore hair shirts in order to tame the fierce lusts of the flesh (as for example in *Piers the Plowman*). They needed the threat of literal punishment to restrain them. Without much conscience they needed to inflict self-punishment in order to frighten such

unconscious forces as lust into abeyance. When they did sin, and plague threatened, they might choose brutal physical means to purify themselves.

If much of the medieval Church's hold over the laiety came from its ability to manipulate guilt through organized penance, it strengthened its psychological grip by providing a vast range of richly evocative and tactile images. The common man's imagination was fed with a kaleidoscope of ghosts, signs, spectres, apparitions – of angels, devils, shades of the dead, white women and countless other forms that the Church managed to weave into its philosophy. More importantly, each man could find comfort in times in which life was generally short, brutish and disease-ridden from the presence of saints and relics. He could visit holy places. He saw pictures of the trinity, of the vices and virtues. He was fascinated by stories from the lives of the saints. Indeed, the veneration of the saints and the belief in the saving power of relics was so fanatical that during the lying in state of St Elizabeth of Hungary in 1231 a crowd of worshippers came and tore strips off the linen shrouding her face. They cut off the hair, the nails and even the nipples for relics. St Thomas was hardly cold when his fellow monks decapitated his corpse and boiled the body, out of fear of having their relic stolen.[6]

Medieval culture was as visual as it was tactile. Pictorial expression far surpassed the intellectual or literary. The popular stories were picturesque. People wanted to adore the ineffable in visible shrines. The fourteenth century became addicted to the lamb and the cross as symbols of Jesus. At the end of one moving sermon Bernard of Siena lit two candles and showed the multitude an azure board with the name of Jesus written on it in large gold letters surrounded by the sun's rays. The people went on their knees and wept with emotion.[7] It was not only religious practice that was visual. People painted their houses in vivid colours, adorned their churches, and those who could afford it loved to dress in richly decorated livery.[8]

The prominent role that magic played in the Middle Ages is one of the leading signs of a superficial guilt culture. Although the Catholic Church was consistently on the side of proscribing magic its own rites had incorporated much of pagan superstition. Magic springs were redefined as holy wells producing holy water.[9] The saints were often blamed for sending disease on a person who had failed to honour them; specific diseases were associated with individual saints – for instance gout was known as St Maur's evil.[10] Here in thin disguise was the popular magical belief that evil spirits cause illness. Moreover relics were only one of many means that the Church provided to protect the anxious from misfortune. One of the great problems to be faced by the early Protestants was that they removed magic from Christian ritual without countering the belief in magic.

The world of magic is that of the child. The child has difficulty

separating wish from reality; his fantasy is the reality. Magic is a precise analogy: it appears in a culture in which the development of conscience and consciousness is primitive, where people have little ability to differentiate their external world and its workings from their own fantasies – and above all their nightmarish ones. Their sense of control over themselves and their environment is weak, another characteristic of a primitive conscience, or low guilt. Magic may also appear amongst more psychologically sophisticated people who regress under strain to infantile behaviour. Huizinga noted that medieval man's experience had the directness and absoluteness of the pleasure and pain of child life.[11]

As the visual was preferred over the literary, so the visible and public were preferred over the private. Even penance was public, with the one exception of private confession – an English innovation. Punishment was predominantly physical, and in the thirteenth century including castration, blinding and lip-removal.[12] The inflicting of pain and disfigurement was reinforced by public shaming. Criminals were either put in the stocks or pillary, available to public abuse, or they were executed, again in public, perhaps after having been dragged around the town tied to a carthorse tail.[13] Very few were hidden away in prisons, and usually only temporarily.[14] The Church punished sins in a similar manner, for example dressing sexual miscreants in white and parading them in front of the congregation or in the market place. If punishment was meant to shame it is doubtful that medieval man was easily shamed. The evidence suggests that even the aristocracy, within which there was attachment to the ideals of honour and defending one's name – that is, ideals vulnerable to public shaming – behaved in general with unscrupulous violence. The 'inner man' seems to have existed only in the sense of the child with terrifying fantasies projecting them onto his surrounding world, such fantasies as were graphically illustrated in the paintings of Hieronymous Bosch.

The disposition of medieval man was that of the delinquent. It was violent and impulsive, without capacity for restraint or moderation. Tempestuous, uninhibited passion was never far from the surface. Everything was in extremes, of the cruellest punishment one moment, mercy the next, barbarism giving way to copious weeping. Philip the Good was a man of monumental pride, he had a ferocious temper, he was given to extravagant feasting and debauchery. At the same time he was strictly devout: he would fast on bread and water for four days a week, and give alms prodigally.[15]

I am not suggesting that all medieval men were delinquents. The society had its small minority of ascetics, as every society does. Indeed many of them, with their capacity for self-control and disciplined work, played a vital role in medieval life, in monasteries, as artisans building cathedrals, or in various branches of science and

craft – the Middle Ages had to its credit a wide range of technological innovation. My point is that the overwhelming majority of the population was delinquent, and this was no longer the case by the seventeenth century, when substantial middle-class strata had somehow come to gird their dispositional loins.

Medieval society, like its inhabitants, was hardly differentiated. Farming techniques were as crude and inefficient as conduct was undisciplined. Institutions were as defective in practice as they were impressive to the sight. The maintenance of law and order was precarious at the best of times, often totally breaking down, especially when the king was either weak or overseas. The Church had only the most tenuous of holds over its anarchic flock. Indeed the parish church was more important as the centre of the secular community, housing cockfights and trading, feasts and fights and most other types of group activity, every day of the week. The scene in a cathedral was no more likely to inspire piety. Finucane describes what the shrine housing the skeleton of St Thomas à Becket in Canterbury Cathedral would have been like in the 1170s. The stench of poverty and disease, the characteristic odour of the Middle Ages, would have infused the crypt, full of wretched cripples writhing on the floor, the air filled with the screams of madmen fighting each other to kiss a toe-bone of the skeleton.[16]

The standard sociological view, shared by many historians, of the rise of modern society has focused on the change from a close-knit and tradition-bound community tied by bonds of affection to the large, anonymous and highly mobile industrial society. The picturing of the English Middle Ages as typified by community in this sense is an almost total travesty of the reality. The only sense in which the medieval village or town had any of the cosy features attributed to it by the sociologists and other romancers is that individuals would have been born, lived, and died within the same few square miles. But even this must be qualified in the case of England because of the existence of a labour market and considerable geographical mobility from at least the thirteenth century.[17] Life was short, with even the upper classes, both aristocracy and merchants, being unable to maintain their families on average for more than three generations: the implacable death rate in one generation or another removing all male heirs before they reached marriageable age.[18] Affection seems to have been scarce; the dominant emotions of the time were rather those of impotent fear and reflex violence. Crimes had to be outrageous to excite protest – for example a man disembowelling his newly-wedded wife on a pilgrimage.[19]

Moreover, the picture of medieval man as closely integrated into his Church, a pious believer in its comprehensive moral code, and as a result very secure in his view of the universe and his place in it, fantastically glamorizes the anarchic reality. Most of the Church's

more competent members withdrew into monasteries, and indeed monasteries themselves were the most impressive buildings of the Middle Ages, symbolizing the reluctance of the Church to grapple with the sordidness of everyday life. At the same time the king more often than not fought a losing battle to maintain some semblance of public order. His weapons, the sheriffs and judges, were pitifully few and weak. England in the late Middle Ages was known throughout Europe for its crime. Violence was chronic; very few offenders were taken to court and even fewer were convicted.[20] What justice there was was often corrupt, with the magnates bribing and intimidating jurors and minor officials, installing proteges in office, and providing armed assistance in feuds.[21]

(iii) *Rampant, uncultured guilt (1530–1600)* The cultural stage of rampant, uncultured guilt is typified by individuals being afflicted by outbursts of chronic anxiety that often bring with them a sense of depravity, culpability and unsettledness. No culture commands for long: rather a mood of intense cultural flux prevails in which new beliefs and values are constantly being created, gaining some hold, and then equally rapidly being replaced. Men grasp desperately at explanations of life and its ultimate ends. They swing between extremes of piety and scepticism, of fanatical social snobbery and millennarian egalitarianism. This is the cultural stage of Aeschylus, of the Jewish prophets and of Elizabethan England. It is the stage of the most intense cultural ferment and innovation, and of greatness. It is also the time in which the dramatic genre of tragedy emerges.

The stage of rampant, uncultured guilt in English history occupies roughly the period 1530–1600, although signs can be seen beforehand, especially in the fourteenth century, and its presence shadowed the years right up to the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660. The emotional atmosphere of the time does not look much different from that of the Middle Ages. Men were violent, distrustful, cholerically impulsive and cold. There were few close ties – romance was practised in one very small class, and even that upper class was violent, with a ferocity and childishness that indicated little capacity for self-control.[22] Village life was poisoned by the inquisitorial snooping of neighbours, and malicious slander to the degree that there was an extraordinarily high level of prosecutions in the church courts. One consequence was that special public punishments were devised for scolds or nagging women.[23] One commentator writes that the Elizabethan village was a place filled with malice and hatred, its only unifying bonds being the occasional episode of mass hysteria, which temporarily bound together the majority in order to harry and persecute the local witch.[24] The towns offered greater anonymity, but life seems to have been more dangerous there – this was especially true in the myriad small back alleys of London. Brutal assaults and

brawls in taverns or at dinner tables were common.[25] The theatre was often a rowdy centre for wooing and squabbling: an unsatisfied audience was likely to riot.[26] In church men would jostle, nudge, spit and swear, finding the service an unwelcome restraint. The typical congregation has been likened to a tiresome class of schoolboys. The poorer classes were never regular church-goers and overall the age seems to have been characterized by great religious indifference.[27] In this it may have differed little from its preceding age. In sum, violence, cruelty and slander were the norm in Elizabethan England.[28]

However, behind the scenes radical changes were in motion. Various segments of society were gaining a greater degree of control over their lives. Above all a middle class was emerging with its own ethos of thrift, work and discipline. Puritanism was gaining adherents, offering both a rationalization of this worldly success and a refuge in a brutal world. Further up the social hierarchy an upstart gentry was learning civility. On another front a new intellectual class was emerging with its own diverse elements, varying from the Puritan preachers and lecturers who utilized their university educations for evangelical purposes, to the secular men of letters such as Shakespeare and Jonson. A. G. Dickens typifies Tudor England as a critical people in search of a positive faith.[29]

Let us look in greater detail at the new cultural forms. By the middle of the sixteenth century a new diversification of middle class interest in knowledge and literature had appeared, including in its ambit science, medicine, natural history, romance, philosophy and poetry. Quite independently of the Reformation, learning had become fashionable. Later in the century passions for books on travel and exploration, and a fascination with history developed.[30] The high literacy and scepticism characteristic of the Renaissance elsewhere in Europe were prominent in Elizabethan England. Book-buying rose rapidly from mid-century to become a fixed habit.[31] Literacy depended on education and the vastly aroused interest of the time in schools and universities was driven mainly by the two dominant cultural forms that carried the age, Puritanism and the civility code of the gentleman. To these we now turn.

In world-historical terms the decisive cultural innovation of the Elizabethan Age was its own peculiar mode of Puritanism. In England a movement that had started in the fourteenth century with Wyclif and his Lollard followers, and that had hibernated through the fifteenth century, finally flowered, with the help of new doctrines that by 1530 were flooding across the Channel. The Puritan code was spread both verbally by preachers and lecturers and through books. The age developed an inordinate appetite for 'good books', guides to godliness. They came in the form of manuals, books and printed sermons, and included collections of pious aphorisms and moralized

allegories, books of prayer and religious instruction. Every rank of society from apprentices upwards contained members who avidly consumed this devotional literature. Demand was only inhibited by supply.[32] The layman was not so much interested in the theological debates of the time as in advice on religious practice – how to atone for his sinful life. These books taught the butcher and gentleman alike how to approach God without the assistance of the Church.[33] They gained the widest circulation and maintained the longest popularity of any books of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[34]

Puritan theology and its moral code may be usefully considered as having operated on two fronts, one religious and one secular. As a religion, Puritanism appealed to men troubled by a new inner sense of their culpability. They longed to know what to do to be saved.[35] Their deep sense of man's original sin, of his woeful depravity, drove them into a very severe and austere religion. Their despair was such that the doctrine of faith alone, granted by God's inexorable grace, seemed the most appropriate to their relation to the universe. They could not believe that man's own initiative or works could save him. Moreover they feared Satan far more than their forefathers had: his terrors and their temptations confronted them starkly.[36]

The other, secular face of Puritanism encouraged work rather than works; it exhorted men to a frugal and disciplined life based on piety. It appealed to the new middle class of honest, sober and industrious people – artisans and small and middling merchants in the towns, yeomen and propertied peasants in the country.[37] Above all those small employers and self-employed to whom frugality and hard work might make all the difference between poverty and prosperity were attracted to the new religion that so aptly encouraged their own material self-interest.[38] These men needed self-control and discipline in order to succeed: Puritanism, in encouraging these virtues, reinforced a disposition more prone to control, reflection and inwardness than would have been found in the majority of Elizabethans. I leave until the next section on parricidal guilt further discussion of the Puritan cultural form.

The other ideal to gain a great following among the middle and upper ranks of Elizabethan England was that of the gentleman. The period was inundated by books of improvement, manuals and pamphlets devoted to manners, conversation, rhetoric, how to write letters, how to address people of differing rank, advice on courtship, marriage and behaviour in bed. There were dictionaries of compliments, anthologies of aphorisms from classical sages. One of the earliest best-sellers, Sir Thomas Elyot's *The Governor*, went through eight editions between first publication in 1531 and 1580.[39]

The period was marked by an unprecedented amount of social mobility, both upwards and downwards. Above all, entrants into a rapidly expanding upper middle class, who had made their money

through land or trade, sought a status commensurate with their new wealth: they strove to join the gentry. Innumerable complaints about everyone grasping to climb have survived. A contemporary exclaimed:

> Who ever saw so many discontented persons . . . so few contented with their own calling; and such a number desirous and greedy of change and novelties? The merchant doth he not tickle the title of a Gentleman?[40]

The furious new interest in how to behave that led to the codification of the conduct appropriate for a gentleman was the result of a mixture of motives, varying especially between the different social strata. The old gentry were threatened on two fronts, first by the possible failure of their own fortunes, and second by having their ranks diluted by hordes of *nouveaux riches*. So they sought to better define themselves as a class, making access more difficult and making their own distinction more visible and impressive. The upstarts themselves were often not unhappy to aim at a club that was difficult to join: the rewards of success were thereby greater. Moreover the career of the *parvenu* typically carries its own peculiar anxieties: rapid rise might just as easily be followed by sudden fall, and when the rise is purely in terms of wealth and is not consolidated by status there is no independent safeguard against fall. Such a group has the single ambition of being accepted and is usually highly conservative in its values, as was the case for fifteenth-century London merchants, among whom the pedantic and snobbish doctrines of gentility that permeated the Elizabethan elites were first mooted.[41]

The need to codify a large slice of everyday conduct that hitherto had been left to the exigencies of impulse, and except in cases of extreme violence had been completely free from the check of conscience, either public or private, indicates a dispositional shift, to a new type of anxiety. It was an anxiety that in permeating everyday life asked for that life to be controlled. A conscience had somehow developed that made men read moral issues into much of their conduct and made them doubt the impulses that would have driven them without inhibition in the immediate past.

The urban middle class sought a more direct confirmation. Filling a position somewhere between the books on Puritan devotion and those on how to behave, a considerable literature emerged extolling the virtues of the valiant apprentice and the merchant alike.[42] We observe here the secular side of Puritanism blending with a modest expression of the gentlemanly ideal to reassure one hefty segment of the population on the rise that it could relax its troubled conscience a little about where it belonged.

The craving for explanations of the world, especially by those anxious about either their health or their destiny, took many other forms as well. Astrology flourished, enjoying high prestige.[43]

Prophecies were also popular, especially during the turbulent period of the Reformation. They served to justify an existence whose direction and value people doubted. Taking the form of predictions made by sages, preferably ancient, they were applied to the present to give a sense that all was in order, all was according to providential plan, because men of insight had foreseen it.[44] Prophecies were a counter to the foreboding sense of disruption and chaos that was never quietened for long in this period. Apart from astrological predictions and prophecies there was a plethora of alternative explanations of misfortune and answers to doubt: scores of wizards, charmers and fortune-tellers peddled their own brands of magic.

The problem of order remained uppermost in Elizabethan England as it had in the Middle Ages. The time was exceptionally intolerant of deviants. However there were some gains and they indicate some growth in the belief that self-mastery was the antidote to social disorder. There was an extraordinary increase in litigation after 1550. As Stone argues, the new enthusiasm for legal action suggests a moving away from taking revenge by private and usually violent means, and an increased level of self-control by the landed class.[45] In another sphere, the universities, the free and turbulent life of the medieval student came under close supervision and the frequent imposition of corporal punishment. From mid-century a new respect for social status and the exclusive merits of the gentleman emerged at Oxford and Cambridge,[46] indicating a growing need to impose a reliable hierarchy on a society appearing more and more fluid. In the middling and upper strata an increasing interest in children went with adherence to the Old Testament maxim that the parent who loves his child will use the rod liberally. Infants were swaddled, children were corsetted, in order to mould their bodies. Their minds were moulded by whipping knowledge and virtue into them. We have here a sign of a new confidence that the chronic disorder that had devastated human life from time immemorial might be vanquished, and above all by harnessing the cruel and impulsive inner man. However, Elizabethan confidence was unsettled and erratic: the optimism about child-rearing was offset by the fear that the innate evil of the child might pollute the whole family.

The Elizabethan Age was marked by an intensity of cultural ferment unmatched before or after in English history and perhaps not in the history of any other society. A passion for truth drove men to inquire across a vast horizon of knowledge. The English language itself was revolutionized. New literary genres emerged, as did the theatre to provide a venue for some of them. The same passion inspired vigorous and often vicious theological debate, and a flurry of new doctrines swept through the period 1530 to 1660. As we have seen an extraordinary range of both Christian and pagan beliefs held sway among different groups, and sometimes within the same group.

The passion for truth went hand in hand with a pursuit of the ideal or the good. Two-thirds of Elyot's *The Governor* was devoted to the virtues becoming a gentleman, and above all to 'goodness'. But again there was little consensus. There were too many competing ideals, and the culturally active parts of the population were too restive. Overall there was as rich a field of exemplars for Elizabethans to choose from as there was variety of character portrayed by Shakespeare. Marlowe's Tamburlaine, with his insatiable ambition, his towering rage and love of slaughter, his fantastic pride, represented one extreme, the swashbuckling adventurer ideal projected by the time onto men like Sir Francis Drake. The adventurer was at many points the antithesis of either the Puritan or the gentleman, and yet the age not only housed all three, it combined and celebrated them in one character, that of Sir Walter Raleigh.

The true and the good represent human goals never far removed from the quest for salvation, however disguised that quest might be. At the root of the Elizabethan turmoil – marked in that new hesitancy stretching from trivial everyday conduct such as how to address a social inferior to the ultimate questions about the meaning of life – we can make out the desperate yearning for access to grace. The common man preferred magical means in his combat with such obstacles to his redemption as evil spirits. The Puritan chose piety and discipline. The aristocrat and the gentleman saw their existence justified by their position in society, and their maintenance of it through a certain style of living. The alchemist sought the secret of salvation through his science. Even the utterly secular and sceptical Shakespeare was in search of the ingredients of character and above all virtue that might bring harmony to an innately unstable society riddled with irresoluble contradictions. A melancholy Hamlet was troubled by the meaning of life. Finally all those Elizabethans who sought an explanation of misfortune, irrespective of the type of answer they finally accepted if any, were in fact asking to be told that God or Providence had not abandoned them, and that if they had erred, and were now suffering the consequences, then there was something that they could do to redeem the past. They were seeking a path to salvation. The time may have been largely indifferent to formal religion, but there is every suggestion that individuals throughout the middle and upper social ranks were deeply troubled about the state of the world and their place in it, and yearned for some sort of grace or salvation.

The extraordinary zest for language is a stark indicator of the mood of the time. To take the greatest example of all, Shakespeare's plays, words are used as if anything is possible, nothing is fixed, everything is in doubt. No convention or tradition of speech seems to inhibit the characters: they will try almost anything to improve their powers of description and understanding. Everyone talks too much.

It is as if they hoped to speak their way through the anxieties that riddle their contrary dispositions and experiences. Shakespeare is the Tamburlaine of language, but his buccaneering is permeated with a discontented questioning, which frequently lurches into an abysmally black vision such as outlined in *Timon of Athens* or *Troilus and Cressida*. Moreover the greatest of sceptics does not manage to produce an ideal man, certainly after Henry V: all his great characters are flawed.[47] There is no more vivid example of the cultural flux that rocked Elizabethan England than Shakespeare's restless pursuit of a possible combination of individual disposition and testing events that might prove balanced and fortunate. The range of the works is a mark of just how dissatisfied the playwright was by any solution. It is not that certain ideals such as friendship (Hamlet and Horatio) are not consistently affirmed; it is rather that no set of appropriate qualities unites in one man in his own time. Salvation, the god-guided passage that Homer's Odysseus enjoyed, eludes all of the mature Shakespeare's characters.

But what of guilt? We have reasonably established that there were high levels of anxiety, and unlike that experienced in preceding centuries the disquiet that troubled Elizabethans drove them to cultural innovation across a wide frontier. The old explanations of the superficial guilt culture of the Middle Ages somehow no longer worked, no longer seemed appropriate. The growing Elizabethan concern over how to behave, whether driven by the Puritan or gentleman ideal or one of the many others, was the sedimentation in everyday life of the age's questioning of the ultimate ends of human life. Asking how to act was the logical outcome of opening up the issue of who a man was and whom he ought to be. Mounting self-consciousness and failing spontaneity indicate that conscience was forming and it made men doubt more and more of what they did. Men whose forefathers had been complacent about their fate when not directly threatened felt the need to seek better explanations, new beliefs, and above all a code in which they could have faith. All in all a new type of anxiety was gnawing away at the well-springs of action. It made men begin to worry more about themselves than external calamity; it made them moralize everyday life in order that they should know what to do; it made them fear their own steps; it drove Puritan and *parvenu* alike through the gates of self-doubt, craving moral and religious guidance lest they stray from the right path. All of this points to the new anxiety being guilt.

We may observe signs of intensified guilt in a number of specific areas, and most importantly in a growing sense of individual responsibility – the best indicator of heightened conscience. The religious side of Puritanism attracted those worried about their fallen state, and they were a steadily increasing number. Puritanism carried with it a radical shift towards an ethic of individual responsibility, making

the individual culpable for his actions, and thereby vulnerable to guilt. The turning away from the magical rites of the medieval Church and its blaming of saints or spirits for misfortune; the preferring of an austere relationship between a man and his God cemented by conscience, sanctioned by guilt and damnation; the controlling of action by individual conscience rather than fear of divine punishment; even the blaming of parents for the sins of their children - all these indicate the shift to individual responsibility. The law acted in tandem. Henry VIII was the last king to punish one member of a family, or an entire family, for another's crime. The vendetta type of family feud died out by the late sixteenth century.[48] By the 1640s individual choice had so replaced the medieval value of loyalty to kin that one in seven aristocratic families found themselves divided internally by the civil war.[49]

There were of course residues of the Middle Ages. We have discussed the violent anarchy of everyday life. One area at least, however, that at first glance indicates the resilience of medieval superstition, at the same time betrays the marks of increasing guilt. There was greater persecution of witches in Elizabethan times. But Thomas shows that the typical witch prosecution was of a poor old woman who had asked for charity and been denied. The prosecutor was driven by his own bad conscience, reasoning that the woman had reason for being hostile to him and invoking evil spirits against him.[50]

Guilt had not got such a tight grip as to inhibit inquiry and action. There was enough of the naïve vitality of the Middle Ages left to carry men buoyantly through their new self-questionings. Englishmen had not reached the point at which they could settle down. They were the adolescents of their country's history, disturbed by psychological growing pains that had driven them beyond the logic of childhood, with its impulsive egoism constrained only by the fear of demons or the hand of external authority. Now they were on their own, and forced to try out different identities, taking to one enthusiastically one day, vigorously rejecting it the next. They were too agitated to relax, too restlessly mobile, rarely finding one identity or mode of living that they could feel at home in. In piecing together their exemplars for how to live they borrowed from the past, both from classical ideals and from the superstitions of the Middle Ages; they borrowed both renaissance ideals and Reformation theology from the Continent. But what they borrowed they adapted, and for the rest, which was quite substantial, they had to invent their own culture. In this they went far beyond adolescence.

(iv) *Parricidal guilt (1600–60)* The cultural stage of parricidal guilt is typified by the predominance of a religion according to which God is harshly punitive, distant, and all-powerful, and man is sinfully low and worthless. Religion is mirrored in a severely patriarchal family

structure. Guilt may be more potent than in the rampant, uncultured guilt stage: the important difference however is that it has been harnessed, a culture has formed through which it can be both explained and sublimated. The search for a housing culture is over. The parricidal guilt stage in ancient Judaism followed the prophets, coming into being as their doctrines took hold among the people. In ancient Greece Sophocles was the great representative of parricidal guilt: in his plays a devastatingly severe notion of fate, and its potency in scourging human life, substitutes for the sternly patriarchal deity of Judaism and Puritanism.

The parricidal guilt stage in England was that of Puritanism. It developed between 1530 and 1600 and reached its maturity between 1600 and the Restoration in 1660. There are a number of reasons for choosing the date 1600 as a rough indicator of Puritanism having moved towards a point of predominant social influence. Puritan ideas had spread rapidly during the Elizabethan period but they had exerted only a moderate influence on the Church. From the incumbency in 1603 of the Stuart monarchy Puritanism gained ground quickly among the gentry and although it was increasingly opposed by the Church of England it gained new force as the ideology of opposition. Indeed it was so well entrenched by this period that the attempt by Archbishop Laud in the 1630s to suppress it, contributing to other factors, precipitated a revolution for which it provided the driving ideology. The increasing power of the House of Commons and of the legal profession, both steadily moving towards the Puritan camp, constituted a new foothold in the London power elite. Christopher Hill points to the 1590s as a turning point for Puritanism. With the defeat of the Armada in 1588 the serious threat of Catholic invasion waned, and the Puritans saw that their chances of greater political power were slim. They turned their efforts to socialization, to converting households throughout the land. Through preaching and lecturing they began in this decade to have major successes. For example their reformation of the calendar, Sabbatarianism – fixing a working week of six days with the seventh devoted strictly to worship – took hold.[51] While the godly continued to see themselves as a tiny minority in an unregenerate world their ideas were gaining much wider credence. Stone argues that the generation of children hardest hit by punitive Puritan child-raising was that at the end of the sixteenth century, when the theology bit.[52]

Parricidal guilt is engendered by a fear of persecution forcing the terrified child to restrain his own aggressive impulses, which then get turned inwards against himself. It contrasts with matricidal guilt, which is conceived out of a fear of loss of love. In the case of ancient Judaism it was fear of persecution by invading armies that induced the cultural stage of parricidal guilt. I have termed this type of guilt 'parricidal' because the image of the persecutor is virtually always

that of a powerful masculine figure, and the culture generated by such fear usually employs the image of the harsh father and the disobedient son to represent the preoccupying psychological situation. Moreover the anthropological literature on primitive societies shows that it is almost universal for the father to be the strict parent deferred to by the children, revered and feared by them, in contrast to the mother who forms the emotional centre of the family.[53] The fact is decisive given that the family has a virtual monopoly on determining the quality of an individual's guilt, the indelible print it makes on his disposition in childhood.

The antidote to the penalties of matricidal guilt is love. By contrast parricidal guilt remains true to its own generative roots, driving individuals to combat it through becoming controlled, disciplined, productive - and thereby authoritative in their own right. Parricidal guilt drives men to become fathers themselves, men of power and influence deferred to by their families and social inferiors with punctilious ceremony. At the same time anxiety now appears unremittingly as guilt, and therefore cannot be thrown off once the individual has achieved mundane power and control, that is countered the specific causes of his early fears. His guilt means that he retains his doubts about his own worthiness, and a prevailing mood of unsettledness draws him to a religion that casts him as corrupt and infinitely beneath his God. Obedience is asserted as the highest value, of the son to his father, and the father to his God. The father's obsession with self-discipline derives from his need to keep his depraved impulses in check; his guilt over his own innate corruption means that he cannot let go, lest his nature lead him into disobeying his God. Milton represents this psychology, turning it into an exemplary case, in his eulogy of Cromwell:

> he was a soldier well-versed in self-knowledge and whatever enemy lay within - vain hopes, fears, desires - he had either previously destroyed or long since reduced to subjection. A commander first over himself, the conqueror of himself, it was over himself he had learnt most to triumph. Hence he went to encounter the external enemy as a veteran accomplished in all military duties. (*A Second Defence of the English People*)[54]

It would be hard to imagine a more perfect example of a culture precipitated by parricidal guilt than that of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English Puritanism. Its God, its patriarchal family, its ascetic obsession with order and discipline, hard work and pious frugal living, its emphasis on conscience and individual responsibility all derive from parricidal motives. Moreover the passion with which it pursued its religion and attempted to impose it on all conduct through the entire society, indicates that the underlying guilt was of extraordinary ferocity.

The Puritan God was at an inconceivable distance from man; man was a nonentity in his sight. This God was far harsher and more powerful than his medieval predecessor, whose threats were carried only by the light self-consciousness of superficial guilt. It was not possible to manipulate the Puritan God's grace: it would have been presumptuous of humble man to expect such influence. In the Middle Ages God had been set mainly in the background: people were more interested in the visible and tactile intermediary figures. A typical medieval will asks special aid from Mary, John the Baptist, and Saint Michael: it does not mention God. The typical Protestant will mention only God.[55] When a medieval man was threatened by disease he feared that a saint was behind it, not God. The single-mindedness of the Puritan's parricidal interest in God led him to scrap the entire medieval panoply of intermediaries, including Mary. It was God's grace that concerned him, the recognition of the father. Everything else was irrelevant.

Parricidal guilt ensured that the leading Puritan virtue would be obedience, as had been that of the Old Testament prophets. To obey the father was to avoid his displeasure. Any loss of control, any wavering, any delinquent impulse would augment the individual's stock of sin and likely reduce the probability of his salvation. The Puritan view held that the cause of man's fallen state, Adam's crime, was disobedience: Adam had been tempted, he had lost control.[56] Obedience meant first of all self-control. The Puritans were feverish in their advocacy of discipline, meaning self-discipline first and foremost. Milton called it the 'most important thing throughout the whole life of man':[57] he saw it as the removal of disorder and the shape of virtue. Discipline found one of its practical manifestations in the notion of a calling, given its classical formulation by William Perkins in his *A Treatise of Vocations* (1603). The new gospel of work provided both an avenue to virtue and a means for avoiding temptation, or disorder. To be settled at one's chosen work, to carry it out soberly and diligently, was to illustrate that one was not disturbed by the temptations of Satan. Puritan discipline was also to be found in devotional practices, the conscientious spending of Sundays in religious activity, attending sermons, taking notes on them, discussing them afterwards, reading the Bible, and so on. Moreover Church organization itself became highly disciplined. Discipline was the Puritan innovation that did most to change the disposition of a significant class of Englishmen in a way that inclined their descendents to capitalist methods.[58]

The greatest Puritan fear was of unsettledness. Most terrifying it was to be uprooted and cast out, without means of reconciliation with God, to be irretrievably damned and thereby cursed to wander aimlessly. The preachers and lecturers often had a first-hand and literal taste of such an existence: their lives were dogged by sporadic

persecution and continued harrassment.[59] The Puritans hated vagabonds more than they hated priests.[60] They had a deep horror of idleness or wasting time – indeed one of their successes was to routinize time by imposing a regular working week at the expense of the irregular Catholic calendar year with its many holy days.

Guilt was so severe that the Puritan could never waver in his disciplined conduct. He feared that any relaxation might open the flood-gates. What lay behind the flood-gates was a torrent of impulses whose potential for violence unnerved him. Hence his notorious seriousness, his plain black suit and his controlled manner. Hence his hatred of dance, drama, decoration, fornication – all representing the thin end of the wedge of licence. In their worry over their conduct Puritans, who had banished the rite of confession, wrote spiritual diaries. To take one example of the tone of these direct confessions to God, the diary of Richard Rogers is full of 'a pious, wary and tense watchfulness'.[61]

The organ that did the watching was conscience. Parricidal guilt characteristically generates the most rigorously punitive conscience. The new religion did not need the sanctions of excommunication or divine vengeance; conscience sufficed. Perkins wrote: 'conscience is a higher authority than any Church court.' By the end of the sixteenth century ceremony was largely discredited as a means of penance: only two of the seven Catholic sacraments survived. Devotion and work replaced magic. The belief in the magical properties of holy words and objects declined.[62] The denial of purgatory made both ghosts and indulgences obsolete. Public penance lost its efficacy.[63] Men had come to see themselves as responsible for averting misfortune, and for paying for their sins without outside aid. Fasting and personal austerity became more prevalent.[64] The simple lives of Christ and Paul gained exemplary significance.

The rise of conscience introduced the new centrality of the individual. Every man was equal before God: grace was independent of social rank. Every man was responsible for his own conduct – his key relationship being the direct one with God, mediated by God's representative in man, conscience. Men were taught to read and interpret the Bible themselves – Protestants were the driving force that translated the Bible into English, from Tyndale in 1526 to the Genevan Bible translated by the Marian Exiles which dominated the latter half of the sixteenth century. They produced the Book of Common Prayer (1549) and the storm of devotional literature that drenched the period up to 1660. The ideology of self-help arose. Puritans were against the giving of alms: they preferred to train the poor to look after themselves by teaching them a calling.[65]

A greatly increased capacity for self-control, through heightened conscience, the remoteness of God, and the suppression of magical practices and images, all indicate that the new religion was more

abstract. Within the Church, belief became more important than practice. The sensual and visual tenor of medieval religion was replaced by a more intellectual and literary attention to the Bible and devotional writings. Education gained a new prominence.

The patriarchal form of religion was mirrored in the Puritan family. Lawrence Stone has argued that the English family became more patriarchal in the period 1530–1660 than ever before or since. He associates the patriarchal interregnum in the history of the family with Protestantism.[66] Puritan theology made the father responsible for order, discipline and obedience within the family. Elizabeth legislated to make the father responsible for his family's spiritual duties: thus he became the spiritual as well as secular head of the household, replacing the priest. In fact, the father had taken over the main social task of the medieval king, that of maintaining order: he did so by taking a merciless interest in the disciplining of his children. The wife lost her rights over the domestic rituals of fasting and feasting. Apart from a brief period in the middle of the sixteenth century, when the education of girls was as rigorous as that of boys, the new Puritan emphasis on literacy favoured the husband. Symbolic of the heightened patriarchy was the rule that only the master could wear his hat in his own home.[67] Moreover, with the family becoming more close-knit, and ties with secondary kin becoming weaker the family was more dependent on the head of the household. The Puritan rejection of Mariolatry was indicative of more than a general ambition to simplify religion: the image of the nurturing mother was less relevant to such an extremely parricidal culture. Similarly the image of the merciful Christ was suppressed.

Puritanism as patriarchy had a threefold hierarchy: God the father, the Christian magistrate or Church elder, the head of the household. Many Puritans would have inserted a fourth rank, the king as father of the nation. Indeed Laslett has argued that the patriarchal theory of the monarchy that dominated the early Stuart period, portraying the king as the divinely installed father of the country, was a simple projection of the family model of the time.[68] John Winthrop opposed democracy on the grounds that it contravened the fifth commandment.

The Puritan saw the human condition as one of fearfulness, distrust and war; human nature was at root corrupted. (We should remind ourselves that given the times this was not an altogether inaccurate reading.) He hoped that religious discipline would create a bulwark against such inherent disorder. His answer to terror and loneliness was obedience, not love – Hobbes responded to an identical reading of the human condition by advocating the authoritarian State. The Puritan ideal was that of the disciplined son being granted recognition (grace) by the stern and impassive, yet just father. Fathers fearful of the wicked impulses of their children tried to whip

them into submission. It was little wonder that sons would cower before both their biological and divine fathers, little wonder that they should bear secretly murderous impulses of revenge against those fathers, and become obsessed out of parricidal guilt that authority prevail. So the greatest literary work of the period, *Paradise Lost*, tells the story of Satan's rebellion against God, and does so with liberal references to the first man's parallel disobedience: it is a single-mindedly parricidal work. (I am taking some liberty with dates, considering Milton as wholly of the 1600–60 period, and Shakespeare as wholly of the preceding Elizabethan Age.)

The rampant, uncultured guilt that had surged through Elizabethan England had now found its appropriate cultural form, and for a time there was a harmony between the individual's psychological disposition and the culture in which he immersed himself. This was a great triumph, similar to that achieved by the Jewish prophets.

(v) *Civilized guilt (1660–1800)* The cultural stage of civilized guilt is characterized by a mellowing of parricidal anxieties and their defending culture, a greater secularity, with conduct becoming more temperately controlled, institutions more rationally bureaucratic. The cultural zenith is passed. There is no longer any need for fierce questioning; men are more at ease in their world; consequently the culture they produce is lighter, more ephemeral, interested in manners and style, and when serious ironical or sceptical. In the case of ancient Judaism the stage of civilized guilt was that dominated by the priests following the Babylonian exile; Yahweh had become less forbidding and distant; the religion had come to stress right conduct in daily life, with lapses governed by a complicated system of penance rather than being threatened by diabolical divine retribution. In Greece civilized guilt emerged in late fifth-century Athens. Pericles and Thucydides were two of its exemplars. Euripides too belongs in part here, although his work betrays the strong presence of the next stage, matricidal guilt.

In English history the period 1660–1800 is roughly that of civilized guilt, although traces of the parricidal stage remain (in for example the literary figures of Defoe and Richardson) and matricidal themes begin to emerge. Religion became less austere, more merciful and sociable, as in the Church of England after the Restoration. It was less that there were substantial changes in attitudes to work and worship after 1660 than that the rasping edge had been blunted. Practices that were revolutionary became routine, and extremes were tempered. For example the notion of hell declined, as did the prosecution of witches.[69]

Sexual restrictions were relaxed. Adultery, mistresses, contraception, prostitutes – in short, licence – were not merely tolerated, they became the norm among the upper classes. Pre-nuptial pregnancies

increased radically from the late seventeenth century; illegitimacy rose from roughly 2 per cent to 6 per cent between 1720 and 1780.[70] The patriarchy weakened. The head of the household exerted a less strict moral control; there was in general less punishment and more affection within the family.[71]

The eighteenth century was the period when the first great advances in personal hygiene and refining domestic practices were made. The body and its functions became private: washbasins, portable bath-tubs and soap appeared. Lice-ridden natural hair was shaved off and men and women took to wearing wigs. Forks replaced fingers as the utensils for eating; there was a proliferation of plates and utensils. Spitting became controlled and noses were blown on handkerchieves and not in clothes or through the fingers.[72,73] Much of what we have come to assume as civilized behaviour appeared during this period. To take a different example, the public shaming of criminals was also on the wane.

A similar pattern is to be observed in the fields of commerce and administration. The commercial revolution, a prerequisite for the later industrial revolution, dates from the Restoration. The half-century after 1660 saw the introduction of marine insurance, the consolidation of the practice of borrowing capital on mortgaged property, limited legal liability for debts of shareholders, the founding of the Bank of England, the creation of a permanent stock market, the use of cheques, and the printing of exchange rates twice weekly.[74] In general the institutions and methods were appearing that would make commerce a more rational and less haphazard enterprise. There were gains in control across a wide frontier. The Puritan passion for order and discipline had found a new world in which to assert itself. Now that the energies of the middle class on the rise were less directed into theological and political controversy, into piety and revolution, they could flow untrammelled into commerce and the betterment of everyday living.

The great literary figures of the civilized guilt culture were, on the lighter side, Farquar and Goldsmith, on the more serious, Pope, Swift, Johnson, Hume, Burke, and as its late and most exquisite flower, Jane Austen. Reynolds and Gainsborough painted the proudly secular spirit of the time; Hogarth scoffed at it. The enthusiasms of the literature mirror the leading themes of the culture: to control human conduct and social life through better manners, greater civility, improved hygiene and comfort, and a more consistent and liberally just political system. Lesser lights of the time such as Smith and Bentham applied the same passion for better order to other organizations, to business enterprise, the law, education, prisons and administration. Men found themselves astride a more sedate beast than the crazed stallion that their Puritan forefathers had tried to ride, and they could afford to diversify their imposition

of self-assertion and mastery over their environment, and better enjoy themselves in the process. The literary and artistic zenith might be past, with men turning in Spengler's terms from culture to civilization, but the fine sceptical intelligence of the English eighteenth century is not by much the less brilliant than the achievement of the Elizabethan Age. In the greatest literary figures like Johnson and Jane Austen, as in the political theory of Edmund Burke, the seriousness of the Puritan search for salvation underpins the civilized outer form of the art and saves it from lapsing into an over-indulgent baroque decadence. Moreover this period laid the intellectual foundations for both the industrial revolution and parliamentary democracy.

The presence of guilt (visible in its symptoms) does not immediately arrest the eye in a civilized guilt culture. But guilt itself did not ease in England after 1660. What happened was that while remaining in a parricidal mode its leading defences and sublimations – the need for authority, order and self-control – no longer expressed themselves in plain and blunt Puritan forms. These sublimations became progressively more differentiated and moved through a much wider span of human activity. It is as if the torrent of guilt-driven energy of the parricidal stage, which had coursed violently along a few main rivers (above all pious religious practice and hard work), was now diffused through a myriad of tributaries covering the whole landscape. In the process men did gain some control over more of the factors that influenced their lives. Their success, combined with the new opportunities for satisfying their need to occupy themselves in productive or self-bettering activity, led them to become a little more at ease with themselves. However, the fact that they were still driven by guilt, its restless doubt gnawing within, meant that in spite of the civilized veneer the new stage of culture in harmony with individual disposition would be precarious.

What we have been discussing is the trend within the middle, and to a lesser extent, upper classes. Many individuals, not to mention the entire lower orders, were experiencing a different cultural stage. However, what we are interested in here, in attempting to trace the main phases and turns in the evolution of English society, is the leading themes – which is no reason for forgetting that the reality was a lot more complicated.

A civilized guilt culture is born out of the very success of its preceding parricidal culture. In its turn it prepares its own demise, the transformation into a matricidal guilt culture. This happened as follows. Rank patriarchal authority within the family declined, a process mirrored in the society at large by the reduced power of the king in favour of the parliament, and the gradual replacement of small family businesses controlled by the master by larger enterprises requiring a more impersonal bureaucratic administration. As the

mother gained greater authority within the family affection slowly replaced obedience as its predominant mood.[75,76] Parents became kinder to their children, more attached to them, less given to either neglecting or beating them. The child's behaviour was sanctioned less by a fear of physical punishment and more by threats of withdrawal of parental, and in particular, maternal love. Thus there was a switch in the way a child learnt to control his impulses, that is develop a conscience. Parricidal guilt gave way to matricidal guilt, and as the transformation of disposition that followed began to take effect the cultural concerns of the society, its driving values, moved away from those of civilized guilt – greater civility, a more just politics and law, better organized industry and commerce – and turned in the direction of the more remiss, orally-indulgent, consumption-oriented modes of the next cultural stage.[77]

In the English case the emergence of a matricidal guilt culture was postponed until the twentieth century by the Puritan and Evangelical revivals in the first half of the nineteenth century. Foreshadowed by the Romantic movement, there followed a return to the cultural forms of parricidal guilt, intermingling with some residues of the preceding civilized guilt culture. The Victorians reintroduced punitive child-rearing practices and restored the undisputed primacy of the authoritative father in the family. The causes of the Victorian regression to parricidal guilt do not concern us here.

(b) THE CAUSES

We turn now to the all-important question of how it happened, what constellation of forces set in motion the process of cultural evolution that led to modern society. The question reduces to one about the shift from stage (ii) to stage (iii), from superficial guilt to rampant, uncultured guilt. The first transition from naïve culture to medieval Catholicism falls outside the concern of the current article – however interpreting this change appears straightforward, given the multiple anxieties of a disease-ridden, famine-prone and war-torn society, and the near-universal human proclivity to look for the causes of misfortune in the past conduct of the individuals involved.[78] The third transition from rampant, uncultured guilt to parricidal guilt takes place spontaneously, as has been indicated: a rampant, uncultured guilt culture is inherently unstable due to the high and uncontrolled levels of anxiety that it harbours. Likewise we have demonstrated how stage (v), civilized guilt, evolved out of stage (iv). Similarly for the final stage, matricidal guilt. Thus the critical causal question is over the emergence of rampant, uncultured guilt, that is over the genesis of the conviction that man is fallen. A superficial guilt culture may be highly stable, as evidenced in a number of European countries

by the survival of medieval Catholicism in a virtually unchanged form down to the twentieth century. We have to explain what tilted it in England. The argument proceeds in two sections, dealing first with the prelude and then moving on to the uncultured guilt phase itself.

(i) *The prelude: 1350–1530* Some of the preconditions already existed in the late Middle Ages for the rampant, uncultured guilt stage. In addition there were social changes that helped prepare the way. It is significant that both the major precondition and the major shift in the balance of social forces in the period 1350–1530 reduce to the same source, harsh experience. Just as harshness, induced by invading enemies, had triggered the growth of guilt in ancient Judaism that led to the prophets and the development of a parricidal guilt culture, an analogous severity of conditions thrust England out of the Middle Ages. It appears that our explanation is at root Hobbesean: it is fear that drives social evolution.

It was not invasion by barbaric Assyrians, or rather the terror thereof, that was the agent of change in England. The harsh conditions were set by two internal factors, climate and plague. Apart from Montesquieu, social theorists have gone to water over attributing much sociological importance to climate. This is surely due to the success with which industrial society has insulated its population, and especially those who live in cities, from the rigours and vagaries of climate. However, in a pre-capitalist society, a harsh climate such as experienced in northern Europe forced its inhabitants to spend much of their energy in keeping out the cold. More importantly for our investigation here, the experience of a long bleak winter, with the horizon close and the sky low, with little colour or warmth in the fields or woods, forcing the people to huddle inside as much as possible, would have predisposed men towards a greater introversion, a greater inwardness: their outside environment awarded them little distraction. At the other extreme, the aboriginal tribes of Australia, the ideal-type of a hedonistic naïve culture, were dependent for much of their style of life on a hot climate.

Whether a country turned Protestant indicates whether it developed enough guilt in an uncultured transitional stage to generate a powerfully parricidal guilt culture. Protestantism is an index of high guilt. Now can it be merely coincidence that Protestantism took hold in precisely those European countries with a harsh climate, in Britain, Scandinavia, the Netherlands and northern Germany? It did not succeed in the more climatically temperate France, southern Germany, or the part of Austria that is heavily populated, the non-alpine country around Vienna. In moving from north to south the single middle-region example of Protestantism is Switzerland, which again suffers from a much more severe winter than surrounding regions on every side.

Moreover, the further north the more severe the impact. There is a bleak melancholy about many Scandinavians and Icelanders. The cold severity and inner torment of Ibsen's characters, or many in the earlier films of Ingmar Bergman, leaves little room for human warmth. A similar mood pervades the two great novels set in northern Germany, Fontane's *Effi Briest* and Thomas Mann's *Buddenbrooks*. Moreover, within Britain itself it was Scotland that first introduced and later retained the harsher Presbyterian form of Protestantism. In the USA before its Civil War the Puritan New Englanders were in marked temperamental contrast to the more relaxed and gregarious gentlemen from the South.

My argument is that climate exerts a major influence on disposition, and that those who have lived for generations in a harsh climate without modern insulation against its rigours would have developed a predisposition towards introspectiveness, towards controlling their emotions: their disposition would have been more receptive to guilt.

In England the severity of life, due in significant degree to the timeless factor of climate, was radically intensified from the middle of the fourteenth century by a series of devastating plagues. The Black Death in 1348 opened a sequence of demographic catastrophes that were to kill off vast numbers of people, and especially children. Plague visited England at least thirty times between 1348 and 1485, twelve times on a national scale, including the Grey Death of 1361. It was complemented by other endemic diseases, including amoebic dysentry, tuberculosis and smallpox (the mysterious 'sweating sickness').[79] Demographers estimate that the fifty years after 1348 saw the population of England roughly halved.[80] To take an individual example, all of Dean Colet's nineteen brothers and sisters died in childhood.[81] The average fifteenth-century London merchant, his prosperity insulating his family better than most against high mortality, could expect twenty years of marriage producing ten children, and yet by the third generation his family would have failed to produce a male heir reaching marriageable age.[82] Nor did plague abate in the sixteenth century, although its deadliness was lesser: between 1500 and 1665 there were only twelve years in which London was free from its pall.[83]

We have already noted that fear of plague was enough to stimulate such extreme fanaticism as the flagellation sects. Jean Delameau has drawn on contemporary accounts from the Middle Ages of the affects of plague to paint a portrait of total social and moral breakdown, with social and economic life coming to a standstill, and men seized by terror abandoning all ties in order to preserve their own lives.[84] Delameau also uses fear of plague to explain the great fascination with Satan and with Hell that first emerged in fourteenth-century Europe.[85] A powerful new cause for anxiety was introduced

into English life from 1348. The flagellants themselves are evidence that such anxiety did not necessarily transform into guilt. What we can claim is that the sense of fearful vulnerability felt by the average Englishman had been greatly heightened, and that he would have been driven to seek some release from the strain.

The plague, by decimating the population, exerted a direct and decisive influence on the social structure: it precipitated a sequence of changes that would bring about the collapse of feudalism. The reduction in population created a labour shortage, pushing wage-rates up - real wages doubled between 1349 and 1415.[86] At the same time demand for rural produce fell, leading to a reduction in prices. The magnates and the large landowners, squeezed from both sides, could no longer afford to maintain the enormous staff of servants and villeins they had been used to in the feudal past. It became more economical for them to lease their land out to independent farmers, many of whom had recently been bailiffs, reeves, or the more distinguished of their own peasantry.[87] Moreover there were great opportunities for villeins to leave their masters and sell their labour on the open market. A greater legal flexibility over the disposal of land also occurred. In short there was a major reorganization of the huge rural estates into smaller and shifting units. The fifteenth century was the English peasant's golden age: he gained an independence and a standard of living hitherto inconceivable to him.

Plague also worked to aggravate the major political problem of the time, civic disorder.[88] All commentators agree that the law was pretty impotent in the fifteenth century. The government was very inefficient in control, it had poor information, and there was serious corruption amongst its officials; a majority of the tiny minority of criminals who were indicted were acquitted; trials took years; men under sentence of outlawry lived freely and openly.[89] The presence of a weak king such as Henry VI on the throne increased the threat of sedition and civil war. Areas of the country were terrorized by armed bands; small gangs of murderers, thieves, poachers, kidnappers, cheats and extortioners were common.[90] Although the poor level of control exerted by the organs of justice over crime may not have been much worse than in previous centuries, we have reason to reckon chronic disorder as one of the minor predisposing factors behind cultural change in England.

There were two major social changes during the period 1350–1530. Firstly there was the expansion of a rural middle class ranging in composition from ex-peasants and yeomen owning or leasing small holdings to the prosperous gentry. A similar development did not occur in the towns, with the minor exception of the growing importance of lawyers. Trade was stagnant during this period. The London merchant class, for instance, did not increase in numbers through the fifteenth century, although there was rapid turnover within its

ranks.[91] One sign of the growing significance of the rural middle class was the fifteenth century subdivision of the third category in the age-old classification of society into men of war, prayer and work – into 'mediocres' and 'paupers'.[92]

The second major social change was the decline in the power of the magnates, as a result in the early decades of the period of the economic consequences of the plague, and in the latter decades of the success with which the first two Tudor kings centralized their power in London, made the common law more effective, defeated rebel barons in battle, and cultivated the gentry.[93] The magnates had a brief period of return to their old glory, and greater, in the middle of the fifteenth century.

Stimulated above all by the aspirations of the new middle class, some cultural motifs anticipatory of the Reformation appeared. In the late fourteenth century both Chaucer and Langland idealized the plowman: they stressed the sacred quality of honest labour, that it was conducive to piety. Wyclif and his Lollard followers were moving in the same direction, but also wanting to simplify religious practice. They attributed virtue directly to individuals without the mediation of the Church (predestination), and sought to scrap much of Catholic superstition. Wyclif placed great importance on the Bible and wanted it available in the vernacular. The Lollards were especially strong among another independent middle-class group, the artisans.[94] The new group that were finding that they could improve their lot through hard work and thrift were naturally attracted to doctrines of self-help and a simpler more secular Christianity. The fifteenth century saw the emergence of devotional literature, manuals of piety – accounting for two-fifths of Caxton's publications between 1474 and 1490. This literature stressed personal devotion and good conduct rather than religious observances.[95] Contemporaneously sermons started to emphasize conscience, and became sceptical about the externals of religion.[96] The influential English mystic, Walter Hilton, stressed moderation and frugality. His book, *The Scale of Perfection*, was more read in the fifteenth century than any other devotional text.

The moves against Catholicism were aided by the rundown state of the Church. The Pope had lost virtually any say in England. The best of the pious withdrew into monasteries; many of the parochial clergy were part-illiterate and poorly educated in the scriptures. There were countless abuses and corruptions.[97] At the same time the classes represented in Parliament were consistently hostile to papal policy.[98]

The fifteenth century saw a growing interest in education.[99] Between 1350 and 1530 six new colleges were built at Oxford, and nine at Cambridge. Wykeham's endowment at Oxford doubled the number of dons. Edward IV founded the royal library, Humphrey of Gloucester owned over 500 books, more than either university library.

By 1500 around 50 per cent of males could read; all London merchants could read English and most some Latin.[100] Ladies began to take their Books of Hours into church with them; pews with book-rests were introduced.

There remain two other factors that contributed directly to the English Reformation, and thereby to the change we are focusing on. First the invention of the printing press made it possible to provide a large section of the population with cheap books. Protestantism was greatly facilitated by being able to give the middling members of society access to a Bible in their own language supplemented with manuals of devotion. Second, England was not alone: she was subject to new ideas from continental Europe, especially in the 1520s when Lutheran doctrines started to cross the Channel.

I have postponed until last discussion of one important factor in the waning of the English Middle Ages. There is mounting evidence of an economically based individualism stretching right back to at least middle medieval times. Macfarlane argues that as early as 1250 England was significantly capitalist in its rural economy: there existed a developed market and mobility of labour, land was treated as a commodity and full private ownership was established – direct inheritance from father to son was not guaranteed by law. There was already considerable social and geographical mobility, the farm and its incumbent family were largely distinct, and there existed rational accounting methods.[101] Above all, individualism existed in the sense of legal rights, property ownership, and the selling of labour. Thus we have here a further factor predisposing a significant part of the rural population towards self-control. When and how English agriculture became organized on an individualistic rather than communalistic basis is important to our discussion. However, current knowledge is far too poor to provide an answer. If Macfarlane is correct in dating this peculiar English experience as well before 1350 then part of my argument will need amending, to take account of the earlier appearance of one of the factors contributing to the rise of guilt.

Let us now sum up the prelude to the cultural shift into rampant, uncultured guilt. The English were predisposed because of their harsh climate to an inwardness of character, to holding in check or internalizing their emotions. Dispositionally they were more receptive to guilt. From 1348 levels of anxiety, driven from primordial times by the fear of death, were heavily reinforced by recurring plague. The plague also forced major changes to the feudal social structure, leading to the growth of a new rural middle class, with its own property and independence. An individualism already well founded in rural England, in its economic practices and the common law, was thereby extended and consolidated. The first signs of new cultural forms emerged: the revaluation of work as sacred, the stress on personal devotion and right conduct as more important than religious

rites, a reduction in the importance of the priest, and a greater interest in education. These signs of change were as yet feeble and sporadic – much more typical of the general mood of the late Middle Ages was the establishment of many new shrines and the proliferation of miracle cults.[102] But in those various signs of cultural change we see a growing confidence among some middle groups in the society that they could improve their lot by virtue of their own efforts; more abstractly, they could gain a greater control over their own lives. These were independent people used to regular and hard work, a capacity that shows that as individuals they were moving away from the typically delinquent disposition of the Middle Ages, with its impulsiveness, its distrust, its cruelty and its low powers of consistency and concentration. They above all showed a capacity for self-control, a greater evenness of temper, as illustrated in *Piers the Plowman*. New economic conditions were allowing those of them who were farmers to prosper in ways unavailable to their forbears. Now the terrors of the age, the sheer precariousness of human life, would have exerted a quite different impact on this group than on their delinquent contemporaries. The latter were condemned by their dispositions to live always in the moment, with no thought of the long term: their anxieties, like those of the flagellants, were short-lived. The new sort of man was by contrast more thoughtful; his work required him to plan, to sow now in order to reap later – in short to be capable of postponed gratification. Heightened anxiety would affect his character in a more profound yet diffuse manner, spreading through it and raising the temperature more moderately and more evenly, but ensuring that it would not leave easily. Such anxiety would first of all unsettle him in a way that would make him seek greater control, which might mean greater industry in his work or greater piety in his worship. Anxiety was being transformed into guilt.

As a postscript to this section: other middle-class strata were showing signs of wanting greater control. Manuals dealing with how gentlemen ought to behave originated in this period. Anger was the vice that most concerned London merchants, indicating the survival of the medieval delinquent in their own breasts.[103] However, the merchants were taking greater pains to make their sons more obedient and civil. Schools taught authority and discipline; the civility code emphasized that what was most important was restraining one's temper before inferiors and superiors. Calmness of manner was the ideal.[104] The merchant class had not yet proclaimed hard work as virtuous, and its love of hunting, eating, drinking, pageants and theatricals indicated that the first halters of the self-controlled man were as yet worn lightly. But the individual had now developed the desire to control his own passions, and he expected that he would thereby be able to better control a disorderly society.

Such an individual would not have to make much progress in constraining his impulses, above all learning to swallow his rage, before that rage would be eating away at his own entrails, and he would begin to feel guilt such as his forefathers had never known.

While these first transformations out of the Middle Ages were under way signs of increasing guilt were appearing in religious belief and practice. The doctrine of purgatory became much more important in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[105] This was the period of the chantries – small chapels, often inside churches, sometimes within houses, devoted to prayers and masses to reduce the time a soul would spend in purgatory. Around 2,000 were built in England.[106] In 1436 Lord Cromwell left money for 3,000 masses to be said for him.[107] At the same time parish guilds grew up, not only to provide comradeship for lesser craftsmen; they had the function of financing requiem masses for those too poor to pay for the care of their souls.[108] The late Middle Ages was also the period of indulgences, devoted to the same end of hastening a soul's journey to heaven.

The heightened concern that the soul of the dead might suffer eternities in purgatory is indicative of a rise in anxiety about how a man conducted his life on earth, a greater fear of sinfulness. However the superficial guilt view prevailed, that God's mercy could be purchased, that all sins could be atoned for. The growth of the chantries, a large number of which lay in the towns, did indicate one other fact: the rise of a middle class wealthy enough to endow such tributes to their faith.[109]

(ii) *The rise of rampant, uncultured guilt: 1530–1600* The movements in late medieval England that had begun to intimate a shift to new social and cultural forms received a sudden and massive increase in momentum from 1530. To an environment pervaded with all the threats of the late Middle Ages – plague, hunger, civic disorder, choleric and untrustworthy neighbours – was added a further unsettling factor: massive social and geographical mobility. Every rank of society from the gentry down to the poor was disrupted by the entry of an unprecedented number of strangers, and the equally rapid departure of old members. Fortune, in a concrete material sense, was added to death as the second implacable tyrant threatening to uproot the individual from his place. Through this turmoil there emerged a sizeable and vigorous middle class. It was this class that was to experience the rigours of rampant, uncultured guilt, and that was to be driven to find new cultural forms to calm its troubled nerves. The question we have to answer is how it was that the anxiety experienced by members of the middling strata became transformed into guilt. We want to know what effected the conversion.

More than half the population belonged to the lowest class, which

included the vagrant, the cottager, the hired labourer, the house-servant, the factory wage-earner, miner and sailor. This class does not concern us, apart from the fact that hordes of wandering vagabonds and paupers provided Elizabethans with a visible cautionary tale about the potential cruelty of fortune. The bottom stratum of the middle class included the small freeholder or leaseholder, the self-employed artisan, the shopkeeper and the internal trader. This stratum was regarded as ignoble. The next stratum, one marking the transition to the gentry, included large export merchants and the younger sons of prosperous yeomen and lesser gentry. The third middle-class stratum, what today we would term the upper middle class, comprised plain gentlemen - including small landed proprietors and the professionals - civil servants, lawyers, higher clergy and university dons. Its members were accredited as members of the gentry, and in the sixteenth century it would have been regarded in some quarters as the lowest rung of the upper class - for example successful lawyers were usually the sons of landed families.[110] On the other hand a sturdy barrier existed in this period between the peers and the gentry and there is a case for relocating the latter in the upper middle class. The upper class itself consisted of two strata, the country elite - many of the esquires and nearly all the knights - and the titular peerage of sixty families. The top three strata contained a mere 2 per cent of the population.[111]

There were specific economic causes for the massive social and geographical mobility of the Elizabethan period. The dissolution of the monasteries in the 1530s made available vast tracts of land for purchase. For the next eighty years the land market saw extensive activity.[112] It was the perfect opportunity for those who had been doing quite well, from the rural lower middle class to the gentry, to improve themselves. A rapid inflation further helped those who bought land early. From the 1520s, after a long period of stable prices, foodstuffs became dearer, pushing up manufactured goods, to the point that prices had more than doubled by the 1550s, and again by 1600. By the 1630s prices were six times what they had been in 1500.[113]

From the 1520s population too started to increase, after the decline of the fourteenth century and the stagnation of the fifteenth. The population rose 25 per cent by 1545 and had doubled by 1650. In the same period London expanded by a factor of eight. Town property, previously mainly in the hands of the Church, was gradually taken over by burgesses, who used it more efficiently, increasing rent, making repairs, and in general contributing to the great rebuilding of the late sixteenth century.[114] Growth in trade and industry, however, was only a minor factor influencing the times. It was not until after 1600 that overseas trade started to boom. In fact the only major change in commerce and trade was the mounting

importance of London as the centre of growth – by 1640 it held 8 per cent of the population of England and Wales. That an industrial revolution of any sort occurred in Elizabethan England has been discounted by recent historians.[115]

In general the great social turbulence of the period benefited those in the middle of society at the expense of those at the top and the bottom. The titular aristocracy lost wealth and influence. Its lands were reduced; it was no longer able to mount an army. From late Elizabethan times it sold improvidently in order to maintain the profligate style of life on which it believed its status depended.[116] The Crown and the Church likewise saw a massive shift of relative wealth from themselves to the middle classes. At the other end of the social scale there was a radical increase in the number of masterless men on all the highways – vagabonds, beggars, discharged soldiers and dismissed servants, unemployed labourers, ruined smallholders, as well as tinkers, minstrels, pedlars and fortune tellers.[117] Many were dressed in tatters, filthy, verminous and disfigured by wounds and sores; some were driven to fake frothing at the mouth or to induce running sores in order to attract alms.

Land changed hands at an accelerating rate from 1560 – this has been measured in the case of manors.[118] Groups of the local landed elite – gentry and yeomen – increased their power, property and prestige. Many town merchants bought land in the country, a key move in the direction of joining the gentry.[119] The late sixteenth century saw the increasing power of the Parliament at the expense of the Crown: the gentry component of the House of Commons rose from 50 per cent to 75 per cent.[120] The middle classes, including the gentry, were becoming better educated, and as a result they gained a new confidence, and developed expectations of political and religious participation. But while they did have general aspirations in common they were marked by extreme varieties of activity, interest, and belief.

The dominant social fact of the period was an extraordinary degree of social and geographical mobility in nearly all groups. Discontent and agitation followed, and not merely among the masterless men. In the middle and upper classes large discrepancies between wealth, prestige and power were inevitable. Rapid change brings with it higher aspirations, and the greater likelihood of those aspirations being frustrated.[121] Aspirations in the sphere of wealth might be gratified only to find the door of status closed. At the top, the aristocracy was under the pressure of decline, a pressure guaranteed to unleash strong forces of resentment. The clergy was likewise losing income and prestige. The end of the century saw large graduate unemployment – the intake into Oxford and Cambridge had peaked in the 1580s.[122] Many of the graduates became itinerant Puritan lecturers, with a precarious livelihood. When it is reflected

that such mobility went on against a background of increasing population, mounting inflation, the possibility of Catholic sedition from within and invasion from without, and the ever-present threat of famine and plague (the latter could be expected to kill off up to half the population of every town once in a lifetime), one can understand why the problem of order remained uppermost in the Elizabethan mind. The threat of chaos was unremitting, and it carried insecurity into every aspect of life – economic, social, religious and medical.

We observe here a multiple intensification of the psychological situation we have described and interpreted in the late Middle Ages. Chronic insecurity and anxiety, severely aggravated by new factors, acted in some parts of the population on classes of people who were at the same time experiencing a greater ability to control their lives, to improve their lot through hard work and shrewd investment. It was more than individual fortunes that improved during the Elizabethan period. Towns themselves became much more pleasant places in which to live. Streets were well-paved and watered; street-lighting was introduced, as were fire control and building regulations; there were more police and poor relief was started; noisy and malodorous trades were banished; public lavatories and wash-houses were built; plague houses were set outside the town walls.[123] In the country agriculture became more efficient. In short there were many reasons for mounting confidence about man's ability to better himself.

The small farmer, the yeoman, the self-employed artisan, the merchant and the lawyer, who had all found that by self-discipline applied to work they could improve themselves, had a stake in a more ordered society. Moreover they had proved that control, especially over themselves, was the royal road to success. Their psychological dispositions had developed the method of responding to strong inner drives that led them to being sublimated in productive activity rather than released on reflex. The halter on passion that creates guilt was already in place. It only needed the inner pressure of heightened anxiety – flowing from disappointment, frustration and terror – to be transformed by that halter into guilt. The violent aggression to which less controlled Elizabethans gave immediate vent was turned inwards. The result would be intensified nervousness, restlessness, doubt, psychological insecurity, and a corresponding craving for justification and security.

To sum up the argument so far. The guilt we observe present in a rampant form in the Elizabethan period was the result of very high and increasing levels of anxiety being felt in the middling strata of society by individuals who were by disposition already relatively self-controlled. As the plague had intensified late medieval anxieties, so accelerating geographical and social mobility further fueled the flame between 1530 and 1600. Anxiety was the petrol, disposition the combustion chamber. The dimension of control, the halter on impulse

that appeared among the middling strata, had its own history. A harsh climate predisposed the English to inwardness, to holding their emotions in check. Second, a unique history of individualism in economic relations through the whole population, reinforced by the common law view of property, provided a further predisposition towards a belief in self-help and individual enterprise. Many of those in the population who were by disposition (and there is a strong genetic factor here) more disciplined and rational than their delinquent contemporaries, found from the late fourteenth century that their lot improved. Their disposition applied in hard work brought them success. Success confirmed them in their belief in self-control. By these means a segment of the population had selected itself out from the mass and by 1530 had come to constitute a substantial middle class, which overall improved its position dramatically in the next seventy years. There was a self-perpetuating mechanism at work here. As anxiety increased it drove precisely this section of the population into more frenzied activity of the type it believed would improve its control – above all industriousness – which in turn furthered its material and organizational success. Heightened anxiety in less controlled dispositions merely aggravated their short-tempered violence, rendering them less capable of economic success. Elizabethan life abounds with examples of inflamed temper.

We have now dealt with the first cause of the rise of rampant, uncultured guilt in England. There was a second important cause, of a quite different genus: the constitution of the family and its emotional climate underwent transformation. It is in his early family that every individual develops his disposition, including the quantity and quality of his guilt. We should therefore expect a substantial rise in guilt must be the direct consequence of some major change in parental conduct towards children.

It is unnecessary for us to get involved in the controversy of whether even in medieval England there was other than an essentially nuclear family. Whatever the likelihood of grandparents or aunts and uncles living in, there was a major change in the area that concerns us, that of the ideas and practices of child-rearing. The medieval attitude to children was that they were not very important. 'Who sees a child sees nothing', such is the sentiment of household proverbs, uttered by princes, poets and parsons. A child is likened to a broken sword, a fool, a drunkard.[124] In practice children were neglected, brutally treated and often killed.

The only strong emotion that the poor seem to have felt was an egoistic panic induced by the threat of plague. To them the death of a child was a matter of indifference.[125] The higher orders in general felt little more grief. With infant and child mortality at anything between 30 per cent and 50 per cent death was commonplace. Here

was a vicious circle: child mortality was high to a marked degree because of parental neglect. Moreover the family was loose-knit, bonds within it hardly closer than with neighbours.[126] Fathers were often absent and kin uninterested. As bonds were weak so affection was low. Diaries and personal communications from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century indicate cool and even unfriendly attitudes to other members of the family.[127] As children were held in low regard they suffered more than adults from the cool and distant emotional atmosphere.

The rich, who did not regard children as human before the age of two, put their infants out to wet-nurse. Wet-nurses were often cruel or ran dry, requiring substitutes, and thereby further disrupting the infant's need for a constant mother-figure.[128] Children were weaned between twelve and eighteen months and then turned over to nurses, governesses and tutors. Any time after the age of seven they were sent away from home. In fact the children of all classes were sent away to work in other homes as servants or apprentices, to serve a magnate, or to go to school.[129] A Venetian reporting on a visit to England in 1497 was shocked at the egoism and mutual suspiciousness of the people, their incapacity for sincere and solid friendship, and above all the lack of affection they showed towards their children.[130]

The constant presence of death served only to aggravate the situation. Among the sixteenth-century aristocracy one-third of children would lose one parent by the age of fourteen. The high death-rate among children gave parents added reason for keeping their distance, in order to preserve their own mental balance. It was a standard medieval practice to give the same Christian name to two siblings, under the assumption that at best only one would survive.[131] Moreover malnutrition meant that both mothers who had to nurse their children and wet-nurses were prone to have their milk dry up, further increasing the danger to either the child's life or its psychological stability – depriving it of its main source of constant emotional and nutritional support.

The mercilessly cold medieval attitude to children in England would have, as I have already suggested, typically produced delinquent characters. And indeed our earlier account of the life of the time indicated that the tempestuous violence and weak conscience of the delinquent were the norm.

A change began to take place, according to Stone, from around 1530. A new interest in children emerged. Books on child-raising appear from the 1510s.[132] Closer ties develop between mother and child. Parents begin to take a keen interest in upbringing. Child portraiture appears in the late sixteenth century.[133] These changes are by and large restricted to the middle classes, and especially the Puritans. The great proportion of the population in the lower classes, and the bulk of the aristocracy did not change their ways. As a result

the overall tenor of Elizabethan life was little less brutal and disorderly than in preceding centuries.

The new interest in the child seems to have two important facets, a much more indulgent relation of mothers to their infants and a harshly disciplinarian method of bringing them up. Among the pious gentry, whether Anglican, Puritan or Catholic, mothers nursed their children – a change inevitably making for closer ties. In general from 1530 affective bonds within the family increase; the conjugal unit becomes more intimate.[134] Infants were fed on demand and weaned between twelve and eighteen months. There was no severe toilet-training and little repression of infant sexuality. The one major restriction on the infant was swaddling – but the modern psychological literature divides on the helpful or harmful effects of swaddling.[135] The most important factor in the emotional development of the young child is its relationship to its mother. Breast-feeding and the time of weaning are the best indices of the degree of nutritional and emotional support it receives. Compared with either the Middle Ages or the contemporary West the emerging middle-class practice in the sixteenth century appears indulgent. It is somewhat less indulgent than the average found in primitive societies, where the median age for weaning is two-and-one-half years.[136]

The main cultural influence behind the changing attitude to children was the Puritan conception of the family and its tasks. Most books on child-rearing were written by Puritans. The new religion proclaimed holy matrimony as the key social institution, replacing the parish. The ideal of conjugal affection within the family was set up against the Catholic ideal of chastity. One consequence was the reinforcement of a more closely-knit family with members mutually dependent on each other. The ideal stretched wider than Puritans themselves. Thomas More argued in his *Utopia* for the dissolution of all social units apart from the family.

Two reasons predominated for taking a greater interest in children. The greater importance of the nuclear family, and its increased detachment from kin and neighbours, automatically brought a deepening of relations within it. At the same time Puritan belief held that it was the duty of parents, and especially the father, to ensure that their children were educated in piety and righteousness.

Puritans believed that children were innately sinful, and this belief drove the second innovation. The child's will had to be broken, like that of a horse, if it were not to pollute the family with its evil ways. A favourite quotation was 'If thou smite him with the rod, thou shalt deliver his soul from Hell'. From the fifteenth century children were beaten at school. The Puritan fear of the sinfulness of their children not only drove fathers to draw blood in their furious attempts to tame wicked impulses, it also drove them to demand unerring deference. It became standard in sixteenth-century homes for children

to kneel before their parents every morning to ask for their blessing. On becoming adults they would kneel respectfully every time they entered or departed from their parents' house.[137] Calvin urged the death penalty for disobeying parents. In short Puritans loved their children, cherished them, prayed over them, but feared them.[138]

Guilt can only develop in a child when he has some reason for controlling his aggression, for holding it back. We know from modern studies that the delinquent or vandal character typically appears as a result of maternal deprivation: the incentive of restraining aggression in order not to lose the mother's love does not exist, and the child does not develop a conscience. He grows into an adult for whom violent acts do not produce remorse: guilt and the fear of guilt do not exist to restrain him. The obverse side of this coin is that guilt is induced in children who experience the tender security of a loving mother and are subject to threats of withdrawal of that love. At one extreme there are examples of highly indulgent primitive societies, such as Samoa, in which the threat of maternal withdrawal takes at most the form of the inevitable occasional absence of the mother when the infant wants her. Such societies generate very little guilt, and because their practices are indulgent rather than indifferent their typical dispositions are sanguine and carefree, most unlike delinquent medieval man. The more a mother threatens, given a foundation of deep intimacy with her child, the more guilt-ridden he will become.

What I have discussed so far is one of two modes of inducing guilt, the matricidal one. The parricidal mode, the one relevant to Puritanism, occurs when the child has experienced warmth and tender security within his early family, and is then threatened less by the withdrawal of maternal affection than naked physical punishment at the hands of the father. He restrains his aggression out of fear of persecutory retaliation. However, a sustained interest shown by a father in his child, even when severe, indicates a strong attachment, a foundation of love as the Puritan code described it. The harsh father, even when his attachment appears driven by hate, is at some deep level a loving father. As the great psychologists from La Rochefoucauld to Freud have all asserted, indifference and not hate is the opposite to love. In short the rare case of a child experiencing pure and unmitigated severity from his parents may be a deceptive one. We should remember the favourite Puritan maxim: 'The child whom the father loves most dear he does most punish tenderly in fear.'

The child-rearing practices emerging in sixteenth-century England fit perfectly into the mode likely to generate acute parricidal guilt. And it is obvious why individuals suffering from guilt of this type should have been driven to a religion dominated by a stern, punitive, devastatingly powerful male God, and that man's relationship to this God should have been conceived in the imagery of the innately weak

and wicked, disobedient son. The son desperately wants to be good, to be obedient and to win recognition from his father.

While parricidal guilt generates patriarchal cultural forms it provokes conduct with a tendency towards the obsessional – restlessly ambitious for achievement and above all the exertion of order and control. Again we have already said enough for it to be clear that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English Puritans conformed neatly to this mode, as had the Jews of the post-exile Old Testament.

Let us now sum up the causes of rampant, uncultured guilt in the English case. In the key period 1530–1600 the principal causes are two-fold. First an emerging and highly heterogeneous middle class experiences unprecedented geographical and social mobility, aggravating already critical levels of anxiety. This anxiety is transformed into guilt in many individual members of these strata, because of already existing elements of self-control in their dispositions. The same period saw a radical change in attitudes to children and practices in rearing them, which in turn induced guilt, and especially guilt of a parricidal bent. Thus the emerging middle class began to raise its children in a manner that would ensure that anxiety was turned into guilt, unwittingly compounding and complementing the techniques it was already employing to combat its unsettledness. The severity with which children were disciplined was on a par with the severity of the Puritan culture by means of which these people finally harnessed their guilt.

The argument has taken little account of political history, the changing fortunes of the monarchy and the noble elites. Perhaps most imprudently it has not found a role in the evolution of guilt for the rise of the absolutist State under the Tudors. Elias, for example, claims in passing that the blood-lusting impulsiveness of the medieval warrior came under restraint because the central authorities gained a monopoly of physical power.[139] This explanation has at best a shred of plausibility in the English case, for the reason that from as early as the thirteenth century there are growing signs of decreasing militarism – for instance a preference for the much less dangerous mock wars of the tournament, and a shift from a military ethos in the direction of one of public service. Moreover Elias's explanation is irrelevant to the growth of self-restraint in the middle ranks of society, all-important to the discussion of the rise of guilt.

There remains the question of Puritan culture's role in this historical process, the degree to which it was cause or effect. The question follows directly on our consideration of changes to the family. Let us consider the case of child-rearing practices first. The Puritan view of the child certainly supported the new attitudes. But was it that the Puritan code was the causal factor itself, or was the family already moving in this direction, and attracted to Puritan beliefs in order to rationalize practices that it already favoured?

Ideally we need to know the history of the belief that the child is innately sinful and that it is the parents' task to break his will. The belief that children should be whipped into obedience was present in the fifteenth century. Apprentices, undergraduates, valets, children serving in households, were freely beaten. In 1458 we have reference to the instruction 'lash him truly'.[140] It seems, moreover, only to be expected that the Middle Ages, in which punishment was physical and open, should have seen children controlled by the most direct means at the disposal of the enraged adult – beating or whipping.

To shift the discussion one pace, the Puritans might nevertheless have introduced the moralizing of child unruliness, with the belief in original sin, and the untamed depravity of the young. But here too doubts arise. Those elements of the pre-Puritan middle class in the late Middle Ages who believed in self-help and saw their position in society improving, were ambitious to assert control in a brutal and disordered world. One of the major causes of disorder, as they would have perceived it, was the wild intemperateness of men. They had every reason to draw a direct parallel with the uncontrolled egoistic impulsiveness of the young child, with its shameless demands and tantrums. The obvious conclusion to be drawn was that the child must be tamed, his will broken, if he was to become an orderly adult. The horse metaphor would have stared medieval parents in the face. The wild, unbroken stallion is a menace to all who come near; once broken he becomes a dutiful and useful member of an ordered community. In short Puritan culture was not needed to exhort such parents to whip their children into obedience.

Puritan culture may have played a more innovative role in the other change to child-rearing practices, the development of parental affection and indulgence. Stone argues that from 1500 the nuclear core of the family became more important in the upper levels of society, not as a unit of habitation (the nuclear model is probably much older in England) but as a state of mind. This followed from the decline of kinship and clientage as the main organizing principles of landed society, and the increasing power of the State, taking over some traditional kin functions, and subordinating kin to patriotism and obedience to the king.[141] Such changes would have indirectly affected the middle classes. The decline of bodies and allegiances intermediary between themselves and the ruling medieval elites (especially the magnates and the Church) rendered them more independent. The household, central to them for historical and economic reasons, received an ideological boost. Above all in relation to their children, their sense of their own family as the central social unit was confirmed. This trend would have been complemented by their growing prosperity, making them less vulnerable to the harshness of the times, and more able to provide a comfortable environment for children – starting with a better nourished mother less likely to have her milk dry up.

There was a significant role for Puritan culture here. The teaching that parents are responsible for their children ensured that they would take those children seriously. The ideal of holy matrimony based on conjugal affection helped turn the emotional climate within the family, from one of indifference to one of intimacy. While these changes were probably already underway, Puritanism helped them along.

In other spheres of life the main influence of Puritan ideas, as we have already discussed, seems to have been to make legitimate already existing practices such as thrift, industriousness and discipline. This is culture as effect rather than cause, but it soon begins to exert a causal push. A supportive moral code helps to improve morale, boost confidence and create solidarity, all of which may help to motivate new action, or the pursuit of old goals with renewed vigour. For example, whether or not John Winthrop and the families he collected to sail to Massachusetts in 1630 had been Puritans, they would have been fed up with the administrative corruption and religious intolerance that confronted them in England. But without the bond of Puritan religion it is unimaginable that they would have enough moral fervour and fellow feeling to band together and undertake the monumental disruption of emigrating to a distant and unknown land. Their faith that they would build a Christian Commonwealth in the new world – to show up the depravity of the old – helped carry them. Similarly a tenacious Puritan morality gave John Knox and many others the confidence to attack the mighty and the established in England.

I have left until last the most significant way in which Puritan ideas influenced the time. The most potent agent of cultural change in the Elizabethan period was the Puritan preacher. He dominated the pulpits; he and his kind, the lecturers, travelled the country addressing the people. They carried the new doctrines to the mass of the population. Both Elizabeth and James made desperate and largely futile attempts to regulate them.[142] Churches became little more than auditoria for the pulpit.[143] In turn the universities, and especially Cambridge, became centres producing Puritan graduates, many of whom took to preaching or lecturing. Many, perhaps most, of the preachers themselves would have been by disposition fairly ascetic – disciplined and inward – and thereby attracted to Puritan ideas. Similarly we can expect that a majority in the country at large moved by their sermons would have found in their ideas a culture suitable to their own dispositional bias. So far we have culture as a confirmation and encouragement, not as a revolutionary doctrine. However there must have been many among the middling strata for whom the new religious ideas provided a great turning point, drawing together diverse and confusedly opaque strands in their lives and giving them a coherent shape. The preachers must have inspired piety

in many, and like the Old Testament prophets given them the sense that the anxiety that disrupted their lives was not arbitrary: it was the result of sin, and they had better learn what to do if they wished to be saved.

Again it was not that Puritanism created anxiety: anxiety was already there. Nor did it form the dispositional halter that turned anxiety into guilt. But it did do two things. It strengthened the halter, increasing the force with which anxiety became guilt, and thereby it boosted levels of guilt. Second it addressed that guilt, providing it with an interpretation and justifying its sublimation into hard work, frugal living and piety. By and large guilt came first, then there was Puritan culture. Puritanism played a minor role in generating guilt – mainly in the area of reinforcing the dualist loving and disciplinarian attitude to children. Its major role was to provide the culture appropriate to the integrating of parricidal guilt into a stable, meaningful and tolerably gratifying life in society. My conclusion on this point is by and large an elaboration and rephrasing of Michael Walzer's assertion that Calvinism did not induce anxiety: 'more likely its effect was to confirm and explain in theological terms perceptions men already had of the dangers of the world and the self.'[144]

Having largely discounted Puritanism as the first cause in the rise of guilt, and thereby rejected the Weberian thesis on the key issue, we are left with a sort of Darwinian explanation. A higher proportion of the population with a genetic inheritance of more controlled dispositions was able from 1350 in England to improve its economic condition. These people selected themselves as the new middling strata, and as upstart elements in the upper class. Their success led them to choose a morality that valued their own inherited qualities or talents, and to change their child-rearing practices accordingly. Fortune, in the shape of plague, a declining feudal Church and aristocracy, and for a time an absolutist monarchy, favoured them, selected them to better their lot at the expense of those with dispositions less suited to exploit the times. The culture they chose and the children they raised helped increase and strengthen their number. Their guilt was not a constant, a fixed store of disturbed energy. From 1350 to 1600 the sources of anxiety multiplied and among these people it was converted into intensified guilt. Moreover, the Puritan culture they embraced served at first to further load their fear of the overbearing consciences that they had already developed. Thus it was that history chose to bless a section of the population with a means for emancipating itself from the brutish anarchy of medieval life. It then, in conjunction with those individuals' dispositions, burdened them with mounting guilt, which in turn drove them on to greater but more agitated successes. Their dispositions had shifted from being moderately controlled to guilt-hounded, and this transformation unleashed the peculiar vigour for sustained

productive activity and disciplined organization that was to constitute the major causal factor in the formation of modern society.

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Simon Taylor

Symbol and ritual under National Socialism

ABSTRACT

The relationship of symbol and ritual to the 'world-view' of National Socialism has rarely been discussed. In this article however, it is argued that for Nazism, symbol and ritual were essential forms of ideological presentation and reinforcement. The NSDAP reduced political relationships to the workings of an eschatology, constructed upon symbols relating either to the German *Volksgemeinschaft* or to *Judentum.* Thereby it was possible to promote a sense of 'internal' consensus, in opposition to 'class politics', whilst simultaneously warning of imminent national catastrophy because of the 'Jewish conspiracy'. It was the very character of Nazi ideology, supported upon nebulous concepts such as 'feeling and belief' which determined its means of presentation through ritualized political celebration, where the mechanisms of 'mass suggestion' were consciously brought into operation. And the failure of other 'intellectual' forms of ideological presentation, such as the *Thingspiel*, supports the hypothesis that symbol and political ritual performed the function of mystifying the real social, economic, and political contradictions between the social strata which constituted German fascism's mass basis.

There have been surprisingly few attempts by social scientists to explore the cult and ritual aspects of National Socialism. Indeed H. T. Burden's book on the Nuremberg Rallies, published in 1967, remains the most substantive work available in English on the general theme of Nazism's political celebrations.[1] However, Burden confines himself to outlining the development of the annual Reichsparty-day, and one has to look to the work of two German authors, Klaus Vondung and Hans-Jochen Gamm, to find any sort of systematic analysis of the ritual forms of National Socialist celebrations, and their possible relationship to the various tenets of the Nazi *Weltanschauung.*[2]

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The purpose of this paper is thus two-fold. First, by outlining the wider spectrum of Nazi political celebrations, we hope to demonstrate that Nazi political ritual cannot just be understood as, for instance, the expression of the 'irrational adulation and deification of Hitler',[3] but rather should be seen as a central component of an ideological system (*weltanschauung*) which consciously sought expression in the 'mysteries' of myth and symbol. Second, an examination of the structure of National Socialist mythos and its symbol-world, suggests that the very nature of the Nazi *weltanschauung* led the NSDAP towards an increasing reliance upon political ritual as a means of ideological presentation.

One of the main limitations of Burden's analysis of the Nuremberg Rallies is precisely his failure to consider the Reichsparty-day within the context of the National Socialist *Jahreslauf*, for although the Reichsparty-day has exercised a particular fascination upon the popular imagination, it was merely one event within a carefully planned calendar of political celebrations. More importantly, much of the inner 'sense' of the Reichsparty-day can only be uncovered and analysed by reference to the so-called National Socialist Holy-History (*Heiligengeschichte*). This in turn was expressed in the various events which constituted the *Jahreslauf*, and in particular through the celebrations of 9 November. But before turning to a closer examination of this Holy-History, let us first sketch out the various forms of political ritual developed by the NSDAP between 1919 and 1945.

It is possible to identify three types of National Socialist celebrations:

1 The celebrations of the National Socialist Year (*Jahreslauf*).
2 The Morning celebrations (*Morgenfeiern*).
3 The Life celebrations (*Lebensfeiern*).

Finally there are the early forms of the *Thingspiel*, a type of theatrical celebration which does not fit into any of the above categories. Of these the *Jahreslauf* and the *Thingspiel* provide us with the most useful examples for the purpose of analysis, mainly because they developed prior to 1939 and thus relate more obviously to the political development of the NSDAP during the *Kampfzeit* and the early years of the Third Reich. The Morning celebrations and the Life celebrations found prominence mainly under wartime conditions, and especially after Stalingrad.

THE CELEBRATIONS OF THE JAHRESLAUF

The various political celebrations which made up the National Socialist *Jahreslauf* can be divided into two distinct categories. On the one hand those festivals already celebrated by the NSDAP prior to the take-over of power in January 1933, such as the 'Founding of

the Party Programme' on 24 February, the Führer's birthday on 20 April, the celebration of the 9 November in Munich and the annual Reichsparty-day, were raised to the status of 'holy days' under the Third Reich, and constitute the most important events in the *Jahreslauf*. Conversely, important events which already had a strong cultural tradition in Germany, whether as expressions of the Christian churches' influence or that of the Labour movement, were taken over by the propaganda machine of the party, emptied of their original content, and transformed into public expressions of the new National Socialist *weltanschauung*. Remembrance Day on the 16 March, for instance, traditionally a day of mourning for the dead of the First World War, was transformed under Hitler's personal orders into an opportunity to reflect upon the heroic nature of the German soldiers' sacrifice. Henceforth the swastika flag was no longer to be lowered to half-mast, but flown proudly 'at the top of the standard' as a symbol of Germany's 're-awakened faith and pride'.[4] The May-day celebrations of the workers' movement was also *gleichgeschaltet*: all signs of a genuinely socialist tradition were obliterated, and instead massive military parades were held in Berlin to celebrate the new mood of 'national unity and class harmony'. Goebbels wrote that this day should show: 'a grandiose picture of the National Socialist "creative will" . . . The whole people (*Volk*) thus unifies itself through that same "will".'[5] Other traditional celebration days, such as Easter, Whitsun, Mothers' Day, the Harvest Thanksgiving and Christmas suffered a similar fate, with NSDAP worthies announcing that 'authentic' ceremonies and ancient Teutonic folk-customs must be revived in view of the onslaught against 'traditional' culture by the spirit of Jewish-Marxist materialism.

However, it is not our intention to examine in detail the structure of the various political celebrations which make up the *Jahreslauf*. Indeed, to do so would be unnecessarily repetitive, since we shall argue that the political interpretation which the NSDAP inserted into the events, and the system of mythos and symbolism through which this interpretation was expressed, was common to all. Rather we wish to demonstrate that political celebrations possessed a specific significance for National Socialism, by presenting and reinforcing certain symbolic entities - flag, Führer, *Volk*, etc. - through the 'revelation' of the mystery of the Holy-History. In order to do this we must first of all look at the celebration of 9 November.

THE 9 NOVEMBER CELEBRATION

The event which Hitler and the party leadership celebrated each year on 9 November was the notorious Munich Beer-hall Putsch of 1923. Throughout the *Kampfzeit* Hitler met with his old guard to remember

and honour the sixteen party members who had lost their lives as a result of this abortive *coup*. With the accession to power of the NSDAP in 1933 however, a radical reinterpretation of the *coup* was inevitable, since according to the party ideologues, National Socialism could not countenance the notion of even temporary defeat. Nor could it be admitted that any event connected with the name of the Führer or the party could have been a costly blunder. Thus the defeat of 1923 was turned into the 'pre-requisite for the victory of 1933'.

Naturally the mystification of events surrounding 9 November did not take place overnight. Even during the *Kampfzeit* many aspects of the 'victorious' interpretation found their way into the annual ceremony which Hitler and the party leadership performed in Munich's Königsplatz. But on 9 November 1935 a ceremony took place which illustrates the extent to which the NSDAP had woven a mystical web around the *coup*, and which also serves to illustrate the inter-relationship of mythos, symbol and ritual which was the hall-mark of National Socialism's ideological style. It was the ceremony of the Resurrection of the Dead.[6]

Late in the morning of 9 November 1935, Hitler and his entourage left the Bürgerbraükeller to march to the Feldherrnhalle, along the route used by the putschists some twelve years previously. At the head of the procession was carried the Bloodflag (*Blutfahne*) which had been carried by the original conspirators, and was 'stained with the blood of the sixteen martyrs'. Hitler ordered a 'Blood-order' to be created, to whom the surviving putschists belonged, and it was their privilege to march with Hitler and the Bloodflag at the head of the procession. The route to the Feldherrnhalle was marked by 240 pylons, each bearing the name of one of the movement's 'fallen heroes'. The name was read out as the head of the column marched past the pylon in question. Throughout military bands played the Horst Wessel march. When the Feldherrnhalle was reached, the service of the resurrection of the sixteen 'Blood-witnesses', present in their recently exhumed state, began. The *Völkischer Beobachter* describes the scene:

> The dead of the 9th of November (do not lie) in dark graves with sad salutes, but in a beautiful building, in a well-lit hall, under God's free heaven, in brass sarcophagen, in which beat the heart of our revolution . . .
>
> We believe that these dead have found new life in us, and that they will live for ever. The belief that our flag is holy: the belief that the Creator has given us and them the strength for work and for victory, and the belief in our sacred mission to which these everlasting hours are dedicated, shows Germany her way forward. We know that out of the inner experience of our movement . . .

> we have gained eternal life because of the struggle and the sacrifice of the fallen for Germany . . .
>
> How few marched off in the beginning? Today there are millions represented in the flags and standards who are witness to this celebration. How few had from the first a clear understanding of this German belief? Yet the way to victory was ever clear to our soldiers in those lonely quiet hours . . .
>
> We old and young National Socialists thank Adolf Hitler for this unforgettable day. We praise him and this holy symbol of the resurrection of Germany, for which we have him and the flag of our struggle to thank. We go forward with open eyes and believing hearts under his direction.[7]

The centrepiece of the ceremony at the Feldherrnhalle was the admittance of the coffins into the sarcophagen, where the sixteen 'martyrs' were to lie as an 'Eternal Watch' for Germany. As the bodies were removed from the gun-carriages, Hitler called out their names one by one, to be answered each time by the thousands of assembled Hitler Youth and party members with the response 'Here!' The *Völkischer Beobachter* explained the significance of the ritual:

> Again and again the thousands roar 'Here!' . . . the testament of these first Blood-witnesses is thus raised up to our entire Movement, whilst their spirit lives and works for Germany as its Eternal Watch. . . . Each of the dead thus greets the assembled thousands, who are themselves the reflection and the carriers of their will to victory.[8]

Then Hitler, flanked by his deputies and the comrades of the Blood-order, entered the temple and walked alone to 'greet his former true-followers'. Having placed wreaths on each of the coffins, Hitler spoke to the assembly of the significance of the ceremony:

> These sixteen men, who twelve years ago gave their lives as a sacrifice for their people (*Volk*) and their Führer, are today raised from the grave. Who does not feel the truth of this resurrection? Who does not see the glint of their eyes in the newly-raised-up Wehrmacht? And the Reich, which is itself built around this consecrated ground, is it not their kingdom? The kingdom of their 'will' and victory?[9]

Thus out of the events of the 9 November 1923, the NSDAP fashioned an inter-related symbol-world founded upon the mythos of a Holy-History to which the 'martyrdom' of the sixteen was witness. However in order to be able to analyse the structure of this Holy-History, it is necessary first of all to examine the various symbols which 'revealed' its meaning.

The most powerful symbol of the 9 November 'revelation' was the

Bloodflag, transformed into a 'witness' of the 'sacrificial blood' of the movement's martyrs. After the takeover of power the Bloodflag was additionally portrayed as a manifestation of the 'historical inevitability' of National Socialism, for as we have seen, the spilling of the sacrificial blood was now the cultural pre-requisite for the movement's victory.

The Bloodflag is a transparent allegory of the Christian cross, especially in its representation of the process of historical salvation for a nation or people through the blood-sacrifice of another. Its power as a 'holy' symbol is emphasized by the fact that the Bloodflag was only exhibited on the 9 November and at Nuremberg on Reichsparty-day. At Nuremberg the Bloodflag performed a specific function in the political ritual developed by the NSDAP. It was carried in front of the Führer during the flag-dedication ceremony, in which the banners and flags of the party formations were 'sanctified' by Hitler's touch and that of the original Bloodflag:

> The drums roll. The flags – how many of them are faded and tattered, soaked with the blood of fallen fighters and riddled with bullet holes. With his hand he presses the cloth of the Bloodflag against the new standards, and thereby they are consecrated with the blood of the sixteen, who as the first martyrs of the movement, gave their life-blood, and thereafter became immortal.[10]

But the blood of the martyrs, like the blood of Christ, was also a means of transfiguration. Thus their blood, the symbol of their 'eternal life', was carried in the blood of the new National Socialist man, who will be recreated in the blood of his descendants, or in the earth as a material basis for the reproduction and recreation of the *Volk*.[11] The choral oath in Böhme's *Cantata for the Ninth of November* makes this clear:

> He who has pledged, he who has taken the oath,
> whether in death he passes away
> he continues to live in the earth.
>
> He who has recognised himself through struggle,
> he who burns within himself, whether death touches him,
> he continues to live in blood.[12]

So the Bloodflag, as the holiest relic of the National Socialist movement, projected its significance and power to all other flags through the medium of the sacrificial blood, in the same way as the Christian crucifix derives its thaumaturgical significance from the original Cross of Golgotha. 'Place your hand proudly on the shaft of this flag,' states Baumann, 'for from this one flag we derive all our strength.'[13] Simultaneously, the interpretation given to the death of the sixteen conspirators by the party propaganda machine meant

that the 'virtues' of the individual's absolute loyalty, unquestioning obedience and his readiness to sacrifice his life for '*Führer* and *Volk*' were equally imprinted in the flag symbol. Therefore the Bloodflag, by symbolizing the 'metaphysical' transformation of Germany which had brought about the Third Reich, provided, as we shall see, an essential 'confirmation' for the entire structure of the Nazi mythos. It is not surprising therefore, to discover that the flag or swastika emblem was rapidly embellished with other 'significant' associations which related to the wider aspects of National Socialist doctrine.

The fact that the NSDAP had originally rejected the old nationalist colours so beloved of the other right-wing para-military formations in the immediate post-war era in favour of the swastika, was claimed as proof by the party ideologues that the movement represented a radical new social and political *weltanschauung*, in opposition to both 'Reaction and Red terror'. The swastika was therefore presented as the deepest historical expression of the German *Volk*; as a symbol of profound religious significance for the early Teutonic tribes who were the first to give historical expression to the 'longing for a German homeland'.[14] The swastika or sun-wheel promoted the quality of sun and light; the red backcloth the association of blood and fire.[15] Möller's epic poem 'The Pledge', which accompanied the flag-dedication ceremony, gave expression to this 'most sacred' quality:

> We are sworn to our flag, for ever.
> Whoever dishonours the flag will be cursed.
>
> The flag is our creed, of God and *Volk* and land.
> Whoever wants to steal it, must first take our life and strength.[16]

Just as the flag derived its 'sacred' character from its analogy to the Christian cross, so Hitler derived a significant part of his status by appropriating the messianic qualities of Christ. Two distinct levels of interpretation operated here. On the lower level Hitler was presented as a cultural hero, a political saviour of his people, and the leader of the *Volksgemeinschaft* (*Volk*-community). Robert Ley's creed, 'We believe only in Adolf Hitler on this earth' fits this notion perfectly.[17] But simultaneously Hitler is apportioned messianic status, not only 'immortal' in his own right, but even capable of conferring immortality upon his followers:

> You walk among the *Volk* as a Saviour
> Because you are completely possessed by belief . . .
> Now we need not fear, for you say to us:
> 'If you believe, then I have slain death,
> even when the body decays'.[18]

Whilst at Nuremberg on Reichsparty-day, the call from the party

ranks: 'The Führer is Germany and Germany the Führer', was answered by Hitler with the words: 'I am never without you, and you are never without me.'[19]

Thus the takeover of power and the establishment of the Third Reich as the secular manifestation of National Socialism's 'will to power' provided the basis for the reinterpretation of the events of 9 November 1923. The Munich *coup* was revealed as a turning point which heralded the coming of a new, historically distinct era. Böhme wrote:

> The earth came to an end with your death
> But with your glory our life began.[20]

The 9 November was the manifestation of this 'new beginning', interpreted by the party idealogues as a metamorphosis of the (German) human condition. The old world has come to an end, and with the coming of the Third Reich the true meaning of history can be revealed. The lives of those whose sacrifice was a precondition of victory, and those who now experience this victory are transfigured in the symbol of the flag:

> Whoever follows the flag, lives,
> And in him live those who died for the flag.[21]

We must now examine the question of the relationship of the ideological content of this mythos, as set out above, to its method of representation in the form of ritualized celebration. Here we cannot be comprehensive, but it is possible to demonstrate an internal consistency between the ideological representation of the Nazi *weltanschauung*, its symbol-world and mythos, and its style of presentation in mass parades and ritualized celebration.

THE COMMUNITY OF THE MASS RALLY

The most obvious characteristic of major National Socialist celebrations, and in particular the Reichsparty-day in Nuremberg, was their monumentality: both in terms of the huge numbers of participants and in terms of the grandiose style of the architectural environment. Hitler's obsession with creating monumental places of celebration for National Socialism was not, however, merely the product of a frustrated architectural vocation. The following extract from *Mein Kampf* shows his understanding of the emotional mechanisms of mass parades. Describing a socialist rally in front of the Royal Palace in Berlin just after the end of the First World War, he writes:

> A sea of red flags, red scarves, and red flowers gave to this demonstration, in which an estimated 120,000 took part, an aspect that

> was gigantic from the purely external point of view. I myself could feel and understand how easily the man of the people succumbs to the suggestive magic of a spectacle so grandiose in effect.[22]

The Reichsparty-day was certainly the great show-piece of the National Socialist *Jahreslauf*, both during the *Kampfzeit* and during the peacetime years of the Third Reich. But its 'function' should not be reduced to what Burden for instance calls, 'a display (of) power with pomp and circumstance'.[23] Once again we need only turn to Hitler's explanation of the 'community of the mass rally' to understand what the NSDAP was attempting to achieve by this annual spectacular in Nuremberg:

> The 'community' of the mass rally strengthens not only the individual, but binds together all, and helps create party spirit. . . . When a participant enters a mass gathering for the first time and suddenly has tens of thousands of men with the same views around him; when he, as one who is 'seeking' is swept along with the mighty effect of a suggestive ecstacy of three or four thousand others; when the visible success and agreement of thousands confirms the correctness of a teaching . . . then he himself lies under the magical influence of mass suggestion . . . The man who had entered such a gathering doubtful and hesitant, leaves it strengthened inside himself; he has become a member of the 'new community'.[24]

Therefore the monumental celebration places of National Socialism did not only lend expression to a desire for bombastic representation. They performed, more importantly, a vital role in providing a carefully planned framework within which the feeling of 'community' could be created, and hence the mechanisms of mass suggestion could operate. The Zepplinfield in Nuremberg for instance could hold almost a quarter of a million people. At one end towered a massive construction of terraces some 400 metres long topped by a white stone column. This centrepiece was flanked by two further stone pillars on which 'eternal flames' burnt. On these three rampart platforms rose a forest of flags and swastika banners which served as a spectacular backdrop to the speaker on the *Haupttribüne*.[25]

On the field below the masses were gathered in detachments or columns, themselves as much an architectural feature of the proceedings as the towering stone framework which enclosed them. Precisely because hundreds of thousands were gathered together on such occasions (and Hitler produced ever more fantastic plans for enlarging the 'community' of the rally) a framework of massive proportions was necessary to contain them. Thus on the one hand great masses of party members and spectators could be *isolated* from the outside world within a specifically National Socialist environment full of the sensory impressions of the Nazi *lebenswelt*. On the other

hand, the architectural surroundings were designed to concentrate the participants' attention upon the centrepiece of the Führer-stand. On this massive column, placed slightly in front of the main platform, Hitler stood alone, high above the masses like a high priest on a temple wall. His 'message', the word of the movement, was delivered to his followers from this vantage point and heard throughout the arena, thanks to a carefully prepared system of loudspeakers which were placed around the parade ground. Thus the masses were spatially subjected to Hitler's person, the symbolism of his absolute power, and to its ideological prerequisite, the Führer-principle.

It has often been noted that the visual and acoustic effects of the rallies were designed to call forth 'religious' emotions in the minds of both participants and spectators. Henderson, the British Ambassador, described Speer's so-called Cathedral of Light at Nuremberg as 'sacred and beautiful at the same time', whilst François-Poncet, the French Ambassador, spoke of a 'mystical ecstacy, a sort of holy illusion' which overcame the spectators.[26] Goebbels himself frequently talked of the need to emulate the mysticism of the Roman Catholic church at the party rallies. Indeed, if we separate the mechanics of the celebrations (the sensory effects which were designed to stimulate the participants' emotions) from the question of ideological presentation (the mythos of the Holy-History and its symbol-world) we can see that there is a common denominator, namely the plagiarization and exploitation of traditional Christian imagery and its means of ritual consecration. Even a brief look at the methods which the NSDAP used to 'consecrate' its symbols shows how the party ransacked the various religious traditions of the German churches, and reproduced their ritual forms in the political celebrations.

Just as the Bloodflag and much of Hitler's apparent 'charisma' were derived from analogy with the Christian concepts of the cross and the messiah, so the 'holy' symbols of the NSDAP were made significant by a technique which borrowed the means of consecration from existing ritual, and then projected this onto new objects and acts. In practice, this meant that the NSDAP uprooted the sanctifying mechanisms of the church and replaced its holy objects with those of National Socialism. In the speeches of the party leaders the suggestion that the flag is a 'sanctuary', the blood of the fallen is 'holy' and the Reich is 'eternal' are constantly repeated. Schumann spoke of the 'reich of the Holy Ghost' and said of Hitler that 'we need him like bread and wine'.[27] Even the relationship between the priest and his congregation, as well as the analogy of Hitler as Christ, is mirrored in the roles of the Caller and the Chorus in Herybert Menzel's eulogy for the Day of National Work. Thus:

> Caller: One for all comrades. Who brought us this salvation?
> Chorus: Adolf Hitler the Führer!

Caller: One for all comrades. Who has brought us honour again?
Chorus: Adolf Hitler the Führer!
Caller: There is one who helps us. Who do we believe when he calls?
Chorus: Adolf Hitler the Führer![28]

We have seen then how the various objects which the NSDAP elevated to the status of 'holy' or 'sacred' symbols essentially derived their significance from the plagiarization of Christian myth. Second, that a substantial part of National Socialism's style of ideological presentation – its political celebrations – was unoriginal and heavily reliant upon analogy with pre-existing forms of ritual. And finally that the various political festivals, and in particular Reichsparty-day, were consciously planned and organized in order to project and reinforce, through the mechanisms of mass suggestion and association, the National Socialist mythos and its symbol-world. Yet the so-called Holy-History of the National Socialist movement can hardly be regarded as 'myth' in the sense that it constitutes an 'explanation' or 'revelation' of the world.[29] So are the various Nazi symbols merely relevant to the circuitous logic of the 'manifestation' of the 9 November, or do they relate to the wider aspects of the Nazi *weltanschauung*, and thereby to an 'explanation' of National Socialism's political task? And if so, why did the NSDAP place such reliance upon this particular form of ritual presentation?

In order to answer these questions it is worthwhile setting out diagrammatically the relationship between symbol, ritual and the Holy-History which has already been discussed. This can be represented schematically as follows:

Holy-History: mythos.

1923 The shedding of the sacrificial blood – the prerequisite for eventual victory.

1933 The founding of the Third Reich – the 'manifestation' of its historical inevitability.

Symbol-world: (representation of *Volksgemeinschaft*)	*Method of ritual presentation.* imagery of:
Bloodflag/swastika	Sun and light/fire and blood.
Führer/Hitler	Messianic ethos of Christ.
The *Volk*	Blood and earth.
Martyrs of the Movement	Salvation through blood-sacrifice. The foundation of 'eternal reich'.

In essence the diagram reveals the structural similarities of the Holy-History to the premises of the Christian apocalypse. The shedding of the blood of the sixteen martyrs in 1923 is analogous to

the sacrificial death of Christ. But quite clearly Hitler is represented as the Christ of the Second Coming – the all-powerful saviour and final arbitrator, surrounded in the imagery of glory and light. The *Volk* are the chosen ones who will experience the millennium of the Thousand Year Reich.[30] But as with any eschatological phantasy the world must be divided into binary oppositions – 'good and evil' – and we have not yet identified an antithesis of the German *Volksgemeinschaft* within the symbol world of the Holy-History.

It is not by chance that the word *Feind* (enemy or evil one) consistently found its way into the propaganda outpourings of the NSDAP. In fact one finds the notion of the *Feind* used as shorthand, even within the party administrative apparatus, for the concept of the Marxist–Jew. Here, set out in 'scientific' precision is the apocalytic antithesis of the *Volk*-community:

> *Judentum* (the Jew-world) – disseminator of liberalism and the heart-wood of Freemasonry, but nevertheless, or rather because of this, also the carrier of Marxism and Communism . . . (it) seeks connections with the Reactionaries, Jewish-liberalism, Jewish-Freemasonry, Jewish-capitalist and Jewish-Marxist groups throughout the world, in order to spin a net around every nation, woven out of propaganda, high-finance and terror, conspiracy, betrayal and criminality.[31]

In general though, the image of the Marxist-Jew was not presented through the medium of political ritual, but rather through the medium of printed propaganda and film. Indeed it is hard to imagine how negative symbols could be presented ritually within the context of political celebration. None the less it should be borne in mind that the speeches of the political leaders at the major rallies, and in particular those of Goebbels and Hitler, consistently included denunciations of the Jews and threats to take radical action against the 'jewish conspiracy'.[32] Equally, the various symbolic attributes which were projected onto this *Feind* – the notion of a universal satanic threat, the Jew as the soul-less sub-human, as a 'wandering parasite', or as the 'carrier of materialism and artistic aridity', can all be seen as counterparts of the symbol-world attributed to the German *Volksgemeinschaft*.

This absolute division of the world into antagonistic and mutually exclusive elements – the *Volksgemeinschaft* and *Judentum* – supported upon the premises of religious eschatological myth, suggests that there is a structural inter-relationship between the Nazi *weltanschauung* and its means of ritual presentation through analogy with traditional Christian myth and symbolism. For we have seen that the NSDAP relied not upon the explanatory qualities of revelatory or cosmological myth in order to underpin its symbol-world

and mythos, but rather upon the nebulous component of 'belief' when seeking legitimation and support for its *weltanschauung*. For the masses the exact form of the Nazi millennium remained tantalizingly vague and undefined. Salvation was certainly not to be achieved in the next world, as Christian myth promised, nor was the promise of this-wordly salvation over-elaborated by the Nazi regime once it had consolidated its political position after 1933. Increasingly the NSDAP demanded belief in its holy symbols *as such*, and the National Socialist 'soldier' was expected to fight and die for 'Flag, Führer and *Volk*' alone, as the German Fourteenth Army was to discover at Stalingrad.

The National Socialist ideal therefore demanded the qualities pertaining to 'religious' belief, and in particular the non-discriminate fanaticism common to those who believe that salvation is imminent in the coming apocalypse, without offering an authentic myth through which the 'mystery' is 'revealed'. Instead, by exploiting the relevant aspects of pre-existing Christian myth and symbolism, the NSDAP was able to represent and reinforce these 'qualities' through the mechanism of mass suggestion. The closed-in environment of the political ritual, free from contradictory images, and alive with the sensory *lebenswelt* of National Socialism provided an ideal context for the party leadership to stage-manage this psychological process of identification. It was essentially an attempt to mystify real social conflict, and to reduce political reality to a *weltanschauung* of 'meaningless' but none the less 'powerful' symbols of unity and cohesion.[33] This symbolic reductionism had important consequences with regard to the NSDAP's task of destroying its political adversaries through the means of state organized terror. And, second, it legitimated National Socialist rule through the maintenance of a broad level of popular support or acquiescence, particularly among the middle sectors of German society which had provided Nazism's political base prior to 1933.

The increasing reduction of social reality to the absolute categories of eschatological myth created an atmosphere simultaneously of imminent social crisis and heightened political expectancy – factors which naturally fed upon one another. During the *Kampfzeit* the NSDAP had identified the twin threats to the German *Mittelstand* – economic extinction through the increasing concentration of capital or 'proletarianization' through socialism – as the machinations of one and the same agent, i.e., the Marxist-Jew. Thus National Socialism promised an immediately 'achievable' Utopia which was free from the abuses of class struggle and 'crisis' or 'parasitic' capitalism, and at the same time warned against the catastrophic consequences of defeat by the forces of *Judentum*. The increasing reduction of social reality to the workings of two mutually antagonistic and competing *weltanschauungen* therefore provided ample justification for drastic

physical repression of the *Feind*, since this was an essential precondition for the achievement of the promised Utopia. At the same time an increasing flight into social reductionism based upon the reification of symbols of unity and harmony allowed the form of this utopia to remain sufficiently vague and undefined as to allow for the widest possible degree of social consensus. For a regime whose original support was based upon its promise to create a state free from the abuses of monopoly capital, high-finance and the encroachment of 'modernity', but whose historical role was to oversee an economic revolution in Germany through the rationalization which accompanied re-armament, the degree of flexibility and elasticity afforded by an ideological style which reduced socio-political conflicts and contradictions to the symbols of national cohesion was paramount.

The logic of our analysis of the relationship between ritual and the Nazi *weltanschauung* therefore suggests that political celebration constituted a fundamental means of both ideological presentation and of political legitimation for National Socialism. It cannot be considered merely as a peripheral phenomenon, as 'irrational' Führer worship, but must be examined within the wider context of German fascism's historical role. Clearly in this article it is only possible to sketch in some of the possible inter-relationships, in a manner which is necessarily schematic. However, if the element of political calculation seems to figure rather large, we can look by way of conclusion to the experience of the *Thingspiel* movement to support our overall hypothesis.

The so-called *Thingspiel* celebrations were theatrical events modelled on earlier lay productions and written in great numbers by National Socialist authors after 1933. Again the aspect of monumentality plays a major role. The Dietrich Eckart stage in Berlin held 20,000 spectators, and the event by which it was consecrated, 'The Frankenburger Würfelspiel', had some 1,200 participants. The architectural model for the *Thingspiel* was the circular Greek cult theatre, but the stage area was almost always divided into three levels, corresponding to the three stages of the Passion plays of the Middle Ages. These three levels denoted three levels of meaning. The lowest level, the arena, was the entrance field of the common people - the spectators. On the second level stood the worldly powers and sovereigns. On the highest level ruled the 'law': 'The highest level . . . is embodied in seven judges, the power of true might, the voice of the people, and the expression of that which we Germans conceive of as the Führer.'[34] The common people constituted the community of the celebration acclaiming the Führer. Their integration into the events was attempted by having the cast stream through the ranks of the spectators towards the stage, just as occurred at Nuremberg.

Goebbels went to great lengths to mould the *Thingspiel* movement



to the direct needs of the party, and founded in 1933 a separate organization to oversee its development, the *Reichsbund der deutschen Freilicht- und Volksschauspiele*. The Labour Service began to built the first of a planned 600 circular theatres; but it was the ideological content rather than the architectural form which was critical. The party-controlled media made great efforts to eulogize the 'holy' nature of the *Thingspiel*. A special meeting of forty writers was called, who were urged by Goebbels to create 'feeling and belief', the 'soul of the movement' and 'mythical effect' in their work.[35] But the results were disappointing. Only a few works were suitable, for most of the proposed productions were short of plot and needed a choir to relate the story. It gradually became apparent, even to the party leadership, that tedious theatrical productions were an unsuitable medium for expressing the themes of the Nazi *weltanschauung*. In 1937 Goebbels was forced to admit defeat: the plays and the building of the theatres were quietly dropped from the level of Reichspriority.

It was precisely because the *Thingspiel* movement attempted to intellectualize, or at least lend 'explanation' to the various aspects of Nazi ideology that it failed. The plays were unable to convince through the medium of conventional theatre. 'Feeling and belief', the cornerstones of the Nazi *weltanschauung*, could not be expressed through dramatic interpretation without becoming laughable; they resisted 'logical' explication. It seems, therefore, that the NSDAP's increasing flight into symbolic reductionism (itself a consequence of the need to mystify ideologically those socio-economic contradictions which could not be overcome politically) forced an increasing reliance upon forms of ideological presentation which persuaded by means of 'association' rather than 'explanation'. The various tenets of Christian myth, and in particular its eschatological aspects, provided a 'model' which was both ideologically suitable, and equally important, widely comprehensible. Political ritual, with its capacity to create the 'community' experience through cleverly organized sensory effects, was the means by which this 'conversion' or reinforcement took place. Removed from this particular environment, the whole ideological façade of Nazism comes dangerously close to collapse. 'Flag! Führer! *Volk*! Eternal Germany! Who can interpret their meaning?' asks the Nazi ideologue Ernst Berthold. It is:

> The Absolute. We sense it, and therefore we believe in it, and trust in the work of our fellow believers . . .
>
> Let us therefore take care that in the honouring of the flag, youth is overcome by a reverential thrill, through which the ultimate and deepest meaning of the flag is revealed. Only then are the forces which form the soul and character of our movement revealed, which inspire the inner and outer behaviour which

> corresponds to the Being of the Eternal Germany, which we all serve as followers of the Führer. . . . for the deepest meaning of the flag is not to be understood from the deliberate interpretation or rephrasing in one's own words, but from *erhalten* (to sense or divine meaning) which is the very deepest understanding.[36]

Simon Taylor

NOTES

1. Burden, H. T., *The Nuremberg Rallies 1923–1939*, London, 1967.
2. See Vondung, Klaus, *Magie und Manipulation: ideologischer Kult und politische Religion des Nationalsozialismus*, Göttingen, 1971. Gamm, Hans-Jochen, *Der Braune Kult*, Hamburg, 1962.
3. Burden, op. cit., p. 91.
4. See *Völkischer Beobachter*, 13 March 1933.
5. Vondung, op. cit., p. 79.
6. One of Hitler's first acts on attaining the Chancellorship was to order the construction of a massive stone Temple of Honour in Munich's Königsplatz. Its construction lasted over two years, and the Celebration of 9 November 1935 was the event by which it was consecrated. See Brandt, A. I., *Meilensteine des Dritten Reiches*, Munich, 1938.
7. *Völkischer Beobachter*, 10 November 1935.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Brandt, op. cit., p. 119.
11. The concept of the *Volk* had a particularly profound significance for National Socialism, meaning not only a 'people', but also a racial entity. It was believed that a transcendental essence united the members of the *Volk*. This essence may be variously defined as 'nature' or 'mythos', but it was always linked to the creativity of a group which had its source in the same cultural or racial heritage.
12. Böhme, Herybert, *Gesänge unter der Fahne*, Munich, 1935, p. 49.
13. Baumann, Hans, 'Wir zünden das Feuer', in *Deutsche Reihe nr. 39*, Jena, 1936.
14. There are many leaflets which were circulated by the NSDAP and its secondary organizations which attempt to explain the 'mystical origins' of the swastika in German pre-history. In particular Rausch, Friedrich, *Das Hakenkreuz, sein Sinn und sein Bedeutung*, Munich, 1933, who equated the swastika with ancient German sun-worship, and suggested that it possessed magical powers against the forces of darkness.
15. It is however worthy of note that during the early years of the NSDAP's *Kampfzeit*, when the notion of *völkisch* radicalism was still an integral part of the National Socialist *weltanschauung*, the red backcloth was portrayed as the colour of socialism.
16. Möller, Eberhard Wolfgang, 'Die Verpflichtung', *Volksspieldienst nr. 5*, Berlin, 1935, pp. 15ff.
17. See Gamm, op. cit., p. 72.
18. Böhme, Herybert, *Das deutsche Gebet*, Munich, 1936, p. 14.
19. Brandt, op. cit., p. 118.
20. Vondung, op. cit., p. 164.
21. Böhme, *Gesänge unter der Fahne*, p. 44.
22. Hitler, Adolf, *Mein Kampf*, Munich, 1925, p. 492.
23. Burden, op. cit., p. 57.
24. Schmeer, Karlheinz, *Die Regie des öffentlichen Lebens im Dritten Reich*, Munich, 1956, pp. 10ff.
25. See for instance, *Nürnberg 1935*, Berlin, 1935, and *Parteitag der Arbeit*, Berlin, 1937, for details of the Reichsparty-day celebrations.
26. Vondung, op. cit., p. 105.
27. Schumann, Gerhard, *Gedichte und Kantaten*, Munich, 1940, pp. 44 and 50.

28. See *Vorschläge der Reichspropagandaleitung zur Nationalsozialistischen Feiergestaltung 1/205 March 1936.*

29. Vondung for instance (op. cit., pp. 162ff.) refers to National Socialist myth as 'ideological myth', since the 'borrowed symbols are taken from the context of their experience. . . . it is the symbolic expression of speculative entities which have no real status'.

Even so there is a sense in which the SS's decision to carry out the Final Solution of the Jewish question could be considered as a 'revelation' of the meaning of the Holy-History.

30. It must however be stressed that the various Nazi symbols are themselves plagiarized from various cultural traditions, although the basic structure appropriates to Christian eschatological myth.

31. From the Foreward to *Bolschewismus und Judentum*, Berlin, 1934, published under the auspices of the Institute for Research into the Jewish Question.

32. Huge banners with mottoes such as 'The Jew is our Downfall!' were hung along the walls and the fronts of the balconies of the halls in Nuremberg where the NSDAP leaders spoke to the assembled party members during the Reichsparty celebrations.

33. Interestingly Rabinbach in his examination of the role of the National Socialist Bureau for the Beauty of Labour, notes how the NSDAP's policies with regard to aesthetizing the place of production enabled 'social realities to be eliminated by social reductionism'. See Rabinbach, Anson, 'The Aesthetics of Production in the Third Reich', *Journal of Contemporary History*, II, 1976, p. 63.

34. Junghans, Ferdinand, 'Die theatre geschichtliche Stellung des "Frankenburger Würfelspiels"' in Möller, *Das Frankenburger Würfelspiel*, 2 Aufl. Berlin, 1936, p. 62.

35. See Trunz, Erich, 'Tatsachendichtung und Weihedichtung', in *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Bildung*, 11, 1935, p. 549.

36. Berthold, Ernst, *Heiliges Brauchtum um die Fahne des Reiches*, Leipzig, 1936, p. 24.

Jason Ditton and Richard Brown

Why don't they revolt? 'Invisible income' as a neglected dimension of Runciman's relative deprivation thesis[1]

ABSTRACT

This article reopens a currently unfashionable sociological concern. Increasingly available evidence testifying to the existence of various forms of 'fiddling', and to the size of the thus manufactured 'hidden economy', is used to suggest a novel answer to the old question: why do the low-paid acquiesce in an inegalitarian income structure? It is suggested that the 'invisible income' individuals receive from their part in the 'hidden economy' creates subjective feelings of 'fantasy equality' whilst simultaneously exacerbating real, objective inequality. It is concluded that the 'hidden economy' supports rather than undermines the *status quo*.

> All societies are inegalitarian. But what is the relation between the inequalities in a society and the feelings of acquiescence or resentment to which they give rise? People's attitudes to social inequalities seldom correlate strictly with the facts of their own position. It might be thought plausible to assume that a person's feelings about the structure of his society should vary with his own location; whatever the system of stratification, should we not expect those at the top to be pleased with it and those at the bottom dissatisfied? But this is not what happens. Dissatisfaction with the system of privileges and rewards in a society is never felt in an even proportion to the degree of inequality to which its various members are subject . . . But what has in fact determined the actual relation between inequality and the acceptance or rejection of it?

This is how Runciman opens his classic text on the social meaning of deprivation.[2] Stated briefly: given class-stratified income inequality (as displayed diagrammatically, for example, in Figure 1),[3] an eternal question recurs. What accounts for the acquiescence of the underprivileged in the inequalities to which they are subjected? Put a little more brutally, why don't they (at the bottom) revolt (against those

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

FIG. 1. *Visible Earnings and Social Class.*

at the top)? Runciman puts it more delicately when he explains that:

> those at the bottom seem least discontented with the system which places them there. Political theorists of many different persuasions have wondered at the acquiescence of the underprivileged in the inequalities to which they are subjected, and have explained this acquiescence in terms of ignorance, or habit, or traditionally restricted expectations. If the least fortunate strata of society – Saint-Simons' 'classe la plus nombreuse et la plus pauvre' – were fully aware of how unequally they were being treated, would not all societies break out into revolution? . . . In stable societies with a long and unbroken history of customary inequalities, it is not difficult to see how the aspirations of the underprivileged could be kept low enough for the pattern to remain undisturbed. But once the possibility of improvement has been disclosed, it becomes more remarkable that inequalities should continue to be passively accepted by the great majority of those at the lower levels of society . . . How is it, therefore, that inequality can be so disproportionate to grievance even where equality is believed to be feasible?[4]

It has been advanced that the reason for this is either that the well-paid are perceived to be too far away from the low-paid for the latter to sustain any real comparisons (and the low-paid would have no feelings of deprivation relative to them – the perceptual account); or that the low-paid fail to define any discrepancies as systematic class ones (the political account). Runciman, for one, discards the latter 'false consciousness' position,[5] and instead adopts the perceptual account wherein deprivation, by and large, is relative. For example, he claims:

> we can roughly say that A is relatively deprived of X when (1) he does not have X, (2) he see some other person or persons, which

> may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X (whether or not this is or will in fact be the case), (3) he wants X, and (4) he sees it as feasible that he should have X.[6]

But it is Runciman's treatment of relative-*income* deprivation which is of particular interest here. In his 1962 survey, respondents were asked:

> first, 'Do you think that there are any other sorts of people doing noticeably better at the moment than you and your family?'; second (if the person had answered yes), 'What sort of people do you think are doing noticeably better?'; and third, 'What do you feel about this, I mean, do you approve or disapprove of this?'[7]

The replies indicated that comparative reference groups (groups of people whose situation or attributes a person contrasts with his own) are limited in scope. Over a quarter of the total sample could think of nobody who was doing noticeably better than themselves.[8] Even those who *were* a little more perceptive were curiously myopic when asked to name names. As Runciman puts it:

> A few direct quotations may bring out both the flavour and the range of replies coded under this heading. 'People with no children', said a woman with four of them. 'Where there is a man working in the family', said an unmarried woman. 'People who get extra money by letting off part of the house', said an eighty-two-year-old widow. 'Army officers retiring since I did', said a retired Army officer. 'People that have good health and are able to be in full time work', said a retired draper. 'People on night work', said a sixty-three-year-old brazier in the engineering industry, 'I have now had to do day work – I'm getting old'. 'People farming in a bigger way who can get subsidies', said a smallholder, 'I don't have enough acreage to be entitled to any.' 'University research people who went into research instead of teaching', said a schoolteacher's wife.[9]

Of those who could at least *see* somebody doing noticeably better than themselves, only 37 per cent of the manual workers, and 61 per cent of the non-manual respondents disapproved of the discrepancy. Runciman finds the answers to follow-up questions difficult to deal with. Having asked whether or not respondents were satisfied with their income, he reports that, 'In both strata, the proportion is almost suspiciously high – 57 per cent of non-manual respondents and 55 per cent of manual expressed themselves satisfied . . . The comparison with the result of the question about other people suggests that a further analysis is necessary.'[10]

Runciman's main findings have been repeated in a recent study of wage determination in industry, which included a large-scale survey

of a variety of industrial establishments. The relevant results were reported as follows:

> We repeated key questions asked by Runciman in his survey of feelings of relative deprivation, and the comparative reference groups from which these feelings were derived. We found that in fact there had been no change since 1962, according to the measure Runciman adopted. First, it remained true that a surprisingly small proportion of the general population felt that others were doing better than them. Secondly it remained true that this proportion was particularly small among those who in absolute terms were faring worst: the lower occupational groups and those in semi-skilled or unskilled manual households especially. Thirdly it remained true that this was because they continued to compare their own position more to those doing similar types of job as themselves, rather than to the highly paid groups at a different occupational level.[11]

Daniel's work shows that the challenge is as relevant today as it was when Runciman made it in 1966. Some more recent research findings concerning the extent of part-time theft - or 'fiddling' - prompt us to take up the challenge (i.e., to explain why such a large number of poorly-paid respondents were satisfied with their position), and exhume the by now universally spurned and subsequently unfashionable ignorance account of the absence of revolt from below. In brief, we suggest that this is at least in part because Runciman was only concerned with 'visible' income. Further, we speculate that Runciman's own plotting of the limited income-comparison horizons of his respondents might feasibly be seen as indicative of a natural ignorance of the 'invisible' incomes of those outside immediate reference groups. We suggest that manual workers may be not only ignorant of the real level of earnings of professional people (although they may suspect that their own earnings are lower), but, also that they assume that such people may be by and large honest, whilst they, themselves, may make enough 'extra' 'on the side' to make up for any perceived income differences.

Increasing research into 'fiddling' - the collective fruit of which is now known by the generic term the 'Hidden Economy' - has revealed widespread involvement in such part-time theft, typically practised by a majority of, and within, those workforces studied.[12] One estimate of the size of the 'Hidden Economy' in 1974 put its extent at 1.8 per cent of the visible economy (GNP). This would be as much as £2,640,000 per year in 1980.[13] Some specific and detailed research completed by Ditton has shown that bread salesmen supplement their meagre official earnings by stealing 'extra' from both customer and employer.[14] This officially 'invisible' (and thus untaxable) stolen income sometimes amounted to 10 per cent

of each man's gross sales volume, although occasionally it dropped to a mere 2.5 per cent. Because the gross sales volumes of individual salesmen's rounds varied considerably (from £200 to £1,000 per week), 'fiddled' income could vary from £5 to £100 weekly. Since the average visible wage (basic salary plus commission) was £32.50 per week for these bread salesmen, the 'invisible' extra portion amounted to between 15.4 per cent and 308 per cent of gross earnings.

However, opportunities for 'invisible' income are naturally greater in the service industries where customers, as well as employers, may become unsuspecting contributors. Equally inevitably, there may be some blue-collar jobs with no access to fiddling at all. For the sake of argument (and because of the lack of anything but estimated macro statistical data), let us assume that each blue-collar worker has an invisible wage equivalent to 10 per cent of his visible gross pay.[15]

There is no logical reason to suppose that the working class are alone in making a 'bit on the side'. In fact (through PAYE) they are systematically prevented from participating in one whole complete sector of theft - the 'Black Economy', or tax-evasion, that greatest of all middle-class fiscal sports. Although white-collar contribution to pilferage rates is generally held to be small, they have built up an unassailable lead in the tax-fiddler stakes. Well recognized concepts like tax 'havens', money 'laundering' and expense-account 'padding' do not emerge from the peculations of a few individuals: they crystallize from the actions of a whole class. The overall losses from such tax-evasion are massive. They were estimated in 1979 by the Chairman of the Board of the Inland Revenue at 2.25 per cent of GNP, or £3,300,000 per year, in 1980.[16] On top of this, there is another way that the middle class can safely notch up earnings 'invisible' to others - through 'perks'. The definitive element of perks is that they accrue invisible earnings in a non-indictable way.[17] As Titmuss has calculated, middle-class dependence on perks and other occupational fringe benefits is significant.[18] Because it is particularly hard to estimate just how financially significant tax-fiddling, and perks are,[19] we will, again for the sake of argument, hold middle-class invisible earnings down to equivalent of 10 per cent of gross visible pay.

Figure 1 now looks a little different: in fact, it looks like Figure 2. Where Figure 1 merely displays the standard, visible income gradient, Figure 2 gives a total income picture (with total income representing the sum of visible and invisible incomes).[20] Figure 2 provides the grounds for resurrecting the aged ignorance account, and provides a partial answer to the old question, Why don't they revolt? Consider a hypothetical specimen earner - Everyman who could inhabit a broad range of positions along the class spectrum (for convenience, we have put our specimen earner at point X on Figure 2). A knowledge of



FIG. 2. *Total Earnings and Social Class.*

'invisible' earnings, we suggest, allows the following interpretation. Everyman can see his own *total* income but only the *visible* income of others. (Recall that Runciman's first question on incomes included the words here emphasized, 'other sorts of people doing *noticeably* better'). So he will see himself as considerably better off (taking everything into account) 'in real terms' than his inferior, A; and crucially, than his marginal superior in visible income terms, earner B. More important, Everyman will compare what he knows to be his own total income with what he 'knows' C's (visible) income to be, and he will perceive himself to be at least the income equal of C. Of course, Everyman will have more or less of an inkling of the invisible incomes of others, but this perception will probably be most accurately levelled at those near him in the class hierarchy. As far as others' invisible earnings are concerned, Everyman is myopic.

This fits Runciman's findings quite neatly. For example, in his survey, of those who *could* think of somebody doing 'noticeably better', 33 per cent of non-manual workers and 25 per cent of manual workers cited someone very similar to themselves.[21] This partially supports our predicted 'halo' effect (i.e., that we may glimpse more easily the extra earnings of those near us in the class hierarchy). On the other hand, Runciman admits to framing his questions 'in order to tie the answers to people's own immediate situations, and to exclude the sort of extravagant or fantastic replies which could not be interpreted as a genuine reference group'.[22] This would mitigate against replies from Everyman comparing himself with those higher on the income gradient than point C on Figure 2.

We have, of course, arbitrarily assumed that class invisible earnings are a roughly similar proportion of their visible pay in the case of all members of a 'class', and it may well be that within a 'class', however defined, there is a range of situations from those with no invisible

earnings to those with more than the 10 per cent we have suggested as a notional figure. In so far as this is the case invisible earnings may contribute in a further way to an explanation of 'why don't they revolt?'. Those with invisible earnings will make the comparisons we have just outlined, seeing themselves as income equals of those above them on the visible income scale. Those with no invisible earnings are more likely to be aware of the invisible earnings of those in the same class grouping as themselves, than of the visible earnings of others; their reaction will be one of intra-class antagonism rather than class solidarity and inter-class conflict.

Something of a paradox, which we term 'fantasy equality'[23] is thus created by the contradictory implications of visible *vis-à-vis* invisible earnings. The question, 'Why don't they revolt?' is even more income-valid than originally supposed (the objective income gradient, i.e. the total income gradient, is even *steeper* than that which was taken originally to inform the question).[24] On the other hand, the subjective income gradient (the total earnings of self compared with the visible earnings of others) is much *flatter* than one would otherwise suspect. In this way, invisible earnings have the paradoxical ability to steepen the objective income gradient and simultaneously flatten the subjective income gradient. Accordingly, invisible earnings contribute to stability of the prevailing social order, and the maintenance of the *status quo ante*.[25]

To parody some of Runciman's rhetoric,[26] the bricklayer can become the income equal of the executive *not* by ceasing to be a bricklayer, but instead by sweating on piece-rate to earn bonus, selling a few bricks on the side, underpaying his mortar-boy, taking building materials home for personal use, falsifying his time-sheet, moonlighting in the evenings (without paying National Insurance or Income Tax), taking in paying guests and not declaring them to the Inland Revenue, and so on. What bricklayer, with this load of extra earnings, invisible (he fervently hopes) to everybody but himself, would not believe himself to be the income-equal of, at least, the manager of the brickworks? The 'bricklayer' is in each of us: life's hidden extras are a constant source of social stability.

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NOTES

1. This article is a revised version of a paper first delivered by one of the authors at the Centre for Occupational and Community Research at Middlesex Polytechnic in 1978.

2. W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*, Penguin, 1972, pp. 3, 4.

3. We have graphically idealized the relationship between 'social class' and income here. As far as we are aware, there is nowhere an explicit collation of one with the other. However, although we wish to keep to the simplistic representation in the main text (because we are not intent upon making statistical or demographic points) it is possible here to give some support to our argument from data published by John Westergaard and Henrietta Resler on p. 78 of their *Class in a Capitalist Society*, London, Heinemann, 1975, which is plotted in Figure 1a. Their figures are for April 1971 (and thus currently seem somewhat otherworldly), and we have collapsed their main categories approximately into Registrar General's Classes V to I. On a graph with axes identical to that used to prepare Figure 1 (in the text), their figures give us Figure 1a.

4. Runciman, op. cit., pp. 29–30.

5. Runciman, op. cit., p. 294, says, 'An interest model can only be properly applied where the person's own conception of his interest will be better realised by his diversion of his present wants to a more expedient object. To tell him that something he believes to be to his interest is not can be justified only by accepting his statement of what he wants and showing him either that the want will be better fulfilled by different means, or that he is mistaken about the facts of the situation of the reference group which has aroused his feeling of relative deprivation. It cannot be justified by telling him that his interest is not what he thinks'. David Lockwood, in *The Blackcoated Worker*, London, Allan & Unwin, 1958, p. 200, quotes Theodor Geiger (from *Die Klassengesellschaft im Schmelztiegel*) 'Differences in class consciousness of workers of the same class are facts that simply exist; logically they can be neither true nor false.'

6. Runciman, op. cit., p. 11.

7. Ibid., p. 227.

8. Whilst Runciman, op. cit., p. 227, claims, 'The proportion rises, as one



FIG. 3. *Visible Earnings and Social Class (derived from Westergaard and Resler).*

would expect, with income', his data only support such a generalization within both his manual and non-manual groups considered separately. In the manual stratum as a whole, 27 per cent could think of nobody doing noticeably better than themselves (within that stratum, 39 per cent of the higher-paid, 32 per cent of the medium-paid, but only 17 per cent of the lower-paid could think of nobody). In the non-manual stratum as a whole, 25 per cent could think of nobody doing noticeably better than themselves (within that stratum, 31 per cent of the higher-paid, 25 per cent of the medium-paid, but only 21 per cent of the lower-paid could think of nobody). We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for drawing this peculiar bimodal result to our attention. We tentatively suggest that whilst we have no novel explanation for these findings, their acknowledgment does not challenge the argument advanced in this article.

9. Runciman, op. cit., p. 229.

10. Ibid., p. 243.

11. W. W. Daniel, 'Wage Determination in Industry', *P.E.P. Broadsheet*, 1976, vol. 42, no. 563, p. 19.

12. Outer Circle Policy Unit, *Policing the Hidden Economy: The Significance and Control of Fiddles*, London, OCPU, 1978. See also, Kerrick Macafee, 'A glimpse of the hidden economy in the national accounts', *Economic Trends*, no. 316, February 1980, London, HMSO, pp. 81–7.

13. Ibid., p. 11.

14. Jason Ditton, *Part-Time Crime: An Ethnography of Fiddling and Pilferage*, London, Macmillan, 1977.

15. This is not an excessive speculation. Blue-collar pilferage losses are generally estimated at between 1.25 per cent and 2 per cent of gross production, or of gross sales. If the total blue-collar wages did not exceed 1/5 (20 per cent) of total sales volume, then 'invisible' blue-collar earnings would equal 10 per cent of blue-collar visible income.

16. The Chairman, Sir William Pile, said that it was 'not implausible' that tax undeclared income (the 'black economy') might amount to 7.5 per cent of GNP, or, about £11,000 millions per annum at 1980 levels. At a 30 per cent income tax rate, we estimate this as a loss of £3,300,000 in 1980. Sir William Pile's remarks are cited on the first page of Michael O'Higgins's pamphlet, *Measuring the Hidden Economy: A Review of Evidence and Methodologies*, London, OCPU, 1980. Further credibility has attached itself to Sir William Pile's estimates after they were repeated by his successor, Sir Lawrence Airey, in the evidence presented to the Committee of Public Accounts on 4 June 1980. Apparently, 7.5 per cent was 'not implausible' on the following grounds: 0 per cent evasion was implausibly low, 15 per cent evasion was implausibly high, and 7.5 per cent, being neither of these two figures, was, *ergo*, 'not implausible'! (*Twenty-Ninth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts*, Cmnd 778, London, HMSO, 1980, p. 8, para. 4637, *Minutes of Evidence*). The Report itself defines the 'black economy' as, 'all forms of non-declaration of taxable income. It thus includes the understatement of income and overstatement of expenses as well as the concealment of secondary sources of income from "moonlighting"' (ibid., para. 21, *Report*). This definition is sufficiently broad to include possible evasion by those conventionally paying tax on the PAYE system. However, no evidence in support of this is cited.

17. See, Jason Ditton 'Perks, Pilferage and "The Fiddle": The Historical Structure of Invisible Wages', *Theory and Society*, Vol. IV, no. 1, 1977, pp. 39–71.

18. Richard M. Titmuss, *Income Distribution and Social Justice*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1962, p. 170 *et passim*.

19. As one ascends the status ladder, costing 'extras' becomes increasingly difficult because 'costs' conceptually blur, and become 'profits'. Simultaneously, kind-benefits, given *instead* of true wage worth to blue-collar

workers, are proffered as *extra* to white-collar workers. Additionally, the middle-class are the chief beneficiaries of perks. As Runciman, op. cit., p. 102, puts it, 'It is, as Titmuss emphasises, impossible to make an accurate estimate of the extent of fringe benefits, but it is certain that these are considerable and it is a plausible guess that they are principally enjoyed by non-manual workers.' For example, an employee's recent expenditure on a suit that he would not have bought had not his employer insisted upon it, and which he never wore outside working hours was decreed upon appeal (Hillyer V. Leeke – Inspector of Taxes, *The Times*, 7 July 1976) not to have been expenditure incurred 'wholly, exclusively and necessarily' for work, and thus not tax-deductible. Generally, for working-class recipients, perks are costed and thus subject to any statutory wages control (see the examples given in fns 45 and 46 of Ditton, 1977, op. cit., at fn. 17, *supra*), whereas executive perks are used precisely to infringe any pay code, since it is allowable that they be taxed on their *value* and not on their actual *cost* (Titmuss, op. cit., p. 175).

20. When we refer to invisible earnings, we do not just refer to earned income (unearned, or inherited income would not necessarily be visible). To count as invisible, earnings must be either secretly in kind, or illegally in cash (this includes income which becomes illegal since it is not declared for tax purposes), or both.

21. Runciman, op. cit. p. 227.

22. Ibid.

23. Its parallel is clearly Runciman's 'mistaken' feeling of relative deprivation (Runciman, op. cit., p. 293), which arises when a man is misinformed about his reference group.

24. Although we have held, for the sake of argument, invisible earnings at 10 per cent of visible earnings across the whole class spectrum, those with higher visible incomes will recieve a larger absolute invisible income. This automatically generates a steeper gradient (the total income gradient).

25. The opposite has, in fact, been suggested. For example, in the magazine, *Up Against the Law*, it has been said that, 'Pilfering and fiddling are the "honest" response of millions of people to being exploited day in, day out, by employers. We are not stealing. We are taking back what is rightfully ours' (quoted in Stuart Henry, *The Hidden Economy: The Control and Context of Borderline Crime*, London, Martin Robertson, 1978, p. 49). Yet in our opinion, invisible earnings do not represent or contribute to any revolutionary potential the working class possess. Indeed, we would agree with the interpretation given recently by Hugo Young who suggested that 'frictional unemployment is rendered singificantly less abrasive' by the participation in the 'black economy' by the unemployed (*Sunday Times*, 14 December 1980).

26. Runciman, op. cit., p. 15.

Helen Roberts and Diana Woodward

Changing patterns of women's employment in sociology: 1950–80[1]

ABSTRACT

This paper looks at changing patterns of women's employment in sociology over the last thirty years since the foundation of the British Sociological Association. Starting with an examination of early studies of the sexual division of labour in sociology, we go on to look at the adequacy or otherwise of explanations in these studies. Moving on to more recent surveys of the profession, it becomes clear that there has not been a substantial improvement in the employment prospects for women in sociology, although the subjective situation of women sociologists has probably been improved through the support of the Women's Caucus and increased attention to sexism in the subject matter of sociology. Finally we suggest that improvement in women's employment prospects in sociology would not only affect the construction of the labour market in sociology, but would be likely to go further, and would also affect the construction of knowledge.

The last decade has witnessed a revival of the women's liberation movement which has fostered the efforts of feminist academics to expose the critical absence of women as both theorists and subjects (or objects) of codified knowledge. The cumulative evidence of the invisibility of women in knowledge which has been constructed primarily by men, from a male perspective and about men, makes salutary reading.[2] In all the social sciences and some of the physical and natural sciences there has been documentation of the way in which women have been omitted and excluded from the production of knowledge.[3]

An attention to the exclusion of women from the codification of knowledge is not a new idea. As early as 1972 in her paper 'My Four Revolutions', Jessie Bernard[4] was asking not what sociology can do for women, but rather what women (and sympathetic male colleagues) can do for sociology. It is of course significant that it is

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almost exclusively women who have been at this particular forefront of knowledge. The consequences of putting women as subjects into sociology is a subject of continuing discussion.[5] Allied to this is a discussion of the place of women as theorists and practitioners within sociology, and the aim of this paper is to examine not so much the gender-bound construction of knowledge in sociology, as the related problem of sexual divisions in the sociological labour force.

A number of studies have been undertaken in Britain and the USA which provide information on the situation of women staff in posts in higher education. Some of these have focused on departments of sociology while others have been broad surveys of academic careers, within which sociologists as a group can be identified. Generally, however, this literature does not provide a comprehensive and reliable series for analysis over time of the woman sociologist's position within the profession. The inadequacies of these studies tend to be of three main kinds:

(a) In many cases, studies of academic careers do not present data or discuss results broken down by both discipline and sex, so that women sociologists cannot be separately identified for comparison with men sociologists, and with women and men in other disciplines.

(b) Some interesting studies of women in sociology cover only a small sample of the relevant population, and one which is likely to be unrepresentative because respondents will disproportionately be those who share the researcher's political convictions. This methodological defect tends to arise in studies mounted with the goal of promoting change within the profession; studies frequently conducted without the resources of money, staff and time normally required to do good empirical research.

(c) Some studies do provide useful and relevant quantitative material but deal with the post-graduation destinations of all graduates or all sociology graduates rather than with recruitment to the profession itself. Of course, an academic career in the subject has long been a major source of employment for sociology graduates, if less so at the moment than in former, rosier times, and it is sometimes possible to gain information on entry to academic careers in sociology from these results. However, this type of research will necessarily provide a much briefer discussion of women sociologists' situation than when this is the main focus of the investigation.

Taking these various studies together we can construct some kind of model, albeit an incomplete and somewhat impressionistic one, of women's position within the sociology profession over three decades. It is no accident that the period for which we have reasonably reliable information on careers in British sociology coincides with the history of the British Sociological Association. Not only did the foundation of the BSA mark the first significant phase of the establishment of

sociology as a discipline in British universities – five universities joined the LSE in offering degree level courses in sociology in the period 1945–51[6] – but also the seven principal studies of British sociologists and sociology graduates, undertaken between 1952 and 1977, have been conducted under the auspices of the BSA.[7]

The first five of these studies provide a longitudinal portrait of the typical British sociology graduate produced between the early 1950s and the early 1970s, and charts initially a gradual and later a dramatic increase in student numbers, associated with changing patterns of recruitment to sociology as a profession. In J. A. Banks's study[8] a population of thirty-seven higher degree and 161 first degree graduates in sociology or social anthropology was identified, whereas the 1970 study[9] was based on a population of 1,871 university sociology first degree graduates, excluding altogether social anthropologists and students with overseas home addresses. The number of university departments offering degrees in sociology increased during the 1950s and 1960s from 6 in 1951 to 14 in 1959, to 33 in 1969 and 39 in 1973, and the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a comparable growth in the teaching of sociology in polytechnics and colleges. This will clearly have influenced opportunities for entry into academic careers. Whereas the provision of staff to teach the first expansionary waves of sociology students in the universities was largely achieved by recruiting those without degrees in the subject, later phases of increased demand for teachers could largely be met from the ranks of those who had graduated in sociology at the earlier stages of the boom. By the time of the rapid growth of sociology teaching in the non-university sector after the mid-1960s, university graduates were eager to take these new jobs as opportunities for them to enter university teaching had largely dried up. Graduates from both the university sector and the polytechnics and colleges were finding that by the mid 1970s opportunities for them to embark on academic careers in all areas of higher education had shrunk very considerably. The era of expansion had ended and a period of retrenchment was about to begin. Thus there has been considerable variation in the opportunities available for the members of each cohort to enter careers in teaching and research in sociology.

This variation over time in the job market for sociology graduates has been a recurrent theme in the studies' reports. The very first of the BSA enquiries was initiated because of 'a considerable degree of anxiety amongst certain sections of the BSA membership concerning the employment opportunities for sociology graduates at that time'.[10]

By 1958 J. A. Banks could write, in his final report on the studies of the 1952 and 1953 graduates,

> Much of the concern that existed in 1951 and 1952 when the BSA set up its Sub-Committee to inquire into the recruitment, training

> and employment of sociologists has now died away . . .. Part of the reason for the decline in concern has arisen from the fact that the graduate members of the BSA who were mainly responsible for the establishment of the Sub-Committee have since become employed almost entirely in sociology teaching or research.[11]

The studies of these cohorts found that two and a half years after graduation one in five sociologists and anthropologists was employed in university teaching or research, compared with about one in twenty-five male graduates in all disciplines. Banks explains this high proportion in terms of 'the expansion of employment in this field since 1952 and the small absolute number of sociologists and anthropologists available in any given year'.[12]

Unfortunately no separate analysis of graduates' occupations by sex is given in these reports, although the text does include a brief general discussion of sex differences in the graduate labour market and the 'special case of the married women'.[13] It has been pointed out that everything is data, but datum isn't everything. The lack of attention to the variable of sex in the early studies is itself of sociological interest.

Joan Abbott's study 'Employment of Sociology and Anthropology Graduates 1966–67'[14] was also a result of the profession's interest in the changing job market for sociology graduates and the implications of the university expansion in sociology teaching. Seven hundred and twenty four first degree graduates from British universities and colleges were surveyed before and after their graduation in June 1966, and 56 per cent of these were women. Abbott found that of those who had tentatively chosen an employment field three months before graduation, 41 per cent of the men but only 21 per cent of the women hoped to have academic careers.[15] Of both the men and women respondents 29 per cent obtained Firsts and Upper Seconds and one year after graduation 26 per cent of the men and 12 per cent of the women were preparing for careers in professional sociology.[16] Men did outnumber women on Masters and Doctoral degree programmes but not significantly so – 25:21 for Masters degrees and 15:13 for Doctorates[17] – and the overall proportion of graduates registering for higher degrees had increased to 18 per cent compared with 8 per cent of Banks's 1952 graduates. Abbott concurs with Carter's diagnosis (again based on a survey of BSA members) that the changing pattern of recruitment into sociology teaching had made a first degree in the subject essential and that future job opportunities would lie within the colleges rather than the universities.[18] A higher degree would increasingly become a pre-requisite for university teaching posts as the main phase of staff expansion here was already over, so that the greater competition for fewer jobs would oblige candidates to be better qualified than earlier entrants had often been.

The Banks and Webb survey of 1966 and 1970 graduates undertaken in 1977 likewise discusses job opportunities against the backcloth of changes in the supply of and demand for sociologically qualified personnel. Surveying Joan Abbott's sample of 1966 graduates five years after graduation (and four years after her last contact with them) they found a quarter of those in full-time work to be academics. This figure was expected to be lower for subsequent cohorts of graduates as 'potential academics face the bottleneck created through the recruiting of a large number of young lecturers in earlier years, and a levelling off in the growth of sociology in higher education'.[19] Despite the relatively small difference in the number of men and women students taking higher degrees found by Abbott, by 1971 Banks and Webb discovered that ease of entry into academic careers for this group had been much greater for the male than for the female graduates. The absolute majority of women which had existed at undergraduate level had been reversed so that after five years 60 per cent of the professional sociologists were men, and this figure had increased from 47 per cent of those whose first jobs were as academic sociologists.

A gradual process can be charted, beginning at the time of graduation, of women's higher propensity to withdraw or, it could be argued, to be excluded from academic sociology. Banks and Webb explain this partly in terms of family commitments – that geographical moves at the time of marriage and after, and the birth of children, make it increasingly difficult for women to pursue an academic career – but also in terms of a subtly masculine ethos within academia which discourages women's achievements. They discuss the careers of those women who do succeed in terms of 'an initiation of endurance'.[20] Women students, they argue, are far more likely than men to be attracted to sociology initially as preparation for a career in social work. Those women who do remain in sociology after graduation are the survivors of an extended competitive social process in which the highest status fields of academic enterprise are increasingly identified as the 'aggressive' theoretical, stereotypically masculine areas; the applied fields in which women are encouraged to specialize are the least prestigious areas and those least likely to be considered as appropriate preparation for an academic career. While the authors of this study avoided sociological reflection on taken for granted assumptions about family commitments, and the purportedly 'masculine' ethos of sociology, the attention to the sexual division of labour was an encouraging one.

One explanation posited by Banks and Webb for the striking under-representation of women in professional sociology is the failure of staff to encourage able women students to continue their studies and to sponsor their progress to the same extent as promising young men. Again, this is an 'explanation' of a type which although

based on an interesting observation itself requires sociological explanation.

Banks's and Webb's study showed that over a third of the women 1966 graduates employed in academic sociology worked in research jobs, compared with a sixth of the men,[21] and almost half of the women academics, but only 30 per cent of the men, had obtained their positions via personal contact rather than the open market.[22] Disproportionate numbers of these women were recruited to work on 'dogsbody' jobs on short-term research contracts, working in low key support jobs, in other words doing the research project housework. It is hardly surprising that the drop-out rate from the profession was high for those women: their conditions of employment made this a likely outcome irrespective of what Banks and Webb saw as the readily available alternatives for women of 'that sideways step across the invitational edge into either domesticity or "personalised" careers such as social work'. Just as trade union commentators have pointed out that if work were such a good thing, the rich would have found a way to keep it to themselves, one may well wonder why, if domesticity were so invitational, male sociologists were able to resist it.

In spite of unanswered questions, however (and perhaps the problem here is not that questions still unresolved on the complex issues of the transmission of knowledge and power and the nature of family commitments were *unanswered* in this study, but that they were *unasked*), the Banks and Webb study does provide a more detailed analysis than earlier studies had done of the implications of sex for academic careers in sociology.

The issue of women's position in sociology had become a much debated one within the profession by the time their report was published in 1977. From the late 1960s on, many women sociologists were active in the women's movement, and women's caucuses had been established within the professional associations in both the USA, and later, Britain. A certain amount of introspection was perhaps inevitable, which resulted in a series of studies of the situation of women academics in general and female sociologists in particular.

An early American article was Sylvia Fava's[23] on the status of women in professional sociology in which she noted the high 'mortality rate' of women passing from undergraduate level through to professional practice of sociology. More recent data on women in sociology were provided by Davis[24] and Rossi[25] and in 1973 an issue of the *American Journal of Sociology* was devoted to research on women, with a number of articles on women academics.[26]

During the 1970s, in response to moves initiated within the BSA by the recently established women's caucus, two surveys of the British situation were undertaken. The Caucus had first met at the 1974 BSA Annual Conference, when the topic was Sexual Divisions

in Society. The introduction to one of the two volumes of papers arising from this conference points to the climate of the profession:

> We think we should record the surprise (and even hostility and ribaldry) shown by some sociologists at the prospect of a BSA conference being devoted to sexual divisions and society. As far as we know nothing similar was expressed about conferences on race and racialism, social stratification or development. Indeed we would use any and all the volumes so far published in this series as examples of the virtual absence in sociological discourse of any awareness of gender as an organising force in society.[27]

From the meetings of the women's caucus at this conference, there came pressure for the BSA to examine the position of women in the sociology profession and sexism in the teaching of sociology and social policy. Each of these issues was investigated by a Working Party. The one on the Status of Women in the Profession, chaired by Professor Margaret Stacey, carried out a survey of BSA members and gathered other data, and reported back to the 1975 Annual Conference. The survey covered about a quarter of BSA members, in which women members were over-represented (they were a third of BSA members). Thus whilst not representative of either the BSA or the profession, it could be used to illustrate certain tendencies within British sociology. Based on responses from 148 women and 179 men, the study found the men's earnings to be consistently higher than women's, irrespective of age, terminal education level, number of publications, and number of dependents. For example, a third of the women with PhDs earned over £5000 per annum (and fully one-third of these women high earners worked in Canadian universities) compared with over half the men. Of the men and women PhDs with the highest rate of publications 38 per cent of the women but 74 per cent of the men earned over £5000 per annum.

Over two-thirds of the women respondents made comments about sex discrimination, but of course it could be argued that a study of this kind would be expected to bring to light more instances of reported discrimination than would a simple random survey of the profession conducted for an ostensibly different purpose. These incidents included barriers to the choice of subject or career in school, hostility from staff or fellow students at university, poor postgraduate supervision and inadequate assistance, the difficulties of reconciling domestic responsibilities with a career, and sex inequalities in job appointments, promotions, salaries and working conditions. Even the few women who had achieved senior positions gave numerous instances of ways in which their career development had been handicapped by their sex, ranging from offers of posts which had already been turned down by a number of men, to the 'tokenism' of their present situation within their institutions. Hilary Rose, writing

a section of the report called 'On the making of sociological women', echoes Rossi and Banks and Webb, saying:

> This is the natural history of survivors. Women who have 'made it', women who are struggling within the profession, women who recognise that they have been pushed and let themselves be pushed into the sociological backwaters, women who see their career as permanently subordinate to their husbands, temporarily subordinate to their children. Yet all of whom still see themselves as sociologists in that they still maintain their professional dues and belong to the BSA. From the experiences of the survivors, we may learn something of the processes that excluded the necessarily silent.[28]

The latest BSA study of women in the profession was undertaken in 1977 by the Committee for the Equality of the Sexes; a committee which had been set up to continue the work originated by the Working Party on the Status of Women in the Profession, and other related tasks. This study was a survey of the sex ratios of staff at various levels of the hierarchy and students in those departments and research groups within higher education where sociologists were employed. The questionnaire also dealt with supervision facilities for research on sexual divisions, the availability and cost of child care arrangements, and the extent to which BSA policy on women was being implemented within the departments. Questionnaires were sent out to individuals who had already volunteered to act as watchdogs (or watchbitches) in their institutions to monitor and promote the implementation of BSA policy. The replies to the survey from thirty-five departments probably represent the response of the committed and not a representative sample of the profession, but they nevertheless provided a wide coverage of the places where sociologists are employed. The replies indicate that in these thirty-five departments women were about 57.5 per cent of undergraduates, 40 per cent of postgraduate students, 53 per cent of research staff, 35 per cent of lecturers (in universities) and of lecturers I and II (in polytechnics and colleges), 16.5 per cent of senior lecturers and readers (in universities) and of principal lecturers (in polytechnics and colleges), and 13 per cent of professors and heads of departments. The overall proportion of women academics was one in three, similar to the ratio of the BSA's membership, but the figures differed slightly from the then latest figures for employment in universities only. The 1974 University Grants Committee figures showed women to be 66 per cent of sociology graduates and 30 per cent of higher degree students. An analysis of university calendars for 1974–5 showed women to be 22 per cent of all staff listed in sociology and related departments, decreasing from 27 per cent of lecturers to 14 per cent of senior lecturers and readers and 10 per cent of professors. The difference

between these figures and the survey's findings will be attributable partly to the inclusion of non-university institutions in the survey and partly to university calendars' propensity to under-represent staff on temporary or part-time or research contracts, who are disproportionately likely to be women.

Certainly for the higher status posts there is broad agreement between the calendars' and the survey's figures, and once again the data indicate a significant tapering-off of the proportions of women at successively higher rungs of the sociologist's career ladder. Whilst the survey information did not permit a detailed analysis of the reasons for the situation which it identified, it broadly supports the findings of the other studies of this issue. It followed up the survey by circulating a document entitled 'Suggested forms of action to improve the situation of women in higher education institutions' designed to help women promote change in their departments.

Over the thirty-year period since the formation of the BSA, no fundamental change has taken place in the proportions of women at higher levels within the profession. The numbers of sociologists graduating from the various types of higher education institution have increased markedly over this time, and the proportion of women has only very slightly increased, remaining at somewhat over half. Yet studies have consistently found fewer women academics than their student numbers would lead one to expect, and have shown an inverse correlation between the status of academic posts and the proportion of women employed at that level. The reasons for this fall-out of women from sociology may be, as Banks and Webb suggest, due to dissonance between students' expectations of a welfare-oriented subject and the reality of a highly theoretical discipline; or due to the constant availability of 'inviting' domestic roles or less competitive careers as socially sanctioned alternatives to an academic career. Or, as Rossi argues, young women's own greater diffidence than that of their male peers, due to sex role socialization, in presenting themselves for higher degrees and junior teaching posts may be partly attributable to the failure of the predominantly male academic establishment to provide the requisite encouragement and support. Others have explained the paucity of women academics at senior level in terms of their informal exclusion from male networks of communication and decision-making, which restricts women's access to new knowledge, unofficial information about job opportunities, and so on. This militates against women obtaining the sponsorship and guidance from established academics which tend to be crucial factors in the development of an academic career.[29] This dearth of women academics, as Rossi and others have pointed out, creates extra difficulties for those few who have achieved senior jobs in that they become overburdened with responsibility for supervising and advising women students, and with 'token' membership of large

numbers of committees; both duties which reduce the time available for their preparation, reading and research.

To some extent it could be argued that the subjective position of women in sociology has changed for the better. The establishment of women's caucuses within the ASA and BSA may have reduced women's feelings of isolation, and overt sexism in teaching and in inter-personal relations is now seen as largely unacceptable even by those not wholly sympathetic to the feminist critique of the discipline. However in many cases these changes are cosmetic; actual structural change seems relatively resistant to the kinds of pressure that the BSA and the Women's Caucus can exert. We may no longer hear women sociology graduates (this one was a trained youth employment officer) say: 'Being married, I am not on the established staff, and I have been told that I should have to make way for a single person should one be available',[30] but we still find, as Banks and Banks did, a high rate of women's unemployment, problems of reconciling domestic roles with a professional career, and – as has consistently been charted – the failure of large numbers of women to gain the posts, salaries and recognition which their qualification and experience would merit.

Women academics are, of course, a relatively privileged group, but as Cass *et al.* point out: '(this) group of women are very much like most employed women because the hierarchy in which they work functions for them like the work hierarchies in which most women are involved'.[31]

It is difficult on the basis of these studies to separate out the effect of family commitments and broken employment from the lack of sponsorship and women's own 'choices' of career, since the three in practice are closely interwoven. The 'choice' of domesticity may seem more attractive if no 'choice' of an academic career is apparently open.

Blackstone and Fulton,[32,33] comparing the situation of women academics in the USA with that in the UK, point, in their later article, to the fact that marital status affects men's as well as women's prospects with married men having the highest earnings of any category and married women the lowest.

Thus, it is clear that it is not marriage and *parenthood* which disadvantages an academic career, but marriage and *motherhood.* This, in spite of the fact, pointed out by Blackstone and Fulton, that those few British academic women in their thirties and forties at the time of their survey who were married and with children wrote and published more than any other group of women. But as Acker[34] makes clear, publishing productivity is most enhanced when someone (usually a wife) does all the support work (laundry, dinners) avoids making competing demands, and types, edits and looks up references as numerous book prefaces remind us.

A recent NUT/EOC survey, *Promotion and the Woman Teacher*[35] indicates that the ramifications of the break in service spread far beyond the actual loss of service, and of course when a woman returns after a break in service, she cannot be guaranteed a post equivalent to the level at which she left.

The difficulty of re-entry as a sociologist teaching in higher education would now make a break in career a highly hazardous course of action. Tessa Blackstone[36] has warned against women academics giving up their posts completely to raise children, and has suggested that opportunities for part-time employment should be made more widely available and women university teachers with family commitments should have their teaching commitment reduced in favour of more time to be allocated to research. This would enable them to work more flexible hours and would assist them, she suggests, with the research and publication necessary for promotion. This does not challenge the assumptions concerning women and family responsibilities (men are parents too, after all), but is highly realistic otherwise in terms of the relative value given to research and teaching in matters of promotion.

The above relates to the subjective elements of employment, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in detail the wider changes that might follow from changes in the composition of the sociological workforce. Sociology might well look very different, however, if women were free to influence the substantive issues in sociology and to do so from a position in which they were central rather than peripheral. If women were to have more control, for instance, over the politics of research funding, we might find less of the extraordinary funding of large scale studies from which women are excluded. We would suggest that the full inclusion of women in the sociological enterprise could well lead to important changes in the construction of sociological knowledge, and there is no more pertinent example than that of stratification theory: the subject of a special issue of the *British Journal of Sociology* in 1979.

Delphy[37] and Roberts,[38] among others, have argued that stratification, an area of central importance in sociology, is also an area where the androcentrism of the subject is most entrenched. Neither the Oxford Mobility Group which studied occupational mobility in England and Wales, nor the Scottish occupational mobility survey, included females in their own right in their samples, although the Scottish team did collect information on wives. But, as they themselves point out,[39] the wives of a random sample of men are not a random sample of women. They exclude single, widowed, divorced or separated women and their selection is dependent on the selection of their partners. In the special issue of the *British Journal of Sociology* on stratification in an article comparing mobility data from France, Sweden and England,[40] the French sample is a population

drawn from 'All persons living in France aged 15–66 (excluding those institutionalised)' and the Swedish 'All persons living in Sweden aged 15–75'. 'Given the limitation of the English inquiry', write the authors, 'to men and to the age range 20–64, our comparative analyses have also had to be limited in these same ways'. Thus, the Oxford Mobility Group, by omitting women from their study are not only imposing an enormous limit on our understanding of intergenerational mobility in England and Wales, but prevent appropriate comparsions with other western European countries. The authors, while admitting that the exclusion of women 'is the more serious shortcoming in that cross-national differences in the extent and pattern of female employment could well have implications for mobility rates among men', (note the emphasis and the inference that it is only the effect of women's employment on the mobility of men which appears to be of interest) are somewhat dismissive of this limitation, and suggest that this possibility can be examined later on the basis of a comparison of mobility among women in France and Sweden.

In an article in the same issue on class formation and class consciousness, with an ambitious aim to 'provide . . . a *general* theory of class formation and class consciousness in advanced capitalist societies'[41] (our emphasis), it does not seem to be unreasonable to expect some attention to be given to the position of women in the class structure, and particularly those women whom the author specifically omits, i.e. unpaid domestic labourers.

The author suggests that structural location in the working class be measured on a scale of how close one is to the 'centre' of the working class, and does not fail to notice that his definitions of what constitutes 'centre' implicitly if not explicitly favours a particular section of the population. We reproduce his table and footnote as Table I.[42]

TABLE I: *Structural location in the working class*

Centre	Periphery
Working-class communities	Middle-class communities
Large enterprises	Small enterprises
Mining/manufacture/construction	Transport, trade and services
Public sector	Private sector
Employed	Not employed
*Males	Females

*This would only apply in a sexist society (which all existing capitalist societies are). It might be argued that sex *per se* is irrelevant; that is, the lower level of class consciousness is a product of their peripheral location in the working class.

Thus, while the author gives a nod in the direction of the problems of sexism inherent in his argument, it is a nod of the most cursory nature which he dismisses by a reference to an unsatisfactory status quo and compounds by a statement on the 'lower level of class consciousness of women' which, since he does not footnote or develop further appears to be a taken for granted assumption on his part. By attributing this lower level of class consciousness to an assumed peripheral location of women in the working class, the author is merely working on assumptions for which he gives us no solid evidence. On what grounds is a large mining enterprise of employed male workers in the public sector more 'central' to the working class or in Parkin's terms, quoted by Stephens,[43] the 'radical value system', than a launderette in the middle of a working-class council housing estate on the outskirts of a large town? Stephens does attempt an answer, but only one which begs further questions:

> The working class housewife may be thoroughly embedded in a working class social network but because contact to unions is greater in work life than at home, she is less likely to be influenced by the radical value system than someone who is working. Likewise, a similar housewife who is a member of a religious organisation is more likely to be influenced by the dominant value system.[44]

Stephens is clearly not unaware of the difficulties of his position. He mentions the problem of sexist societies in the note below his table. He occasionally uses the construction 'he or she'. He refers to 'families', 'parents' and even 'secretaries' and 'housewives' in passing, but the problem of locating women in this 'general' theory of class formation and class consciousness is clearly not a central one for him, since the directions for future research mentioned in his conclusion do not point even a tiny signpost towards the difficulty of locating women in this general theory.

Such work as has been done, incorporating women into stratification studies, has tended to be piecemeal. Catriona Llewellyn and Sara Graham, while working on the Oxford project, conducted a study of a group of bank workers including women.[45] It is indicative of the weight (or lack of it) attached to this work that it was carried out in addition to their full-time work.

Delphy,[46] in her work on the exclusion of women from studies of stratification, takes a radical view, arguing that in adopting inadequate methods (or even no method at all), of classifying women, sociology not only produces poor data, but actually *obscures* a particular mode of production.

Changes in the way in which we do our sociological work, it can thus be argued, may well go further than correcting methodological errors or ideological biases. Such changes would mean that the social

and intellectual climate in which men have flourished and in which many have made their reputations would change with shifts in paradigm as the 'old explanations' are seen to be inadequate in dealing with 'new' data (if the existence of women as a category to be taken into account in sociological studies can be seen as new). As Kuhn's work suggests[47] there is likely to continue to be considerable resistance as the traditionalists try to protect their reputations. The studies quoted above do not present an altogether rosy picture in this respect for while there has been some movement in the employment of women in British sociology over the last thirty years, their representation in the profession is not as great as one might expect from the undergraduate numbers, ability and performance. We have come a long way since Logan Wilson, who wrote: 'Average salaries are . . . depressed by the fact that there is a higher percentage of women workers than in any other major profession.'[48] Nevertheless, in a climate of educational cuts, it is unlikely that the employment situation of marginal groups will improve, and as long as women are under-represented in the profession we cannot be confident that gender differentiation in social structure will be seen as a central issue.

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NOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented by the authors to the 1980 BSA annual conference on behalf of the Sex Equality Sub-Committee of the BSA. Helpful comments from those attending that session (as it happens all women) are gratefully acknowledged, as are the *BJS* referee's suggestions and the typing of successive versions by Sue Sinclair.

2. See Dale Spender (ed.), *Men's Studies Modified*, Pergamon, 1981.

3. See for example, D. Smith, 'A peculiar eclipsing: women's exclusion from man's culture', *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 1, no. 4, 1978, pp. 281–96.

4. Jessie Bernard, 'My Four Revolutions', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 78, no. 4, 1972, pp. 773–89.

5. See for example, Margaret Stacey, 'Rethinking the Division of Labour: The Light shed by People Work and Recent Feminist Theory', paper presented at the British Sociological Association Conference at Lancaster, Easter 1980 and Helen Roberts, 'The Impact of Feminism on Sociology' in D. Spender (ed.), *Men's Studies Modified*, 1981.

6. See J. A. Banks and D. Webb, *Ideas or People: The Vocational Dilemma for Sociology Graduates*,

London, British Sociological Association, 1977.

7. See J. A. Banks, 'The employment of sociology graduates, 1952 and 1953', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 5, June 1954: J. A. Banks, 'Employment of sociology and anthropology graduates: final report', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 9, September 1958; J. A. Banks and O. L. Banks, 'Employment of sociology and anthropology graduates, 1952 and 1954', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 7, March 1956; Banks and Webb, (op. cit.); Joan Abbott, *Employment of Sociology and Anthropology Graduates 1966–67*, London, British Sociological Association, 1969; British Sociological Association, *Report of the Working Party on the status of Women in the Profession*, 1975; British Sociological Association, *Survey by the Committee for the Equality of the Sexes*, 1977.

8. Banks, 1954, op.cit.

9. Banks and Webb, op. cit.

10. Banks and Banks, op. cit., p. 46.

11. Banks, 1958, op. cit., p. 280.

12. Ibid., p. 232.

13. Banks and Banks, op. cit., pp. 48, 50–1.

14. Abbott, op. cit.

15. Ibid., p. 36.

16. Ibid., p. 50.

17. Ibid., p. 52.

18. H. P. Carter, *Report on a Survey of Sociological Research*, London, British Sociological Association, 1968.

19. Banks and Webb, op. cit., p. 30.

20. Ibid., p. 46.

21. Ibid., p. 60.

22. Ibid., p. 59.

23. Sylvia F. Fava, 'The status of women in professional sociology', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, April 1960.

24. Ann E. Davis, 'Women as a minority group in higher academics', *American Sociologist*, vol. 4, May, 1969.

25. Alice Rossi, 'Status of women in graduate departments of sociology, 1968–69', *American Sociologist*, vol. 5, February 1970, p. 776.

26. These were reprinted as Joan Huber (ed.), *Changing Women in a Changing Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1973.

27. Diana Leonard Barker and Sheila Allen (eds), *Sexual Divisions and Society, Process and Change*, London, Tavistock, 1976, p. 18.

28. British Sociological Association, 1975, op. cit., p. 19.

29. P. A. Yokopenic, L. B. Bourque and D. Brogan, 'Professional communication networks: a case study of women in the American Public Health Organisation', *Social Problems*, vol. 22, no. 4, 1975.

30. Banks and Banks, op. cit., p. 49.

31. B. Cass, *et al.*, 'Working it out together: Reflections on research on women academics', in C. Bell and S. Encel, *Inside the Whale*, Pergamon, Australia, p. 155.

32. T. Blackstone and O. Fulton, 'Sex discrimination among university teachers: a British American comparison', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 26, September 1975, pp. 261–75.

33. T. Blackstone and O. Fulton, 'Discrimination is the villain', *Times Higher Educational Supplement*, 9 July 1976.

34. S. Acker, 'Women, the Other Academics'. Paper given to Equal Opportunities in Higher Education Conference – EOC/SRHE March 1980.

35. National Union of Teachers/ Equal Opportunities Commission, *Promotion and the Woman Teacher*, 1980.

36. T. Blackstone, 'Women Working in Higher Education'. Paper presented to EOC/SRHE conference, 1980, op. cit.

37. C. Delphy, 'Women in Stratification Studies', in H. Roberts (ed.), *Doing Feminist Research*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981.

38. Helen Roberts, 'Women, social class and IUD use', *Women's Studies International Quarterly*, vol. II, 1979, pp. 49–56.

39. G. Payne, C. Ford, and M. Ulas, 'Occupational Change and Social Mobility in Scotland since the First World War', in M. Gaskin (ed.), *The Political Economy of Tolerable Survival*, Croom Helm, London, 1981.

40. R. Erikson, J. H. Goldthorpe and

L. Portocarero, 'Intergenerational class mobility in three Western European societies: England, France and Sweden', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXX, no. 4, December 1979.

41. John D. Stephens, 'Class-formation and class consciousness', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXX, no. 4, December 1979, p. 389.

42. Ibid., p. 398.

43. Ibid., p. 397.

44. Ibid., p. 398.

45. Reported in C. Llewellyn, 'Occupational Mobility and the Use of the Comparative Method', in Roberts, H. (ed.), *Doing Feminist Research*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981.

46. Delphy, op. cit.

47. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, University of Chicago Press, 1973.

48. Logan Wilson, *The Academic Man: A Study in the Sociology of a Profession*, Oxford University Press, 1942, p. 137.

Yael Azmon

Sex, power and authority

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to throw some light on the factors promoting inequality of the sexes in the area where it is most striking, that of politics – in the allocation of *de facto* power and even more so in the allocation of authority.

It is suggested that in order to approach the problem of inequality in power and in authority between the sexes, one should take into account the production of material values as well as of non-material ones, and the possibilities of conversion of values of these two kinds from the private sphere, in which a great part of women's activities take place, to the public sphere.

Some major impediments for benefiting women by such a conversion process are: (a) the existence of gate-keepers, which control the conversion of values produced by women, and (b) the stereotyping of the values produced by women in the private sphere; the individual mother is rewarded for her role by means of fusion with highly-valued mother-stereotypes, which do not allow for accumulation of resources by individual women.

There have been interesting theoretical developments associated with a new kind of ethnographic attention to the roles and status of women in tribal societies,[1] yet these ideas have not been taken as far as they can be in providing a largely sociological – as opposed to psychological and psychobiological – explanation of male domination in the exercise of power and authority. Our intention is to show what needs to be added to those theories, in order to pursue such an explanation further. The area in which sex inequality in access to positions of power is most evident is the political area.[2] We prefer, therefore, to focus our discussion on inequality between the sexes in access to positions in this area.

It might be expected that all of three possible situations involving equality/inequality in access to social roles, or positions, on the basis

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of sex would be found in human societies: inequality, with women as the group discriminated against in the chances of access to roles; inequality, with the men discriminated against as a group; and a situation of equality between the sexes.

In order to examine the question of the existence of the three situations of sex inequality in the political sphere, and the factors related to it, we shall distinguish between two types of political power: authority, as a recognized and legitimate right to control the behaviour of others, and actual power as a control of behaviour of others established by means of manipulating resources. The major questions that face us will be, then, as follows: to what extent do all three of these situations exist in terms of actual power as against legitimized authority? What factors promote the explanation of their existence or non-existence? We shall deal with authority and actual power in the political sphere only. That is to say, we shall not occupy ourselves with actual power and authority relations in such spheres as the family or in economic production.

EXPLAINING SEXUAL INEQUALITY IN TERMS OF THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY

Some recent researches in comparative anthropology may throw light on these questions regarding situations of equality as against inequality in the area of power and authority. Let us begin with inequality regarding *de facto* power. One of the most interesting of these researches is that of Sanday,[3] a re-analysis of information on tribal societies. Sanday provides a complete answer to the first of the two questions, that of *de facto* power. She examines the extent to which all three different possible situations of equality and inequality on the basis of sex can be found in different societies as regards actual control of political power: political domination by women, political equality of the sexes, and women's inferiority, these situations being measured by the degree of systematic influence over decision-making. Her conclusion is that all three possible situations of sex equality as to *de facto* control of power do *not* exist, but only two of them. Real power of women to influence decision-making differs in different societies – from extreme inferiority in some societies to a situation approaching equality in others – but nowhere was a situation of inequality to be found where the dominant political group was that of the women.

However, Sanday's research deals mainly with the second question – the factors *promoting* inequality in *de facto* power. She examines the degree to which there is a connection between women's actual power and their contribution to the subsistence of the tribe. The hypothesis is that the larger this contribution of theirs, the larger their political *de facto* power. She contends that the origin of the

political inequality between the sexes is explained by their unequal contribution to subsistence.

This answer of Sanday's to the question is only a partial one. The evidence Sanday presents demonstrates that contribution to subsistence does indeed constitute a factor in the explanation of the difference in women's actual political power in different societies, but only up to a certain point. In every society where women exercise political power, they are seen to contribute to subsistence. There is no instance of women's having actual political power without their contributing to subsistence. But Sanday also makes clear that the direct relation between these two variables breaks off at a certain point, the women's power increases with their contribution to subsistence only until the point is reached of equality in actual power between the sexes. At the point where the women's contribution to subsistence is generally equal to that of men, the women achieve their maximum amount of *de facto* political power. In no instance does such power that they possess exceed that of the men. The possibility of transforming the use of economic goods produced by the women into actual political power is blocked, then, at a certain point. A further *rise* in the economic contribution made by the women is not connected with an addition to their actual political power but rather by its *reduction*. At the point on the curve where the women's contribution to tribal subsistence needs is higher than that of the men, the position of the women actually approximates to slavery. This was the position of women in the Azande tribe, for example, as described by Evans-Pritchard:[4] the women produced a very considerable part of the food of the tribe, but they lacked all political power and their social status was of the lowest. Thus the theory connecting inequality of actual power with the size of the contribution to subsistence has only a limited power to explain the phenomena. It can explain the existence of various degrees of inferiority but it cannot supply a pretext for the non-existence of a state of women's dominance in actual political power. In other words, this theory explains the existence of different degrees of women's inequality in different societies, but not the inequality between the general population of women in the world and the general population of men. Why has this theory only limited force? It may well be that *contributing* to the production of economic goods is not sufficient for the acquisition of real power in the political sphere as long as it is not accompanied by *control* of the process of economic production as well as of the goods produced.

Following the research by Sanday, we shall therefore put the main question again to the explanation of inequality in the real political power between the sexes in this way: to what degree does a connection exist between women's control over organizing the process of production and over the goods produced and their control of real

power in the political area? The Iroquois will serve as the case in point, since they are unique in respect of the degree to which women control political *de facto* power. Brown[5] deals with the origin of social differences between the sexes in the case of the women of the Iroquois Red Indian tribe, well-known in the anthro-political literature for their high degree of control over actual political power. The unusually large degree of real power of the Iroquois women springs, Brown attempts to show, from their control of the organization of production. The work groups of the women of this tribe are occupied in growing agricultural produce; they take the decisions on planning the agricultural work and on the use made of the crop garnered in the granaries. Any public action calling for allocation of resources by releasing food from the granaries, whether for a drinking party or for going to war, would have to be authorized by the women. This secured the women a certain power in central political matters - the question of war and peace, the choice of leaders. But even in this society as far as can be judged the women did not have dominance in actual power.[6] The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that even practically full control by women of the organization of economic production and of the goods produced, which does lead to a relatively high degree of women's control of actual political power, does not lead to women's dominance.

The explanation of inequality of actual political power as based on women's control of production and goods - Brown's hypothesis - reaches a dead end at this point, like that based on Sanday's hypothesis on women's contribution to subsistence.

EXPLAINING SEXUAL INEQUALITY IN TERMS OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF MATERIAL AND NON-MATERIAL VALUES PRODUCED BY WOMEN

A theory which has been put forward by Rosaldo will serve as a starting point for a better understanding of the factors promoting inequality in power between the sexes, largely because it will help us to distinguish between activity which takes place in the private sphere as against that which takes place in the public sphere. Rosaldo distinguishes between two spheres - the domestic and the public, and sees in this distinction the structure which crystallizes inequality between the sexes. The domestic sphere includes all activities organized immediately around the mother or mothers and their children. The public sphere covers all the activities outside the bounds of these relationships. The women are identified with the domestic sphere, while the men are identified with the public sphere.[7]

Murphy and Murphy[8] describe the physical setting of the men's house as against that of the women's dwellings of the Brazilian

Mundurucu and the symbolic meaning of the difference between them, in a way which is most relevant to the distinction between the private and the public spheres: 'Whereas the women's dwellings are walled, and the activities of their inmates sheltered from the outside, the men's house has no walls' and,

> Whatever the practical considerations, the physical layout and architecture of the Mundurucu village tell us something about their social system. Women are supposed to belong in the home, in a private sector; men are public figures, and their activities are pursued under the scrutiny of others. Village life is ideally dominated by the men and is under their purview. The women are, of course, part of this community, but they are shut out of it in a symbolic sense, though hardly in ordinary workday activities.[9]

The distinction made by Rosaldo between the domestic and the public spheres is not new. A similar distinction was already to be found in the writings of Engels.[10] But Engels and his followers confined themselves to the effect women's economic activities in the domestic sphere have on sex inequality. The importance of Rosaldo's contribution lies in her extending the field of women's activities taken into consideration in relation to the problem of sex inequality. Rosaldo herself does not exploit this advantage to the full. Her explanation of inequality focuses on the continuity of the setting in which the girl performs her roles as a child and then as a mother, contrasted with the necessary breaking of ties with the family setting imposed on the boy in order to fill his role as an adult. As Rosaldo presents it, the psychological importance of this basic fact is in the coming into being of character traits in the girl which are defined as feminine, such as acceptance of domination, a poor drive to achievement and the development of informal social relationships – and this when achievement-orientation, ability to impose domination and activity in formal settings are precisely the qualities needed for the exercise of authority.

1 *The provision of a predominantly sociological explanation* A better approach, in my view, to the question of the factors promoting inequality between the sexes in everything touching on access to positions of actual power and authority in society will be one that does not start out with the factors of socialization but with an analysis of the factors operating on the plane that the question presents itself on, factors in the field of access to *roles in society*. But before presenting this alternative approach to the problem, we have to go back and examine the two spheres, the domestic and the public, and re-define the difference between them.

Rosaldo defines the difference between the two spheres on the basis of who the participants are in the social contacts involved.

Contacts centring around the mothers, their children and those connected with them constitute the private sphere, while contacts that do not centre around mothers and their children constitute the public sphere. The definition of the public sphere is in fact a residual category.

We propose an alternative approach to the characterization of the two spheres, distinguishing between them not by the persons participating in the social relations but by the characteristics that qualify the social relations in each sphere. This will provide a better starting-point for understanding the difference in the access to power positions.

Activities in the domestic sphere in contrast to those in the public one are marked by the unique personal relations taking place among the participants. This is easily observed in economic activity: the products or services provided in the domestic sphere set the seal on the personal relations between the maker of the products or the provider of the services and the person who has the benefit of them. A dress or a special food made in the home for the needs of the home has value in the eyes of the specific person, a unique value which cannot be exchanged for another and which therefore has no value in the overall system. As against this, producing goods or services that can be exchanged (for example, by selling them for money) in the set-up outside the family means the production of 'merchandise' which has a market value and is subject to social evaluation.

An explanation of status inequality on these lines has been suggested by Sacks[11] in her revision of Engels, but she deals with *material* products only. Sacks follows Engels in explaining 'social value' as attaching to economic products in the public sphere in contrast to 'lack of value' attaching to economic activity in the domestic sphere.[12]

2 *Material and non-material values* In my opinion, this analysis should not be confined to material values alone: this distinction between the domestic and the public spheres also holds good for the production of non-material values: ritual, moral, aesthetic or other values. The person creating such values within the family will be rewarded by the appreciation and affection manifested by the members of the household.

This creation of non-material values and its rewards are not susceptible to being exchanged and hence do not constitute a basis for accumulating power and authority in society as a whole. On the contrary, an attitude of appreciation as a reward for creation of cultural values in the public sphere can be subject to exchange relationships and therefore constitutes a basis for the creation of positions of power and authority. Owing to this difference between

the two spheres as regards the character of the social relations developed, it is activity in the public sphere, both material and non-material, which is most relevant to access to positions of political actual power and of authority. It is in the public sphere that exchangeable resources can be accumulated and transferred into such political positions. The inequality between the sexes in everything touching on positions of actual political power and authority is to be traced to the woman's place in the private sphere and to the fact that a great proportion of both her material and her non-material contributions is not subject to being exchanged in the public sphere and hence is 'without value' in market terms. That is to say, the men's activity in the public sphere is what serves their political positions. The delimitation of the women's activity to the domestic sphere, and the *constraints on the transformation* of the non-material and material values created by them to the public sphere, are what bar their equal access to political positions.

Any analysis is incomplete that does not take into account the control of non-material values as well as material ones. As the case of the Iroquois indicates, despite the fact that the women of the tribe control the production and use of most of the subsistence resources, they do not attain dominant power positions. This cannot be explained by Brown's hypothesis accounting for sex inequality in terms of women's control of the economic production. Yet it can be explained if we take into consideration the fact that the Iroquois women do not control the creation and transmission of non-material symbolic values.

3 *Constraints on the transformation of values created by women from the domestic to the public sphere* The placing of the boundary line between the two spheres and its nature might differ greatly from one society to another: (a) The scope of activities which take place in the two spheres might vary. (b) Commodities which are exchanged in the public sphere are, in many societies, produced by women in their households. How does this practice affect these women's exchange opportunities in the public sphere? The answer is that it depends on the existence and nature of several transformation mechanisms.

Gate-keepers controlling the transformation of values from the private to the public sphere One such mechanism is that of gate-keeper positions in the process of transferring commodities created in the private sphere to the public sphere. The more control the producing women have of such positions of gate-keepers, the better their chances to acquire power in the public sphere.

As we have seen above, the Iroquois provide an outstanding example of women acquiring actual power in the political sphere. In

the Iroquois it is women leaders who serve as gate-keepers: old women who are leaders of work groups function as such gate-keepers. It is for them to decide whether a hunting or fighting event will take place by supplying or denying the food needed for such an event from the granaries controlled by the women.

On the other hand, in the Azande tribe, as we have already mentioned, women produce a considerable part of the food of the tribe but they lack political authority as well as actual political power. In the Azande it is the men who serve as gate-keepers in relation to the women in their families. Control of the gate-keeper positions seems, indeed, to be a factor of great importance governing women's opportunities for attaining positions of power.

The stereotyping of the values produced by women in their roles as women in the private sphere Nevertheless, despite the difficulty in 'translating' values created by women from the domestic sphere into socially significant values in the public sphere, women's activity is not thought of as lacking all significance for the wider social unit. Such significance certainly exists, but it is of a special character. Social recognition of women's contribution is effected by *linking with cultural stereotypes*,[13] and women's activity is rewarded by way of fusion with these stereotypes. Society's appreciation of the fulfilment of the function of motherhood, for example, is granted to the mother stereotype and not to the individual woman.

The individual mother earns appreciation for her role only by means of fusion with the mother-stereotype. 'Mother of all living', for example, stresses the immemorial nature, the universality and perpetuance of the mother role. The individual contributions of women are swallowed up in cultural stereotypes and it is through them that women's actions are granted *symbolic* value by society. This is another mechanism of constraint on women's opportunities for transforming values created by them into political power.

Let us proceed to examine the questions related to sex inequality in the area of authority. In this area we are still faced with the unexplained, universal phenomenon; the achievement of *de facto* political power by women is not necessarily accompanied by social recognition of their power. Convincing evidence presented by these researchers demonstrates that even when women in a given society do possess actual power based on control of resources, they do not possess authority. There is a gap between women's real power in the societies where they have this power and recognition of their actual power by the society. Thus, even in the unique case of the Iroquois tribe, where the accumulation of power in practice in the women's hands is at its peak (compared with other tribal societies), women do not fill roles through which they could acquire authority. Even though the women influence the election of the tribal Council of

Elders through their control over the food in the store-houses, they themselves are never members of the tribal Council.[14]

Another society that has an honoured place in anthropological literature in this respect, the African Lovedu tribe, is a unique example of female authority. Therefore the Lovedu is a most important case in point in this context. Women alone are the rulers, the queens. But careful study of the reports about the tribal queens, the 'Rain Queens', show that the 'queenship' is indeed a political role, but its dominant importance is as a symbol of all-tribal solidarity and common political identity. The activity of the queen centres on ritual and political ceremonies and on developing a network of relations with different parts of the tribe. Yet the amount of control that the queen enjoys over the institutions charged with the legitimate use of means of force is minimal. There is no army at the queen's disposal, and she does not even maintain a judicial system. The tribe's army and courts of law are located at the regional level and controlled by male aristocrats. That major element of government, maintenance of law and order, is not part of the queen's authority.[15] If women have not reached positions of full public authority even in these societies that are outstanding in terms of women's actual power (the Iroquois) and authority (the Lovedu), much less have they been able to do so in other societies.

In the area of *authority*, anthropological research bears witness that *two* of the possible situations of equality as against inequality do not exist at all, but only one situation and one alone – that of women's inferiority: nowhere do we find female dominance in authority positions, nor even a situation of equality of authority between the sexes. Hence another particularity: in societies where women do achieve a relatively large measure of actual power, a gap is created between the extent of their control of this power and the extent of the authority they have a right to.

Existing explanations of this inequality that refer to material values alone – both in terms of economic contribution and of control of the use of economic products – do not explain the existence of the gap between the positions of authority and the *de facto* power accessible to women. This can be better accounted for if we also take into account non-material values, since there is a close connection between constraints on the accumulation and exchange of non-material values and constraints on access to positions of authority. Positions of authority, unlike the manipulative power that expresses dependency relations in a particular bargaining situation, are normatively defined and are closely connected with symbols. Hence constraints on participation in the symbolic system very considerably affect access to positions of authority.

The constraints characterizing women's participation in the symbolic system originate from two sources:

(a) Limitation of women's activity in the public sphere – in the process of production and transfer of symbols. This limitation is a bar to women's participation in the main spheres of the tribal cult connected with symbols of collective identity.[16]
(b) Limitation of possibilities for exchanging values in general and symbolic values in particular created by women in their domestic sphere for some counterpart in the public sphere. In this blocking off of the symbolic sphere a particularly important mechanism is the stereotype recompense described above. The use of stereotypes for granting symbolic value to women's creation in the domestic sphere in a way that is not linked to the individual woman in person and so does not permit accumulation of a private 'credit' account prevents women's exchanging symbolic values acquired in the domestic sphere for the purpose of acquiring authority in the public sphere. The combination of closing off possibilities of participating in the process of creation and transfer of symbols directly in the public sphere and blocking off possibilities of creating and exchanging symbolic values created or acquired by women in the domestic sphere is what explains women's being almost completely cut off precisely from positions of authority.

Thus the constraints imposed on Iroquois women's creating and transferring values to the public sphere explain the striking gap between the women's legitimate authority and their *de facto* power in this society. The Iroquois exemplify the rule: absence of access for women to participation in the symbolic sphere and, together with this, absence of political authority for women. Unlike the Iroquois, the case of the Lovedu constitutes the exception: here we have a rare instance of a society that offers women access both to positions of authority and to the tribal cult. The significance of this is that a connection exists here too between authority and participation in the symbolic sphere but in the opposite direction – a degree of openness of access in both spheres. In this sense it is the exception that proves the rule of the existence of a connection between lack of symbolic participation and absence of authority. This rule is confirmed by the case of the Lovedu in another sense: the positions of authority open to Lovedu women are restricted to a certain sector of such positions – to those connected with representing the tribe's solidarity and collective identity. On a parallel, participation by women in the symbolic sphere is also focused on a certain sector – that of cultic and social activity connected with strengthening tribal solidarity.

The next question to be asked is why it is that males, and not females, are those who control these mechanisms which establish their actual power and authority. How do males come to be gatekeepers? Is the answer to the last question that they alone have the power and authority to perform this self-protective role and to

adjudicate on what can pass through the gate? The same applies to the stereotyping of female roles, which can be seen as strongly influenced by male evaluations because males dominate and so have both power and authority to exercise such an influence. In other words, male dominance is self-protecting. Is this not a circular explanation? Yes, in a sense it is. What does it explain, if anything at all? The answer to this will be that we have not tried to explain the *origins* of inequality between the sexes in the political sphere. This is why we preferred not to present reductionist explanations in terms of psychobiology or psychology.[17] Rather than doing that, we provided a synchronic analysis of the various mechanisms which keep the system of sex inequality going. In short, the question we have tried to answer was not how sex inequality originated but what sustains it.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, the economic explanation of the position of women, either in terms of economic contribution to subsistence (Sanday) or in terms of control of the economic production process (Brown) is unsatisfactory. The economic explanation is unsatisfactory because it ignores the creation of non-material values by women in the private sphere and the relevance of such values to the acquisition of *de facto* power and of authority.

The possibilities for the exchange of non-material values created by women in the private sphere are limited in the same way as those of economic values. This is why a situation of inequality in power and authority between the sexes can come into being even in a society like that of the Iroquois, where the women make an important economic contribution and even control key points in the process of exchange of the economic values they create into public values. Women's role in creating non-economic values – ritual, aesthetic and other – which is limited to the domestic sphere and cannot be exchanged from the domestic sphere goes far to explain sex inequality in the political domain.

Another phenomenon that calls for explanations is the gap regarding achievement of actual power and authority, the fact that in some societies women achieve a position approaching equality in the area of power, while in that of authority they are almost universally in a position of inferiority.

The process of conversion of non-material values in the private sphere to the public sphere, is the core of the problem of the impediments to women's access to political positions of authority in particular.

According to our view, three different types of constraints stand in the way of women's opportunities in the political sphere:

(a) The particular non-exchangeable nature of a great proportion of the values created in the private sphere. Many of the values created at the home for the needs of the home have unique value for specific persons, and do not have a market value. The point made here is that this is true for non-material values created in the private sphere as much as it is for material ones.

(b) The existence of gate-keepers in the process of converting those values which do have an exchangeable nature. The conversion of material as well as of non-material values created by women in the private sphere into political positions is conditioned on keeping control of the gate-keeper stations in the hands of the women involved in the conversion process.

(c) The stereotyping mechanism by which women are rewarded for the creation of values (both material and non-material) in the private sphere. This stereotyping means that women are rewarded for their activities as wives and mothers by fusion with highly valued stereotypes (as 'mother of all living') rather than individually. Such a rewarding mechanism hinders accumulation of resources by individual women in the private sphere - and thus even more impedes women's opportunities to convert resources into political positions.

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NOTES

1. Some works which deal with the general problems of divisions of labour by sex in tribal societies are: M. Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935; G. P. Murdock and C. Provost, 'Factors in the Division of Labor by Sex: A Cross-Cultural Analysis', *Ethnology*, vol. 12, 1973, pp. 203–25; J. K. Brown, 'A Note on the Division of Labor by Sex', *American Anthropologist*, vol. 72, 1970, pp. 1073–8; J. Siskind, 'Kinship and Mode of Production', *American Anthropologist*, vol. 80, 1978, pp. 860–70; A. Lebeuf, M. D., 'The Role of Women in the Political Organization of African Societies', in D. Paulme (ed.), *Women of Tropical Africa*, Berkely, University of California Press, 1963; E. Friedl, *Women and Men - An Anthropologist's View*, N. Y. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975; R. G. D'Andrade, 'Sex Differences and Cultural Institutions' in E. Maccoby (ed.), *The Development of Sex Differences*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966. Of particular interest in this respect are the studies of egalitarian tribal societies: P. M. Kaberry, *Aboriginal Women: Sacred and Profane*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1939; J. C. Goodale, *Tiwi Wives: A Study of the Women of Melville Island*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971; M. K. Martin and B. Voorhies, *Female of the Species*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1975; E. E. Begler, 'Sex, Status and Authority in Egalitarian Society', *American Anthropologist*, vol. 80, 1978, pp. 571–87.

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5. J. K. Brown, 'Iroquois Women: An Ethnohistoric Note', in R. Reiter (ed.), *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1975.

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7. Rosaldo-Zimbalist, op. cit., p. 23.

8. Y. Murphy and R. Murphy, *Women of the Forest*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1974, pp. 56–7.

9. Ibid., pp. 56–7.

10. E. F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, New York, International, 1972 (first publication 1884); K. Sacks, 'Engels Revisited: Women, the Organization, Production and Private Property', in Reiter (ed.) op. cit.

11. Ibid.

12. See also K. Gough, 'An Anthropologist Looks at Engels', in N. Glazer-Malbin and Youngelson Wachres (eds), *Women in a Man-Made World*, Chicago, Rand, 1973; E. Leacock (ed.), Introduction to *The Origin of the Family Private Property and the State*, by F. Engels op. cit.; C. Randall, 'A Conflict Theory of Social Stratification', *Social Problems*, vol. 19, 1971, pp. 3–22.

13. On feminine stereotypes see S. B. Ortner, 'Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?', in Rosaldo-Zimbalist op. cit.

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M. E. J. Wadsworth

Social class and generation differences in pre-school education

SUMMARY

Since the Second World War the provision of pre-school education facilities has increased enormously, particularly in the private sector. This paper investigates the use made of pre-school education of all kinds by a sample of parents who have themselves been extensively and frequently studied from birth to adult life. It compares the extent of experience of pre-school education in the two generations, and examines some of the factors that underlie apparent social class differences. Attention is drawn to the wide range of expectation of pre-school experience, and the implications of this for later studies of ability and of apparent 'effects' of pre-school education are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

It seemed the intention of the 1944 Education Act that numbers of nursery school places should be greatly increased, ultimately to become universally available. However, this has not happened, and although there has been a modest increase in the numbers of local authority nursery school places during the time since the Act, it has not met parental demand, the extent of which is reflected in the very large number of privately run nursery school and playgroup facilities of various kinds. Blackstone[1] has described the history of pre-school education in both the public and private sectors, and Osborn[2] has shown the more recent increases in the provision of both local authority, and in particular, privately run playgroup places.

Whereas most research interest in pre-school education has generally been concerned either with its availability or with its effects, this paper is concerned with use and demand. It describes the use of nursery school facilities, both public and private, in two generations of families during the time since the 1944 Act. As well as simply providing comparative information on the use of facilities this study

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also gives the opportunity to examine more closely the rise in demand for pre-school education. It shows that this is associated both with the achievement of and desire for social mobility, and also with certain changes in social structure and attitudes.

Before describing the findings of this study it is important to consider those aspects of social structure and social values in which change may have a particular relevance for pre-school education.[3]

SOCIAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE USE OF PRE-SCHOOL FACILITIES

During the period of study (1946 to the present), actual numbers of local education authority nursery school places have been increased;[4] at the same time, as Osborn[5] has pointed out, numbers of playgroups have risen and these changes, together with the falling birthrate, have helped many more children to experience pre-school education.

Changes in social values are difficult to discern, and for present purposes only those concerned with children's upbringing and pre-school education will be discussed. Social values in this sense can be sought in the views of philosophers or ideologists, who have often been attracted to the study of infant development; they can be seen too in the practical application of such ideas in the growth and changes of the pre-school system of education. Expressions of relevant social values are also to be found in studies of teachers and of parents.

Ideological theorists of pre-school education have ranged from those especially concerned with the individual, such as Froebel, to the social idealism of, for example, Russell. Froebel stressed, for example, that 'every human being, even as a child, must be recognised, acknowledged, and fostered as a necessary and essential member of humanity',[6] as compared with Russell's view, also quoted by Blackstone, that:

> the nursery school, if it became universal, could, in one generation, remove the profound differences in education which at present divide the classes, could produce a population all enjoying the mental and physical development which is now confined to the most fortunate and could remove the terrible deadweight of disease and stupidity and malevolence which now makes progress so difficult.[7]

Although both Russell and Froebel tried out their philosophies in experimental form, perhaps a more concrete expression (but certainly no more influential and indeed probably derived from the idealistic views) of concepts of what nursery schools were for is to be found in the administrative history of the pre-school education movement in the UK. This has been well described by Blackstone.

She showed the movement away from the view, common in the early part of this century, that nursery schools were basically to be provided for some, but not all children, and their work was to be 'the physical and medical nurture of the debilitated child'.[8] Gradually, however, as the results of work on the development of speech and language, and on the foundations of intelligence, were disseminated, ideas about who should receive pre-school education expanded, to include not only the deprived and the debilitated, but also the apparently normal child. However, as Blackstone notes, arguments for the value of pre-school experience for the intellectual development of the child seem to have played relatively little part in British thinking and also occurred rather later when compared with the USA. And although the relevance of nursery school education for all children was officially acknowledged in 1943[9] the Plowden report could still observe in 1967 that 'nursery school education on a large scale remains an unfulfilled promise'.[10] Perhaps an extreme expression of the importance of pre-school experience for all children can be seen in Van der Eyken's remarks which seem to swing the debate back from positive arguments in favour of pre-school education toward the original concepts of deprivation.

> However enlightened, financially secure and socially aware the parents, however affluent the neighbourhood, the home environment provided for the pre-school child is inadequate if measured in absolute terms against the child's potential and intellectual development during this period.[11]

Concepts of the importance of pre-school education may be seen in a study of local authority nursery school teachers. Taylor *et al.* found that nursery school teachers saw as their major purpose '. . . the social education of the young, particularly that form of social education through which personality and character begin to develop'.[12] Teachers in their study also ranked nursery school aims, and their consensus view was that physical development and social awareness were the first objectives, whilst intellectual and cognitive objectives were ranked fifth and last. However, Taylor and his colleagues described a 'generation gap' in the views of their sample of teachers. They go so far as to say that the older teachers 'may not yet see clearly the relevance of educational sociology to the professional education of the nursery teacher',[13] whereas younger teachers in their study seem to have thought this of supreme importance. Regrettably it is not clear what relevance Taylor *et al.* see for educational sociology, but perhaps the 'social education' referred to above is a reflection of what the younger teachers felt. They seem to have been interested not so much in the need to provide the child with education 'in increasing association with other children'[14] but rather in involvement in the movement that Van der Eyken described

as a reform of 'elitist systems, designed to educate small groups of children from specially favoured families' and the replacement of these with schools 'democratic in character and (somewhere) in which, ideally every child, whatever its innate ability, its home background or its inclinations, can achieve its maximum human potential'.[15]

Unfortunately no comparable body of work on parental views of pre-school education exists. The clearest indicator of the rise, since 1946, in parental demand for nursery school places is probably to be found in the greatly increased incidence of parental self-help, in the form of pre-school playgroups.[16,17] To some extent parental views may be inferred from studies of the growth and development of pre-school education. However, it seems clear from the work of the Newsons that, at the time of writing (1968), there was a considerable and unsatisfied demand for nursery school places, and they compare the reports of non-manual and manual social class mothers:

> These mothers [non-manual],[18] mainly in the professional class, are the ones who organise playgroups and tea parties, pay for private nursery school education (but not for day-nurseries), keep a close watch on their children's play, and in general, expect to *provide* suitable company, just as they provide food, clothing and education: the child is not expected to find his own friends or else do without. The principles which they are trying to lay down at this age are not those of survival through aggressive competition [as previously illustrated with reports from manual workers' wives],[18] but of peaceful coexistence, with the accent on peace.[19]

Popular books of advice about bringing up children may also be an indication about what some kinds of parents are thinking. They usually tend to do one of two things: either they present the reader with simple directions about what emphasis or style to expect from different kinds of pre-school education. Leach, for example, advised that play or community groups are good for enriching experience, whilst local education authority nursery schools are more directly educational.[20] On the other hand, in his widely read book, now in its thirteenth edition, Jolly begins his chapter on starting school with a section called 'fostering intelligence'.

> It is true that the pre-school years are vitally important in influencing the intellectual growth and curiosity of a child, and that by the age of five the measure of his intelligence gives a rough estimate of his future performance.[21]

This is a sharp contrast with the views of nursery school teachers that Taylor *et al.* (1972) described, who ranked intellectual development as their lowest priority. How far Jolly's view reflects his experience as a paediatrician working with children and parents, and how far he has helped to mould attitudes cannot be known.

In addition to these developments in concepts and practice of pre-school education it is necessary to describe certain changes in social structure and attitudes that have taken place during the period of the study reported here (1946 to the present), since they have had an especially important effect on the demand for and use of pre-school places.

Women's attitudes to their social role have changed considerably, and there is increasing desire to lead a life that is not wholly dependent on the home and family. Some educational and medical changes have helped to bring this about, and to make its achievement a reality. First, it has been aided by the increasing range of opportunities in education and training that are now open to women.[22] These changes in attitudes and opportunities have, naturally, been accompanied by an increasing proportion of married women going out to work (rising from 21.7 per cent of married women in 1951 to 47.9 per cent in 1975, the greatest rise being the age group twenty-five to forty-four) and remaining in work during their children's infant years. For many women this has become a necessity, as well as perhaps also being desirable, as the number of single-parent families, mostly with women having sole custody of children, has increased considerably during these years. At the same time career-associated geographic mobility has become increasingly common, with the result that fewer mothers than ever before live sufficiently close to their mothers or mothers-in-law to benefit from their regular support.

Two important medical discoveries have also enabled women to have greater control over their lives. Far more reliable contraception, usually in the control of the female partner, has given only relatively recently almost complete personal control of fertility, and thus enabled women for the first time to choose when they will first bear children and how often they will subsequently become pregnant. And for women with children, antibiotics, particularly, have given much greater freedom from the regular ravages of childhood infections, as well as their own, which must in the past have helped to keep many mothers at home, and which must also have added to the arguments that helped to make women feel that it was neglectful not to be at home.

From this cursory review of factors affecting the development and use of pre-school educational facilities it is reasonable to infer that they have been expected to fulfil several tasks: they have been expected to serve as a child minding service for working or harassed mothers, to be sources of character development, sources of intellectual preparation and sources for the redress of both personal and social imbalances. But more importantly, expectations seem to differ between the various groups concerned. Teachers, at any rate, in local education authority nursery schools, apparently expect schools to develop character and personality, and perhaps also to be a resource

for the redress of what they perceive to be social injustices. Parents on the other hand seem to expect them to pay particular attention to the child's intellectual development and to act as child minders, as well as giving an opportunity for the child to meet and mix with other children.

This paper investigates some aspects of parents' reports and observed reasons for sending their first born child to some form of pre-school education. Of all the sources of influence on the development and use of pre-school facilities this is the least studied: and investigation of it should give the opportunity, compared with the other sources of influence described above, to compare social class differences in views and expectations of pre-school education, since parents come from all classes as compared with philosophers, teachers and planners and administrators of education who, by and large, come from only one section of the class spectrum. Data from this study of parental behaviour in a group who have themselves been regularly studied since childhood have therefore been used in two ways. First, simply to compare numbers and social backgrounds of children who have had some pre-school education experience in two generations, and next to examine the school experiences and social backgrounds of parents who choose to make use of pre-school facilities for their first-born child. From this it will be possible to draw conclusions about current parental choice of pre-school education.

STUDY DESIGN AND METHOD

This paper is the first report from a study of a birth cohort's behaviour as parents. The cohort concerned is the Medical Research Council's National Survey of Health and Development, which is a longitudinal study, begun in 1946, of all single, legitimate births to wives of non-manual and agricultural workers, and one in four of similar births to wives to manual workers, that occurred in England, Wales and Scotland during the week 3-9 March 1946, a total of 5,362 births. Since that time the subjects have been studied at intervals of two to five years, and information has been collected on a wide range of medical, sociological, psychological and education topics: summaries of recent work have been written by Douglas *et al.*,[23] and by Atkins *et al.*[24]

Since 1969 when cohort members were twenty-three years old a study of their behaviour as parents has been carried out, and this is known as the Second Generation Study. It takes the form of a home visit to both male and female subjects, when their first-born is four years old, and again when the first-born is eight years old. At these visits professional interviewers carry out semi-structured interviews with the mother, at which a wide range of medical, social and psychological information is collected (see appendix).

The present paper is concerned with the pre-school educational experience of the first-born child in the first 1,676 families to be included in this Second Generation Study.

Clearly the offspring of a population sample cannot themselves be considered a population sample, and this must be taken into consideration in the interpretation of findings. The value of this study lies in the inter-generational comparisons that can be made, and in the investigation of continuity and change between generations. Attempts have been made wherever possible to explore associations found in the original cohort study, by obtaining greater detail about such factors in the Second Generation.

The study is concerned only with first-born children. This is because age of the first-born is a fixed point in family life, and also because follow-up of subsequent children would not have given enough numbers for analysis, once such important factors as sex and birth interval had been taken into account, as Maxwell[25] found in another population. Four years was chosen as the first age for interview since at that time children have not yet gone to full-time school, but they are already living in a social world. Many will have siblings, most are themselves being prepared for school, and some will be at nursery school. It is also a time at which it is thought that some kinds of physical and emotional influences may have a lasting effect, as has been suggested by earlier work in this study,[26,27,28,29] as well as by many other investigators. Eight years old was chosen for the second home interview because it was an age at which certain data (teachers' assessments and verbal ability scores that turned out to be powerfully predictive of later achievements, and strongly associated with earlier family life) had been collected in the original cohort. Comparable information for inter-generational comparison has been collected in the Second Generation Study (see appendix) and is used in this paper wherever possible. The age of eight years is also a time which may be thought of as the very beginning of the transition from childhood to adolescence, particularly in relationships with parents.

When the first-born child of either a male or a female cohort member was aged four years (the fourth birthday plus or minus four weeks) the mother was interviewed at home, and asked a series of questions about the child's health and his/her behaviour with parents and with others (see appendix). A similar interview was carried out when the same child was aged eight years (the eighth birthday plus or minus four weeks), and the interviewer gave the child generation fair versions[30] of three tests of verbal ability that the cohort member parent had taken at this age in 1954. Mothers' reports of the child's admission to hospital were followed up with requests for confirmation and further details from hospitals, and brief postal questionnaires about the child's progress were sent to schools. The peak age at which cohort members first gave birth to or fathered children was

TABLE I *First births to cohort members and the second generation study response rate*

Year of first birth	*Age at first birth*	*Nos of first births*		*Total first births*	*Second generation study response rate (%)**
		to males	*to females*		
1961	15 yrs	0	2	2	**
1962	16 yrs	1	13	14	**
1963	17 yrs	6	42	48	**
1964	18 yrs	16	73	89	**
1965	19 yrs	46	116	162	71.6***
1966	20 yrs	68	162	230	71.2
1967	21 yrs	107	186	293	66.3
1968	22 yrs	129	189	318	78.8
1969	23 yrs	130	152	283	82.5
1970	24 yrs	129	140	269	83.7
1971	25 yrs	170	136	306	81.6
1972	26 yrs	150	113	263	89.2
1973	27 yrs	127	110	237	97.8
1974	28 yrs	129	77	206	93.6
1975	29 yrs	101	43	144	95.5

* The denominator comprises all births known of and defined as eligible for inclusion in the study.
** Second Generation study not begun during these years.
*** Part year of interviewing only.

twenty-two years the peak for females being twenty-two years and for males twenty-five years, as Table I shows. These rather late ages by population standards reflect the middle class bias of the sample, that is a result of the sampling of the original birth week.

All singleton first births were regarded as eligible for the Second Generation Study, unless at age four years the child was no longer living with the cohort member parent, or was living abroad or had been adopted.

The rate of refusal was generally low, ranging from none at age twenty-seven years to a maximum of 11.6 per cent of those eligible for interview when parents were aged twenty-two years: the mean was 6.3 per cent. The gradual improvement in the response rate, shown in Table I, is largely the result of increased effort to rediscover cohort members who had changed address, and an extra effort to do this was made from 1969 onwards.

RATE AND EXTENT OF USE OF NURSERY SCHOOLS AND PLAYGROUPS

By the time they were aged four years 14.2 per cent of first-borns in the generation born in 1946 had received some pre-school education, as compared with 81.9 per cent in the next generation, as Table II

TABLE II *Kindergarten and playgroup attendance in two generations of first born children*

	First generation	*Second generation*
None	86.9	18.1
Local Authority facilities	5.8	25.1
Other	7.3	56.8*
Total (=100%)	2,272	1,676

* mainly privately run playgroups: 8 children were looked after by child minders or nannies.

shows. The greatest rise was an eightfold increase amongst all forms of schools and playgroups other than local authority nurseries, and amongst the local authority group there was almost a fivefold increase. In a national study of children born in 1958 Davie *et al.* found that 'no more than 15 per cent of the children in the study sample attended a nursery school or class',[31] that is, in the terms used in Table II, went to a local authority school, compared with 25.1 per cent of this study population.

Whereas in the first generation socio-economic differences in the percentage of children receiving any pre-school education were small, these were markedly different in the second generation. In this study population 87.4 per cent of children of non-manual class families went to some kind of nursery school or playgroup, compared with 68.4 per cent of children from manual families. There has been a general increase in the use of all types of schools and playgroups. In local authority nurseries this has changed from being a greater use by manual families to a much more even distribution across the socio-economic groups (22.1 per cent of non-manual families children and 27.3 per cent of others). The use of privately run nurseries has increased most, and here, although socio-economic differences are less pronounced in the second generation than in the first, they still very much favour the professional and salaried groups. In the second generation 65.3 per cent of non-manual families' children went to privately run schools as compared with 41.1 per cent of manual families' children.

There was a great range in the amount of time the children spent in nursery schools and playgroups. The modal amount spent at local authority nurseries was two and a half days a week, and at all other types it was two days: in many cases these amounts of time were made up of half days. The mean amount of time spent at local authority nurseries was four and a half days a week, and for other nurseries and playgroups it was three days. Only eighty-nine children (5.3 per cent of the total study population) went as full time attenders to nursery or playschool every day, and of this group

fifty-nine went to local authority nurseries. Forty-eight of these full time school attenders went because their mother worked full time, and of these parents seventeen were living as single parents at the time of the interview and working full time, one a father. There were also twenty-two single parents who were not working, and of these only three made no use of any kind of nursery or playschool.

REASONS THAT MOTHERS GAVE FOR USING NURSERY SCHOOLS AND PLAYGROUPS

The commonest reasons that mothers gave for sending their child to nursery or other pre-school facility were to increase social experience, and as a form of preparation for infant school, as Table III shows.

TABLE III *Mothers' reasons for sending this child to nursery or other pre-school facility*

	Type of pre-school facility used	
Mothers' reasons	*Local Authority nursery*	*Other*
To increase child's social experience	37.2	43.6
As preparation for infant school	32.5	28.1
For mother's benefit	9.3	8.4
Child wanted to go	9.0	9.9
Insufficient attention at home, and/or nowhere to play at home	9.3	8.4
Advised to do so by nurse or doctor	1.7	0.8
Other mothers did it	1.0	0.8
Total (=100%)	409	858

This order of priority of reasons is the same in all socio-economic groups. In each group the desire to increase the child's social experience is the first priority given by mothers who send their child to playgroups and similar facilities: preparation for infant school is more frequently reported by local authority nursery school users, but the differences are very small. The order of priority is also the same amongst parents from all kinds of educational backgrounds.

Mothers were also asked whether they were preparing their child for entry to full-time primary school, and if so how. Mothers who

sent their child to nursery school or playgroup as a preparation for school most often also prepared the child in academic ways, such as teaching him or her to read, write or count. Those who sent their child for reasons of social contacts and relationships were usually not preparing their child in any particular way.

Of the children who did not go to any kind of nursery school or playgroup, it was reported that half (49.4 per cent, or 10.1 per cent of the whole study population) did not do so because there was no such facility available. The next most frequent reason given was that the mother felt the child did not need to go to such a school (33.3 per cent of non-manual and 24.7 per cent of manual mothers). Other reasons were that it was too expensive (3.2 per cent and no class difference), or too inconvenient for the mother (4.1 per cent and twice as many non-manual mothers as compared with manual mothers), or that the mother thought it best that the child should not go (4.3 per cent and a small class difference). Although numbers in this last group are small (fifteen altogether, 3.2 per cent of non-manual and 5.1 per cent of manual mothers), this was the most specific reason given for not sending the child to nursery school or playgroup, and in almost all cases it was explained as a way of avoiding resentment in the first-born of a new baby in the family.

In addition to these explicit reasons that mothers gave it is possible also to look at various family, social and personal circumstances that may be associated with the use of pre-school facilities, and these are now discussed.

FAMILY PROXIMITY

Most second generation study parents had a parent alive when their first born was aged four years (0.1 per cent had neither parents nor parents-in-law, and 2.6 per cent of mothers had no parents alive at this time). 57.2 per cent of mothers saw their own parents once a week or more often and these mothers were those who made the most use of nursery and other pre-school facilities. However, when the mother's contacts both with her own parents and with her in-laws were taken into account, those least likely to use pre-school facilities were those with the most frequent parental contacts, as Table IV shows. The pattern of least pre-school facility use by families with frequent (at least once a week) contact with grandparents is common to both non-manual and manual families.

It seems, therefore, that on the whole families who were most cut off from regular contact with their families of origin made most use of pre-school facilities of all kinds.

TABLE IV *Frequency of family contacts with this child's grandparents and its association with the use of pre-school facilities*

Frequency of contacts	*Use of pre-school facilities*			*Total* (=100%)
	None	*Local Authority nursery*	*Other*	
At least once a week	23.6	28.1	48.3	1133
Less than once a week but more often than once a month	10.4	19.6	70.0	230
Less often than once a month	10.7	18.7	70.6	187

EMPLOYED MOTHERS

Most of the study mothers (75.8 per cent) were not in employment when their first born child was aged four years, and only 5.9 per cent were then working full-time. Published official statistics show considerable increases in the population of gainfully employed women during the period of data collection of this study,[32] and so it was not surprising to find that the percentage of mothers of first-born children in the original cohort who were not employed in 1950 when their child was aged four years was higher than in the second generation, at 84.9 per cent. As Table V shows, in fact 39.8 per cent of mothers worked if their first born was the only child when he/she was aged four years, but this proportion fell to 19.6 per cent if there was more than one child in the family. The proportions of mothers employed in full-time or part-time occupations were not very different for those with only one child (17.8 per cent in full-time employment and 22.0 per cent part-time), but mothers with more than one child were much more inclined to work part-time (17.2 per cent) rather than full-time (2.3 per cent). Mothers with more than one child were much less likely to be employed, unless the children could go to work with them, or unless the work could be done at home.

Whilst mothers with one child were in full-time employment their children were most often cared for by a nursery school or playgroup of some kind, although relatives, neighbours or friends provided care almost as frequently; but mothers who had one child, and who also worked part-time, made much less use of nursery schools and playgroups for this purpose. Mothers with more than one child most often had relatives (mostly husbands), friends or neighbours to care for the children whilst they worked, whether it was in full-time or

TABLE V *Mother's employment when the first born was aged 4 years and its association with total number of children and their care whilst she worked*

Mother's employment status	*Care of child(ren) whilst the mother works*	*All families*	*Families with*	
			One child	*More than one child*
Not working	At home with mother	75.8	60.2	80.4
Working full time	Child(ren) go to work with mother or she works at home	0.5	1.1	0.3
	Nursery or child minder*	2.5	8.9	0.6
	Relative, friend or neighbour	2.8	7.8	1.4
Working part time	Child(ren) go to work with mother or she works at home	5.3	5.9	5.1
	Nursery**	1.2	3.7	0.5
	Relative, friend or neighbour	11.8	12.4	11.6
	Total (=100%)	1620	372	1248

* 8 children out of 41 were reported as cared for by a child minder.
** None of these children were reported as cared for by a child minder.

part-time employment, and nursery and play school involvement in care of the children was very small. This pattern of care was substantially the same in both non-manual and manual families, with the exception of a higher rate of husband involvement in care in the manual families and a higher rate of work carried out at home in the non-manual families.

If mother's employment at the time of marriage is compared with her employment when the first-born was four years old (see Table VI) it is evident that those who were in professional or skilled manual jobs at marriage were the most likely to be employed when the first-born was aged four years, and the most likely still to be employed as professional or skilled employees at that time. These differences are almost certainly the result of marketability of skills, and are perhaps also associated with personal outlook and motivation, rather than the result of family size at this time, since the proportions of mothers with one as compared with more than one child are almost identical in each socio-economic group. However, as Table VI also shows, the manual working mothers were more likely than others to have changed socio-economic group by the time their first-born was four years old.

TABLE VI *Socio-economic group of employed mothers* at marriage and when their first born was aged four years*

Socio-economic group	*Occupation at time of marriage* (% of all employed women)*	*Employment when first-born was aged four years*		
		% not employed	*% still employed in this s.e. group*	*% employed in another s.e. group*
Professional and salaried	316 (20.7)	69.3	20.9	9.8
Non-manual wage earners	874 (57.3)	76.5	16.1	7.4
Skilled workers	160 (10.5)	60.6	18.1	21.3
Semi-skilled and un-skilled workers	174 (11.4)	75.9	8.6	15.5
Total (=100%)	1524			

* Based on the mother's occupation.

REPORTS OF PARENTS' BEHAVIOUR WITH THEIR FIRST-BORN CHILD

In view of the interest there has been in possible effects of pre-school experience, both at home and in schools and playgroups, on children's intellectual and cognitive development, it seemed worthwhile to investigate differences in those aspects of parent-child behaviour that are often taken to be associated with intellectual and cognitive stimulation. Mothers' reports of handling their first-born child's boredom, of taking part in play with him or her, particularly imaginative play, and of their restriction on the type and place of play and of friends, were all examined, but none of them differentiated users of pre-school facilities from others.

Mothers' reports of their self-confidence or otherwise in bringing up this child were also considered. Whereas pre-school facility users were no different from others in their judgment of whether the first child was 'growing up too fast', those not using these facilities significantly more often felt worried about some aspect of their child managing in due course at full-time compulsory school. They were worried mainly that they would miss him or her, and they expected to be worried about how he or she would manage at full-time school. Similarly, mothers who had not used any kind of nursery school also significantly more often reported that they had worried in some way about 'going wrong' in bringing up this child. Their worries were not

very specific, but they were concerned that they were not 'doing the right things' or somehow failing to be good mothers. Mothers whose child had never been to any kind of pre-school education also more often felt that he or she was in some way mentally immature.

This study replicated the Newsons'[33] in combining a score from four questions about matters on which mothers sometimes avoid or distort the truth when speaking to their four-year-olds. These questions are concerned with where babies come from, punishment in the form of threats of authority figures or threats to send the child away or to leave him or her, and the practice of slipping out when leaving the child with a baby sitter, rather than explain that she is going out. Mothers whose children had not been to nursery or play-school scored significantly higher on this nominal scale of evasion, that is they more often distorted or avoided telling the truth. As the Newsons showed, this scale is class biased, with the non manual groups being less inclined to distort or avoid true answers, that is to score low, but in this study use of pre-school education was associated with low scoring in both the non-manual and the manual socio-economic groups.

It therefore seems reasonable to say that, in terms of these findings, mothers whose first-born child went to nursery or play-group tended to be more self-confident than others, but there is no way of knowing in this investigation whether this is a matter of self selection of the more self-confident mothers to make greatest use of pre-school facilities or an effect of pre-school education.

PARENTS' OWN EDUCATION

When use of nursery schools in the two generations was compared, those with parents who had themselves been to nursery school were neither more nor less likely to have sent their children to nursery school, or to have used other pre-school facilities. However, there were differences when parental experiences of primary and secondary school education were examined.

Parents who sent their children to nurseries and playgroups had themselves generally been more successful at school compared with parents who did not use such facilities. Of the parents who had been regarded by their teachers as hard workers at primary school when they were aged ten years (in 1956) 81.8 per cent sent their children to nursery schools or playgroups, as compared with 70.6 per cent of the children of parents judged in childhood to be lazy or indifferent to school work. Similarly, parents who sent their children to nursery schools and playgroups had achieved significantly higher mean aggregate scores in a set of four educational tests[34] taken when they were aged fifteen years when compared with parents of children who

had stayed at home, even after allowing for socio-economic group. These findings apply equally to male and to female survey members. It is therefore not surprising that pre-school facility user parents were also significantly better qualified than others: 71.6 per cent of parents who did not use pre-school facilities were entirely without qualifications as compared with 41.8 per cent of users.

The generation carry over effect from parent to child can be examined further by investigating the concern for and achievement in education of the study child's grandparents. As would be expected from previous work in this study,[35] the better qualified parents had in their childhood been distinguished by a much greater parental interest in their school progress, as shown in Table VII. This statistically significant association existed both in non-manual and manual

TABLE VII *Grandparents' interest in this parent's primary school education* and its association with the use of pre-school facilities by their grandchildren*

Use of pre-school facilities by grandchildren	*Grandparents' degree of interest in parent's primary education*			*Total* (=100%)
	Low	*Medium*	*High*	
None	52.1	29.2	18.7	267
Some	24.7	34.3	41.0	907

* assessed by teachers and parents (26)
$\chi^2 = 80.056$ with 2 d.f. $p. < .001$.

socio-economic families, as measured by the occupation of the index child's father. Educational achievement in two earlier generations is also equally strongly associated with the use of pre-school education in the generation of children studied now, as Table VIII shows. Minimum and lowest levels of achievement in the two previous generations were associated with the least use of pre-school education of all descriptions, and the higher the levels of achievement the greater the chance that the study child would have been to a nursery school or play group of some kind. The use of local authority nurseries is relatively stable, and it is the increasing use of other kinds of nurseries that is most strongly associated with parental higher educational achievement.

It is quite possible simply to regard this finding as class bias in the use of pre-school facilities, as an example of the better educated middle classes using their superior financial resources to set up their own schools where too few places were provided by the local education authority. It would be equally possible to interpret it as an indicator of initiative taken by those who, having experienced what they see as the benefits of education were anxious to see that their

TABLE VIII *Achievement level of education of survey member parents and grandparents, and the use of pre-school facilities*

Education achievement in 2 previous generations	*Use of pre-school facilities*			
	None	*Local Authority day nurseries*	*All others*	*Total (=100%)*
Earliest school leaving and no further or higher education	36.6	28.7	34.7	467
Lower levels of achievement in parents than grandparents – i.e. intergenerational fall	21.7	23.1	55.2	221
Higher levels in parent than grandparent – i.e. intergenerational rise	14.9	25.0	60.1	609
Both generations have some further and/or higher education	9.8	19.6	70.6	153

children had a similar opportunity. These better educated parents are, of course, those who are most likely to have read the books that give advice about upbringing, amongst them, very probably, those such as Jolly's that suggest that the foundations of good intellectual development must be prepared during infancy.[36]

Fortunately some further information exists which may be used to examine another facet of these inter-generational links.

PARENTS' VIEWS OF SOCIETY AND THEIR OWN SOCIAL POSITION

When they were twenty-six years old cohort members were asked a short series of questions about socio-economic position, social class and opportunity, both with regard to their own lives and about the population in general.

Those who felt that it was impossible to change their social class were least likely to have sent their first child to any kind of nursery or playschool (31.6 per cent did not). As optimism about the chances of social class change increased so did the use of nurseries and playgroups, and of those parents who thought that a change of social class would be easy or not very difficult for them to achieve, only 17.9 per cent of their children had never been to any kind of nursery or playschool. Parental optimism about the chances of changing social class for people in general was also associated with an increased chance of the child going to some kind of pre-school

activity when compared with others. Similarly parental belief that education or qualifications or training were the key to a change of social class also significantly increased the child's chance of going to nursery school or playgroup.

These associations of views of social change with the use of nursery schools and playgroups are equally strong in both non manual and manual social group families, as well as in the use of local education authority nurseries and of playgroups and other privately run schools.

DISCUSSION

From the evidence of the changes in social structure and values reviewed briefly at the beginning of this paper it would be reasonable to expect a general rise in demand for nursery school and playgroup places. Evidence presented from this study of two generations shows that the actual rise in use of these schools is found to be unevenly distributed across the whole population, and reasons for this can be seen in the ways that individual parents cope with change in circumstances, and how they interpret the value of pre-school education.

It is clear, for example, that when compared with their mothers, more women with children of pre-school age were in some kind of employment. For the most part, however, children of employed mothers were cared for by their fathers, as well as by friends or neighbours. Unfortunately this study has no evidence to show how far this was a matter of personal choice, or the extent to which those who wanted to be employed could not be so because there was no one to care for their child(ren). But only 10 per cent of mothers said that their first-born child did not go to any kind of nursery or playgroup because none was available.

From the evidence of this investigation the caretaking role of pre-school educational facilities was very much less in demand than certain positive advantages which mothers saw as available to their children by this means. For example, mothers ranked highest their expectations of the value of pre-school education to this child's personal and intellectual development. These expectations may have been stimulated to an extent by an increasing awareness of the value of education in infancy to the child's future academic and cognitive abilities. Such an awareness receives substantial support from published and in some form often well publicized work, some of it based on research, about childrens' thought processes,[37] language[38] and intelligence.[39] But, however influential these publications may have been this study shows that parental use of pre-school education for the first-born child is significantly associated with their own educational achievements, which have themselves been very different

from those of the previous generation. Whereas 15.6 per cent of fathers and 11.9 per cent of mothers of cohort members received both secondary education and some form of further or higher education, comparable figures for cohort members themselves are 47.3 per cent of men and 47.5 per cent of women. Parents in this study who sent their child to pre-school education of some kind were predominantly those who had been successful in their own education, who had tended to achieve a higher level of education than their fathers', and who tended to see education and training as the key to getting on in the world. And, in turn, more often than otherwise, their parents had taken great interest in their education. These parental views and experiences are strongly associated with the use of pre-school facilities *within* each of the four socio-economic groups as used in Table V.

It looks as though there might be an important difference of opinion between parents and teachers about the function of pre-school education. When mothers' views from this study are compared with those of the teachers' studied by Taylor *et al.* it is clear that although both rate the social function of pre-school education very highly, they differ on intellectual preparation. Whereas teachers rated this last, parents who use such facilities saw it as a very close second to the social value of pre-school education. However, some degree of semantic difference may need to be taken into account. Teachers' expressions of the importance of social awareness look, from their presentation in Taylor *et al.* as if they encompass a broader spectrum of meaning than was indicated by mothers' reports in this study. Teachers spoke of 'the child's psychological awareness of himself and others' which Taylor *et al.* commented on as 'the beginnings of personality and character development'.[40] Mothers, on the other hand, in this study, express their concern rather more in terms of the child making a wider circle of friends.

Similarly, there may be differences in what teachers and mothers mean by intellectual preparation. Mothers may not always appreciate the function of certain sorts of cognitive skill development as precursors of the things they saw as intellectual preparation, which usually meant reading and an introduction to number work.

The greater use that parents with better educational achievements make of nursery and playschool facilities raises important questions about the origins and interpretation of what, in later life, may appear as differences in ability in these children. A full description and exploration will, in due course, be possible since the children took verbal ability tests at the age of eight, and a comparison with work on the previous generation, that is the original cohort members themselves, will be made. When this information is available it will be possible to see how far apparent effects of nursery and playgroup experience may be disentangled from what we know of home life and

family circumstances in both generations, from parents' own achievements in education, and from parental interest in education and enthusiasm for this child's intellectual progress. It may be that the self-selection (on the basis of parental achievement)[41] of the population that received pre-school education will be a particularly important effect, since as Kagan *et al.* observed in a follow-up investigation of children extensively studied in infancy and again at the age of ten, 'the educational level of the family was the best predictor of both IQ and reading skill'.[42]

CONCLUSIONS

Since 1946 the increased demand for pre-school education has sprung much less from the need for the child minding functions of nursery schools, than from parents' particular concern for their childrens' intellectual and cognitive development as a preparation for school. Parents seem at first sight to be in agreement with many of the philosophers, social historians and others who speculate about the importance of infant education. However, philosophers tend to see the importance of pre-school education rather less for the individual child than for the redress of imbalances in the development of human potential. Parents, on the other hand, are naturally concerned with the welfare of their own child rather than with that of all children, and wish to give their child the opportunity and the advantage that they see in pre-school education. Judging by a study of one local education authority a comparable difference of thinking exists amongst nursery teachers: whereas older teachers seemed quite close in their expression of priorities to those of very many parents, younger teachers have apparently chosen to emphasize the notion of redress, even at the expense of intellectual content which, in direct contrast to parents, they rank as their lowest priority.

The parents in this study who sent their children to nursery schools and playgroups differed from those who did not do so, particularly in their better educational achievements and experiences even within social groups, and also in their tendency to be more optimistic about their own and others' chances of social mobility. The implications of an educationally biased population of parents making greatest use of nursery schools and playgroups for the interpretation of the effect of pre-school education on later educational achievement are considerable, and will be examined in due course in this study.

But for the present these life history and inter-generational data show that consideration of social class differences in the use of nursery schools may lead to conclusions which inappropriately place too

much stress on economic aspects, at the expense of the very influential factors of parental attitudes and experience.

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APPENDIX

Data for the study of 1946 Cohort members as parents

How the children spend their time – pre-school education, friends, imaginary friends and games, time spent with parents, reading and use of libraries, preparation for school.

Independence – things that the child is permitted to do alone, dressing, personal hygiene.

Discipline – methods and circumstances, rewards and promises of rewards, agreement with spouse on discipline, bed and meal times.

Habits and dreams – frequency of dreams and notions of their cause, methods to avoid them, habit behaviour and whether or not an attempt is made to stop it.

Bladder and bowel training – methods used, degree of success to date, advice asked, time taken.

Health, illness and accidental injury – admissions to hospital, allergies, respiratory disease, mother's worries about this child's health.

Separation – cause, length, own assessment of effect, care of child whilst mother works and goes out.

Family cohesion – activities together, husband's help at home and with this child, holidays, parents' use of free time, contacts with the wider family, own assessment of family closeness, associations with friends and neighbours.

Emotion and temper – own assessment of each parent's emotional relationship with this child, frequency of child's temper tantrum, handling anger and temper.

Sex education and family planning - sex education of this child, intentions for family size and spacing, own (i.e. parents') sex education.

Mother's self assessment and her assessment of this child - mother's worries about bringing up this child, her assessment of this child's intellectual ability, degree of independence and character.

Recollection of childhood - parental relationships, discipline, copying or avoiding things from own and spouse's upbringing.

Education and verbal ability - present school and parents' wishes for the future, contacts with school, tests for the child of mechanical reading, sentence completion and word comprehension.

NOTES

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2. A. F. Osborn, 'Under Fives in School in England and Wales, 1971-9', *Education Research*, vol. 23, pp. 96-103.
3. In this paper the term nursery school will be used to describe all kinds of nursery and play schools, and specific types such as day nurseries will be referred to by title. Local authority nursery schools will be referred to simply as nursery schools.
4. *Social Trends*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980.
5. A. F. Osborn, op. cit.
6. T. Blackstone, op. cit., p. 13.
7. T. Blackstone, op. cit., pp. 168-9.
8. T. Blackstone, op. cit., p. 53.
9. T. Blackstone, op. cit., p. 64.
10. *Children and their Primary Schools*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967, para. 291.
11. W. Van der Eyken, *The Pre-School Years*, London, Penguin Education Special, 1974, p. 35.
12. P. H. Taylor, G. Exon and B. Holley, *A Study of Nursery Education*, London, Evans/Methuen Educational, 1972, p. 60.
13. P. H. Taylor *et al.*, op. cit. p. 60.
14. *Children and their Primary Schools*, op. cit., para. 300.
15. W. Van der Eyken, op. cit., p. 24.
16. A. F. Osborn, op. cit.
17. *Children and their Primary Schools*, op. cit., para. 294.
18. My note added in brackets.
19. J. Newson and E. Newson, *Four Years Old in an Urban Community*, London, Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968, p. 109.
20. P. Leach, *Baby and Child: from Birth to Age Five*, London, Penguin Books, 1979, pp. 393-4.
21. H. Jolly, *Book of Child Care*, London, Sphere Books, 1977, p. 312.
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26. J. W. B. Douglas, *The Home and the School*, London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1964.

27. J. W. B. Douglas, 'Early Hospital Admissions and Later Disturbances of Behaviour and Learning', *Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology*, vol. 17, 1975, pp. 456–80.

28. M. E. J. Wadsworth, *Roots of Delinquency: Infancy, Adolescence and Crime*, Oxford, Martin Robertson, and New York, Barnes & Noble, 1979.

29. M. E. J. Wadsworth, 'Social Change and the Interpretation of Research', *Criminology*, vol. 19, 1981, pp. 53–75.

30. By 'generation fair' I mean that words that had been in common use in 1954 and were not longer so in the 1970s, such as 'muslin' and 'guinea' were replaced by words of comparable difficulty, and the facility value of each word was checked in pilot studies, and reordering was carried out as necessary.

31. R. Davie, N. Butler, and H. Goldstein, *From Birth to Seven*, National Children's Bureau and Longman Ltd., 1972, p. 106.

32. *Social Trends*, op. cit.

33. J. Newson and E. Newson, op. cit., pp. 430–76.

34. J. W. B. Douglas, J. M. Ross and H. R. Simpson, *All our Future*, London, Peter Davies, 1968, pp. 194–7.

35. J. W. B. Douglas, 1964, op. cit., pp. 52–9.

36. H. Jolly, 1977, op. cit., p. 312.

37. J. Piaget and B. Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.

38. B. Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control*, St Albans, Paladin Press, 1973.

39. L. Stott and R. Ball, *Infant and Pre-school Mental Tests: Review and Evaluation*, Monograph of the Society for Research in Child Development, no. 30, 1965.

40. P. H. Taylor *et al.*, op. cit., p. 38.

41. A selection factor of another kind, namely very poor home circumstances, certainly complicated interpretation of the effects of preschool education on later achievement and behaviour in a study of the first generation. See J. W. B. Douglas and J. M. Ross, 'The later educational progress and emotional adjustment of children who went to nursery schools or classes', *Educational Research*, vol. 7, no. 1, November 1964, pp. 73–80.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

Richard Albrecht

Some aspects of the sociology of literature in West Germany

I

In the eyes of West German academic sociology, the sociology of literature and, particularly, of its literary effects, appears to be an unwelcome hybrid form of sociology. This reflects a tendency which was also characteristic of German society in the Weimar Republic. Then, too, it was largely left to outsiders to pose the general probblems in the sociology of literature. Typical were L. L. Schücking,[1] with his largely *geistesgeschichtlich* sociology of literary taste (*Lehre von den Geschmacksträgertypen*), or W. Strauss's study of literature effects.[2] The questions which form the basis of R. König's early work[3] centre – in a similar fashion to his study of the dissolution of the Naturalist aesthetic in France[4] – on issues of social aesthetics and taste discussed in the context of cultural science.

Another focus of the early sociology of literature in Germany was the question of 'literary success'. Of course, we must bear in mind here that in the sociology of the 1920s 'success' was still a legitimate object of investigation.[5] It was typical that the discussion of literary success and literary reputation was conducted in the art pages (*Feuilleton*) of the press and outside the realm of academic sociology.[6] None the less, although they were neglected at the time, as they are today, these were the first attempts to elaborate the connection between literary theory and literary production.[7]

The Nazis had no use for critical sociology and sociologists. On the contrary, they drove a whole generation of sociology teachers to emigration. The literary sociologists of the day (e.g. E. Kohn-Brahmstedt or L. Löwenthal)[8] shared the same fate as German writers (e.g. T. Mann, H. Mann, B. Brecht, F. Wolf, A. Seghers, K. Tucholsky, W. Bredel, J. R. Becher). What then passed for the sociology of literature in Germany can safely be forgotten.[9]

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II

The initial attempts to find a new basis for the sociology of literature in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were narrowly conceived. Either literature was left entirely to the art pages of the press, or the old questions of literary success were taken up again. In retrospect, it is clear that the opportunity was missed for a new productive start in the sociology of literature, reviving the democratic and socialist traditions in Germany which, since the outbreak of war, had been cultivated in literary emigration and which became dominant later in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) up until the 1950s. There was no lack of a heritage to create this opportunity: as well as Marxist authors such as F. Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg,[10] there was also a genuine democratic tradition stretching from the *Vormärz* (for instance R. Prutz[11]), the Social Democracy of the Imperial Period,[12] up to the writers of the Weimar Republic.[13]

However, the few attempts to pick up the threads of the traditional sociology of literature, its questions and intellectual points of emphasis were not pursued in the FRG. On the contrary, in the 1950s and early 1960s, two dominant currents developed on the fringes of the sociology of literature: on the one hand, a largely demoscopic and methodically unreliable survey of the book market which in the final analysis was geared to the commercial interests and market strategies of publishing capital and book clubs – in particular, the *Bertelsmann Konzern* and the *Börsenverein für den deutschen Buchhandel*;[14] on the other hand, there was a sociology of literature which drew largely on the models of US structural-functionalism.[15] The first direction, which produced similar work in France and England as well as in Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands,[16] lacked any specific understanding of literature in so far as it tried to stretch 'literature' to include printed matter *sui generis*.[17] The other direction was indifferent to literature in so far as it hurriedly pressed the object of all literary sociology into the corset of structural functionalism. Thus, for example, H. N. Fügen claims for his sociology of literature – a sociology which expressly opposes the Marxist literary theory – that it is *not* concerned with the literary work as an aesthetic object. In contrast to R. König's early socio-aesthetics, Fügen is only concerned with the social action of individuals and groups who are involved in the social phenomenon of 'literature' as an object of sociological study.

Besides these two dominant currents there were, of course, individual and unco-ordinated approaches to the sociology of literature: for example, A. Silbermann, who, on the one hand, made an attempt to incorporate literature into a wider phenomenon of social communication,[18] while, on the other hand, in his comprehensive bibliographical survey,[19] showed his disinterest in the socio-aesthetic object

by narrowing the sociology of art into a largely empirical field of investigation. Independently of these developments, various studies appeared in the first half of the 1960s in the FRG, which discussed different aspects of the literary process informatively and with reference to sociological questions and methods. For instance, H. J. Krysmanski's study of the Utopian novel based on the sociology of knowledge,[20] G. Linz's study of literary elites,[21] U. Otto's work on literary censorship as a problem of the sociology of politics[22] and the first systematic approach to empirical aspects of 'popular' texts by W. Nutz[23] might be mentioned.

In view of this state of affairs, it is not surprising that in the FRG – similar in some aspects to the situation in the GDR, where a Marxist sociology of literature was not developed before the mid-1960s[24] – the genuine field of literary sociology lay fallow, with the result that other academic disciplines encroached. Here the investigations of the history of reading – above all the work of R. Engelsing[25] – and the critical approach of R. Schenda,[26] belonging more to the field of ethnology (*Volkskunde*), might be mentioned. Furthermore, various studies, both from the field of ethnology[27] and communication science, concentrated on the phenomenon of popular texts and *genres*.[28] Parallel to these developments, academic German studies and literary scholarships attempted to emancipate themselves from their traditional subservience to text-immanent philology and interpretation: on the one hand, by concentrating on the role of *reader of literature*, and, on the other, by coming to terms with the challenge presented by popular literature (*Trivialliteratur*) and the aesthetics of literary response (*Rezeptionsästhetik*). In particular, the attention given to 'popular literature as a problem of research' (H. Kreuzer)[29] was felt as a provocation by the community of scholars,[30] in so far as the reader as the subject of literature was taken out of his traditional role in the literary process.

Subsequently this critical approach to literature (which in the past only developed in the course of the criticism articulated by the West German student movement, above all in the 'ideological' disciplines) has achieved considerable respectability by concentrating on the reader, and, also by rendering certain sociological problems obsolete.[31]

With this development – and the greater involvement of Marxist questions from aesthetics and literary theory in the study of art and literature resulting from the student movement[32] as well as Marxist approaches in the GDR – a challenge was issued to the academic sociology of literature, which so far – it would appear – has not been recognized, let alone faced up to. Certainly, since the early 1970s, there have been important monographs in the fields of literary and social studies: for instance, various empirical studies of the aesthetic reception of texts,[33] critiques of the dominant modes of the mass

consumption of literature,[34] or studies of the political and literary character (*Politizität und Literarizität*) of certain groups of writers,[35] the social situation and organizational forms of authors and writers (in various media),[36] and critical investigations of reading behaviour.[37] But these studies, too, fail to meet the critical challenge posed by various writers towards[38] both traditional literary studies and orthodox literary sociology.

III

As a result, the attempt has yet to be undertaken, in the interests of literature and society, to mediate between society and literature, between literary studies and sociology. In this regard, a new study by Jürgen Scharfschwerdt,[39] which tries to give a systematic and historical survey of the fundamental problems of literary sociology, emphasizes important issues, by attempting both to systematize the problem area of literary sociology and to incorporate impulses and questions arising out of the work of Marxist authors from the GDR, where in the meantime wider social aspects have been integrated into literary theory.[40]

To conclude this brief survey I shall dwell on some of the stimulating lines of argument in this work, which might be regarded as representative for the progress and the progressive types of recent literary sociology in the FRG. Scharfschwerdt's analytic point of departure and point of reference with regard to social reality is literary life 'as the vital coexistence of interconnected, competing or conflicting literary cultures, which are subject to various social conditions in their growth and effect'.[41]

The fundamental question of literary sociology, posed in this way, points to basic social structures; that is the various literary cultures within a society, the ideas, values, ideals and guides to action expressed in the content and form of particular literary works are to be related to the different social groups: 'an evaluation of these social functions of literature will only be possible by way of a social categorisation, a sociological classification in which the producers and the readership – as members of society – can be connected with this society.'[42]

In formal terms Scharfschwerdt here approaches the concept of a 'literature society' (*Literaturgesellschaft*),[43] developed in Marxist discussion, by using this term to refer to the 'literature of a particular social formation in its overall social systematic structure.'[44] Irrespective of whether this concept (developed by J. R. Becher at the Fourth GDR-Writer's Congress to characterize the status of literature in a socialist society) can be applied to the investigation of literature in late-capitalist society, the important thing about the sociological

point of departure quoted above is Scharfschwerdt's rejection of literary analysis stuck in a position of 'simple negation' in the sense of the Frankfurt School, which has remained largely fixated on the ideological critique of the mechanism of the 'culture industry' (Adorno/Horkheimer)[45] or the 'consciousness industry' (Enzensberger)[46] and which has had an influence outside the FRG, e.g. in the discussion in Scandinavian countries[47] or, initially, in Anglo-American discussions.[48]

In his central chapter, Scharfschwerdt gives a comprehensive survey of the early stages of systematic research in the sociology of literature,[49] sketches the influence of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge[50] in particular, gives a critical account of the understanding of literature in the positivist tradition of literary sociology,[51] and then discusses the 'problem of the development of a marxist sociology of literature'.[52]

Even though, in spite of its thoroughness, one may have reservations with regard to individual lines of argument in Scharfschwerdt's 'survey of academic development', these reservations will not be discussed here, as these particular chapters do not contain any new arguments of importance for further work in the field. Such arguments are to be found, however, in the final chapter, 'Literary studies and every day life'.[53]

IV

In this final chapter, Scharfschwerdt attempts to draw conclusions which might be of importance for future research in the FRG. It is only of secondary importance that, once again, this attempt *poses* questions rather than answering them and that Scharfschwerdt addresses literary academics rather than sociologists.

The author's concern is, above all, with re-establishing the links between art in general and literature in particular (or rather the various literatures, as elaborated at the beginning) and every day life (*Alltagsleben*). At this point, Scharfschwerdt takes up questions posed by the well-known literary scholar, W. Kayser,[54] two decades ago, although only in an embryonic form. These questions concern three basic aspects of literary life: entertainment, edification and analysis of the age (*Unterhaltung, Erbauung, Zeiterkenntnis*).

The fundamental perspective Scharfschwerdt's takes on the everyday life of social classes, strata and groups – empirically verifiable (e.g. in the FRG)[55] and *a priori* co-contextual with literature – is not based on the concept of the mode of life (*Lebensweise*) developed in the Marxist discussion conducted in West Germany.[56] On the contrary, Scharfschwerdt tries to operate with Dilthey's idea of the experience of life,[57] Weber's sociological concept of the life-style[58]

and some ideas of Mannheim,[59] Schütz and Berger/Luckmann[60] from the fields of the sociology of religion and the sociology of knowledge.

In contrast to the basic sociological relations discussed in earlier chapters, the author suddenly introduces a specific anthropological viewpoint of literature and its social functions.[61] However, it remains a matter of some obscurity to what extent this amalgam of ethno-sociological approaches (offered as recent sociology of knowlege)[62] and the findings of the sociology of religion (apart from the thesis that pulp fiction and other forms of popular literature have assumed, in secularized form, the ideological function of religion)[63] can contribute to a sociological understanding of literature in society. Finally, the claim that the sociology of literature should concentrate on identifying images of society in fictional texts - in the manner of M. Osterland's analysis of 'images of society in films'[64] - seems limited in view of the wealth of the theoretical and empirical tasks facing the sociology of literature, particularly a Marxist-critical one, - even if this praised method seems to open up a specific sociological approach to the problem of artistic *form*.[65]

It is true that the sociological investigation of the production, distribution and reception of literature and 'literary life' can give 'the realm of aesthetics and literature a vital, analytic function', which is 'closely linked with the concrete, individual and social life of man'[66] *only* on the basis of an empirical analysis of life and its concrete and transformable character. It is true, also, that, for example, literary expectations can only be discussed, analysed and decoded in socio-cultural terms with a due regard to social life, experience and awareness. Nevertheless, Scharfschwerdt in his conclusion does not move beyond the most generally formulated programme in the sociology of literature, without specifying the function or position of literature in the every day life of social classes and groups in the antagonist society of West Germany today. Even if it is clear that in the present, late-capitalist social structure of the FRG the majority of people are 'legitimately, primarily concerned with material problems'[67] and that particularly the working-class people are to all intents and purposes excluded from active participation in any 'literary culture' - whatever its nature - it remains a broad field for research in the sociology of literature, which can make a productive and, indeed, operative contribution towards overcoming the division between life and literature. This requires, of course, knowledge not just of 'literature' but also of real life.

Although social-practical problems are raised, which are in the final analysis bound up with the historical and current nature of literature, society, work and life in late-capitalist society and its specific 'literature society',[68] a sociological approach and a sociology of literature which takes everyday life as its point of reference can contribute to solving these problems and help to explore means of

access to literature and its capacity for gratifying needs through entertainment, education and enjoyment.[69]

It is a positive contribution of Scharfschwerdt's sociology of literature to have made clear the need for a sociology of literature of this kind, even though the problems posed still await their solution by means of further collective efforts.

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NOTES

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4. R. König, *Die naturalistische Ästhetik in Frankreich und ihre Auflösung*, Leipzig, 1931.

5. G. Ichheiser, *Kritik des Erfolges*, Leipzig, 1931.

6. R. Neumann, 'Zur Soziologie des Literaturerfolgs', *Literarische Welt*, vol. 6, 1930, no. 26; S. Kracauer, 'Über Erfolgsbücher und ihr Publikum', *Frankfurter Zeitung*, June, 9./10., 1930.

7. E. K. Brahmstedt, 'Probleme der Literatursoziologie', *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*, vol. 7, 1931, pp. 719–31.

8. E.g. E. Kohn-Brahmstedt (cf. E. K. Brahmstedt, *Aristocracy and the Middle Classes in Germany*, Chicago, etc. 1964, 2nd edn) or the 'sociologist of literature' of the Frankfurt School, L. Löwenthal (cf. L. Löwenthal, 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur', *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, vol. 1, 1932, pp. 85–102; L. Löwenthal, 'Das Individuum in der individualistischen Gesellschaft', *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, vol. 5, 1936, pp. 321–63; L. Löwenthal, 'Knut Hamsun', *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, vol. 6, 1937, pp. 295–345).

9. K. Vietor, 'Programm einer Literatursoziologie', *Volk im Werden*, vol. 2, 1934, pp. 35–44; G. Keferstein, 'Aufgaben einer volksbezogenen Literatursoziologie', *Volksspiegel*, vol. 1, 1934, pp. 114–23.

10. See for example R. Luxemburg, *Schriften über Literatur und Kunst*, Leipzig, 1972; F. Mehring, *Aufsätze zur deutschen Literaturgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1969.

11. Cf. Robert Prutz, *Kleine Schriften. Zur Politik und Literatur*, 2 vols, Merseburg, 1847; R. Prutz, *Vorlesungen über die deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1847; now *Robert Prutz Zwischen Vaterland und Freiheit*, H. Kircher (ed.), Köln, 1975.

12. See for example E. Wengraf, 'Literatur und Gesellschaft', *Neue Zeit*, vol. 7, 1889, pp. 241–8.

13. See for example W. Mahrholz and A. Hirsch.

14. See *Schriftenreihe zur Buchmarktforschung*, Hamburg, 1963 ss., (ed.) W. Strauss, the former leader of Bartelsmann public relations agency; see *Archiv für Soziologie und Wirtschaftsfragen des Buchhandels*, supplement of *Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel*, Frankfurt am Main.

15. Cf. particularly the writings of

H. N. Fügen, e.g. *Die Hauptrichtungen der Literatursoziologie und ihre Methoden*, 1964, Bonn, 1974 (6th edn); H. N. Fügen (ed.), *Wege der Literatursoziologie*, West Berlin etc., 1964; H. N. Fügen, *Dichtung in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Bonn, 1972; critique of Fügen cf. B. J. Warneken, 'Zur Kritik positivistischer Literatursoziologie', *Literaturwissenschaft und Sozialwissenschaft*, vol. 1, 1971, pp. 81–150.

16. See for example the writings of R. Escarpit (France), H. P. Mann (England), H. Weinhold (Switzerland), P. Meyer-Dohm (West Germany), and E. Gehmacher *et al.* (Austria).

17. See for example H. Meyer, 'Grundlagen der Literatursoziologie', *Studium Generale*, vol. 17, 1964, pp. 1–33.

18. Cf. A. Silbermann, 'Literaturphilosophie, soziologische Literaturästhetik oder Literatursoziologie', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, vol. 18, 1966, pp. 139–48; A. Silbermann, 'Von den Wirkungen der Literatur als Massenkommunikationsmittel', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, special issue 17: *Künstler und Gesellschaft*, Opladen, 1974, pp. 24–44.

19. A. Silbermann, *Empirische Kunstsoziologie*, Stuttgart, 1973; see also A. Silbermann, 'Kunst', *Soziologie*, (ed.) R. König, Frankfurt am Main, 1967, pp. 164–74.

20. H. -J. Krysmanski, *Die utopische Methode*, Cologne etc., 1963.

21. G. Linz, *Literarische Prominenz in der Bundesrepublik*, Freiburg, Br., 1965.

22. U. Otto, *Die literarische Zensur als Problem der Soziologie der Politik*, Stuttgart, 1968.

23. W. Nutz, *Der Trivialroman – seine Formen und seine Hersteller*, Cologne etc., 1962.

24. See for example the beginning of the discussion in the GDR; T. Höhle, 'Probleme einer marxistischen Literatursoziologie', *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe*, vol. 15, 1966, pp. 477–88; D. Sommer, 'Entwicklungstendenzen der bürgerlichen Literatursoziologie', op. cit., pp. 463–76; G. K. Lehmann, 'Grundfragen einer marxistischen Soziologie der Kunst', *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, vol. 13, 1965, pp. 933–47; the results of a broad empirical survey of effects of arts and literature are now published; cf. D. Sommer *et al.*, *Funktion und Wirkung. Soziologische Untersuchungen zur Literatur und Kunst*, Berlin/DDR etc., 1978.

25. R. Engelsing, *Zur Sozialgeschichte deutscher Mittel- und Unterschichten*, Göttingen, 1973; R. Engelsing, *Analphabetentum und Lektüre*, Stuttgart, 1973; R. Engelsing, *Der Bürger als Leser*, Stuttgart, 1974.

26. R. Schenda, *Volk ohne Buch. Studien zur Sozialgeschichte der populären Lesestoffe 1770–1910*, Frankfurt am Main, 1970 (2nd edn, Munich, 1977); R. Schenda, *Die Lesestoffe der kleinen Leute*, Munich, 1976.

27. Cf. for example H. Bausinger, 'Wege zur Erforschung der trivialen Literatur', *Studien zur Trivialliteratur*, (ed.) H. O. Burger, Frankfurt am Main, 1968, pp. 1–33; H. F. Foltin, 'Zur Erforschung der Unterhaltungs und Trivialliteratur, insbesondere im Bereich des Romans', op. cit., pp. 242–70.

28. Cf. for example W. R. Langenbucher, *Der aktuelle Unterhaltungsroman*, 1964, Bonn, 1974 (2nd edn); W. Faulstich, *Thesen zum Bestsellerroman*, Bern etc., 1974.

29. H. Kreuzer, 'Trivialliteratur als Forschungsproblem', *Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, vol. 41, 1967, pp. 173–91.

30. H. R. Jauss, *Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft*, 1967, Frankfurt am Main, 1970 (2nd edn).

31. Cf. for example G. Grimm (ed.) *Literatur und Leser*, Stuttgart, 1975; R. Warning (ed.), *Rezeptionsästhetik*, Munich, 1975; H. Link, *Rezeptionsforschung*, Stuttgart, 1976; P. F. Schütze, *Zur Kritik des literarischen*

Gebrauchswerts, Darmstadt, 1975; B. Zimmermann, *Literaturrezeption im historischen Prozess*, Munich, 1977; N. Groeben, *Rezeptionsforschung als empirische Literaturwissenschaft*, Kronberg, Ts., 1977; W. Faulstich, *Domänen der Rezeptionsanalyse*, Kronberg, Ts., 1977; W. Faulstich (ed.), *Kritische Stichwörter zur Medienwissenschaft*, Munich, 1977.

32. Cf. B. J. Warneken, op. cit., pp. 81 ss.; B. J. Warneken, 'Abriss einer Analyse literarischer Produktion', *Argument*, vol. 14, 1972, pp. 207–32; B. J. Warneken, 'Autonomie und Indienstnahme', *Rhetorik, Ästhetik, Ideologie*, Stuttgart, 1973, pp. 79–115; L. Winckler, *Kulturwarenproduktion*, Frankfurt am Main, 1973.

33. See for example W. Dehn (ed.), *Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarisches Lernen*, Frankfurt am Main, 1974; H. Heuermann *et al.* (eds), *Literarische Rezeption*, Paderborn, 1975; D. Gerlach *et al.*, *Lesen und soziale Herkunft*, Weinheim etc., 1976; D. Kirsch, *Literaturbarrieren bei jugendlichen Lesern*, Frankfurt am Main, 1978.

34. See for example P. Nusser, *Romane für die Unterschicht*, Stuttgart, 1973; C. Bürger, *Textanalyse als Ideologiekritik*, Frankfurt am Main, 1973; W. Hollstein, *Der deutsche Illustriertenroman der Gegenwart*, Munich, 1973.

35. Cf. H. Lethen, *Neue Sachlichkeit 1924–1932*, Stuttgart, 1970, 1975 (2nd edn); L. Peter, *Literarische Intelligenz und Klassenkampf*, Cologne, 1972; H. M. Kepplinger, *Realkultur und Medienkultur*, Freiburg, Br., 1975; F. Kröll, *Die "Gruppe 47"*, Stuttgart, 1977; R. Stollmann, *Ästhetisierung der Politik*, Stuttgart, 1978.

36. H. Fohrbeck and A. J. Wiesand, *Der Autorenreport*, Reinbek, 1972; F. Kron, *Schriftsteller und Schriftstellerverbände*, Stuttgart, 1976.

37. Cf. K. Maase, *Leseinteressen der Arbeiter in der BRD*, Cologne, 1975; R. Albrecht, *Buch und Leser in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Phil. Diss., Bremen, 1976.

38. Cf. the contributions in J. Kolbe (ed.), *Ansichten einer zukünftigen Germanistik*, Munich, 1969; J. Kolbe (ed.), *Neue Ansichten einer zukünftigen Germanistik*, Munich, 1973.

39. J. Scharfschwerdt, *Grundprobleme der Literatursoziologie. Ein wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher Überblick*, Stuttgart etc., 1977.

40. Cf. M. Naumann *et al.*, *Gesellschaft – Literatur – Lesen. Literaturrezeption in theoretischer Sicht*, Berlin/DDR etc., 1973, 1975 (2nd edn).

41. Scharfschwerdt, op. cit., p. 10.

42. Ibid., p. 10.

43. Cf. D. Schiller, 'Zu Begriff und Problem der Literaturgesellschaft', *Literatursoziologie*, vol. 1 (ed.), J. Barck, Stuttgart etc., 1974, pp. 28–38; cf. as well Naumann *et al.*, op. cit., pp. 291 ss.

44. Scharfschwerdt, op. cit., p. 10.

45. T. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, Amsterdam, 1947, pp. 144–98; T. W. Adorno, 'Resumé über Kulturindustrie', *Ohne Leitbild. Parva Aesthetica*, Frankfurt am Main, 1967, pp. 60–70.

46. Cf. H. M. Enzensberger, 'Bewusstseinsindustrie', *Einzelheiten*, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main, 1962, pp. 7–17.

47. Cf. for example K. Aspelin, *Marxistiska Litteraturanalysen*, Stockholm, 1970; P. E. Sørensen, *Elementare Literatursoziologie*, Tübingen, 1976 (1st Danish edn, Copenhagen, 1973).

48. See for example F. Jameson, *Marxism and Form*, Princeton (N.J.), 1971; M. Jay, *The Dialectic Imagination*, London, 1974 (2nd edn); J. O'Neill, (ed.), *On Critical Theory*, London, 1977 (2nd edn); P. Slater, *Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School*, London, 1977.

49. Scharfschwerdt, op. cit., pp. 42–74.

50. Ibid., pp. 90 ss.

51. Ibid., pp. 112–36.

52. Ibid., pp. 137–86.

53. Ibid., pp. 187–221.

54. Cf. W. Kayser, *Deutsche Literatur in unserer Zeit*, Göttingen, 1959, pp. 5–31.

55. Cf. Institut für Marxistische Studien und Forschungen (IMSF) (ed.),

Klassen- und Sozialstruktur der BRD 1950–1970, Frankfurt am Main, 1972 ss., vols; M. Osterland *et al.*, *Materialien zur Lebens- und Arbeitssituation der Industriearbeiter in der BRD*, Frankfurt am Main, 1973.

56. Cf. in the FRG above all the publications of Kaspar Maase, in which the connection between the Marxist theory of need and the concept of the 'mode of life' from the sociology of culture is established; K. Maase, *Leseinteressen*, op. cit.; K. Maase, 'Arbeiterklasse, Reproduktion und Kultur im heutigen Kapitalismus', *Kulturelle Bedürfnisse der Arbeiterklasse* (ed.), IMSF, Munich, 1978, pp. 8–53; K. Maase, 'Zur Diskussion um die marxistische Kulturtheorie', *Marxistische Studien* (ed.), IMSF, vol. 1, 1978, pp. 337–53; K. Maase, 'Kulturbedürfnisse und demokratische Kulturarbeit', *Sozialistische Politik*, vol. 10, 1978, no. 45, pp. 6–29.

57. Cf. W. Dilthey, *Die Philosophie des Lebens*, Stuttgart, 1961.

58. Cf. M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Tübingen, 1922 (first part).

59. Cf. K. Mannheim, *Beiträge zur Theorie der Weltanschauungsinterpretation*, Wien, 1923; K. Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie*, Bonn, 1929; Mannheim, *Die Bedeutung der Konkurrenz im Gebiete des Geistigen*, Tubingen, 1929; K. Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, (ed.) E. Mannheim and O. Kecskemeti, London, 1957 (2nd edn).

60. Cf. A. Schütz, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, Wien, 1932 (2nd edn, 1960); A. Schütz, *Collected Papers*, 3 vols, The Hague, 1962 ss.; A. Schütz and T. Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, Neuwied etc., 1975; P. Berger and T. Luckmann, *Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit*, Frankfurt am Main, 1968.

61. Cf. Scharfschwerdt, op. cit., p. 197.

62. Cf. ibid., p. 198.

63. Cf. ibid., pp. 214–16.

64. Cf. M. Osterland, *Gesellschaftsbilder in Filmen*, Stuttgart, 1970.

65. Cf. Scharfschwerdt, op. cit., pp. 207 ss.

66. Ibid., p. 201.

67. Ibid., p. 216.

68. Cf. the empirical approach; Albrecht, *Buch und Leser*, op. cit., pp. 159–207.

69. Cf. Maase, *Leseinteressen der Arbeiter*, op. cit., pp. 87–97.

The Sociology of Belief: Fallacy and Foundation *Keith Dixon* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980 138 pp. £7.95 (£3.95 paper)

The extraordinary recrudescence of the sociology of knowledge over the last decade is frequently remarked upon, if only as a source of anxiety. What is less frequently recognized is how profoundly the practice of the field has been transformed. The traditional stereotype of the sociology of knowledge, derived from plausible, if contestable, analyses of writers like Durkheim and Mannheim, is worse than useless as a framework for the interpretation of current contributions.

The traditional stereotype is constructed upon the same central oppositions as those of optimistic rationalist epistemology: where society is, reason is not; where culture is, nature is not. It differs from standard optimistic forms of rationalism merely in its insistence that society and culture are distressingly pervasive, and in its consequent scepticism concerning the extent to which 'genuine' knowledge is possible. Both positions alike conceive of cognition as a field for competition between the promptings of reason and experience on the one hand, and the countervailing pressure of social contingencies on the other.

In contrast, the current tendency in the sociology of knowledge is to reject not rationalist optimism, but the entire set of oppositions upon which rationalism rests. Far from opposing the reasonable and the socially conditioned it addresses reasoning precisely as a social activity, and reasonable belief as a cultural variable. The way in which we argue is at once a matter of cognitive proclivities and social conventions. The knowledge-claims we accept are at once a matter of how our culture happens to classify nature and what nature offers for classification. Such a position neither debunks the rational nor aggrandizes the conventional: it merely takes note of the fact that the two are inseparable in all actual situations. No specific inference can ever gain acceptance because of its appeal to an unconditioned reason; no specific belief can ever draw its credibility from an unproblematic correspondence with reality. Reference to local social contingencies is always necessary in any actual study of credibility, which is not to say that all inferences and beliefs are unsatisfactorily based. The former states what is necessary for empirical understanding, whereas the latter is a value judgment; the two are only related to each other in the rejected framework of rationalism.

This preamble is relevant because Dixon chooses to develop his attack upon the possibility of a thoroughgoing sociology of knowledge entirely within a rationalist framework. Thus he ignores current debates in the sociology of knowledge, takes for granted precisely what is currently taken as crucially problematic, and projects arguments and polemics into what, as far as current practice is concerned, is empty space. Perhaps nothing more than a sociology of belief is possible; but the basic framework of this work ensures that it will have no role to play as the issue is decided. It has the kind of curious irrelevance which professional epistemologists are so adept at achieving, as from afar they discuss this or that field of enquiry. But this book is worse than irrelevant. It is written by an insider who proceeds as

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if rationalist oppositions serve as the unquestioned basis of thinking in his field, and who thereby seriously misleads his readers.

The content of a monograph may be insightful and informative even though its basic framework is misconceived, but that is not the case here. Many individual writers and a great range of topics and fields are considered, including Marxism, dialectics, cognitive relativism, ethnomethodology, the sociology of science and the sociology of religion. But in attaining the requisite height above the intellectual landscape Dixon seems to have soared well above its cloud cover; for his discussion all too often displays ignorance, imprecision and superficiality. Nor are such lapses mitigated by reticent presentation. By proclaiming ethnomethodology a 'vulgarised synthesis' of phenomenology and symbolic interactionism, Dixon merely convicts himself of vulgarity. By eschewing a properly sympathetic account of Garfinkel, Kuhn and Wittgenstein, and resorting instead to caricature, he discourages the sympathetic reading which his own far from coherent argument badly needs. These, however, are small points; for the book has little to offer even to a sympathetic reader. Believing rationalists will have little difficulty in finding a better-crafted apologia than this one.

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Presbyteries and Profits: Calvinism and the Development of Capitalism in Scotland, 1560–1707 *Gordon Marshall* Clarendon Press 1980 406 pp. £18.00

England, despite its peculiar religious and legal background, was the first industrial capitalist society; Scotland, despite a number of favourable social conditions, experienced a 'retarded' capitalist development. These contrasted cases have long represented a problem for Weber's account of the rise of capitalist society. While sociologists have been perennially concerned with the 'peculiarities of the English', the equally intriguing peculiarity of Scotland has been noted but not systematically analysed. *Presbyteries and Profits* is thus an important contribution to historical sociology in attempting to plug a gap in our understanding of capitalist development. The book is valuable at two levels. It presents a detailed empirical account of changing attitudes towards capitalist production in Scotland from the Reformation to the Union. Second, it clarifies much of the confusion which has encompassed discussion of Weber's Protestant ethic thesis. Dr Marshall argues that Weber's critics have illegitimately conjoined two separate arguments in Weber's sociology. In the first, Weber sought the origins of the capitalist mentality in this-wordly asceticism. In the second, Weber examined the interaction between that ethic and certain structural conditions in the rise of capitalism. The origins of the spirit of capitalism and the emergence of capitalism thus represent two analytically separate issues. By separating these arguments, Marshall produces an elegant account of Weber's case and avoids digression into sterile exegesis. *Presbyteries and Profits* is primarily concerned with the more restricted aspect of Weber's thesis, namely the 'elective affinity' between neo-Calvinism and the spirit of capitalism.

Marshall is persistently honest about the daunting problem of producing the empirical evidence which would be at all relevant in testing Weber's first thesis, namely of showing how neo-Calvinism shattered traditionalist economic norms and practices. However, a persuasive argument is mounted to demonstrate that the formal doctrines and pastoral advice of Scottish neo-Calvinism were congruent with a rational capitalist ethos. Religious asceticism deeply penetrated entrepreneurial attitudes in the day-to-day management of nascent manufactories in Scotland. In short, Weber's first thesis is vindicated. Why then did Scotland remain a relatively 'backward'

region? In providing an answer, the book moves to Weber's second thesis, namely the 'structural preconditions' of capitalism. While the ethic was willing, a range of factors – geography, trading conditions, social upheaval, an archaic agrarian structure – placed structural limitations on Scottish economic development.

Classical sociologists were ultimately ambiguous about major theoretical issues like agency and determinism, knowledge and social structure. Weber was no exception and therefore this distinction between the two theses is precise, but fails to capture the complexity of Weber's position. By concentrating on the spirit of capitalism, the second thesis which, from the point of view of general sociology, is by far the most significant is inadequately examined. Thus, *Presbyteries and Profits* is unduly restrictive, since the 'suggestions' about unfavourable structural conditions for Scottish capitalism are too limited to be convincing. The book is not, as its subtitle claims, about capitalism in Scotland, but merely about the capitalist ethos. These reservations should not, however, detract from the importance of this study as a major contribution to Weberian sociology and to our comprehension of a religious ethic that shaped capitalist culture.

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Capitalism, Class and Politics in Scotland *Ron Parsler* (ed.) Gower Publishing Co. Ltd 1980 166 pp. £10.50

Publishing, we are told, is in a crisis and I find inexplicable the production of this collection of nine articles reprinted from the *Scottish Journal of Sociology*. Some of the pieces are so slender that their original publication seems somewhat marginal in retrospect; there is no justification for reprinting them in a fairly expensive hardback.

There are two heavyweight articles in this book, one by Gordon Marshall on the Weber thesis and Scotland, the other by Tony Dickson on Class and Nationalism in Scotland. Both have been superseded by subsequent books, Marshall's entirely by his outstanding *Presbyteries and Profits* (1980) and Dickson's somewhat by the publication of the co-authored *Scottish Capitalism*.

The article by Payne, Ford and Robertson addresses itself to two matters. First a critique of Glass's Mobility Study in so far as it is taken to apply to Scotland. Second a preliminary analysis of their own Scottish data (1975) in order to attack Westergaard and Resler's 'mobility threshold' arguments and Parkin's use of the 'buffer zone' concept. The empirical material is of interest (at any rate until the publication of more extensive accounts) but theoretically has been somewhat overtaken by the publication of the results of the Oxford study. Scott, Hughes and Mackenzie present a piece of somewhat 'local' interest criticizing the work of John Firn on ownership and control in the Scottish economy. The article is less substantial than other work published by these authors although it is good to have it, like the mobility group's findings, in back numbers of the *Journal*.

The remaining essays strike me as concerned with such specialist or alternatively detailed, parochial and rather dated matters that no one would want them reprinted now. Sara Delamont examines, with the aid of data on a Scottish middle-class school, a typology of the effects of sex and class on education proposed by King in 1971. This is interesting in itself but limited and not at all related to the other contributions. There are two articles by John W. Dickson and Stephen White which reproduce exactly the same data and although they may have stimulated thought at the time, can only be described as featherweight; an entertaining but theoretically empty content analysis of Scottish local newspapers during the February 1974 General Election by Bochel and Denver; and a somewhat

more substantial analysis by Victor Hanby of 'Current Scottish Nationalism' using 1974 and 1976 data. This is largely of interest in showing how dangerous socio-political prediction can be, especially when based on the kind of attitudinal data on which we have all at some time, myself included, relied!

Finally, any overall structure this book may have eluded me. The standard of typesetting and proofreading can only be described as a disgrace to any publisher and even leaves a well-known daily newspaper far behind.

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Class Structure and Income Determination *Erik Olin Wright* Academic Press 1980 271 pp. £11.80

This book is of great importance for two main reasons. First of all, it demonstrates the significance and relevance of the Marxist conception of the social relations of production for the sociological analysis of class. Second, it does this as much through empirical as through theoretical arguments. Indeed, this book is a direct rebuttal to those who have stressed the abstract and theoretical nature of writings which make use of the concept of social relations of production, by clearly showing its significance through a coherent and rigorous empirical study of a major feature of stratification in contemporary capitalist societies, namely income.

This is not to say that the book lacks theoretical arguments. Wright sustains his theoretical position, in the first instance, by contrasting it, in a critical fashion, with alternative approaches. He prefers analyses of stratification based on production relations as against gradational models because the latter merely present arbitrary dissections of statistical hierarchies such as income, education or occupational prestige, and thus fail to be relational and sociological, qualities which the former succeeds in achieving. However, class theories based on market and/or authority relations can be as equally relational and here Wright's theoretical argument rests upon the claim that while both of these aspects are important, market relations are rooted ultimately in production relations and it is these relations which furnish the structure and content of authority relations.

Wright is therefore led to regard the social relations of production – social relations grouped around the appropriation of surplus labour in production – as the fundamental basis of class relations and the leading criterion for class analysis. He thus sets out once again his theory of contradictory class locations. The class map of advanced capitalist societies is drawn by Wright in terms of the contours and reliefs given by control over three aspects of production: money capital, physical capital and the labour process. This distinguishes the two major classes in capitalist society, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, while the petit-bourgeoisie is defined by its place in a system of simple commodity production. Since control or lack of control over the various facets of production do not necessarily coincide, structural locations objectively situated between the major classes develop within the class structure – these locations thereby become contradictory class locations: they concern small employers, the managerial hierarchy, from top management to supervisors and foremen, and semi-autonomous employees who possess some control over their immediate process of production.

Not content to let his case rest with such theoretical speculations, Wright attempts to demonstrate their value for empirical research and takes as his problem one much covered in the social science literature, what determines income? In doing this, Marxist theory has to be set against competing theories, in particular the status attainment theory in sociology and the human capital theory in economics. Wright argues that both of these

alternative theories take the individual rather than social structure or class as their basic unit of analysis and that in so far as they deal with social relations these are conceived of as market or exchange relations and technical relations (i.e. the technical division of labour) and not as production relations. Hence, the value of testing these respective theories in order to discern the independent effect of the social relations of production in determining income. This is especially the case since Wright views classes as positions or empty places in the structure of production and thus as operating independently of the personal and social attributes of individuals (the empirical tests are designed with this in mind), so that it becomes appropriate to contrast this with theories which rely for their explanations upon the qualities of individuals.

Income determination for Wright is a consequence of class relations and class struggles organized around the process of production for it is this which sets limits upon income variations and upon the secondary effects of exchange relations, the technical relations of production, and individual characteristics like education and social background, on income levels. So unlike the other theories considered, Marxist theory predicts that income variations between classes will be much more significant than income variations within classes.

In a more specific sense, income or the exchange value of jobs, is seen by Wright to derive from the costs of reproducing socially average labour power, that is, average wages for average skills, and from factors which will cause income to vary above or below this average, such as the trajectory of class struggles, the element of control exercised in and over production, and directly discriminatory and market forces. Accordingly, the book cogently establishes the fact that incomes vary much more between classes than within them and that this is a product of the class structure itself, emanating from the social relations of production.

I cannot detail all the specific hypotheses Wright tests in his study but some of them illustrate very clearly what the considerations above entail for empirical research. He finds that an individual's position within class relations is an equally good if not better predictor of income than occupational status, noticeably when controls for the influence of education are introduced. Here Wright explicitly criticizes, on the basis of empirical data, the claims of other theories, without putting down all the variances noted to class, nor regarding occupation as inconsequential, though at the same time, confirming the relative independence of the social relations of production from the technical relations of production.

But Wright also provides data for his own theory. The process of income determination in the contradictory class location between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the managerial hierarchy, is related to the need for inducement and legitimation in order to secure control over the social relations of production and to guarantee the effectiveness of managerial labour power. It is hypothesized and confirmed that a highly differentiated and steep income gradient, associated with higher levels of education, characterizes the managerial hierarchy (even after allowing for the effects of factors stressed by alternative theories), both to secure managerial control over production as well as control over management, and to legitimate the managerial hierarchy in the labour process. Thus, a privilege component is contained in the income earned by managerial labour power precisely because of its contradictory class location (see, especially, p. 181).

A particularly interesting part of the study attempts to gauge the way in which class mediates the influence of racial and sexual divisions on incomes. Wright argues that this influence, in the last instance, will be determined by the social relations of production. This is so for the simple reason that more blacks than whites and more

women than men tend to be members of the working class, so that the ramifications of racism and sexism in reducing the exchange value of the labour power of blacks and women often below the costs of its reproduction – i.e. through a discriminatory component in their wage – will follow from, rather than function independently of, the class structure. Thus, he finds strong empirical support for the propositions that the income returns to education for blacks and whites and for men and women will be much closer within classes than across class boundaries. Wright is adamant that he is not trying to reduce race relations or the sexual division of labour to production but rather to define more closely and precisely their connections with the class structure, including not only their role in income determination but also in class and occupational recruitment.

In a way Wright is his own best critic for he himself points to some of the limitations of his work, noting the following: its need for more refined research indicators of class relations; its static quality and its avoidance of the issue of how the structural determinants of class and income can be subject to change as a result of struggles, and, thereby of how class relations change over time; its lack of a comparative dimension; its failure to consider how individuals are distributed into the empty places of the class structure; its forced assumption of the organizational homogeneity of the social relations of production, neglecting in turn the different ways in which production can be organized and the variable structure of the labour process; and the failure to consider the social relations of reproduction and the role of the family in income determination. It could also be argued that Wright is never very clear as to the actual claims to knowledge that his study can sustain. It is never very apparent whether he is providing another theoretical interpretation of the data for which other theories present equally plausible accounts, or whether he is presenting a more accurate and complete description and explanation of social reality (see e.g. pp. 228–9).

Nevertheless, this book can be highly recommended for admirably presenting convincing arguments in respect of its major claims which are to show the analytical usefulness of the recent resurgence of Marxist social science (e.g. p. 236), to underline the influence of class relations grounded in the social relations of production over the process of income determination in capitalist societies (e.g. p. 223), and 'to demonstrate the relevance of class to hard-nosed empiricists'. (p. 123).

Dominic Strinati
University of Leicester

Political Manipulation and Administrative Power: A Comparative Study *Eva Etzioni-Halevy* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 218 pp. £8.95

The question of whether, in western-style democracies, there has been a continuing trend towards greater public participation in political decision-making or whether, on the contrary, political power has remained effectively concentrated at élite level, is a perennial issue in political sociology. Authors such as Almond and Verba, and Eisenstadt, have emphasized the increased participation of the general public in policy-making, via extensions of the franchise and the exercise of choice in elections and referenda; while C. Wright Mills and others have argued that the political dominance of the élites has been maintained by their ability to manipulate the mass electorate through the exercise of economic power, through control of the mass media, and by other means.

Dr Etzioni-Halevy has investigated political manipulation in four western democracies: Britain, the USA, Australia and Israel. Her study focuses on a type of manipulation which is generally perceived as illegitimate in democratic polities – the offer of material rewards to individuals in

return for votes. The evidence assembled by the author indicates that attempts to influence the outcome of British parliamentary elections by systematic bribery became much less frequent during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and that by the 1890s electoral corruption had been more or less eliminated. Similarly, in the Australian colonies, where the secret ballot first came into general use, electoral irregularities were of negligible significance by the time the Australian Commonwealth was created in 1901.

Political corruption on a significant scale has persisted longer in the USA, and political machines in many of the major cities have retained power not only by the use of violence and intimidation, but principally by the provision of cash, loans, jobs on the public payroll, and extra-legal welfare benefits, in return for the electoral support of local machine bosses and their agents. Although the influence of machine politics has declined in recent decades, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that expenditures by candidates or their backers on rewards to individuals still influence the results of local, state, and even federal government elections in various parts of the USA.

The practice of offering material rewards to individuals and families in return for votes is, it is claimed, even more prevalent in Israel, despite some recent evidence of growing public disapprobation. This type of electoral manipulation has been a feature of the Israeli political system since political movements and parties were first established in the days of the mandate. With the emergence of Israel as a sovereign state this practice became even more strongly entrenched as the parties competed with each other for the support of the rapidly increasing numbers of new immigrant voters.

Dr Etzioni-Halevy seeks to extract a general theory of electoral manipulation in democracies from her findings in these four countries, and she examines a number of suggested explanations in terms of poverty, large-scale immigration, educational standards, and the degree of control exercised by economically dominant classes over the political system. None of these explanations is found to fit all four of the countries examined, and she is drawn to conclude that the character of the state administered system is a decisive factor, influencing the overall significance of material inducements to voters. In particular, the degree of politicization of the state bureaucracy, rather than its power *vis-à-vis* political bodies, is regarded as the crucial variable. The character of the administration is related in turn to the culture and traditions of the social strata from which it is drawn.

The author's arguments are generally persuasive, though the influence of certain additional divergencies between the societies and political systems surveyed could perhaps have been more fully explored. Israeli society is exceptional in many respects — not least in terms of scale — and the author's comparison of Israeli politics with politics at the (mainly) local level in the USA is in some ways more enlightening than the comparison with national level politics in Britain. Questions also arise concerning the relevance of the high degree of interpenetration of government and economy in Israel, and of the flow of external financial aid through politically controlled channels.

This is nevertheless a careful survey of the incidence and social context of a certain kind of electoral manipulation, which provides useful evidence in relation to some of the more general issues concerning the power structures of western democratic societies.

Phil Bacon
University of Hull

Deviant Interpretations: Problems in Criminological Theory *David Downes and Paul Rock* (eds) Martin Robertson 1979 176 pp. £7.95 (£2.95 paper)

Before the rise of the New Criminology deviancy theory in Britain was almost synonymous with a phenomenological interactionism. The New Criminology, however, bid such an interpretation of sociology and social action kneel before the absolutism promised by a political economy of repression. The major orientation of *Deviant Interpretations* is to settle a few scores. The result is an at times enjoyable humiliation for the worst excesses of the New Criminology but little more. There is endemic, in the no doubt cathartic experience of attacking the New Criminology, a confusion of the latter with Marxism as a materialist analysis of social formations. Further, the book reads as if the New Criminology was the only source of new adventures in sociology. Ethnomethodological writings in particular are ignored.

The essay by Rock, however, repays a careful reading. Rock must be the Clive James of the deviancy field and like James his style is exhilarating and his tongue sharp. His resurrection of the promise of interactionism, embedded in an appraisal of the radical critique, is not found wanting in analytic incisiveness. Rock is on a crusade with an affection for the underlying pragmatism in interactionism. He is not about to see it fall victim to the imperial forces of absolutism. Pragmatism refers to the post-Kantian forging of a formal analysis of social forms through a concrete apprehension of consciousness which, when provided with Kantian *a priori* synthetics to bridge the gap between thought and action, establishes a philosophical tradition for interactionism from Dewey through Mead. It is all good stuff, a kind of Chinese torture for the new pretenders. Even if the 1960s variant of interactionism is rendered unrecognizable, such a rejoinder to the essentialism being offered shows Rock as one of the ablest writers in the field. Rock's co-authors are less successful. Both Cohen and Downes play the New Criminology at its own game, and lose. Not only do they naively accept that the post-revolutionary society is up for academic grabs but they seek to integrate social democratic values into revolutionary politics. Either there is a revolutionary design or there is not, and if there is then the political values inhere in the practice and not the preaching.

The three final essays are less interesting. Plumer saves interactionism from terminological troubles, while Beylefeld and Wiles commit the worst sin, resurrecting our free will and extrapolating from that to the 'good' society. Given the arguments for placing any explanatory determinacy within our theories rather than within the world, their invocation of rationality to bridge the gap and 'save our souls' seems an unnecessary confusion of epistemology with ontology.

Finally, we have Taylor, who these days is more likely to be reviewed by Clive James. His is the area of motivation reviewing the literature from Mills to Blum and McHugh. Unfortunately he states clearly neither the nexus between language, motive and action nor what he requires of a 'comprehensive sociological theory of motivation'. It would have helped if Taylor had given even the smallest attention to the analysis of ordinary discourse which is giving a handle on the conceptual troubles of constructive motivational analyses, but there is no mention. Perhaps one should not be surprised given that elsewhere in the book the analysis of ordinary talk is held as worthy of no more than a cheap aside. At £2.95 the book is just that. It is to be hoped that Rock's essay does not founder with it.

P. J. Wilkinson
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies Oxford

Controlology: Beyond the New Criminology *Jason Ditton* Macmillan 1979 124 pp. £10.00 (£3.95 paper)

This book is a sequel to Ditton's earlier study of the part-time criminality of bread salesmen as they went about their rounds systematically fiddling

both retail and wholesale customers. Once again we are at Wellbread's, though in contrast to an ethnographic and phenomenological discussion of how salesmen reconcile the potential guilt of criminality with their core identity, we now join the bakery workers as bit players in a piece of societal theorizing about crime as a representation of the activities of controllers.

Since employee theft happens all the time at Wellbread's, the sacking of Keith and Doug for 'dealing' bear all the hallmarks of a *control* wave, and not at all those of a *crime* wave. Following both labelling theory, and the work of Cohen and Hall and his colleagues on 'moral panics', Ditton re-emphasizes the anti-positivist theme of social reaction that crime is a consequence of the activities of the offended and not the offender. If we are talking about the *societal* phenomenon of crime, then 'explanations of the rise and fall in crime rates have to be sought elsewhere than in the motives and intentions of those eventually called criminal' (p. 100). In a neat piece of word juggling Ditton describes these differences in terms of societal *response-ability* and individual *responsibility*, and that the break with criminological positivism can only emerge by rigidly eschewing any temptation to explain societal phenomena as mere aggregations of the activities of individuals.

It is only upon a reformulation of labelling theory that Ditton sees criminology moving beyond the 'relatively orthodox analyses of the state' (p. 6) that has become the new criminology, 'dogmatically deducing the nature of control from a challengeable interpretation of selected parts of Marx's work' (p. 103). Labelling is about social reaction, and social reaction is about control, a sequence which places labelling theory at the centre of a societal (rather than the more familiar situational) theory of crime production. The ultimate 'reaction rate' appears in the form of official statistics, which far from being worthless, serve as the finest measure of how society constructs the entity known as 'crime'. But these official statistics apparently show that crime does indeed have a wave-like existence, suggesting that 'crime panics' subside and then pick up again. In the first substantial chapter of what is really a two-chapter book (though there are six-page pieces of packaging at either end), Ditton includes a number of cybernetic diagrams and comments on Wilkins's deviancy amplification model in order to show how these declines and revivals in reaction rates may be better understood.

This is an important (and ingenious) chapter, and the model should be judged, as Ditton asks it to be, on theoretical and logical merit (p. 37). But he also regards the test of practical applicability as important, and for this he takes us in the second of these longer chapters back to Wellbreads and the sackings of the two despatch workers. He also does this because it is from what happened to Doug and Keith that the theoretical 'propositions and models in chapter two were induced' (p. 37). The thrust of the ethnographic 'data' is that although there were empirical grounds for management doing something about employee theft, the circumstances under which a hitherto tolerated, ignored or unknown aspect of company life was transformed into a 'crime wave' through the social reaction of sacking remains the single most important question about the 'making' of the phenomenon of 'crime'. For Ditton's purposes, Wellbread's, in having its own control waves, is an analogue of society.

As to the departure which its neologistic title claims for it, *Controlology*, rests on the claim that hitherto studies of control 'have emphasized situational aspects to the neglect of societal considerations' (p. 103), though the contributions of (amongst others) Foucault, Scull and Hall and his colleagues suggest there have already been a string of notable exceptions to this. Ditton's major contribution in

this book is his model of expanding and contracting crime waves, something which could have stood without the extended ethnography that has transformed what was presumably originally an article into a book. As a contribution to the study of control, *Controlology* has probably been eclipsed by *Policing the Crisis*, a point implicitly recognised by Ditton in a piece of self-assessment when he writes that *controlology* serves as a 'complementary and critical footnote to their analysis' (pp. 104–5). This, I think, is a fair comment.

David Webb
University of Leicester

The Hidden Professoriate: Credentialism, Professionalism, and the Tenure Crisis *Arthur S. Wilke* (ed.) Green-Wood Press 1979 290 pp. £14.75

There has been a structural transformation in higher education in the USA. On the one hand, runs the argument, there is now the quasi-closed elite comprising full professors in tenured posts; on the other hand, there are those, also engaged in teaching and research, who not only have lower-status positions, but whose career prospects and job security are in doubt. Some of these are on temporary contracts. Some have started out in tenure-track positions but failed to achieve tenure. Some are graduate teaching assistants. Many are members of minority groups and many are women. These are the 'hidden professoriate'; they are in an unorganized, economically weak and precarious position. They are invisible to each other in their individual struggles for survival and are unacknowledged in the sociology of higher education.

The introduction and the initial essay by Wilke and Griessman set the socio-economic background well and raise interesting questions about the rise of the hidden professoriate, its role in different kinds of higher education institutions and its place in different disciplines. The body of the book is taken up with individual case studies, compiled by different authors and suitably camouflaged to avoid identification of individuals and institutions. These case studies make for absorbing reading as does Paul Blumberg's vivid portrayal of events surrounding the temporary closure and subsequent re-opening and slimming down of the City University of New York. Don Martindale's chapter on sociology and its students, however interesting in its own right, appears as something of an oddity amongst this reportage and the division of the volume into an introductory part, a part dealing with tenure and a part dealing with consequences of the tenure crisis does not stand up to inspection.

It is particularly disappointing to see the analytical thread, never as strong as the descriptive material, wavering about in a concern over the adequacy of personnel procedures in universities and colleges and coming to rest upon well-worn notions of multiple and shifting goals and of rules as pawns in power-play. It is a fair point, to be sure, to note the part, under threat, played by established faculty members as well as and sometimes instead of administrators in the demise of members of the hidden professoriate. But there is a real danger of becoming overly absorbed with the interpersonal dynamics of individual cases, which the author does little to rectify.

Two crucial weaknesses stand out. The first has to do with the case study design. The author argues that deviant cases are a good way to explore new and evolving norms; he claims that it is as important to identify and to analyse the hidden professoriate at this moment as it is to explore the conditions of its emergence; he makes a case for the concentration on social sciences rather than other disciplines which the book displays. Strictly speaking, such caveats are quite proper and must do much to disarm critics. Yet it remains true that arbitrarily selected case studies such as these,

while drawing attention to the hidden professoriate and doing so in an arresting and highly readable way, cannot take the analysis much further. We do not know the dimensions of the hidden professoriate, its distribution, the time of its emergence or many of its consequences.

The second weakness arises from the concept of the hidden professoriate itself. It is not just that the vocabulary of professors and the tenure mechanism described is so thoroughly American; for in the current economic crisis in Britain the parallels are immediate and striking. It is rather that this highly specific phraseology particularizes the problem so. Are Wilke and his colleagues not talking of labour market segmentation and perhaps a dual labour market in higher education? What of polarization, deskilling or even proletarianization as concepts applicable to these data? To remain so innocent of debates in the sociology and political economy of labour is remiss.

To me, the real value of this book lies in the light it sheds on the exploitation of labour in the academic world. It is an exploitation which occurs not just in teaching, but in the terms and conditions of research posts. In Britain at any rate there is a segregated and disadvantaged labour market here too. Furthermore, there is exploitation again, in Britain at least, of unpaid academic labour, in particular in the shape of jobless women academics, willingly helping men with chores of indexing, referencing, proof-reading and so on. So I wonder about that final useful bibliographic chapter by Ms Barbara Wilke; there are no notes on contributors to give clues as to whether she is in the hidden professoriate or in the other ranks of exploited academic labour. *The Hidden Professoriate* should be read for it will open a few eyes. The next task, however, is to broaden their vision.

Celia Davies
University of Warwick

Middle Class Couples: A Study of Segregation, Domination and Inequality in Marriage *Stephen Edgell* George Allen & Unwin 1980 144 pp. £6.95
Dual-Career Marriage: Conflict and Treatment *David G. Rice* Collier Macmillan 1980 197 pp. £8.50

Stephen Edgell studied thirty-eight couples obtained by referrals in a northern British city. Thirty-one came through the co-operation of an industrial personnel manager and a further seven came from a local university. Though Edgell requested 'spiralist' (by which he seems to mean middle-class, career-oriented) families, the issue of mobility is not central to his analysis. In essence his argument is that though there is a discernible growth in ideology of gender equality in our society, there is little to indicate that equality has arrived or is even expected. This is in spite of the writings of most family theorists over the past three decades — many of which argue that there is a movement toward greater sharing of interests, interchangeability of task performance in the home and a sense of equality between the sexes — and that the changes are most pronounced amongst middle-class families.

Shadow boxing throughout the book with Parsons and Goode, Pahl and Pahl, Young and Willmott and others, Edgell argues that data from his sample do not support the idea of a movement toward desegregation, levelling of authority and greater equality in marriage. He agrees, however, that family life nowadays penalizes women who are — as Jessie Bernard, Ann Oakley and others have shown — more disadvantaged than men. He implies that the illusion of this change is a figment of liberal sociologists' imagination. The reason he feels that this is not happening and cannot be expected to happen is because these couples are confronted with a highly inequitable social and economic system. Edgell concludes that the acceptance by his couples of domination and subordination in their relationship 'represents an implicit

rejection of certain fashionable yet inaccurate contemporary myths concerning marital equality'.

Edgell's conclusions, based on a rather idiosyncratic reading of the family literature and a dubious interpretation of the meaning of his data are, to say the least, controversial. He extrapolates from a tiny sample drawn from a notoriously traditional-minded group of occupations (scientists and engineers) in a traditional-minded part of the country to all of industrial society. He extrapolates from data collected on this set of couples at one point in time in the 1970s to a change process. He indicates no way of discovering whether there was change or not in attitudes or behaviour of such families over the past thirty years. They may show segregation, male domination and inequality, but how does Edgell know that things were not far worse for such arch-conservatives twenty or thirty years ago? Alternatively, how does he know that he is not tapping residual 'locals' from a pool of families the more progressive-minded of which left the area years ago; or that this group is expressing a backlash against change processes which *because of* their vitality are stimulating these atavistic patterns?

The dust-jacket states that this book could become a classic in its radical critique of existing social theories. Perhaps it will be read widely and argued fervently; any work with this degree of effort and commitment behind it deserves a fair hearing. But I think that it will find its place as a book that was as stimulating as much because it was wrong as for any other reason. This is not an insignificant role in the development of a science, and it is enjoyed and used to the hilt by many polemicists. I believe that Edgell is wrong because he mislocates the problem. Changes in sex-roles are difficult in capitalist countries but equally in countries which have revolutionized the economic order along socialist lines and therefore produced a more equitable (if less option-affording) type of society. He is wrong because he fails to acknowledge the limitations of his sample and the presence in the world of other relevant data.

The second book under review emanates from just such a body of research. Research on dual-career families is now expanded to such an extent that three generations of research are now recognized since the term was coined in the late 1960s. Several volumes, special issues of journals, case study reports, market research analyses and so on have now emerged in this strand of work, which is only cursorily and inaccurately referred to by Edgell. One strand relates to clinical work with couples wishing to adopt a more egalitarian model of family life – in behaviour as well as in ideology. Twenty years ago, a psychiatrist confronted with a couple in which the wife wished to have a career on an equal basis to her husband's was likely to give attention to the possibility that the wife was having trouble with her maternal instincts; or that she suffered from excessive rivalry feelings with males; or that she might be driven by neurotic needs arising out of her early family constellation. The presence today of large numbers of couples who not only give lip-service to the ideal of equality between the sexes but actually work hard on seeking to achieve it in their everyday lives is now reaching very large proportions. Though most working wives are still not in careers or jobs equal to their husbands, about 20 per cent (according to one estimate) are; and many more see their occupational role as legitimate, economic motivation aside. We have reached what Jessie Bernard has termed a 'tipping point', where statistical prevalence gives over to the acceptance of a new norm. The new norm communicates itself not only to many young people looking forward to the development of their work and marriage careers (as several recent studies of dual-career couples have shown) but to the helping professions as well.

David G. Rice is a professor of psychiatry at the University of Wisconsin. No Mecca for unusually egalitarian-minded variants (as say Hampstead might be for refugee couples from northern neighbourhoods inhabited by Edgell's families), it is a broadly representative, generally liberal state. It is therefore not surprising (though not eccentric either) that a new point of view has arisen in that setting about egalitarian-minded couples seeking to work out ways of dealing with barriers to greater equity. On the basis of his study in depth of a number of dual-career couples seeking help from counsellors, Rice has set out a new point of view, not by any means unique to middle America. On the basis of general experience in university life as well as in the clinical setting, he notes that many couples accept the stresses of trying to make the dual-worker form of marriage work, accepting the need for help as a normal and healthy part of coping with contemporary difficulties.

After detailed accounts of the problems in counselling such couples, Rice presents a set of observations based on his clinical research experience which indicate how far the field of professional thinking has progressed. He concludes (p. 142) that dual-career couples who have shown a positive response to therapy have the following characteristics: a freedom from rigidly prescribed gender role behaviours and constraints; flexibility and willingness to try new behaviours, including those that involve some risk (in the sense that their implementation is likely to change the relationship); willingness to share power or influence in the relationship and an appreciation of the destructive as well as the positive effects of competition; they value affective communication and openness to their own and their partner's feelings; appreciation of each partner's right to self-fulfilment and a willingness to make some sacrifices in this regard.

Rice is no liberal, Parsonian functionalist, and his data are based not on armchair theorizing but on couples as real as Edgell's. He notes that the processes involved in seeking greater equality in marriage are applicable to married couples generally, not just dual-career couples; but that the dual-career variant with its specific constellation of stresses is both increasing in prevalence and usefully highlights some contemporary problems rather than being special deviant cases. (Only three of Edgell's thirty-eight couples could be described as dual-career couples and of these, two wives were teachers.)

In a plural society there is obviously room for the kinds of couples described by Edgell as well as those described by Rice. A pluralist orientation requires sensitivity in research as well as in life. Any particular small sample fits into the whole fabric of a society increasingly characterized by diversity.

Rhona Rapoport
Institute of Family and Environmental Research

On Clichés: The Supersedure of Meaning by Function in Modernity *Anton C. Zijderveld* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 129 pp. £5.95

This book continues the author's programme of 'cultural analysis' announced in *The Abstract Society* (Allen Lane 1972). The cliché is a form of expression which has lost its original meaning and force but retains a social function as a token in the devalued conversational currency of modern abstract society. Social bonds become thin and ephemeral, meanings proliferate but simultaneously become less binding. Clichés express this state of society: 'Can literature still produce a novel . . . social science a general theory without producing clichés?' (p. 2). But clichés also function as reference-points in abstract society, creating an illusion of stable, shared meanings and a temporary check on what Zijderveld, following Schelsky,

calls the permanent reflectiveness of modern man.

This is an attractive little book, guaranteed to freak out one's empiricist friends. I felt, however, that more explicit attention should have been given to the substantial literature on metaphor. Zijderveld argues that, though clichés are unavoidable, 'we should consciously try to limit their use' (p. 112). He recognizes that his own book is bound to 'fall prey to them' — I would say it is chock-full, brimming over, bursting at the seams . . . .

William Outhwaite
University of Sussex

Western Sociologists on Indian Society: Marx, Spencer, Weber, Durkheim, Pareto *G. R. Madan* Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979 399 pp. £9.95

In the present condition of academic publishing it is astonishing that a publishing house which has rendered so much service to sociology should find the resources to produce a compilation of this nature. It amounts to no more than a selective summary of what these five scholars had to say about Indian society — in the case of Durkheim very little indeed. The summaries are then assessed against the 'facts' and rated accordingly. The criteria of this assessment are nowhere exposed and the authorities cited at length are drawn indiscriminately from all generations with the notable exception of those American, British and French scholars who have made detailed studies of Indian society over the last twenty-five years: there is for example no reference to Louis Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus* nor, as far as I can see, even to Durkheim's younger contemporary Bougle who wrote a classic study of the caste system.

The book lacks any historical sensitivity: the five classical authors are represented on a single plane and there is no consideration of their motives or of the context in which they were writing; equally the 'modern India' to which their views are related is a timeless uniformity.

These weaknesses throw into relief Dr Madan's pontifical manner: Marx is 'more correct than Spencer' in one particular, 'Spencer is more correct than Marx' in another, 'Pareto's observation that the soma drink gave a mysterious vigour . . . in Vedic religion is quite correct', Durkheim's 'knowledge about Buddhism was better even than that of Max Weber'. He is no less magisterial in his judgments of the good and evil in his own society.

There does not appear to have been any proof-reading as the reference to 'Karl Mark' in the first line of the first page suggests, and the transliteration of some Indian words is bizarre: 'samperadaya' for *sampradaya*, 'pushui' for *pusti*, 'Narayand' for Narayan, and there is at least one paragraph (the first full one on p. 213) which is quite unintelligible.

All in all this is a piece of bookmaking which reflects no credit on any of the parties concerned in its appearance.

D. F. Pocock
University of Sussex

Bibliographies of use to the sociologist continue to flow off the presses, and their subject matter tends to be a good guide to growth points in the discipline. It will, therefore, come as no great surprise that of five recent works in this genre, three deal with the problems of women. *Women, 1870–1928: A Select Guide to Printed and Archival Sources in the UK*, by Margaret Barrow (Mansell, 1981, £25.00) is an admirably successful attempt to update and extend the range of the first major survey of the position of women in England by McGregor, printed in this *Journal* in 1955. Barrow's book has four sections – Archives (including letters and diaries); printed books and pamphlets; what she terms 'non-book material' (films, newspaper cuttings, artefacts, etc.); and an extremely useful description of some little known library collections (for example, the treasures of the Fawcett Library housed in the City of London Polytechnic and the Blackburn Collection in Girton College, Cambridge). The addresses and telephone numbers of about one hundred locations, along with details of availability (or in many cases restrictions of access) are listed. In short, this is an exemplary research aid and although it is expensive, it could well pay for itself in the avoidance of wasted trips to track down material.

Mary Anne Warren, an American philosopher, has ambitiously tried to cover everything that has been written about women in one (albeit 700 page) book. *The Nature of Woman: An Encyclopedia and Guide to the Literature* (Edgepress, California, 1980, n.p.) is clearly designed for American students writing term papers, but it is nevertheless scholarly, critical, and extremely informative. Through a series of interlinked book reviews and topical surveys, it traces the roots of practically all issues of relevance to women from Biblical and Classical Greek sources to contemporary controversies. Its major weakness (among many strengths) is its very thin coverage of the Third World and the implicit assumption that the 'nature' of American women coincides with the 'nature' of women as such. Page 229 reads, curiously: 'INTELLECT: See Emotion'! These shortcomings apart, it is an excellent sourcebook and of very great utility for teachers and students of women's studies alike.

In common with the practice in the physical and biological sciences bibliographies in well-subscribed fields in the social sciences are being produced in the form of computer print-outs. *The Inventory of Marriage and Family Literature, 1979* edited by David Olson (Sage, 1980, £18.75) is the sixth to appear, and it lists almost 4,000 items from 650 journals, though only 15 of these journals contributed as many as 30 items. Items are classified by the KWIT (Key Word in Title) system, and the most numerous category for 1979 was 'sex' (almost 10 per cent of entries), with 'women' and 'therapy' following closely. Interestingly, whereas there were 400 women-oriented listings, there were only 72 male-oriented. Three comprehensive indexes (including authors' addresses for reprints) make this an essential work for researchers in the area.

The effects of television, and the Labour Movement are two further growth areas in sociological research, and recent bibliographies, in rather different ways, serve to confirm this. J. P. Murray, in *Television and Youth – 25 Years of Research and Controversy* (Boys Town Center for the Study of Youth Development, Nebraksa, 1980, $10.00) documents the rapid growth of interest in the

field – 60 per cent of his 2,886 items were published between 1975 and 1980. This work can also claim cross-national coverage as about 15 per cent of the references are from non-English language sources. Throughout, Murray succinctly summarizes the main issues and the relevance of research findings, in this notoriously difficult field, for policy and social action. Extensive cross-referencing makes this bibliography easy to use. Once again, we have here an essential research tool and a useful contribution in itself to its field.

Harold Smith's *The British Labour Movement to 1970* (Mansell, 1981, £30.00) is a straightfoward list of printed sources. Of the 3,838 numbered items, about two-thirds are on the lives of individuals and trade unions. Smith has sensibly excluded both industrial relations (well served by Bain and Woolven as I noted in a previous *Book Note*) and the publications on HMSO *Daily Lists*, but he does cover over 100 journals. This is a reference work rather than a research tool as the categories are quite blunt and, although there is a full index, there is no cross-referencing. We are promised a decennial supplement in 1982 which one hopes will improve the section on The Left, the weakest in the book. The whole, however, is a substantial achievement, worthy to sit beside the *Dictionary of Labour Biography* on the library shelf.

L.S.

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